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My	  fascination	  with	  the	  Balkans	  dates	  back	  to	  the	  early	  1990s	  when	  the	  conflict	  first	  broke	  
out	  and	  many	  families	  from	  the	  region	  fled	  to	  the	  area	  where	  I	  lived	  in	  Southern	  Germany.	  I	  
was	  only	  a	  teenager	  then	  and	  I	  was	  fortunate	  to	  become	  friends	  with	  several	  of	  the	  refugee	  
kids	  from	  these	  families.	  At	  the	  time,	  the	  violence	  that	  spread	  across	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  
seemed	  incomprehensible	  to	  me,	  and	  I	  decided	  to	  help	  collect	  and	  send	  aid	  packages	  with	  
the	   local	   German	   Red	   Cross	   to	   the	   war-­‐torn	   region.	   While	   in	   high	   school	   and	   as	   an	  
undergraduate	  student,	  I	  tried	  to	  study	  and	  understand	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  conflict,	  the	  gross	  
human	  rights	  violations	  and	  the	  aftermath.	  A	  decade	  later,	  I	  eventually	  travelled	  to	  Sarajevo	  
in	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina	   to	   visit	   a	   friend,	   Jasmina	   Viteškić.	   I	   had	  met	   her	   a	   few	   years	  
earlier	  in	  San	  Francisco,	  before	  she	  moved	  back	  to	  her	  hometown	  to	  work	  as	  a	  trial	  monitor	  
for	  the	  Organization	  for	  Security	  and	  Cooperation	  in	  Europe	  (OSCE).	  My	  visit	  turned	  out	  to	  
be	   physically	   and	   emotionally	   overwhelming.	   I	   witnessed	   not	   only	   the	   beauty	   of	   a	   city	  
surrounded	  by	   the	  Dinaric	  Alps	   in	   the	  Sarajevo	  valley	  with	   lavish	   forests	   and	   the	  Miljacka	  
River,	  but	  also	  the	  deep	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  scars	  of	  a	  war	  that	  ravaged	  the	  city	  
and	  region	  for	  many	  years.	  These	  experiences	  in	  the	  Balkans	  and	  the	  recent	  conflict	  fueled	  
my	  interest	  in	  further	  studying	  accountability	  efforts	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  pursuing	  
this	  topic	  as	  part	  of	  my	  Ph.D.	  program.	  
My	   dissertation	   took	   shape	   molded	   by	   these	   experiences	   and	   motivated	   by	   a	   desire	   to	  
better	  understand	  how	  people	  in	  the	  Balkans	  understood	  the	  cataclysmic	  events	  of	  the	  past	  
two	  decades	  and	  used	  a	  variety	  of	  transitional	  justice	  mechanisms	  to	  address	  the	  legacies	  of	  
the	  conflict.	  As	  a	  Ph.D.	   student	   in	  Political	  Science	  at	  Mason,	   I	  had	  many	  opportunities	   to	  
conduct	  research	  on	  post-­‐conflict	  and	  transitional	  justice	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  The	  Human	  Rights	  
and	  Global	  Justice	  Working	  Group	  at	  the	  Center	  for	  Global	  Studies	  in	  particular	  was	  a	  great	  
space	   and	   platform	   to	   interact	   with	   like-­‐minded	   scholars	   to	   discuss	   how	   transitional	  
societies	  across	   the	  world	  coped	  with	   the	   legacies	  of	  violence.	  Under	   the	  direction	  of	   the	  
working	   group	   leader,	   Dr.	   Jo-­‐Marie	   Burt,	   I	   also	   helped	   organize	   over	   half	   a	   dozen	   events	  
related	   to	  accountability	   and	   transitional	   justice,	   including	   conferences	  on	   “Human	  Rights	  
Tribunals	   in	   Latin	   America:	   the	   Trial	   of	   Fujimori	   in	   Comparative	   Perspective”	   (2008),	  
“Accountability	  After	  Mass	  Atrocity:	   Latin	  American	   and	  African	   Examples	   in	   Comparative	  
Perspective”	   (2009)	   and	   “Arts	   after	   Atrocity:	   Global	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Local	  
Representations	  of	  Violence	  and	  Resistance”	  (2012),	  among	  others.	  This	  scholarly	  exposure,	  
together	  with	  my	  long-­‐held	  interest	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  helped	  shape	  my	  ideas	  and	  develop	  my	  
research.
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   context,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   thank	  my	   dissertation	   advisor	   Dr.	   Jo-­‐Marie	   Burt	   from	   the	  
Department	  of	  Public	  and	   International	  Affairs	   (PIA)	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  for	  her	  continuous	  support,	  
availability	  and	  flexibility	  while	  researching	  and	  writing	  my	  dissertation.	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  the	  
other	  members	   of	  my	   committee	   as	  well,	   Dr.	   Johanna	  Bockman	   from	   the	  Department	   of	  
Sociology	  and	  Anthropology	  at	  Mason	  and	  Dr.	  Peter	  Mandaville	  from	  PIA,	  whose	  timely	  and	  
constructive	   feedback	   helped	   clarify	   my	   ideas	   and	   shape	   my	   argument	   over	   the	   years.	  
Moreover,	  I	  greatly	  appreciate	  Dr.	  L.	  Earle	  Reybold’s	  advice,	  from	  the	  College	  of	  Education	  
and	   Human	   Development	   at	   Mason,	   inspiring	   me	   to	   use	   a	   combination	   of	   different	  
qualitative	  methods	  to	  find	  adequate	  answers	  to	  my	  research	  puzzles.	  
I	  am	  also	  grateful	  to	  the	  institutional	  and	  financial	  support	  from	  Department	  of	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International	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  at	  Mason—with	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  Program	  
Directors	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  in	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  Science.	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  travel	  grant	  awards	  by	  PIA	  and	  the	  Mason	  
Graduate	  Student	  Travel	   Fund	  offered	  me	   the	  opportunity	   to	  present	  my	  work	  at	   various	  
conferences	   including	   the	   International	   Studies	   Association	   (ISA)	   annual	   convention,	   the	  
Association	  for	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  European,	  and	  Eurasian	  Studies	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  convention	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   European	   Consortium	   for	   Political	   Research	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   general	   conference.	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   multiyear	  
research	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  at	  CGS	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  Mason	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  well	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  dissertation	  completion	  grant	  awarded	  by	  
the	  Office	  of	  the	  Provost	  provided	  additional	  support	  to	  complete	  my	  research	   in	  a	  timely	  
manner.	  
Outside	   the	  Mason	  community	   I	   am	  appreciative	  of	  a	  Foreign	  Language	  and	  Area	  Studies	  
grant,	  allowing	  me	  to	  enroll	   in	  an	   intensive	  Bosnian-­‐Croatian-­‐Serbian	  language	  class	   in	  the	  
summer	   2009	   at	   Indiana	   University	   in	   Bloomington;	   as	   well	   as	   an	   American	   Council	   of	  
Learned	  Societies	  grant	  to	  conduct	  preliminary	  fieldwork	   in	  the	  Balkans	   in	  the	  fall	  2009.	   In	  
this	   context	   I	   would	   also	   like	   to	   thank	   Dr.	   Lidija	   Cvikić,	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   professor	   from	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  colleagues	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This	   dissertation	   examines	   the	   politics	   of	   post-­‐conflict	   justice	   in	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia.	   It	  
discusses	  the	  protagonistic	  role	  of	  human	  rights	  activists	  in	  challenging	  existing	  transitional	  
justice	  models	  that	  emphasize	  international	  and	  domestic	  war	  crimes	  trials	  over	  restorative	  
justice	   mechanisms—including	   truth	   commissions,	   reparations	   and	   memorials,	   among	  
others.	  Using	  a	  political	  sociology	  perspective,	  this	  study	  goes	  beyond	  statist,	  normative	  and	  
legalist	   scholarship	   on	   accountability	   after	   mass	   atrocity	   and	   builds	   on	   an	   emerging	  
literature	   in	   the	   social	   sciences	   that	   focuses	  on	   the	   impact	  of	   global	  human	   rights	  on	   the	  
national	   and	   local	   level.	   It	   analyzes	   human	   rights	   advocates’	   recent	   efforts	   to	   initiate	   a	  
transnational	   fact-­‐finding	   body—called	   the	   Coalition	   for	   RECOM	   Initiative—in	   the	   post-­‐
conflict	   Balkans	   against	   the	   backdrop	   of	   the	   successes	   and	   challenges	   of	   the	   UN-­‐created	  
International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  (ICTY)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  difficulties	  of	  
national	   judiciaries	   to	   prosecute	  war	   crimes	   and	   gross	   human	   rights	   violations	   across	   the	  
	  region.	   This	   victim-­‐centric	   fact-­‐finding	   movement	  —whose	   primary	   goal	   is	   to	   establish	   a	  
transnational	   commission	   in	   charge	   of	   collecting	   testimonies	   about	   human	   rights	   abuses	  
and	   war	   crimes—	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   introduce	   a	   holistic	   and	   complementary	   transitional	  
justice	   strategy	   that	   goes	   beyond	   the	   unidimensional	   retributive	   justice	   approach	   in	   the	  
Balkans.	   Concentrating	   on	   individuals	   and	   society,	   instead	   of	   high	   politics	   (such	   as	   the	  
European	   Union	   enlargement	   process	   with	   its	   broad	   political	   and	   economic	   agenda)	   this	  
bottom-­‐up	  initiative	  is	  an	  important	  step	  to	  democratize	  transitional	  justice	  processes	  in	  the	  
post-­‐conflict	   Balkans.	   The	   study	   explores	   the	   efforts	   promoted	   by	   nongovernmental	  
organizations	  (NGOs)	  in	  several	  Balkan	  states—particularly	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  Croatia	  
and	   Serbia—to	   coordinate	   a	   transnational	   campaign	   to	   cope	  with	   past	  mass	   atrocities.	   It	  
discloses	   the	   struggle	   that	   this	   movement	   faces	   from	   within—confronted	   by	   diverging	  
interests	  of	  its	  members—and	  from	  outside,	  as	  it	  seeks	  political	  and	  financial	  support	  from	  
international	  and	  region-­‐specific	  organizations	  as	  well	  as	  national	  governments.	  Drawing	  on	  
participant	   observation	   and	   in-­‐depth	   interviews	   (along	   with	   archival	   material,	   including	  
reports,	  policy	  briefs,	  strategy	  papers,	  press	  releases	  and	  news	  articles,	  among	  others)	  this	  
research	  examines	  how	  these	  NGOs	  organize	  their	  relations	  with	  international	  actors	  (such	  
as	  the	  ICTY),	  national	   judiciaries	  and	  their	  constituencies	  to	  discuss,	   interpret,	  and	  identify	  
meanings	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  democracy	  within	  and	  across	  state-­‐boundaries	  of	  countries	  
in	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia.	   It	   traces	   how,	   the	   extent	   to	  which,	   and	  with	  what	   effect	   these	  
meanings	   travel	   and	   transform	   through	   the	   movement’s	   transnational	   networks	   and	  
practices,	   and	   attempts	   to	   see	  whether	   and	   how	   they	   influence	   the	  NGOs’	   campaign	   for	  










Throughout	   the	   1990s	   the	   breakup	   of	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia	   led	   to	   horrendous	   conflict	  
among	  the	  newly	  proclaimed	   independent	  states.	  Since,	  dealing	  with	  past	  war	  crimes	  and	  
accounting	   for	   mass	   atrocities	   has	   constituted	   a	   very	   intricate	   and	   contentious	   process,	  
mainly	  led	  by	  state-­‐centric	   international	  retributive	  justice	  initiatives.	  The	  1993	  creation	  of	  
the	   International	   Criminal	   Tribunal	   for	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia	   (ICTY)	   in	   The	   Hague	  
constituted	   a	   watershed	   moment	   in	   international	   humanitarian	   law,	   leading	   to	   a	   global	  
spillover	   effect.1	  Within	   the	   last	   few	   years,	   an	   increasing	   number	   of	   national	   war	   crimes	  
prosecution	   mechanisms	   have	   also	   been	   established,	   taking	   on	   transfer	   cases	   while	   The	  
Hague	  Tribunal	  is	  winding	  down	  its	  activities.	  	  	  
Recent	   research	   on	   the	   Balkans,	   however,	   has	   pointed	   to	   the	   problems	   of	   politicized	  
retributive	   justice	   on	   the	   international	   as	   well	   as	   national	   level.	   	   Transitional	   justice	  
processes	   in	   the	   Balkans	   relied	   primarily	   on	   international	   retributive	   justice	   mechanisms	  
even	   while	   the	   conflict	   was	   still	   ongoing.	   This	   is	   quite	   different	   from	   other	   transitional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  for	  instance	  Ruti	  G.	  Teitel,	  “Global	  Transitional	  Justice,”	  Center	  for	  Global	  Studies	  Working	  Paper	  Series	  on	  
Human	  Rights,	  Global	  Justice	  &	  Democracy,	  no.	  8	  (Spring	  2010).	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countries	  that	  sought	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  grave	  human	  rights	  violations	  in	  Latin	  America	  
and	  Africa	  in	  the	  1990s:	  in	  most	  cases,	  trials	  were	  deemed	  to	  risky	  to	  the	  newly	  established	  
democracy	  or	  were	   simply	  off	   the	   table	  as	  a	  policy	  option	  due	   to	  negotiated	  pacts.	   Truth	  
commissions,	  and	  sometimes	  amnesties,	  thus	  loomed	  large	  in	  the	  1990s	  transitional	  justice	  
lexicon.	  The	   ICTY	  put	  the	   issue	  of	  accountability	  after	  atrocity	  at	   the	  center	  of	   transitional	  
justice	   debates.	   	  While	   the	   ICTY	   has	  made	  many	   important	   contributions	   to	   international	  
law	  and	  without	  a	  doubt	  has	  reshaped	  transitional	  justice	  debates	  and	  practice,	  the	  Tribunal	  
was	  only	  partly	  successful	  in	  its	  mission	  to	  help	  society	  in	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  Balkans	  cope	  with	  
past	  mass	   atrocity.	  As	   I	  will	   illustrate	   later,	   in	  many	  ways,	   the	   justice	  processes	   that	   took	  
place	  faraway	  from	  the	  site	  of	  the	  conflict	  in	  The	  Hague	  did	  not	  fulfill	  the	  needs	  of	  victims	  of	  
the	  Balkan	  wars.	  As	  a	   result,	   two	  decades	  after	   the	  establishment	  of	   the	   ICTY,	  a	   series	  of	  
initiatives	   have	   emerged	   across	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia	   to	   pursue	   fact-­‐finding	  missions	   to	  
establish	   a	   definitive	   version	   of	   the	   conflict	   that	   ravaged	   the	   Balkans	   and	   left	   140	   000	  
victims	   in	   its	   wake.	   My	   research	   examines	   the	   most	   recent	   transnational	   fact-­‐finding	  
initiative	   in	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia—the	   Regional	   Commission	   for	   Establishing	   the	   Facts	  
about	  War	  Crimes	  and	  other	  Gross	  Violations	  of	  Human	  Rights	  Committed	  on	  the	  Territory	  
of	   the	   Former	   Yugoslavia	   (RECOM)—and	   explains	   why	   thus	   far	   the	   social	   movement	  
proposing	  this	  initiative	  has	  been	  unsuccessful	  in	  creating	  a	  regional	  truth	  commission.	  
As	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  in	  the	  next	  two	  chapters,	  my	  research	  looks	  beyond	  the	  state-­‐centric	  
driven	   analyses	   of	   retributive	   justice,	   focusing	   on	   state-­‐society	   relations	   in	   a	   post-­‐conflict	  
justice	   context	   instead.	   Large	  parts	  of	   the	   literature	   in	   transitional	   justice	  have	  addressed	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normative	  and	  policy	  oriented	  questions.2	  As	  a	   result,	  many	   ‘pracademics’3	  have	  provided	  
insights	   ranging	   from	   legal	   advice	   to	   trust	   and	   institution-­‐building.	   Notwithstanding,	   the	  
field	  has	  yet	  to	  gain	  a	  broader	  knowledge	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  justice.	  In	  other	  words,	  my	  study	  
aims	   at	   analyzing	   the	   complex	   political	   dynamics	   that	   necessarily	   play	   a	   role	   in	   the	   way	  
transitional	   justice	   policies	   and	   mechanisms	   are	   put	   into	   place	   and	   implemented.	   The	  
political	  objectives	  and	  stakes	  in	  these	  varying	  contexts	  provide	  an	  excellent	  opportunity	  for	  
political	  scientists,	  and	  in	  particular	  for	  scholars	  of	  international	  relations	  (IR),	  to	  contribute	  
new	  insights	  to	  the	  field	  of	  transitional	  justice.	  Yet,	  the	  defining	  factors	  of	  the	  international,	  
the	  national	  and	  the	  local	  —as	  areas	  in	  which	  politics	  are	  carried	  out—have	  changed	  due	  to	  
an	   increasingly	   globalized	   and	   interconnected	   world	   and	   therefore	   require	   a	   new	  
methodological	  approach	  which	  I	  discuss	  in	  my	  literature	  review	  below	  as	  well	  as	  in	  chapter	  
2.	  The	  traditional	  boundaries	  of	  nation-­‐states	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  state	  actors	  have	  shifted	  
to	  a	  transnational	  space	  in	  which	  non-­‐state	  actors	  form	  advocacy	  networks	  and	  as	  a	  result	  
shape	  politics	  in	  various	  areas	  on	  different	  levels.	  Margret	  Keck	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink	  analyze	  
these	   changes	   in	   their	   seminal	   work,	   Activists	   Beyond	   Borders:	   Advocacy	   Networks	   in	  
International	  Politics,	  arguing	  that	  
[w]orld	  politics	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  involves,	  alongside	  with	  states,	  
many	   non-­‐state	   actors	   that	   interact	   with	   each	   other,	   with	   states,	   and	   with	  
international	  organizations.	  These	   interactions	  are	  structured	   in	  terms	  of	  networks	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See	  for	  instance	  Siphiwe	  Dube,	  “Transitional	  Justice	  Beyond	  the	  Normative:	  Towards	  a	  Literary	  Theory	  of	  Political	  
Transitions,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Transitional	  Justice	  5,	  no.	  2	  (2011):	  177–197.	  
3	  A	  pracademic	  is	  someone	  who	  is	  both	  an	  academic	  and	  an	  active	  practitioner	  in	  their	  subject	  area.	  While	  the	  term	  
has	  been	  in	  use	  for	  over	  30	  years,	  Paul	  Posner	  coined	  it	  in	  2001.	  Since	  many	  scholars	  have	  used	  the	  term	  and	  
discussed	  various	  related	  issues.	  For	  more	  detail	  see	  Paul	  Posner,	  “The	  Pracademic:	  An	  Agenda	  for	  Re-­‐Engaging	  
Practitioners	  and	  Academics,”	  Public	  Budgeting	  &	  Finance	  29,	  no.	  1	  (2009):	  12–26.	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and	   transnational	   networks	   are	   increasingly	   visible	   in	   international	   politics.	   Some	  
involve	   economic	   actors	   and	   firms.	   Some	   are	   networks	   of	   scientists	   and	   experts	  
whose	  professional	  ties	  and	  shared	  causal	   ideas	  underpin	  their	  efforts	  to	   influence	  
policy.4	  
This	  phenomenon	  of	  transnational	  politics	  drew	  further	  academic	  attention,	  with	  a	  couple	  
of	  scholars	  conceptualizing	  the	  trend,	  such	  as	  Michael	  Smith	  and	  Luis	  Guarnizo:	  	  
Transnational	   practices	   do	   not	   take	   place	   in	   an	   imaginary	   “third	   space”	   […]	  
abstractly	   located	   “in-­‐between”	   national	   territories.	   […]	   	   Transnational	   practices,	  
while	   connecting	   collectivities	   located	   in	   more	   than	   one	   national	   territory,	   are	  
embodied	  in	  specific	  social	  relations	  established	  between	  specific	  people,	  situated	  in	  
unequivocal	  localities,	  at	  historically	  determined	  times.5	  
Efforts	  to	  reckon	  with	  the	  past	  in	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  Balkans	  are	  a	  good	  example	  of	  this	  trend,	  
as	   different	   states,	   actors	   share	   (and	   compete	   in)	   overlapping	   geographical,	   sociopolitical	  
and	  ideological	  spaces.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  I	  opt	  for	  a	  process-­‐oriented	  framework—instead	  
of	  other	  models,	  such	  as	  institutionalist,	  normative	  and	  statist	  analyses,	  among	  others—to	  
examine	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  quest	  for	  accountability	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  	  
I	  draw	  on	  the	  case	  of	  a	  transnational	  coalition	  of	  different	  civil	  society	  organizations	  in	  the	  
former	   Yugoslavia,	   called	   the	   Coalition	   for	   RECOM	   Initiative,	   whose	   goal	   is	   to	   create	   a	  
regional	  truth	  commission	  to	  establish	  facts	  about	  victims	  of	  war	  crimes	  and	  other	  serious	  
human	  rights	  violations	  committed	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	   in	  the	  period	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Margaret	  E.	  Keck	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  Activists	  Beyond	  Borders:	  Advocacy	  Networks	  in	  International	  Politics	  (Cornell	  
University	  Press,	  1998),	  1.	  
5	  Michael	  Smith	  and	  Luis	  Guarnizo,	  eds.,	  Transnationalism	  from	  Below,	  vol.	  6,	  Comparative	  Urban	  &	  Community	  
Research	  (New	  Brunswick,	  NJ:	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  1998),	  11.	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from	   1991-­‐2001.	   The	   origins	   of	   this	   campaign	   to	   institutionalize	   a	   regional	   fact-­‐finding	  
mechanism	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  an	  increasing	  non-­‐governmental	  organization	  (NGO)	  activism	  in	  
the	  region	  to	  support	  war	  victims	  (see	  chapter	  4	  and	  5).6	   	   In	  a	  nutshell,	   I	  analyze	  different	  
factors	  to	  explain	  why	  until	  today	  this	  NGO	  campaign	  has	  remained	  unsuccessful	   in	  recent	  
years	  despite	  repeated	  attempts	  to	  complement	  the	  ongoing	  work	  of	  the	  ICTY.	  In	  fact,	  it	  has	  
been	  over	  17	  years	  since	  the	  ICTY	  issued	  its	  first	  indictment.7	  As	  I	  will	  show	  in	  chapter	  3	  and	  
4	  of	  my	  dissertation,	  although	  many	  have	  praised	  the	  work	  of	  the	  ICTY	  as	  a	  breakthrough	  in	  
international	   humanitarian	   law,	   its	   work	   was	   not	   victim-­‐centered.	   In	   other	   words,	  
particularly	   the	   early	   cases	   in	   The	   Hague	   focused	   on	   successfully	   implementing	   legal	  
procedures,	   instead	   of	   responding	   to	   individualized	   needs,	   including	   the	   recognition	   of	  
witnesses	   as	   victims	   and	   reparations,	   among	   others.	   Many	   victim-­‐witnesses	   and	   victims	  
across	  the	  region	  thus	  felt	   that	  their	  dignity	  had	  not	  been	  restored	  and	  wanted	  a	  broader	  
inquiry	   into	   the	   war	   crimes	   and	   political	   violence	   across	   the	   region	   (see	   chapter	   4	   for	   a	  
detailed	  discussion	  on	  the	  issue).	  The	  RECOM	  Initiative	  therefore	  presents	  an	  effort	  to	  cope	  
with	  the	  lack	  of	  victim-­‐oriented	  transitional	  justice	  projects	  and	  focus	  on	  the	  local	  needs	  of	  
victims	   and	   their	   families	   to	   cope	  with	   past	  mass	   atrocities.	   In	   other	  words,	   this	   regional	  
fact-­‐finding	  movement	   is	  an	  attempt	   to	  democratize	   international	  humanitarian	   law—and	  
globalized	  human	   rights	   concepts	  more	  generally—in	   local	   post-­‐conflict	   settings.	  With	  my	  
research	   I	   explore	   the	   intricate	   efforts	   among	  NGOs	   in	   several	   states	   across	   the	   region—
particularly	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  (BiH),	  Croatia	  and	  Serbia—to	  coordinate	  a	  transnational	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  See	  for	  instance	  the	  work	  of	  Documenta	  Center	  for	  Dealing	  with	  the	  Past	  (Croatia),	  the	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center	  	  
(Serbia)	  and	  the	  Research	  and	  Documentation	  Center	  (Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina),	  among	  others.	  
7	  It	  was	  issued	  against	  Dragan	  Nikolić,	  a	  commander	  of	  a	  camp	  in	  eastern	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  for	  crimes	  
committed	  against	  non-­‐Serbs	  in	  1992.	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campaign	   to	   cope	  with	  past	  mass	   atrocities	  by	   attempting	   to	  mobilize	   the	   support	  of	   the	  
United	   Nations	   (UN)’s	   ICTY,	   other	   region-­‐specific	   international	   organizations	   and	   national	  
governments.	  In	  fact,	  the	  RECOM	  Initiative	  began	  as	  a	  grass-­‐roots	  project	  in	  2008	  and	  since	  
its	   founders	  have	  struggled	  to	  gain	  the	  official	  endorsement	  of	   international	  organizations	  
and	   governments	   (in	   form	   of	   domestic	   laws	   that	   provide	   the	   legal	   foundation	   for	   the	  
commission	   and	   financial	   resources,	   among	   others)	   to	   institutionalize	   their	   regional	   fact-­‐
seeking	   body.	   Through	   participant	   observation	   and	   in-­‐depth	   interviews,	   I	   examine	   how	  
these	  NGOs	   organize	   their	   relations	  with	   international	   actors	   (such	   as	   the	   ICTY),	   national	  
judiciaries	  and	  their	  constituency	  (war	  victims)	  to	  discuss,	   interpret,	  and	  identify	  meanings	  
of	   human	   rights	   and	   democracy	   within	   and	   across	   state-­‐boundaries	   of	   countries	   in	   the	  
former	   Yugoslavia.	   My	   study	   reveals	   the	   movement’s	   struggle	   from	   within—caused	   by	  
conflicting	   interests	   of	   its	  members—and	   from	   outside,	   as	   it	   seeks	   political	   and	   financial	  
support	   from	   international	   and	   region-­‐specific	   organizations	   as	   well	   as	   national	  
governments.	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  also	  trace	  how,	  the	  extent	  to	  which,	  and	  with	  what	  effect	  these	  
meanings	   “travel”	   (and	   transform)	   through	   the	   movement’s	   transnational	   networks	   of	  
meaning	   and	   practice,	   and	   explain	  why	   the	   NGO	   campaign	   for	   political-­‐legal	   institutional	  
change	  within	  the	  region	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  have	  been	  unsuccessful	  thus	  far.	  
In	   this	   introductory	   chapter,	   I	   will	   first	   present	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   political	   violence	   that	  
escalated	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  that	  lead	  to	  bloodshed	  across	  the	  region	  from	  1991	  
to	  2001.8	  This	   is	  necessary	  to	  provide	  background	   information	  to	  understand	  the	  different	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  This	  time	  period	  refers	  to	  the	  interstate	  wars,	  including	  the	  wars	  in	  Croatia,	  BiH	  and	  Kosovo,	  among	  others.	  
However,	  political	  violence	  still	  remains	  a	  problem	  particularly	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  Northern	  Kosovo	  were	  recent	  border	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questions	  related	  to	  the	  quest	  of	  dealing	  with	  past	  mass	  atrocities	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  which	  are	  
central	  to	  this	  study.	  Second,	  I	  review	  some	  of	  the	  foundational	  themes	  and	  concepts	  raised	  
in	   the	   transitional	   justice	   literature,	   ranging	   from	   democratic	   transition	   theories	   to	   legal	  
concepts,	   in	  order	   to	   illustrate	  why	  political	   science	  research	  continues	   to	  contribute	  new	  
insights	  to	  the	  field.	  In	  this	  context,	  I	  also	  discuss	  a	  selection	  of	  more	  recent	  work	  within	  the	  
transitional	  justice	  literature	  that	  has	  inspired	  this	  study.	  Last,	  I	  outline	  each	  of	  the	  chapters,	  
summarizing	  key	  questions	  my	  study	  will	  address.	  
	  
The	  Breakup	  of	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia:	  A	  Devastating	  Chain	  
Reaction	  
After	  World	  War	  II,	  Marshal	  Josip	  Broz	  Tito	  implemented	  a	  policy	  called	  “brotherhood	  and	  
unity”	   to	   forge	   a	   homogenous	   nation	   within	   the	   Socialist	   Federal	   Republic	   of	   Yugoslavia	  
(SFRY).9	  Yet,	   the	  country’s	  political	   institutions	  and	   later	   its	   internal	  boundaries	  defined	  by	  
its	   six	   republics	   (BiH,	   Croatia,	   Macedonia,	   Montenegro,	   Serbia	   and	   Slovenia)	   and	   its	   two	  
autonomous	  regions	  (Kosovo	  and	  Vojvodina)	  eventually	  disintegrated	  after	  the	  Tito’s	  death	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
clashes	  in	  the	  summer	  2011	  have	  provoked	  concerns	  of	  international	  actors,	  such	  as	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  
(EU).	  	  
9	  Tito’s	  goal	  was	  decrease	  the	  ethnic	  differences	  of	  each	  group	  that	  lived	  within	  the	  SFRY’s	  territorial	  boundaries.	  In	  
fact,	  the	  SFRY	  included	  over	  a	  dozen	  different	  ethnic	  groups	  such	  as,	  Serbs,	  Croats,	  Bosniaks,	  Slovenes,	  Albanians,	  
Macedonians,	  Yugoslavs,	  Montenegrins,	  Hungarians,	  Roma,	  Turks,	  Slovaks,	  Romanians,	  Bulgarians	  and	  Italians	  (listed	  
according	  to	  their	  percentage	  during	  the	  census	  in	  1981).	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in	  1980	  (see	  figure	  1	  below).10	  Indeed,	  the	  1980s	  were	  marked	  by	  economic	  instability	  and	  
political	  turmoil.	  As	  a	  result,	  different	  political	  forces	  in	  the	  republics	  contested	  the	  Yugoslav	  
leadership	   in	  Belgrade	  and	  attempted	  to	  gain	  more	  power.11	   In	  1981,	   for	   instance,	  Kosovo	  
Albanian	  students	  protested	  to	  demand	  that	  Kosovo	  become	  a	  republic	  within	  Yugoslavia.	  









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Sabrina	  P.	  Ramet,	  Balkan	  Babel:	  The	  Disintegration	  of	  Yugoslavia	  from	  the	  Death	  of	  Tito	  to	  the	  War	  for	  Kosovo	  
(Westview	  Press,	  2002),	  4.	  
11	  See	  for	  instance	  Lenard	  Cohen,	  Broken	  Bonds:	  The	  Disintegration	  of	  Yugoslavia	  (Westview	  Press,	  1993).	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Source:	  Wikimedia	  Commons	  
	  
	   Figure	  1:	  	   General	  Map	  of	  the	  Socialist	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Yugoslavia	  before	  
	   	   	   the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  war	  in	  1991	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Almost	  a	  decade	   later,	   in	  1989,	  Slobodan	  Milošević,	  an	  ambitious	  young	  Serbian	  politician	  
who	  would	  later	  turn	  into	  a	  war-­‐waging	  Serbian	  dictator,	  used	  the	  Kosovo	  issue	  to	  support	  
and	   strengthen	   the	   influence	   of	   Kosovo	   Serbs	   in	   the	   region	   and	   to	   buttress	   his	   power	   in	  
Serbia.12	   The	   goal	   of	   this	   brief	   overview,	   however,	   is	   not	   to	   isolate	   specific	   nationalist	   or	  
state-­‐centric	  factors	  to	  determine	  the	  causes	  of	  the	  political	  violence	  that	  occurred	  during	  
the	   1990s.	   Instead,	   I	   aim	   at	   laying	   out	   different	   dynamics	   all	   of	  which	   contributed	   to	   the	  
political	  and	  institutional	  chaos	  and	  which	  eventually	  escalated	  into	  violent	  conflicts	  and	  led	  
to	   outright	  war.	   To	   this	   end,	   these	   nationalist	   tendencies	   also	   have	   to	   be	   viewed	   from	   a	  
global	   perspective.	   In	   fact,	   the	   fall	   of	   the	   Soviet	   Union	   is	   crucial	   in	   this	   context.	   Mikhail	  
Gorbachev’s	   reforms	   of	   glasnost	   and	   perestroika,	   that	   helped	   fuel	   the	   peaceful	  
revolutionary	   changes	   across	   Central	   and	   Eastern	   Europe13,	   also	   inspired	   leaders	   of	   the	  
republics	  within	  Yugoslavia	  to	  follow	  suit.	  Yet,	  contrary	  to	  the	  nonviolent	  movements	  in	  the	  
neighboring	  countries,	  the	  separatist	  nationalism	  across	  Southeast	  Europe	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  
deadly.	  
In	  1990,	  extremists	  of	  all	  political	   colors	  began	   to	  dictate	   the	  course	  of	  events.	  When	   the	  
Kosovo	   Albanians	   rose	   up	   to	   demand	   their	   freedom	   from	   Serb	   domination,	   Croats	   and	  
Slovenes	   made	   plans	   to	   declare	   their	   independence.	   In	   Serbia,	   the	   media	   prompted	   for	  
calm,	  claiming	  that	  if	  Croatia	  and	  Slovenia	  were	  allowed	  to	  leave	  Yugoslavia,	  the	  horrors	  and	  
atrocities	   of	   World	   War	   II	   would	   soon	   return.	   In	   Croatia,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   the	   media	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Ramet,	  Balkan	  Babel:	  The	  Disintegration	  of	  Yugoslavia	  from	  the	  Death	  of	  Tito	  to	  the	  War	  for	  Kosovo,	  10.	  
13	  Not	  all	  transitions	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  were	  peaceful.	  Rumania	  is	  an	  exception.	  The	  government	  of	  the	  
authoritarian	  leader	  Nicolae	  Ceaușescu	  was	  overthrown	  and	  the	  leader	  and	  his	  wife	  executed	  on	  December	  22,	  1989	  
after	  a	  short	  televised	  court	  session.	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supported	  the	  Croatian	  cause,	  increasingly	  accusing	  Serbs	  of	  being	  terrorists.14	  The	  Croatian	  
police	   began	   arresting	   Serbs,	   which	   worsened	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   ethnic	  
groups.	   As	   police	   harassment	   increased,	   thousands	   of	   Serbs	   fled	   northern	   Croatia,	   while	  
thousands	  of	  other	  Serbs	  sought	  refuge	  in	  the	  Yugoslav	  People’s	  Army	  (YPA).	  As	  a	  response,	  
Serbian	  extremists	  sent	  troops	  and	  armed	  volunteers	  to	  help	  their	  comrades.	   	  Around	  the	  
same	   time,	   in	   June	   1991	   the	   war	   between	   the	   SFRY	   and	   Slovenia	   broke	   out	   after	   the	  
Slovenian	  parliament	  declared	   the	   republic’s	   independence	   from	   the	  SFRY.	  Croatia,	  which	  
supported	  Slovenia’s	  efforts	  politically,	  served	  as	  a	  geographic	  buffer	  zone	  between	  Serbia	  
and	  Slovenia.	  Within	  10	  days	  Slovenian	  forces	  drove	  the	  YPA	  out	  of	  its	  territory,	  leaving	  only	  
nine	  civilians	  dead.	  During	  the	  summer	  the	  war	  eventually	  spread	  to	  Croatia.	  Although	  the	  
Sabor,	   the	   Croatian	   parliament,	   also	   declared	   Croatia’s	   independence	   from	   the	   SFRY,	  
contrary	   to	   Slovenia,	   the	   country	   had	   a	   significant	   Serb	   population.	   Inevitably,	   Serbian	  
leader	  Milošević	  announced	  that	  if	  Croatia	  left	  Yugoslavia,	  the	  Serbs,	  who	  formed	  a	  majority	  
in	  several	  Croatian	  regions,	  would	  leave	  Croatia.	  This	  sociopolitical	  context	  was	  one	  of	  the	  
reasons	  why	   the	  Serbo-­‐Croatian	  war	  was	  much	  more	  devastating	  and	   lasted	  much	   longer	  
than	  the	  war	  in	  Slovenia.15	  
Croatia’s	  war	  of	  independence—also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Homeland	  War”16	  in	  official	  history	  
books	  and	  state	  discourse—was	  waged	  from	  1991	  to	  1995.	  After	  the	  Croatian	  declaration	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  See	  for	  instance	  Mark	  Thompson,	  Forging	  War:	  The	  Media	  in	  Serbia,	  Croatia,	  Bosnia	  and	  Hercegovina	  (Luton,	  
United	  Kingdom:	  University	  of	  Luton	  Press,	  1999).	  
15	  See	  for	  instance	  Misha	  Glenny,	  The	  Fall	  of	  Yugoslavia	  (New	  York:	  Penguin	  Books,	  1994).	  
16	  While	  the	  official	  discourse	  stresses	  the	  defensive	  nature	  of	  the	  war	  against	  the	  Serbian	  aggressor,	  it	  also	  conceals	  
war	  crimes	  against	  non-­‐Croatian	  ethnic	  groups	  because	  of	  the	  need	  to	  restore	  national	  unity	  during	  the	  violent	  
conflict	  form	  1991	  to	  1995.	  This	  discourse	  legitimizes	  in	  particular	  human	  rights	  abuses	  during	  Operation	  Storm	  in	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independence	   on	   June	   25,	   1991,	   the	   YPA	   attempted	   to	   keep	   Croatia	   within	   the	   SFRY	   by	  
occupying	   the	   entire	   Croatian	   territory.	   As	   the	   YPA	   failed	   to	   achieve	   its	   goal,	   Serb	   forces	  
created	  the	  self-­‐proclaimed	  Republic	  of	  Serbian	  Krajina17,	  which	  covered	  over	  one	  quarter	  of	  
Croatia’s	  territory.	  This	  republic	  was	  never	  recognized	  internationally	  and	  consisted	  of	  some	  
Eastern	  parts	  of	  Croatia	  (including	  areas	  around	  the	  cities	  of	  Vukovar	  and	  Osijek)	  as	  well	  as	  
Central	  and	  Southern	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  including	  cities	  such	  as	  Petrinja,	  Plitvice	  and	  Knin,	  
among	   others	   (See	   Figure	   2).	   Following	   the	   failed	   attempts	   to	   occupy	   Croatia’s	   territory,	  
Serbs	  implemented	  ethnic	  cleansing	  programs	  in	  areas	  dominated	  by	  Serbs	  in	  Croatia.	  They	  
also	  relied	  on	  heavy	  artillery	  to	  attack	  urban	  areas,	  which	  caused	  many	  civilians	  to	  die	  and	  
destroyed	  many	  buildings	  and	  sites,	  such	  as	   large	  parts	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Educational,	  
Scientific	   and	   Cultural	   Organization	   (UNESCO)-­‐protected	   city	   of	   Dubrovnik.18	   Less	   than	   six	  
months	  after	  the	  initial	  fighting,	  Croats	  and	  Serbs	  negotiated	  an	  international	  ceasefire,	  the	  
Vance	  plan,	  named	  after	  Cyrus	  Vance	   former	  US	  Secretary	  of	  State	  who	  was	  a	  UN	  special	  
envoy	  to	  negotiate	  a	  peace	  deal	  between	  the	  warring	  parties.	  
After	   the	  ceasefire	   in	   January	  1992	  Croatia’s	   independence	  was	  recognized	   internationally	  
and	   its	   borders	   drawn	   at	   the	   existing	   battle	   lines.	   In	   addition,	   UN	   forces	  were	   deployed,	  
resulting	   in	   only	   intermittent	   fighting	  during	   the	  next	   three	   years.	  During	   this	   period,	   the	  
Republic	   of	   Serbian	   Krajina	   occupied	   almost	   14,000	   square	   kilometers	   (see	   red	   areas	   in	  
figure	  2).	   In	  1995,	  Croatia	   launched	  two	  major	  offensives	  known	  as	  "Operation	  Light"	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1995,	  when	  Croatian	  forces	  regained	  most	  of	  the	  territory	  that	  they	  had	  lost	  in	  earlier	  phases	  of	  the	  war,	  forcing	  non-­‐
Croatian	  civilians	  to	  leave.	  For	  more	  details	  on	  Operation	  Storm	  and	  the	  Homeland	  War	  see	  chapters	  3	  and	  5.	  
17	  “Kraijna”	  means	  frontier	  in	  Serbo-­‐Croatian.	  
18	  Jerome	  Oberreit,	  “Destruction	  and	  Reconstructoin:	  The	  Case	  of	  Dubrovnik,”	  in	  Reconstructing	  the	  Balkans:	  A	  
Geography	  of	  the	  New	  Southeast	  Europe,	  ed.	  Derek	  Hall	  and	  Darrick	  Danta	  (Chichester:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  1996),	  67–78.	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"Operation	   Storm"19,	   which	   effectively	   put	   an	   end	   to	   the	   war	   in	   its	   favor20;	   however,	  
Croatian	  armed	  forces	  committed	  numerous	  war	  crimes	  particularly	  against	  Serbo-­‐Croatian	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  The	  private	  US	  military	  contractor	  Military	  Professional	  Resources,	  Incorporated	  (MPRI)	  had	  helped	  provide	  tactical	  
training	  for	  the	  Croatian	  forces.	  See	  for	  instance	  Richard	  Liebl,	  “The	  Croatian	  Armed	  Forces	  Training	  Simulations	  
Program,”	  DISAM	  Journal	  of	  International	  Security	  Assistance	  Management	  24,	  no.	  3	  (2002):	  10–15.	  
20	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Transitional	  Authority	  for	  Eastern	  Slavonia	  areas,	  Baranja	  and	  Western	  Sirmium	  
(UNTAES)	  was	  peacefully	  reintegrated	  into	  Croatia	  in	  1998.	  
21	  For	  more	  details	  on	  Operation	  Storm	  and	  the	  Homeland	  War	  see	  chapters	  3	  and	  5.	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   Source:	  Wikimedia	  commons	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  	   Map	  of	  Croatia	  and	  surrounding	  Balkan	  states.	  	  
	  
The	  red-­‐marked	  areas	  represent	  locations	  with	  dense	  Serbo-­‐Croatian	  population.	  These	  areas	  also	  
constituted	  the	  approximate	  territorial	  boundaries	  of	  the	  Serb	  Republic	  of	  Krajina.	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The	  ceasefire	  between	  Serbia	  and	  Croatia	  allowed	  the	  Serbs	  to	  turn	  their	  attention	  to	  the	  
situation	  in	  BiH,	  which	  was	  beginning	  to	  deteriorate.	  In	  the	  spring	  of	  1992,	  the	  YPA	  began	  to	  
take	   up	   positions	   around	   Sarajevo,	   the	   capital	   of	   BiH.	   Reminiscent	   to	   the	   Croatian	   case,	  
Serbian	  leader	  Milošević	  declared	  that	  if	  BiH	  left	  Yugoslavia,	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  would	  form	  their	  
own	  state	  out	  of	  BiH,	  by	  uniting	  with	  Serbia,	  thus	  backing	  the	  interests	  of	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  led	  
by	   a	   local	   political	   figure	   Radovan	   Karadžić.22	   The	   war	   in	   BiH	   lasted	   from	   April	   1992	   to	  
December	  1995	  with	  Bosnian	  Croats,	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  and	  Bosniaks	  (Bosnian	  Muslims)	  fighting	  
against	  each	  other.	  While	  the	  self-­‐proclaimed	  Serb	  Republic	  relied	  on	  military	  support	  from	  
Belgrade,	   Croats	   of	   Herzegovina	   (the	   southern	   region	   of	   Bosnia)	   eventually	   joined	   the	  
Republic	  of	  BiH’s	  forces	  against	  the	  Serbs	  as	  I	  explain	  in	  more	  detail	  below.	  The	  war	  broke	  
out	  following	  the	  referendum	  on	  February	  29,	  1992,	  when	  the	  multiethnic	  republic	  of	  BiH—
which	  was	  inhabited	  by	  Bosnian	  Muslim-­‐majority	  (44	  percent),	  Orthodox	  Serbs	  (31	  percent)	  
and	   Croatian	   Catholics	   (17	   percent)—decided	   to	   proclaim	   BiH’s	   independence	   from	  
Yugoslavia.23	  	  
The	   Bosnian	   war	   was	   marked	   by	   ethnic	   cleansing	   of	   Bosnian	   populations,	   particularly	   in	  
eastern	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	  During	  the	  heavy	  fighting,	  indiscriminate	  bombing	  of	  cities	  and	  
villages,	   mass	   rapes	   and	   systematic	   genocide	   occurred.	   	   Although	   initially	   all	   sides	   were	  
fighting	  against	  each	  other—the	  Croatian	  government	  intended	  to	  secure	  territorial	  gains	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  See	  for	  instance	  Steven	  Burg	  and	  Paul	  Shoup,	  The	  War	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina:	  Ethnic	  Conflict	  and	  International	  
Intervention	  (M.E.	  Sharpe	  Incorporate,	  2000),	  chap.	  3.	  
23	  Glenny,	  The	  Fall	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  chapter	  5.	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the	  southern	  region	  of	  Bosnia	  that	  was	  heavily	  populated	  by	  Croatian	  Bosnians24—Croatian	  
forces	   ultimately	   joined	   the	   BiH	   Republic’s	   forces	   to	   stop	   the	   Serbs	   from	   taking	   over	   the	  
region.	   Events	   such	   as	   the	   siege	   of	   Sarajevo,	   the	   Srebrenica	  massacre25	   and	   the	  Omarska	  
camp26	  became	  looming	  symbolic	  events	  characterizing	  the	  devastating	  conflict.	  While	  Serbs	  
initially	  had	  a	  military	  advantage	  due	  to	  the	  equipment	  provided	  by	  the	  YPA,	  they	  lost	  their	  
momentum	   as	   allied	   Bosnian	   and	   Croatian	   forces	   held	   up	   against	   the	   army	   of	   the	   Serb	  
Republic.	   The	   Federation	   of	   BiH	   (including	   Bosniaks	   and	   Bosnian	   Croats)	   was	   created	  
following	   the	   Washington	   Agreement	   in	   1994.	   After	   the	   massacres	   of	   Srebrenica	   and	  
Markale27	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   1995	   armed	   forces	   of	   the	  North	  Atlantic	   Treaty	  Organization	  
(NATO)	   intervened	   and	   launched	   air	   raids	   against	   the	   positions	   of	   the	   army	   of	   the	   Serb	  
Republic,	  which	  proved	  essential	  to	  stop	  the	  war.	  The	  war	  finally	  came	  to	  an	  end	  when	  the	  
warring	  parties	  signed	  a	  peace	  agreement	  in	  Paris	  on	  14	  December	  1995.	  The	  initial	  peace	  
negotiations	   were	   long	   and	   complex,	   taking	   place	   in	   Dayton,	   Ohio,	   between	   1	   and	   21	  
November	  1995.	  The	  agreement	  is	  generally	  known	  as	  the	  Dayton	  Accords.28	  A	  United	  States	  
(US)	   Central	   Intelligence	   Agency	   (CIA)	   report	   from	   1995	   found	   that	   Serb	   forces	   were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Croatian	  President	  Franjo	  Tuđman	  and	  Serbian	  President	  Slobodan	  Milošević	  had	  a	  series	  of	  meetings	  in	  1991,	  
known	  as	  the	  Karađorđevo	  agreement,	  which	  forsaw	  the	  redistribution	  of	  the	  territories	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  The	  
meetings	  did	  not	  include	  the	  third	  largest	  ethnic	  group	  of	  Bosniaks.	  
25	  This	  massacre	  refers	  to	  the	  July	  1995	  killings	  of	  8,000	  mainly	  male	  Bosniaks	  in	  and	  around	  the	  town	  of	  Srebrenica	  in	  
BiH	  by	  units	  of	  the	  Army	  of	  the	  Serb	  Republic	  under	  the	  command	  of	  General	  Ratko	  Mladić.	  
26	  Omarska	  camp	  was	  a	  concentration	  camp	  run	  by	  Bosnian	  Serb	  forces,	  in	  Omarska,	  a	  mining	  town	  near	  Prijedor	  in	  
northern	  BiH.	  It	  was	  set	  up	  during	  the	  Prijedor	  massacre	  for	  Bosniak	  and	  Croat	  men	  and	  women.	  The	  Priijedor	  
massacre	  is	  the	  second	  largest	  killings	  after	  Srebrenica.	  Over	  5,000	  Bosniaks	  and	  Croats	  are	  missing	  or	  were	  killed.	  
27	  These	  massacres	  were	  two	  artillery	  attacks	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Army	  of	  the	  Serb	  Republic	  against	  civilians	  during	  the	  
Siege	  of	  Sarajevo	  in	  the	  Bosnian	  War.	  They	  occurred	  at	  the	  Markale,	  a	  marketplace	  located	  in	  the	  historic	  core	  of	  
Sarajevo,	  the	  capital	  of	  BiH.	  The	  first	  bombing	  took	  place	  on	  February	  5,	  1994	  and	  killed	  68	  people,	  wounding	  144.	  
The	  second	  one	  occurred	  on	  August	  28,	  1995,	  killing	  35	  people	  and	  wounding	  another	  90.	  
28	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  negotiations	  see	  for	  instance	  Richard	  Johnson,	  Negotiating	  the	  Dayton	  Peace	  Accords	  
Through	  Digital	  Maps,	  Virtual	  Diplomacy	  Report	  (Washington,	  DC:	  United	  States	  Institute	  of	  Peace,	  1999).	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responsible	  for	  90	  percent	  of	  war	  crimes	  committed	  during	  the	  conflict.29	  With	  over	  200,000	  
civilian	  and	  military	   casualties	  and	  over	  2.2	  million	  displaced	  people,	   the	  Bosnian	  war	  has	  
been	  the	  most	  devastating	  conflict	  since	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II	  in	  Europe.30	  	  
The	   war	   in	   Bosnia,	   however,	   provoked	   stern	   international	   economic	   sanctions	   against	  
Serbia,	   which	   fueled	   hyperinflation,	   weakening	   not	   only	   its	   economy	   but	   also	   Serbian	  
society.	  As	  a	  result,	  Serbia’s	  fragile	  position	  fueled	  old	  Kosovan	  independence	  claims.	  Some	  
Kosovo	   Albanian	   leaders	   decided	   it	   was	   time	   to	   take	   up	   arms	   against	   weakened	   Serbs	  
authorities,	  ignoring	  Kosovo’s	  first	  president	  Ibrahim	  Rugova’s	  policy	  of	  passive	  resistance	  of	  
the	  early	  1990s.31	  By	  1996	  a	  guerrilla	  war	  led	  by	  the	  Kosovo	  Liberation	  Army	  (KLA)	  began.	  To	  
stop	   the	   KLA,	   Serbian	   police	   expelled	   hundreds	   of	   thousands	   of	   civilian	   Kosovo	  Albanians	  
from	  their	  homes,	  forcing	  them	  to	  escape	  into	  the	  surrounding	  foothills	  and	  mountains.	  The	  
winter	  of	  1998	  was	  particularly	  harsh	   for	   the	   refugees	  who	  were	  without	   food	  or	   shelter,	  
appealing	   to	   the	   West	   for	   humanitarian	   aid.	   In	   the	   end,	   the	   international	   community	  
decided	  to	  bomb	  Serbia	  and	  Serbian	  positions	  in	  Kosovo	  using	  NATO	  air	  power	  on	  March	  24,	  
1999.	   78	   days	   after	   the	   first	   bomb	   hit	   Serbian	   soil,	   President	   Milošević	   capitulated	   and	  
withdrew	   his	   forces.	   During	   the	   NATO	   raids	   hundreds	   of	   Serbian	   civilians	   died,	   while	  
thousands	  of	  Kosovo	  Albanians	  died	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  Serbian	  forces.32	  Less	  than	  a	  year	  after	  
the	   NATO	   bombing,	   a	   wave	   of	   popular	   protests	   forced	  Milošević	   to	   hold	   new	   elections.	  
Although	  he	   lost	   the	  elections,	  he	   refused	   to	   resign	  as	  president	  of	  Serbia.	  On	  October	  5,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Roger	  Cohen,	  “C.I.A.	  Report	  on	  Bosnia	  Blames	  Serbs	  for	  90%	  of	  the	  War	  Crimes,”	  New	  York	  Times	  (March	  9,	  1995).	  
30	  See	  for	  instance	  Cherif	  Bassiouni,	  The	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  of	  Experts	  Established	  Pursuant	  to	  Security	  
Council	  Resolution	  780	  (1992)	  (New	  York:	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  1994).	  
31	  He	  was	  in	  office	  from	  1992	  to	  2006.	  
32	  See	  for	  instance	  Tim	  Judah,	  Kosovo:	  War	  and	  Revenge	  (New	  Haven,	  CT:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2002).	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2000,	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  people	  took	  to	  the	  streets,	  declaring	  a	  national	  strike.	  Ten	  
days	   later,	   demonstrators	   stormed	   the	   parliament	   and	   forced	   Milošević	   to	   resign.33	   In	  
February	  2002,	   the	  government	  of	  Zoran	  Đinđić34—a	  political	  opposition	   leader	  during	  the	  
years	   of	   the	  Milošević	   regime	   and	   founder	   of	   the	  modern	  Democratic	   Party—cooperated	  
with	  the	  ICTY	  and	  extradited	  the	  former	  President.	  Slobodan	  Milošević	  faced	  charges	  in	  The	  
Hague	   for	   war	   crimes	   and	   genocide	   for	   his	   actions	   across	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia.	   Shortly	  
before	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  trial	  in	  2006,	  the	  former	  Serbian	  leader	  died	  of	  a	  heart	  attack.35	  
	  
Crimes	  Against	  Humanity	  and	  the	  International	  Response	  	  
The	  different	  conflicts	  across	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  during	  the	  1990s	  were	  characterized	  by	  
grave	   human	   rights	   abuses	   and	   the	   violation	   of	   international	   humanitarian	   law,	   including	  
killings,	  mass	  murder,	  systematic	  rape,	  torture	  and	  other	  crimes	  against	  humanity.	   In	  fact,	  
the	   term	   "ethnic	   cleansing"	   reappeared	   among	   the	  more	   frequently	   used	   terms	   in	   IR	   to	  
describe	   the	   range	  of	  human	   rights	  violations,	   such	  as	   forced	  evictions	  and	  executions,	   in	  
the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  while	  leaders	  attempted	  to	  create	  new	  nation	  states	  with	  sovereign	  
territories	  that	  consisted	  of	  homogenous	  ethnic	  groups.	  While	  all	  parties	  to	  the	  conflict	   in	  
the	  Balkans	  committed	  human	  rights	  violations,	  Serb	  paramilitary	  and	  armed	  forces	  carried	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Florian	  Bieber,	  “Serbia	  After	  the	  Kosovo	  War:	  The	  Defeat	  of	  Nationalism	  and	  Change	  of	  Regime,”	  in	  Understanding	  
the	  War	  in	  Kosovo,	  ed.	  Florian	  Bieber	  and	  Židas	  Daskalovski	  (Oregon,	  WA:	  Frank	  Cass	  Publishers,	  2003),	  319–336.	  
34	  He	  was	  assassinated	  in	  2003.	  
35	  Marlise	  Simons	  and	  Alison	  Smale,	  “Slobodan	  Milosevic,	  64,	  Former	  Yugoslav	  Leader	  Accused	  of	  War	  Crimes,	  Dies,”	  
New	  York	  Times	  (New	  York,	  March	  12,	  2006).	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out	  a	  large	  number	  of	  them.	  Below	  I	  list	  and	  summarize	  some	  of	  the	  worst	  war	  crimes	  and	  
atrocities.	  
 In	  fall	  1991,	  Serb	  forces	  shelled	  the	  Croatian	  coastal	  city	  of	  Dubrovnik,	  an	  action	  
without	  military	  justification	  that	  caused	  severe	  material	  damage	  and	  a	  number	  
of	  casualties.	  
 In	  November	  1991,	  Krajina	  Serbs	  took	  several	  hundred	  injured	  Croatian	  soldiers	  
from	   a	   hospital	   in	   Vukovar	   in	   eastern	   Slavonia,	   executed	   them	   in	   a	   field,	   and	  
buried	  them	  in	  mass	  graves.	  For	  years,	  Serbian	  authorities	  denied	  international	  
investigation	  teams	  access	  to	  the	  sites.	  
 Throughout	  the	  conflict	  Sarajevo	  and	  other	  cities	  were	  exposed	  to	  indiscriminate	  
bombing.	   Dozens	   of	   civilians	   were	   killed	   or	   wounded	   by	   snipers	   and	   artillery	  
used	  by	  Bosnian	  Serb	   forces.	   Six	  of	   these	   cities	  were	  designated	   safe	  areas	  by	  
the	  United	  Nations	  in	  May	  1993,	  but	  this	  did	  not	  prevent	  further	  bombings.	  
 In	   early	   spring	   of	   1992	   entire	   enclaves,	   including	   towns	   like	   Prijedor,	   Bijeljina,	  
Zvornik	   and	   Jajce,	   among	   others,	   and	   villages	   such	   as	   Foča	   and	   Cerska	   were	  
"cleansed"	  of	  their	  Muslim	  and	  Croat	  inhabitants	  when	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  attempted	  
to	  "purify"	  their	  occupied	  territories.	  
 In	  1992	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  set	  up	  prison	  camps	  and	  detention	  facilities	  where	  tens	  of	  
thousands	   of	   Muslims	   and	   Croats	   were	   held.	   During	   the	   summer	   of	   1992,	  
international	  investigators	  were	  refused	  access	  to	  the	  camps,	  but	  the	  prisoners	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who	   managed	   to	   escape	   described	   serious	   human	   rights	   violations,	   including	  
torture	  and	  executions	  among	  others.	  
 During	  the	  summer	  of	  1995	  Bosnian	  Serb	  forces	  overran	  the	  towns	  of	  Srebrenica	  
and	  Žepa,	  committing	  gross	  human	  rights	  violations.	  As	  many	  as	  6,000	  captured	  
Muslim	  men	  were	   gathered	   and	  brought	   to	   surrounding	   farms,	   then	   shot	   and	  
buried	   in	   mass	   graves.	   A	   Muslim	   population	   of	   over	   42,000	   people	   was	  
"cleansed"	  from	  the	  region.	  
 Croatian	   military	   also	   committed	   serious	   human	   rights	   violations,	   including	  
executions	  and	  torture,	  among	  others,	  against	  Serbo-­‐Croatian	  civilians	  in	  Croatia	  
in	   the	   summer	   1995	   when	   the	   Croatian	   military	   took	   over	   Serbian	   territories	  
such	  Western	  Slavonia	  and	  the	  Krajina	  region	   in	  Croatia	  that	  were	  occupied	  by	  
Serbs	  between	  1992	  and	  1995.36	  
The	   international	   response	   to	   these	  atrocities	   consisted	  of	   creating	  a	   special	   investigation	  
commission	   to	   verify	   the	   early	   human	   rights	   abuses	   and	  war	   crimes	   across	   the	   region.	   In	  
August	   1992,	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council	   gave	   the	   green	   light	   for	   the	   UN	   Commission	   on	  
Human	  Rights	   to	  appoint	  a	  Special	  Rapporteur	   to	  conduct	  on-­‐site	   investigations	  of	   crimes	  
against	  humanity	  and	   to	  draft	  a	   report	  on	   its	  observations.	  The	   team	  comprised	  different	  
observers	   in	   Sarajevo,	  Mostar,	   Zagreb	   and	   Skopje,	   who	   submitted	   a	   series	   of	   reports	   on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  See	  for	  instance	  the	  Research	  and	  Documentation	  Center’s	  online	  Bosnian	  War	  Crimes	  Atlas	  at	  
http://www.idc.org.ba,	  accessed	  on	  December	  2,	  2011.	  See	  also	  OSCE,	  Delivering	  Justice	  in	  BiH:	  An	  Overview	  of	  War	  
Crimes	  Processing	  from	  2005	  to	  2010	  (Sarajevo:	  OSCE	  Mission	  to	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  2010);	  Amnesty	  
International,	  Behind	  a	  Wall	  of	  Silence:	  Prosecution	  of	  War	  Crimes	  in	  Croatia	  (Amnesty	  International	  Publications,	  
2010).	  
	  19	  
violations	   throughout	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia.	   In	   October	   l992,	   the	   Security	   Council	   then	  
approved	   the	   request	   for	   an	   impartial	   international	   investigation	   to	   identify	   those	  
responsible	  for	  violations	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  to	  deter	  acts	  of	  violence	  on	  ethnic	  basis.	  The	  
investigation	   was	   carried	   out	   based	   on	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council	   Resolution	   780	   the	  
“Commission	   of	   Experts	   to	   Examine	   and	   Analyze	   Information	   Submitted	   Pursuant	   to	  
Resolution	  771,”	  which	  followed	  the	   initial	  August	  1992	  request	  and	  which	  was	   led	  by	  the	  
Special	  Rapporteur	  Cherif	  Bassiouni,	  an	  Egyptian	  international	  UN	  war	  crimes	  expert.37	  
	  
Based	   on	   preliminary	   findings	   of	   the	   Commission	   in	   spring	   1993	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council	  
concluded	   that	   the	   committed	   atrocities	   were	   war	   crimes	   and	   that	   international	  
prosecutions	  against	  individuals	  responsible	  for	  these	  human	  rights	  abuses	  were	  necessary	  
to	  ensure	  stability	  and	  lasting	  peace	  in	  the	  region.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Security	  Council	  adopted	  
a	  resolution,	  creating	  the	  ICTY,	  which	  then	  took	  over	  the	  Committee’s	  work.	  As	  I	  will	  show	  in	  
chapter	  3,	  the	  US	  played	  a	  crucial	  role,	  leading	  international	  efforts	  to	  establish	  the	  Tribunal	  
and	  contributed	  extensively	  to	  get	  the	  ICTY	  off	  the	  ground.	  This	  includes	  not	  only	  financial	  
contributions	  but	  also	  the	  services	  of	  attorneys,	  investigators,	  and	  other	  experts.	  The	  impact	  
of	  the	  ICTY’s	  work	  changed	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  and	  accountability	  efforts	  after	  
mass	  atrocity.	  Unsurprisingly,	   there	  exists	  an	  extensive	   literature	  on	  the	   ICTY.	  Later	   in	  this	  
chapter,	  and	  in	  chapters	  2	  and	  3	  I	  will	  discuss	  some	  of	  the	  work	  on	  the	  sociopolitical	  impact	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Cherif	  Bassiouni,	  “The	  United	  Nations	  Commission	  of	  Experts	  Established	  Pursuant	  to	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  
780	  (1992),”	  The	  American	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  88,	  no.	  4	  (1994):	  789–792.	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of	   the	   Tribunal.38	   As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   however,	   my	   research	   focuses	   on	   state-­‐society	  
relations	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  and	  transitional	  justice	  contexts.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  following	  section	  
consists	   of	   a	   short	   discussion	   on	   the	   evolution	   in	   past	   transitional	   justice	   scholarship	   in	  
order	   to	  highlight	   some	  of	   the	   shifts	   in	   the	   literature	   and	   to	   illustrate	  how	  my	  own	  work	  
builds	   on	   more	   recent	   studies	   that	   concentrate	   particularly	   on	   the	   relationship	   of	   civil	  
society	  and	  the	  state	  in	  post-­‐authoritarian	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  settings.	  
	  
The	  Growing	  Importance	  of	  State-­‐Society	  Relations	  for	  
Understanding	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Justice	  	  
Different	   forms	   of	   transitional	   justice	   mechanisms	   have	   been	   applied	   for	   millennia,	  
especially	   in	  times	  of	  regime	  change,	   including	  Antiquity,	   the	  French	  Revolution,	  and	  after	  
World	  War	  II,	  among	  others.39	  	  However,	  the	  scholarly	  debate	  around	  these	  issues	  and	  the	  
term	  itself	  was	  in	  particular	  coined	  by	  Ruti	  Teitel’s	  early	  work	  published	  in	  Neil	  Kritz’s	  edited	  
volume	   Transitional	   Justice:	   How	   Emerging	   Democracies	   Reckon	   with	   Former	   Regimes.40	  	  
Only	   a	   few	   years	   later,	   in	   2000,	   Teitel	   published	   her	   groundbreaking	   book	   Transitional	  
Justice,	   in	  which	  she	  argues	  that	  the	  role	  of	  justice	  in	  political	  transitions	  is	  not	  a	  universal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  For	  legal	  analyses	  see	  for	  instance	  Shane	  Darcy	  and	  Joseph	  Powderly,	  Judicial	  Creativity	  at	  the	  International	  
Criminal	  Tribunals	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010);	  Rachel	  Kerr,	  The	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Former	  
Yugoslavia:	  An	  Exercise	  in	  Law,	  Politics,	  and	  Diplomacy	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004);	  Gideon	  Boas	  and	  William	  
Schabas,	  International	  Criminal	  Law	  Developments	  in	  the	  Case	  Law	  of	  the	  ICTY	  (Martinus	  Nijhoff	  Publishers,	  2003).	  
39	  For	  a	  historical	  account	  on	  different	  forms	  of	  justice	  applied	  after	  regime	  changes	  see	  for	  instance	  Jon	  Elster,	  
Closing	  the	  Books:	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Historical	  Perspective	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  
40	  Ruti	  G.	  Teitel,	  “How	  Are	  the	  New	  Democracies	  of	  the	  Southern	  Cone	  Dealing	  with	  the	  Legacy	  of	  Past	  Human	  Rights	  
Abuses?,”	  in	  Transitional	  Justice:	  How	  Emerging	  Democracies	  Reckon	  with	  Former	  Regimes,	  ed.	  Neil	  J.	  Kritz	  (United	  
States	  Institute	  of	  Peace	  Press,	  1995),	  146–154.	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norm,	   but	   instead	   has	   a	   unique	   and	   constructivist	   character.	   	   Grounding	   her	   research	   in	  
legal	   analysis,	   she	  posits	   that	   “[l]aw	   is	   caught	   between	   the	  past	   and	   the	   future,	   between	  
backward-­‐looking	   and	   forward-­‐looking,	   between	   retrospective	   and	   prospective,	   between	  
the	   individual	   and	   the	   collective.”41	   In	   her	   subsequent	   work	   she	   explores	   this	   concept	  
further,	  providing	  a	  broad	  timeline	  of	  transition	  cases	  since	  1945	  in	  order	  to	  conceptualize	  
political	  shifts	  and	  the	  role	  justice	  plays	  during	  these	  processes.42	  Teitel’s	  post-­‐World-­‐War-­‐II	  
genealogical	  work	  on	  transitional	  justice	  demonstrates	  how	  law	  and	  politics	  closely	  relate	  to	  
each	   other.	   With	   her	   historical	   analysis	   she	   provides	   a	   synthetic	   and	   aggregative	   view,	  
disclosing	  the	  changes	  of	  political	  institutionalization	  from	  the	  early	  trials	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  
to	  the	  recent	  developments	  that	  have	  solidified	  the	  transnational	  justice	  phenomenon	  in	  a	  
globalized	  world.	  As	  she	  precisely	  states:	  “The	  genealogical	  perspective	  situates	  transitional	  
justice	   in	   a	   political	   context,	   moving	   away	   from	   essentializing	   approaches	   and	   thereby	  
illuminating	  the	  dynamic	  relationship	  between	  transitional	  justice	  and	  politics	  over	  time.”43	  	  
As	   a	   consequence,	   Teitel’s	   article	   describes	   a	   genealogy	   that	   is	   based	   on	   three	   phases.	  
Phase	   I	  refers	  to	  the	  period	   immediately	  after	  World	  War	   II	  and	  the	  models	  of	  retribution	  
based	  on	  victors’	   justice,	  such	  as	  the	  Nuremberg	  and	  Tokyo	  Trials.	  Phase	  II	  moved	  beyond	  
the	  retributive	  justice	  model	  of	  Phase	  I.	  This	  phase	  was	  concerned	  with	  broader	  issues	  than	  
the	   question	   of	   how	   to	   punish	   perpetrators.	   Scholars	   and	   practitioners	   were	   seeking	  
answers	   on	   how	   to	   heal	   and	   reconcile	   post-­‐conflict	   and	   post-­‐authoritarian	   societies,	  
including	  sustainable	  peace	  processes	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  Thus,	  transitional	  justice	  moved	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Ruti	  G.	  Teitel,	  Transitional	  Justice	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  USA,	  2000),	  6.	  
42	  Ruti	  G.	  Teitel,	  “Transitional	  Justice	  Genealogy,”	  Harvard	  Human	  Rights	  Journal	  16	  (2003):	  69.	  
43	  Ibid.,	  94.	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away	  from	  focusing	  solely	  on	  judicial	  mechanisms	  of	  international	  law	  and	  made	  an	  attempt	  
to	  integrate	  more	  complex	  processes,	  including	  for	  instance	  nation-­‐building.	  Her	  third	  phase	  
is	  characterized	  by	  an	  acceleration	  of	  transitional	  justice	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  with	  
increasing	   political	   instability	   and	   violence.	   “In	   this	   contemporary	   phase,	   transitional	  
jurisprudence	   normalizes	   an	   expanded	   discourse	   of	   humanitarian	   justice	   constructing	   a	  
body	  of	  law	  associated	  with	  pervasive	  conflict.”44	  She	  refers	  particularly	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  
different	   jurisprudence	  across	  different	   regions,	   including	   the	  creation	  of	   the	   ICC.45	   	  These	  
interactive	  processes	  and	  dynamics	  on	  the	  local,	  national	  and	  global	  level	  are	  crucial	  for	  my	  
study	   and	  will	   be	  discussed	   throughout	  my	   chapters.	   As	   for	   now,	   however,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	  
discuss	   Teitel’s	   Phase	   II	   in	   more	   detail	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   relationship	   between	  
retributive	  justice	  and	  restorative	  justice	  mechanisms.	  	  	  	  
In	  her	  Phase	   II,	  Teitel	  analyzes	   the	  dilemma	  of	  assuring	  accountability	   through	   the	   rule	  of	  
law	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	   and	  durable	   peace	  during	   regional	   democratization	  processes	   after	  
World	  War	  II	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  including	  Latin	  America,	  Africa	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  among	  
others.46	  	  The	  main	  question	  during	  democratic	  transitions	  was	  whether	  dictators	  and	  their	  
authoritarian	  rule	  could	  be	  dealt	  with	  using	   the	  model	  of	   international	   justice	  such	  as	   the	  
Nuremberg	   Trials,	   or	   whether	   past	   wrongdoings	   should	   be	   addressed	   using	   domestic	  
mechanisms.	  In	  many	  cases,	  as	  she	  points	  out,	  political	  realities	  and	  the	  power	  struggles	  of	  
the	   successor	   regimes	   with	   national	   military	   elites	   in	   Latin	   America	   led	   to	   solutions	   that	  
compromised	   the	   judiciary,	   often	   granting	   amnesties	   and	   immunities	   to	   these	   rogue	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Ibid.,	  71–72.	  
45	  Ibid.,	  90.	  
46	  Teitel,	  “Transitional	  Justice	  Genealogy.”	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leaders.47	   Yet,	   she	   continues	   that	   during	   this	   phase,	   there	   was	   also	   a	   dynamic	   that	  
responded	  to	  transitional	  justice	  by	  looking	  for	  alternative	  strategies.	  	  According	  to	  her,	  	  
	  
[t]he	   leading	  model	   in	  this	  phase	   is	  known	  as	  the	  restorative	  model.	   In	  this	  phase,	  
the	  main	   purpose	  of	   transitional	   justice	  was	   to	   construct	   an	   alternative	   history	   of	  
past	  abuses.	  A	  dichotomy	  between	  truth	  and	   justice	   therefore	  emerged.	  Thus,	   the	  
Phase	  II	  paradigm	  largely	  eschewed	  trials	  to	  focus	  instead	  upon	  a	  new	  institutional	  
mechanism:	  the	  truth	  commission.	  […]	  The	  appeal	  of	  the	  model	  is	  its	  ability	  to	  offer	  
a	  broader	  historical	  perspective,	  rather	  than	  mere	  judgments	  in	  isolated	  cases.	  Truth	  
commissions	  are	  most	  popular	  where	  the	  predecessor	  regime	  disappeared	  persons	  
or	   repressed	   information	   about	   its	   persecution	   policy,	   as	   was	   typical	   in	   Latin	  
America.	   In	   contrast,	   truth	   commissions	   have	   been	   of	   less	   interest	   in	   post-­‐
Communist	   Europe,	  where	   the	  use	  of	   history	   by	   various	   governments	  was	   itself	   a	  
destructive	  dimension	  of	  Communist	  repression.	  Accordingly,	  in	  Eastern	  Europe,	  the	  
main	   critical	   response	   by	   the	   successor	   regime	  was	   not	   to	   create	   official	   histories	  
but	  rather	  to	  guarantee	  access	  to	  the	  historical	  record.48	  
	  
While	   her	   article	   frames	   the	   changes	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   societies	   from	   a	   legal	   perspective—
discussing	  the	  effects	  of	  alternative	  models	  on	  international	  law	  and	  analyzing	  the	  impact	  of	  
the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  different	  contexts—other	  authors	  have	  studied	  transitional	  justice	  from	  a	  
historical	  and	  institutional	  perspective.49	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Ibid.,	  75–78.	  
48	  Ibid.,	  79.	  
49	  For	  literature	  on	  institutional	  change	  during	  democratic	  transitions	  that	  has	  also	  influenced	  transitional	  justice	  
scholarship	  see	  for	  instance	  Guillermo	  O’Donnell	  and	  Paul	  Schmitter,	  Transitions	  from	  Authoritarian	  Rule:	  Tentative	  
Conclusions	  About	  Uncertain	  Democracies	  (Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1986).	  Their	  edited	  volume	  provides	  
different	  case	  studies	  on	  several	  political	  shifts	  and	  regime	  changes	  in	  the	  1980s,	  focusing	  on	  Latin	  America.	  They	  
explore	  different	  democracy	  models	  and	  political	  efforts	  to	  build	  democratic	  foundations	  in	  times	  of	  uncertainty.	  	  
While	  Laurence	  Whitehead	  describes	  international	  factors	  in	  chapter	  one	  of	  the	  volume—discussing	  for	  instance	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Jon	   Elster’s	   work	   Closing	   the	   Books:	   Transitional	   Justice	   in	   Historical	   Perspective,	   for	  
instance,	  constitutes	  an	  account	  of	  different	  cases	  in	  history—ranging	  from	  Ancient	  Greece	  
to	  the	  East	  German	  transition	  in	  the	  1990s—and	  provides	  a	  good	  example	  of	  expanding	  the	  
institutional	  debate	  by	  scholarship	  on	  democratic	  transition	  in	  post-­‐authoritarian	  and	  post-­‐
conflict	   justice	   contexts.50	   In	   fact,	   by	   defining	   the	   “comparanda	   and	   explananda”51	   of	  
transitional	   justice—which	   he	   describes	   as	   the	   basic	  motivations,	   including	   emotions	   and	  
interests	  that	  lead	  to	  specific	  actions—he	  discusses	  different	  institutional	  forms	  of	  justice.	  In	  
his	  view,	  there	  are	  three	  of	  them:	   legal	   justice,	  administrative	   justice,	  and	  political	   justice.	  
Instead	  of	  looking	  at	  them	  separately,	  however,	  he	  suggests	  to	  view	  them	  as	  a	  continuum.	  
He	   then	   compares	  his	   selected	  historical	   cases	   and	  explains	   the	  different	   regime	   changes	  
(along	   with	   the	   transitional	   justice	   mechanism	   that	   have	   been	   chosen	   in	   each	   of	   the	  
contexts)	   according	   to	   his	   institutional	   justice	   framework.52	   	   His	   analysis	   is	   very	   valuable	  
from	   a	   historical	   and	   comparative	   point	   of	   view.	   It	   also	   helps	   understand	   institutional	  
processes	  within	  political	  structures	  during	  regime	  change.	  Yet,	  it	  does	  not	  include	  political	  
processes	   between	   state	   and	   society	   actors,	   but	   its	   analytical	   lens	   remains	   focused	   on	   a	  
state-­‐centric	  view.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
foreign	  policy	  tools—,	  other	  contributors,	  such	  as	  Adam	  Przeworksi,	  raise	  methodological	  questions,	  examining	  ways	  
in	  which	  different	  data	  sets	  could	  be	  analyzed	  to	  help	  researchers	  better	  understand	  these	  processes.	  This	  type	  of	  
literature	  concentrates	  especially	  on	  the	  sociopolitical	  factors	  of	  democratic	  transitions,	  including	  political	  institutions	  
and	  in	  some	  cases	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  during	  these	  processes.	  See	  also	  Juan	  J.	  Linz	  and	  Alfred	  Stepan,	  Problems	  of	  
Democratic	  Transition	  and	  Consolidation:	  Southern	  Europe,	  South	  America,	  and	  Post-­‐Communist	  Europe	  (Johns	  
Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Samuel	  P.	  Huntington,	  The	  Third	  Wave:	  Democratization	  in	  the	  Late	  Twentieth	  
Century	  (University	  of	  Oklahoma	  Press,	  1993).	  
50	  Elster,	  Closing	  the	  Books:	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Historical	  Perspective.	  Both	  words	  are	  Latin	  and	  stand	  for	  
comparisons	  and	  explanations.	  
51	  Ibid.,	  79.	  
52	  Ibid.,	  chap.	  4.	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My	  study,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  aims	  at	  strengthening	  the	  sociopolitical	  research	  agenda	  of	  post-­‐
conflict	   justice.	   In	  other	  words,	   I	  analyze	  the	  importance	  of	  political	  objectives	  of	  different	  
actors	  in	  transition	  contexts.	  In	  particular,	  I	  look	  at	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  state	  (or	  its	  
representatives)	  and	  society,	  characterized	  by	  civil	  society	  organizations.	  Several	  important	  
political	  scientists	  have	  paved	  the	  way	  studying	  state-­‐society	  relations	  in	  different	  contexts	  
and	   eras,	   including	   Charles	   Tilly,	   Theda	   Skocpol,	   Barrington	  Moore,	   James	   Scott	   and	   Joel	  
Migdal	  among	  others.	  As	  a	  case	  in	  point,	  Joel	  Migdal	  in	  State	  in	  Society	  and	  James	  Scott	  with	  
his	   Seeing	   Like	   a	   State,	   both	   provide	   detailed	   accounts	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  
state	  and	  society.53	  Migdal,	  for	  instance,	  underlines	  the	  changes	  from	  traditional	  Weberian	  
state-­‐models,	  such	  as	  states	  as	  bureaucracies	  and	  planning	  units—by	  highlighting	  the	  power	  
struggles	  from	  within	  and	  describing	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  as	  a	  counterweight	  against	  state	  
institutions	  such	  as	  the	  military.54	  	  Scott’s	  analysis,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  explores	  the	  grotesque	  
power	   that	   in	   particular	   authoritarian	   states	   yield	   over	   society,	   providing	   several	   case	  
studies	   ranging	   from	   a	   German	   pine	   tree	   forestation	   model	   in	   the	   19th	   century	   to	   a	  
compulsory	  villagization	  in	  Tanzania.55	  
Earlier	  scholarship	  on	  transitional	  justice	  was	  less	  preoccupied	  with	  sociopolitical	  dynamics	  
between	   the	   state	   and	   society;	   instead	   it	   was	   more	   concerned	   with	   finding	   appropriate	  
mechanisms	   of	   rebuilding	  war-­‐torn	   societies.	   Two	   contributions	   by	  Neil	   Kritz	   and	   Priscilla	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Joel	  Migdal,	  State	  in	  Society:	  Studying	  How	  States	  and	  Societies	  Transform	  and	  Constitute	  One	  Another	  (Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  2001);	  James	  Scott,	  Seeing	  Like	  a	  State:	  How	  Certain	  Schemes	  to	  Improve	  the	  Human	  Condition	  Have	  
Failed	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1998).	  
54	  Migdal,	  State	  in	  Society:	  Studying	  How	  States	  and	  Societies	  Transform	  and	  Constitute	  One	  Another,	  3–5;	  130–133.	  
55	  See	  for	  instance	  Scott,	  Seeing	  Like	  a	  State:	  How	  Certain	  Schemes	  to	  Improve	  the	  Human	  Condition	  Have	  Failed,	  
chap.	  1,	  7.	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Hayner	   that	   have	   shaped	   the	   scholarly	   debate	   on	   rebuilding	   post-­‐conflict	   societies	   are	  
particularly	  interesting.56	  Both	  authors	  are	  practitioners	  and	  their	  respective	  works	  provide	  
detailed	   comparative	   analyses	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   specific	   transitional	   justice	  
mechanisms	   in	   varying	   contexts.	   In	   Kritz’s	   edited	   volume	  mentioned	   earlier,	   for	   instance,	  
several	  authors	  describe	  different	  forms	  of	  transitional	   justice	  tools	  for	  states	   in	  transition	  
periods—including	   retributive	   and	   restorative	   mechanisms.	   Each	   tool	   is	   discussed	   and	  
illustrated	   by	   a	   different	   empirical	   case.	   Hayner,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   focuses	   only	   on	   one	  
mechanism:	  truth	  commissions.	  Nonetheless,	  she	  compares	  over	  two	  dozen	  empirical	  cases	  
in	  which	   truth	   and	   reconciliation	   commissions	   have	  been	  used	   in	   order	   to	   deal	  with	   past	  
human	   rights	   abuses	  or	  mass	   atrocities.	  Her	   cases	   range	   from	  countries	   in	   Latin	  America,	  
such	   as	   Peru	   or	   Argentina,	   to	  Asia,	   including	   South	   Korea	   and	   Indonesia,	   among	   others.57	  	  
Kritz’s	  volume	  was	  published	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  divide	  between	  scholars,	  practitioners	  and	  
activists	   whether	   justice—in	   its	   punitive	   form—trumps	   truth	   in	   terms	   of	   healing	   and	  
reconciliation.	   Hayner’s	   book	   was	   written	   shortly	   after	   a	   general	   scholarly	   consensus	  
emerged	  on	  the	   issue,	  which	  presented	  retributive	  and	  restorative	  mechanisms	  of	  dealing	  
with	   past	   atrocities	   as	   complementary	   tools.	   In	   both	   books,	   however,	   the	   normative	  
character	   of	   the	   research	   remains	   visible,	   as	   the	   ultimate	   goal	   of	   the	   rich	   empirical	  
comparative	   studies	   consists	   of	   examining	   cases	   from	   a	   policy	   and	   practitioners’	   view	   to	  
create	   tools	   for	   future	   post-­‐conflict	   and	   post-­‐authoritarian	   regime	   changes.	  
Notwithstanding,	   the	   politics	   of	   transitional	   justice—put	   differently,	   the	   complex	   political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Neil	  J.	  Kritz,	  Transitional	  Justice:	  How	  Emerging	  Democracies	  Reckon	  with	  Former	  Regimes	  (United	  States	  Institute	  
of	  Peace	  Press,	  1995);	  Priscilla	  B.	  Hayner,	  Unspeakable	  Truths:	  Confronting	  State	  Terror	  and	  Atrocity	  (Routledge,	  
2001).	  
57	  Hayner,	  Unspeakable	  Truths:	  Confronting	  State	  Terror	  and	  Atrocity,	  chap.	  4,	  5.	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dynamics	  that	  necessarily	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  way	  transitional	  justice	  policies	  and	  mechanisms	  
are	  put	  into	  place	  and	  implemented—stayed	  underexplored.	  	  
Other	  more	   recent	   transitional	   justice	   scholarship	  on	   the	   former	  Yugoslavia	  has	  produced	  
findings	  that	  address	  this	  issue,	  examining	  the	  politics	  of	  justice.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  chapters	  2	  
and	  3,	  Jelena	  Subotić’s	  Hijacked	  Justice:	  Dealing	  with	  the	  Past	   in	  the	  Balkans	  discusses	  the	  
politicization	   of	   the	   ICTY’s	   compliance	   requirements	   of	   prospective	   European	   Union	   (EU)	  
member	   states	   from	   the	  Western	   Balkans.58	   Another	   scholar,	   Victor	   Peskin	   reasons	   along	  
similar	   lines.	   In	   fact,	   Peskin	   compares	   state	   cooperation	   with	   the	   International	   Criminal	  
Tribunal	  for	  Rwanda	  (ICTR)	  and	  the	  ICTY.59	  He	  argues	  that	  
[t]hese	  ad	  hoc	  tribunals	  can	  effectively	  become	  victor’s	  courts	  insofar	  as	  the	  winners	  
of	  a	  conflict	  may	  be	  able	  to	  control	  a	  tribunal’s	  prosecutorial	  agenda.	  By	  the	  same	  
token,	   the	   losers	   of	   a	   conflict	   may	   be	   able	   to	   control	   the	   courts	   by	   blocking	  
investigations	  and	  prosecutions	  of	  their	  nationals.	  […	  To	  this	  end,	  his]	  book	  focuses	  
on	   two	   levels	   of	   such	   political	   activity	   beyond	   the	   courtroom:	   first,	   the	   political	  
struggles	   and	   negotiations	   between	   tribunal,	   state,	   and	   powerful	   international	  
community	  actors	  that	  occur	  prior	  to	  as	  well	  as	  during	  the	  courtroom	  trials;	  second,	  
the	  political	  struggles	  and	  negotiations	  within	  states.60	  
	  More	   precisely,	   Peskin	   examines	   why	   state	   cooperation	   with	   the	   ICTR	   has	   decreased	  
compared	  to	  a	  state	  cooperation	  increase	  with	  the	  ICTY	  over	  the	  years.	  For	  this,	  he	  analyzes	  
various	   relationships	   between	   powerful	   actors,	   including	   judges,	   politicians,	   government	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Jelena	  Subotić,	  Hijacked	  Justice:	  Dealing	  with	  the	  Past	  in	  the	  Balkans	  (Ithaca,	  London:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  
2009).	  
59	  Viktor	  Peskin,	  International	  Justice	  in	  Rwanda	  and	  the	  Balkans:	  Virtual	  Trials	  and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  State	  Cooperation	  
(Cambridge,	  NY:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008).	  
60	  Ibid.,	  6.	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representatives	  and	  diplomats,	  among	  others.	  His	  study,	  much	  as	  Subotić’s	  work	  (as	  we	  will	  
see	   later)	   focuses	   nonetheless	   on	   a	   state-­‐centrist	   perspective—mentioning	   civil	   society	  
efforts	   only	   fleetingly61—	   and	   therefore	   leaving	   the	   story	   of	   state-­‐society	   relations	   in	   the	  
dark.	  Both	  authors	  are	  part	  of	  a	  group	  of	  international	  relations	  scholars	  who	  have	  engaged	  
in	   transitional	   justice	   research	   that	   emphasizes	   agency	   centered	   around	   states	   and	  
international	  organizations	  as	  primary	  actors	  to	   implement	   international	  humanitarian	   law	  
on	   the	   international	   and	   domestic	   level.	   Interactive	   processes	   and	   the	   sociopolitical	  
dynamics	   between	   states	   and	   society	   are	   therefore	   of	   less	   interest	   to	   them.	   As	   Leslie	  
Vinjamuri	   and	   Jack	   Snyder	   put	   it,	   “international	   relations	   scholars	   have	   a	   wealth	   of	  
knowledge	  about	  the	  factors	  that	  shape	  the	  successes	  or	  failures	  of	  postwar	  reconstruction	  
efforts	  and	  nation	  building.	  	  Strategies	  of	  justice	  are	  one	  component	  of	  these	  frameworks.”62	  
Recent	   scholarship	   that	   focuses	   particularly	   on	   transitional	   justice	   processes	   in	   Latin	  
America	  has	   started	   to	  address	   issues	  of	   civil	   society	  and	   state-­‐society	   relations.	   Jo-­‐Marie	  
Burt,	  for	  instance,	  based	  on	  a	  Peruvian	  case	  study,	  explores	  the	  global	  norm	  shift	  in	  favor	  of	  
accountability	  for	  human	  rights	  violations	  and	  specific	  domestic	  factors	   in	  Peru	  that	   led	  to	  
the	  extradition	  and	  prosecution	  of	  former	  President	  Alberto	  Fujimori.63	  	  Her	  article	  
locates	   the	  Fujimori	   trial	   in	   this	  broader	   international	   context	  but	   suggests	   that	   to	  
fully	  understand	  the	  factors	  contributing	  to	  the	  successful	  prosecution	  of	  Fujimori,	  it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Ibid.,	  24.	  
62	  Leslie	  Vinjamuri	  and	  Jack	  Snyder,	  “Advocacy	  and	  Scholarship	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  International	  War	  Crime	  Tribunals	  and	  
Transitional	  Justice,”	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Political	  Science	  7,	  no.	  1	  (2004):	  359.	  
63	  A	  national	  court	  convicted	  him	  in	  2009	  for	  grave	  human	  rights	  abuses	  during	  his	  presidency	  from	  1990	  to	  2000.	  For	  
more	  information	  on	  Peru’s	  transition	  see	  chapter	  3.	  See	  also	  Jo-­‐Marie	  Burt,	  Political	  Violence	  and	  the	  Authoritarian	  
State	  in	  Peru:	  Silencing	  Civil	  Society	  (Palgrave	  MacMillan,	  2007).	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is	  necessary	  to	  examine	  the	  specific	   interactions	  between	  international	   institutions	  
and	   actors	   and	   domestic	   actors	   in	   Peru	   that	   expanded	   the	   opportunities	   for	   a	  
domestic	  accountability	  agenda.64	  	  
She	   describes	   how	   Peruvian	   civil	   society,	   in	   particular	   human	   rights	   and	   victims’	   groups,	  
have	  played	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   successful	   prosecution	  of	   the	   former	  head	  of	   state.	  
After	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Fujimori	  regime	  in	  2000,	  the	  new	  government	  was	  confronted	  with	  
a	   number	   of	   challenges,	   ranging	   from	   a	   problematic	   electoral	   system	   to	   direly	   needed	  
reforms	   in	   the	   corrupted	   legislature	   and	   judiciary.	   As	   a	   result,	   interim	   president	   Valentín	  
Paniagua	   put	   in	   place	   a	   special	   prosecutorial	   unit	   to	   investigate	   corruption	   cases.	   In	  
addition,	   Paniagua	   brought	   Peru	   back	   under	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court’s	   contentious	  
jurisdiction,	  from	  which	  in	  1999	  Fujimori	  withdrew	  Peru	  because	  he	  was	  angered	  about	  the	  
Court’s	  ruling	  on	  human	  rights	  cases.	  The	  new	  government	  also	  acknowledged	  the	  Peruvian	  
state’s	   responsibility	   in	   a	   series	   of	   human	   rights	   abuses	   committed	   under	   the	   Fujimori	  
regime.	  Yet,	  in	  light	  of	  the	  Peruvian	  judiciary’s	  inability	  to	  prosecute	  human	  rights	  cases	  due	  
to	  certain	  amnesty	  laws,	  a	  national	  human	  rights	  organization	  called	  Coordinadora	  Nacional	  
de	  Drechos	  Humanos65	  (Coordinadora)—who	  was	  established	  in	  1985	  and	  has	  a	  long	  history	  
of	  advocating	  for	  human	  rights	  and	  democracy—started	  lobbying	  for	  cases	  to	  be	  heard	  by	  
the	   Inter-­‐American	   Court.	  Meanwhile,	   the	   Coordinadora	   also	   built	   up	   the	  momentum	   to	  
create	  a	  national	  truth	  commission.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  these	  debates,	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  Jo-­‐Marie	  Burt,	  “Guilty	  as	  Charged:	  The	  Trial	  of	  Former	  Peruvian	  President	  Alberto	  Fujimori	  for	  Human	  Rights	  
Violations,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Transitional	  Justice	  3,	  no.	  3	  (2009):	  385.	  
65	  The	  English	  translation	  is	  National	  Human	  Rights	  Coordinator.	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ruled	  that	  the	  Peruvian	  state	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  Barrios	  Altos	  massacre	  in	  1991.66	  The	  
ruling	  had	  drastic	  consequences.	  As	  Burt	  candidly	  put	  it:	  	  
The	  ruling	  effectively	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  prosecutors	  and	  judges	  to	  pursue	  human	  
rights	  cases	  in	  court.	  Two	  weeks	  after	  the	  ruling,	  a	  judge	  ordered	  the	  arrest	  of	  two	  
army	  generals	  and	  11	  members	  of	  the	  Colina	  Group	  death	  squad	  implicated	  in	  the	  
Barrios	  Altos	  massacre.67	  
Her	   article	   therefore	   nicely	   illustrates	   how	   contrary	   to	   the	   case	   of	   international	   tribunals	  
such	  as	   those	  of	   the	   former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Rwanda	   (with	   their	   remoteness	   to	  crime	  sites	  
and	   international	   judges,	   among	   other	   factors)	   Peruvian	   domestic	   actors	   were	   able	   to	  
construct	   local	   ownership	   of	   these	   processes.	   Other	   studies	   have	   also	   underlined	   the	  
importance	  of	  local	  actors	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  and	  post-­‐authoritarian	  contexts.	  	  
A	  comparative	  study	  Post-­‐Transitional	  Justice:	  Human	  Rights	  Trials	   in	  Chile	  and	  el	  Salvador	  
by	  Cath	  Collins,	  for	  example,	  provides	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  struggle	  for	  justice	  in	  the	  
aftermath	   of	   political	   violence	   and	  mass	   atrocity.68	   In	   her	   comparison	   she	   underlines	   the	  
importance	  of	  domestic	   transitional	   justice	   initiatives	  carried	  out	  by	   local	  actors,	   including	  
human	  rights	  activists	  and	  victims.	  As	  her	  title	  “post-­‐transitional	  justice”	  indicates,	  she	  also	  
introduces	  a	  new	  conceptual	  framework	  that	  goes	  beyond	  the	  transitional	  justice	  models	  of	  
the	   1980s	   and	   more	   recent	   theories,	   such	   as	   the	   “justice	   cascade”	   or	   the	   “boomerang	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  The	  Barrios	  Altos	  massacre	  took	  place	  on	  November	  3,	  1991	  when	  members	  of	  a	  death	  squad	  called	  Colina	  Group—
a	  part	  of	  the	  Peruvian	  Armed	  Forces—killed	  over	  a	  dozen	  people,	  including	  an	  eight-­‐year-­‐old	  child,	  who	  were	  
mistaken	  for	  Shining	  Path	  rebels,	  a	  Maoist	  paramilitary	  organization.	  
67	  Burt,	  “Guilty	  as	  Charged:	  The	  Trial	  of	  Former	  Peruvian	  President	  Alberto	  Fujimori	  for	  Human	  Rights	  Violations,”	  390.	  
68	  Cath	  Collins,	  Post-­‐Transitional	  Justice:	  Human	  Rights	  Trials	  in	  Chile	  and	  El	  Salvador	  (Pennsylvania	  State	  University	  
Press,	  2011).	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effect,”	  which	  underlines	  the	  role	  of	   international	   law	  in	  national	  courts	  and	  transnational	  
civil	  society	  actors	  to	  advocate	  for	  accountability	  on	  the	  domestic	  level.69	  	  In	  fact,	  her	  book	  
“adopts	  a	  more	  agnostic	  approach	  to	  claims	  that	  transitional	  factors	  drive	  national	  events,	  
be	  it	  in	  legal	  activism,	  government	  policy,	  or	  judicial	  performance.”70	  To	  this	  end,	  she	  traces	  
the	  domestic	  evolution	  of	  accountability	  issues	  and	  shows	  that	  	  
the	  interaction	  of	  domestic	  actors	  with	  local	  judicial	  institutions	  provides	  a	  delimited	  
and	  accessible	  field	  of	  inquiry	  within	  which	  elements	  of	  change	  and	  continuity	  over	  
time	   can	   be	   identified.	   Transnationalized	   cases	   can	   then	   be	   viewed	   as	   part	   of	   a	  
succession	  or	  trajectory	  of	  accountability	  events	  in	  specific	  settings.71	  
According	  to	  Collins,	  domestic	  human	  rights	  organizations	  play	  therefore	  an	  important	  role	  
in	  transnationalized	  accountability	  cases.72	  	  
Moreover,	   Naomi	   Roht-­‐Arriaza’s	   The	   Pinochet	   Effect:	   Transitional	   Justice	   in	   the	   Age	   of	  
Human	   Rights	   is	   an	   important	   contribution	   to	   transnational	   mobilization,	   examining	   the	  
challenges	   in	  bringing	  human	  rights	  violators	  to	   justice	   in	  their	  home	  country.	  Drawing	  on	  
the	  landmark	  Pinochet	  case,	  she	  explores	  the	  questions	  of	  extradition	  and	  universal	  justice	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  For	  a	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  the	  cascade	  model	  see	  Ellen	  Lutz	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  “The	  Justice	  Cascade:	  The	  
Evolution	  and	  Impact	  of	  Foreign	  Human	  Rights	  Trials	  in	  Latin	  America,”	  Chicago	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  2	  (2001):	  
1.	  For	  the	  “boomerang	  model”	  see	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  Activists	  Beyond	  Borders:	  Advocacy	  Networks	  in	  International	  
Politics.	  Both	  concepts	  are	  further	  elaborated	  in	  chapter	  2.	  
70	  Collins,	  Post-­‐Transitional	  Justice:	  Human	  Rights	  Trials	  in	  Chile	  and	  El	  Salvador,	  26.	  
71	  Ibid.	  
72	  For	  similar	  research	  see	  for	  instance	  Jo-­‐Marie	  Burt,	  “Impunity	  and	  Accountability:	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Transitional	  
Justice	  Struggles	  in	  Latin	  America,”	  in	  Human	  Rights:	  Challenges	  of	  the	  Past	  and	  Challenges	  for	  the	  Future,	  ed.	  
Katherine	  Hite	  and	  Mark	  Ungar	  (Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  2012);	  Phil	  Clark,	  Critical	  Perspectives	  in	  Transitional	  
Justice	  (Insentia,	  2012);	  Victoria	  Sanford,	  Buried	  Secrets:	  Truth	  and	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Guatemala	  (Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  
2003).	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and	   discusses	   the	   role	   of	   transnational	   prosecutions	   in	   national	   courts	   of	   countries	   other	  
than	  those	  where	  the	  crimes	  took	  place.	  73	  	  
Naomi	   Roht-­‐Arriaza	   also	   published	   a	   co-­‐edited	   volume	   with	   Javier	   Mariezcurrena,	  
Transitional	  Justice	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century:	  Beyond	  Truth	  Versus	  Justice,	  in	  which	  over	  a	  
dozen	   pracademics	   provide	   in-­‐depth	   case	   studies	   of	   ten	   different	   countries	   to	   illustrate	  
various	   institutions	   and	   actors	   involved	   in	   transitional	   justice	   processes,	   describe	  
community-­‐level	   initiatives,	  and	  analyze	  traditional	   instruments,	  among	  other	  post-­‐conflict	  
justice	  mechanisms.	  The	  authors	  of	  this	  edited	  volume	  argue	  that	  more	  recent	  transitional	  
justice	  efforts	   face	   challenges	   to	   legitimacy	  and	   local	  ownership	   in	  post-­‐conflict	   and	  post-­‐
authoritarian	   transitions.74	   My	   study,	   which	   focuses	   on	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia,	   builds	   on	  
these	  new	  research	  trends	  and	  examines	  the	  protagonistic	  role	  of	  human	  rights	  activists	  in	  
challenging	  existing	   transitional	   justice	  models	   that	  emphasize	   international	   and	  domestic	  
war	   crimes	   trials	   over	   restorative	   justice	   mechanisms.	   Below	   I	   summarize	   each	   of	   my	  
chapters	  and	  outline	  the	  specific	  issues	  that	  are	  addressed	  in	  each	  of	  them.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Naomi	  Roht-­‐Arriaza,	  The	  Pinochet	  Effect:	  Transnational	  Justice	  In	  The	  Age	  Of	  Human	  Rights	  (University	  of	  
Pennsylvania	  Press,	  2005).	  
74	  Naomi	  Roht-­‐Arriaza	  and	  Javier	  Mariezcurrena,	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century:	  Beyond	  Truth	  Versus	  
Justice	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006).	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Chapter	  Outline	  
As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  this	  introductory	  chapter,	  scholarship	  on	  global	  accountability	  efforts	  for	  
mass	  atrocities,	  state	  violence,	  and	  grave	  human	  rights	  violations	  has	  been	  bourgeoning	  in	  
the	  last	  few	  decades.	  In	  recent	  years,	  the	  field	  of	  transitional	  justice	  research	  has	  integrated	  
alternative	  approaches	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  such	  as	  anthropology,	  arts,	  or	  cultural	  studies.	  
Political	  science	  has	  also	  emerged	  among	  the	  disciplines.	  Yet,	  as	  noted	  above,	  more	  political	  
science	   scholarship	   that	   embraces	   these	   new	   transitional	   contexts	   and	   analyzes	   the	  
conditions	   in	  post-­‐conflict	   societies	   to	  better	  understand	   the	  differences	   in	   the	  politics	  of	  
justice	  needed.	  Chapter	  2	  therefore	  introduces	  the	  analytical	  tools	  from	  political	  sociology—
the	   analysis	   of	   the	   relations	   between	   state	   and	   society,	   particularly	   advanced	   by	   political	  
scientists	   and	   social	   scientists,	   such	   as	  Max	  Weber,	   Luc	   Boltanski	   and	   Barrington	  Moore,	  
among	  others—to	  provide	  the	  tools	  for	  this	  study	  to	  analyze	  the	  international	  networks	  and	  
groups	   producing	   legal	   knowledge,	   their	   practices	   and	   goals,	   and	   the	   relationship	   these	  
driving	  forces	  sustain	  among	  national	  and	  local	  practitioners	  and	  activists.	  The	  combination	  
of	   two	   qualitative	   research	   methods,	   participant	   observation	   and	   narrative	   interviews,	  
provide	  suitable	  tools	  to	  tackle	  these	  analytical	  and	  methodological	  challenges.	  Drawing	  on	  
the	   former,	   I	   observe	  human	   rights	   and	   judicial	   actors	   in	   different	   environments,	   such	   as	  
conferences,	  meetings,	   trials	   and	   hearings,	   while	   they	   perform	   or	   discuss	   retributive	   and	  
restorative	   justice	  practices	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  both.	  The	   latter,	   complementing	   the	   first	  
method,	   consists	  of	   formal	  and	   informal	   in-­‐depth	   conversations	  with	  key	   individuals	   from	  
human	   rights	   organizations,	   judicial	   institutions	   and	   governments,	   among	   others.	   	   I	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demonstrate	  that	  this	  framework	  provides	  a	  flexible	  and	  contextually	  adaptable	  set	  of	  tools	  
to	  analyze	  different,	   intersecting	   spaces	  and	   the	   role	  of	  key	  actors	  within	   these	   spaces	   to	  
help	  understand	  current	  practices	  of	  truth	  and	  justice	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  settings.	  Additionally	  
it	   helps	   explain	   why	   the	   recent	   fact-­‐finding	   initiative	   has	   thus	   far	   been	   unsuccessful	   to	  
create	  a	  regional	  truth	  commission.	  
In	  the	  first	  two	  chapters,	  I	  introduced	  some	  of	  the	  fundamental	  social	  differences	  between	  
the	   professional	   habitus	   of	   legal	   practitioners	   and	   human	   rights	   activists.	   	   In	   chapter	   3,	   I	  
expand	   this	  discussion,	  providing	   some	  of	   the	   ‘socio-­‐legal’	   context	   in	  which	  current	  NGOs	  
engage	   in	   transitional	   justice	   initiatives	   against	   war	   crimes	   in	   the	   region.	   In	   fact,	   their	  
activities	   and	   prevailing	   struggles	   to	   promote	   accountability	   efforts	   are	   conditioned	   by	   a	  
problematic	  evolution	  of	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  that	  the	  ICTY	  spearheaded	  in	  order	  
to	   promote	   international	   criminal	   law	   not	   only	   across	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia,	   but	   also	  
around	   the	   world.	   The	   continuous	   difficulties	   the	   ICTY	   faced	   when	   putting	   into	   practice	  
international	   humanitarian	   law	   on	   the	   ground	   finally	   helped	   increase	   the	   role	   of	   human	  
rights	  activists	  and	  NGOs	  in	  the	  field	  of	  transitional	  justice.	  The	  next	  two	  chapters	  therefore	  
trace	  the	  increasing	  importance	  of	  these	  actors	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  development	  of	  the	  
ICTY’s	  activities.	  	  
Far	  from	  being	  a	  linear	  and	  smooth	  process	  of	  applying	  legal	  norms	  to	  a	  war-­‐torn	  area	  with	  
the	  goal	  of	  restoring	  peace	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  conflict	  zone,	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  UN	  ad	  hoc	  
tribunal	  was	  beset	  by	  numerous	  difficulties.	  Some	  are	  more	  obvious	  than	  others.	  The	  idea	  of	  
an	  international	  court	  in	  charge	  of	  sentencing	  war	  criminals	  and	  human	  rights	  violators,	  for	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instance,	   infringes	   on	   state	   sovereignty	   and	   therefore	   required	   a	   UN	   Security	   Council	  
resolution	  supported	  by	   its	  members.	   In	  addition	  to	  supranational	   legal	   issues,	   in	  order	  to	  
try	  alleged	  perpetrators	  the	  legal	  procedures	  at	  the	  tribunal	  had	  to	  be	  defined	  and	  applied.	  
This	   task	  was	  easier	   to	  conceptualize	  than	  to	  put	   into	  practice.	  While	   the	  above	  obstacles	  
concern	   issues	  at	   the	   international	   level,	   the	   implementation	  of	   these	   legal	  concepts	  on	  a	  
national	   level—such	   as	   the	   ICTY	   request	   urging	   to	   governments	   to	   cooperate	   with	   the	  
tribunal	  and	  to	  prosecute	  their	  own	  war	  criminals	  under	  domestic	  jurisdiction—constitutes	  
yet	  another	  set	  of	  problems	  that	  still	  needs	  to	  be	  solved.	  Interestingly,	  it	  is	  this	  state-­‐centric	  
logic	  that	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  basic	  problems	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  democratizing	  human	  rights	  
issues	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  Chapter	  3	  looks	  therefore	  at	  some	  of	  the	  initial	  problems	  international	  
lawyers	   had	   to	   grapple	   with	   while	   advocating	   for	   an	   international	   tribunal	   to	   stop	   the	  
conflict	   in	   the	   former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  deter	   further	  violence.	   In	   this	   context,	   I	   also	  explain	  
their	  early	  reticence	  to	  rely	  on	  truth	  commissions.	  Moreover,	  I	  analyze	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  UN	  
tribunal	  after	  over	  16	  years	  of	  operation,	  in	  order	  to	  outline	  changes	  in	  legal	  practices	  and	  
ideologies.	   Last,	   I	   focus	   on	   issues	   encountered	   at	   the	   national	   level	   when	   applying	  
international	  humanitarian	  law	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  relying	  on	  a	  case	  study	  of	  Croatia.	  	  
Chapter	   4	   addresses	   the	  difficulties	   the	   ICTY	   faced	   and	   the	   increasingly	   important	   role	   of	  
human	  rights	  activists	  to	  cope	  with	  these	  challenges.	  In	  fact,	  the	  selective	  case	  choice	  by	  the	  
ICTY—guided	   by	   the	   need	   to	   establish	   precedents	   in	   international	   criminal	   law,	   including	  
precedents	   on	   chain	   of	   command,	   genocide,	   and	   rape,	   among	   the	   most	   important	   war	  
crimes—and	  the	  problematic	  use	  of	  witnesses	  during	  court	  hearings	  caught	  the	  attention	  of	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human	  rights	  advocates.	  Indeed,	  the	  ICTY	  trial	  record	  illustrates	  the	  great	  importance	  judges	  
and	  prosecutors	  accorded	  to	  international	  humanitarian	  law,	  applied	  from	  the	  top	  down	  in	  
the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  The	  intention	  of	  the	  tribunal	  was	  to	  leave	  behind	  a	  normative	  legacy	  
that	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  cases	  of	  mass	  atrocities	  worldwide.	  Yet,	  such	  a	  strategy	  has	  left	  the	  
voices	  of	  many	  victims	  silent	  or	  diminished	   in	   importance.	   	  For	  a	   large	  number	  of	  victims,	  
their	  cases	  could	  not	  be	  processed	  due	  to	  the	   limited	  procedural	  capacity	  of	  the	   ICTY.	  For	  
others,	  who	  had	  the	  chance	  to	  testify	  in	  front	  of	  the	  tribunal,	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  issues	  have	  
arisen.	  These	  issues	  range	  from	  post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  disorders	  to	  death	  threats	  upon	  their	  
return	  home.	  	  
To	  this	  end,	  chapter	  4	  focuses	  in	  particular	  on	  those	  victims	  who	  were	  called	  to	  testify	  and	  
consequently	  had	  to	  face	  some	  of	  the	  above	  issues.	  Drawing	  on	  examples	  of	  NGO	  programs	  
centered	   around	   witness	   protection,	   including	   support	   in	   The	   Hague	   and	   in	   the	   home	  
country	   of	   the	   witnesses,	   this	   chapter	   explores	   the	   understanding	   of	   international	   war	  
crimes	   law	   that	   activists	   have	   gained	   since	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   ICTY	   and	   how	   they	   have	  
integrated	  the	  normative	  work	  of	   the	  court	   in	  their	  own	  agenda	  to	  promote	  the	  voices	  of	  
victims	   in	  society.	  Based	  on	  some	  of	   the	  difficulties	  witnesses	   in	  war	  crimes	   trials	  have	   to	  
face,	   I	   first	   describe	   the	   challenges	   for	   NGOs	   providing	   support	   in	   this	   context.	   Then	   I	  
conceptualize	   the	   changing	   meaning	   of	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   from	   a	   grand	  
narrative,	   promoted	  by	   the	   ICTY,	   to	   individualized	   stories	   of	   victims	   supported	   by	   human	  
rights	  activists.	  Last,	  I	  discuss	  a	  general	  trend	  shift	  in	  transitional	  justice	  strategies	  in	  which	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restorative	   justice	  mechanisms	  have	  found	  their	  place	  within	  the	  broader	  discourse	  of	  the	  
ICTY’s	  retributive	  justice	  approach.	  
After	  discussing	  the	  difficulties	  of	  retributive	  justice	  mechanisms	  to	  cope	  with	  past	  atrocities	  
in	  chapters	  3	  and	  4,	  chapter	  5	  turns	  to	  restorative	  justice	  initiatives.	  These	  initiatives	  include	  
truth-­‐seeking	  projects,	  documentation	  of	  testimonies	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  historic	  memory,	  
which	  have	  found	  their	  way	  onto	  the	  agenda	  of	  NGO	  activities	  in	  the	  region	  of	  the	  former	  
Yugoslavia.	   However,	   after	   several	   unsuccessful	   attempts	   in	   the	   past—including	   a	   highly	  
politicized	  pseudo	  truth	  commission	  in	  Serbia	  between	  2002-­‐2003	  and	  several	  initiatives	  in	  
BiH	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s	  that	  did	  not	  result	  in	  any	  tangible	  progress	  over	  the	  past	  15	  
years—the	  current	  regional	   initiative	  of	  RECOM,	  which	  will	   include	  all	  states	  of	  the	  former	  
Yugoslavia,	  also	   faces	   serious	  problems.	  Referring	   to	  human	  rights	  activists’	   initial	  witness	  
protection	  work	  from	  Chapter	  3,	   I	  employ	  concepts	  of	  sociology	  of	  spaces—which	  focuses	  
on	   the	   creation	   of	   spaces	   through	   action	   and	   the	   interdependence	   of	   action	   on	   spatial	  
structures—to	   illustrate	   how	   activists	   move	   between	   different	   spaces	   constituted	   by	  
narratives	   of	   justice	   and	   truth.	   This	   chapter	   analyzes	   thus	   the	   structural	   and	   institutional	  
challenges	  of	  human	  rights	  advocates	  to	  promote	  this	  regional	  restorative	  justice	  initiative.	  I	  
have	  organized	  it	  in	  three	  sections.	  First,	  I	  describe	  the	  continuous	  struggle	  of	  human	  rights	  
activists	  to	  create	  a	  transnational	  extra-­‐legal	  space—such	  as	  a	  regional	  fact-­‐seeking	  body—
to	   deal	   with	   the	   past	   across	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia.	   I	   particularly	   focus	   on	   internal	   and	  
external	   obstacles	   the	  movement	   faces.	   Second,	   I	   discuss	   issues	   of	  multiple	   narratives	   of	  
victimhood,	  partly	  because	  of	  the	  transnational	  character	  of	  the	  restorative	  justice	  efforts.	  I	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draw	   on	   several	   different	   empirical	   cases	   for	   this.	   Third,	   I	   examine	   the	   issue	   of	   framing,	  
which	  is	  practiced	  by	  the	  main	  NGO	  actors	  during	  the	  RECOM	  campaign—in	  other	  words	  the	  
strategy	  to	  mobilize	  the	  widest	  possible	  support	  base—which	  comes	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  watering	  
down	  their	  discourse	  for	  their	  cause.	  
While	  the	  previous	  chapters	  revealed	  the	  problematic	  rise	  of	  restorative	  justice	  mechanisms	  
in	  the	  region,	  chapter	  6	  explores	  the	  legalist	   influence	  on	  truth	  commissions	  by	  examining	  
the	  RECOM	  Initiative.	   In	   fact,	  at	   least	  on	  a	  conceptual	   level,	   truth	  commissions	  have	  been	  
integrated	  into	  a	  broader	  legalistic	  framework.	  In	  the	  legal	  world,	  truth-­‐seeking	  bodies	  have	  
found	   supporters	   consisting	   of	   lawyers,	   judges	   and	   prosecutors,	   who	   acknowledge	   their	  
complementary	  character	  (see	  ideological	  shift	  of	  the	  truth	  versus	  justice	  debate	  in	  chapter	  
4).	   Rather	   than	   discussing	   the	   normative	   stakes	   of	   this	   debate,	   however,	   this	   chapter	  
analyzes	   and	   discusses	   the	   draft	   statute	   of	   the	   regional	   RECOM	   initiative	   to	   trace	   the	  
influence	   of	   legal	   concepts	   on	   grassroots	   advocacy	   and	   point	   to	   persisting	   challenges.	  
Indeed,	   recent	   fact-­‐finding	   and	   documenting	   projects,	   such	   as	   RECOM,	   illustrate	   the	  
creation	  and	  expansion	  of	   so-­‐called	   truth	   spaces	  by	   activists.	   In	   the	   constitution	  phase	  of	  
these	   spaces,	   put	   differently,	   the	   consultation	  meetings	   to	   establish	   the	  mandate	   for	   the	  
RECOM	   commission,	   stakeholders	   (including	   activists,	   practitioners,	   representatives	   and	  
experts)	  rely	  on	  tangible	  and	  practicable	  legal	  instruments.	  	  
The	  dominance	  of	  legal	  concepts	  in	  institutionalizing	  fact-­‐finding	  measures,	  however,	  raises	  
questions	   about	   the	   influence	   and	   consequences	   of	   “hard”	   justice	   (such	   as	   retributive	  
mechanisms)	   on	   “soft”	   justice	   (such	   as	   restorative	   tools,	   including	   truth	   commissions).	   In	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fact,	   human	   rights	   activists’	   attempt	   to	   create	   a	   deliberate	   space	   for	   victims	  within	   state	  
institutions—which	   initially	   integrated	   views	   and	   opinions	   from	   the	   grassroots	   base—has	  
become	  a	  technical	  and	  legalist	  process	  removed	  from	  local	  needs.	  A	  phenomenon	  I	  refer	  to	  
as	  the	  legalization	  of	  truth	  spaces.	  Despite	  depoliticization	  attempts,	  activists	  still	  face	  highly	  
politicized	   grounds.	   Indeed,	   politically,	   their	   goal	   remains	   highly	   disputed,	   preventing	  
current	   national	   parliaments	   from	   passing	   the	   required	   legislation	   to	   create	   the	   legal	  
framework	  for	  the	  body.	  The	  varying	  sociopolitical,	  geographical	  and	  historical	  contexts	  of	  
each	  of	  the	  countries	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  in	  which	  the	  RECOM	  body	  will	  operate,	  casts	  
therefore	  shadow	  over	  the	  important	  bottom-­‐up	  efforts	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  past.	  Although	  the	  
relationship	  between	  human	  rights	  activists	  and	  judicial	  practitioners	  is	  complementary,	  this	  
phenomenon	   illustrates	   the	   continuous	   political	   struggle	   of	   the	   former	   to	   institutionalize	  
alternative	  transitional	  justice	  mechanisms.	  
In	   line	   with	   the	   argument	   of	   democratizing	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   in	   my	   earlier	  
chapters,	   chapter	   7	   concentrates	   on	   the	   cost	   of	   justice	   and	   the	   politics	   of	   transitional	  
accountability	  efforts,	  by	  investigating	  the	  role	  that	  human	  rights	  activists	  play	  in	  it.	  Drawing	  
on	  a	  case	  study	  of	  BiH,	  I	  compare	  two	  main	  funders	  of	  transitional	  justice	  initiatives,	  Norway	  
and	  Sweden,	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  donors	  integrate	  civil	  society	  and	  local	  
actors	  in	  their	  funding	  projects.	  Despite	  several	  report	  recommendations	  stating	  otherwise,	  
both,	  Norway	  and	  Sweden,	  have	  kept	  a	  state-­‐centric	  top-­‐down	  approach—disbursing	  grants	  
to	  their	  respective	  domestic	  non-­‐profit	  organizations.	  Contrary	  to	  Norway,	  Sweden’s	  policy	  
strategy	  foresees	  a	  stronger	  streamlining	  with	  the	  EU	  enlargement	  agenda.	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These	   aid	   strategies,	   however,	   face	   a	   number	   of	   challenges	   and	   affect	   the	   promotion	   of	  
more	  holistic	   transitional	   justice	   projects	   in	   BiH.	  As	   a	   consequence,	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   broader	  
transnational	   justice	   strategy	   in	   BiH—which	   could	   complement	   the	   2008	   national	   war	  
crimes	  strategy,	  whose	  goal	   is	   to	   improve	  the	  efficiency	  of	  BiH’s	   judiciary—restricts	  donor	  
investments	   mainly	   to	   state	   institutions.	   Hence,	   strengthening	   ties	   with	   NGOs	   and	   local	  
actors	  therefore	  remains	  very	   limited.	   In	   fact,	   initially	  government	  development	  strategies	  
were	  not	  tailored	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  local	  project	  funding.	  Over	  the	  years,	  donor	  governments	  
have	  nonetheless	   attempted	   to	   target	   their	   aid	   and	   strategies	  more	  effectively.	   Yet,	   their	  
current	  policy	  approaches	  remain	  focused	  on	  cooperation	  with	  state	   institutions	  and	  have	  
difficulties	  reaching	  local	  civil	  society	  actors’	  projects.	  
In	  my	  conclusion	  I	  point	  to	  future	  research	  projects	  that	  analyze	  the	  EU	  integration	  process	  
of	   the	  Western	   Balkans	   and	   transitional	   justice	   strategies	   that	   go	   beyond	   the	   initial	   ICTY	  
cooperation	   requirements.	   Moreover,	   I	   point	   to	   possible	   comparative	   research	   agendas	  
including	   for	   instance	   country	   studies	   such	  as	  Colombia,	   South	  America,	   to	  draw	  parallels	  
and	   highlight	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   transition	   and	   accountability	   efforts	   in	   the	  
Balkans	  and	  a	  country	  in	  which	  continuous	  low-­‐intensity	  conflict	  has	  hampered	  processes	  to	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“Analysts	  who	  rigidify	  the	  analytic	  process	  are	  like	  artists	  who	  try	  too	  hard.	  Although	  their	  
creations	  might	  be	  technically	  correct,	  they	  fail	  to	  capture	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  objects	  




As	   already	   discussed	   in	   detail	   in	   chapter	   1,	   within	   the	   past	   few	   decades,	   scholarship	   on	  
global	   accountability	   efforts	   for	   mass	   atrocities,	   state	   violence	   and	   grave	   human	   rights	  
violations	   has	   emerged	   from	   a	   political	   science	   literature	   concerned	   with	   democratic	  
transition	   processes2	   and	   an	   incremental	   consolidation	   of	   human	   rights	   law	   studies	   and	  
practice.3	   Coined	   “transitional	   justice”	   by	   a	   handful	   of	   scholars4,	   research	   on	   this	   topic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Anselm	  L.	  Strauss	  and	  Juliet	  M.	  Corbin,	  Basics	  of	  Qualitative	  Research:	  Techniques	  and	  Procedures	  for	  Developing	  
Grounded	  Theory	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage	  Publications,	  Inc,	  1998),	  129.	  
2	  Dankwart	  Rustow,	  “Transitions	  to	  Democracy,”	  Comparative	  Politics	  2,	  no.	  3	  (1970):	  337–363;	  Samuel	  P.	  Huntington,	  
Political	  Order	  in	  Changing	  Societies	  (Yale	  University	  Press,	  1968);	  Elster,	  Closing	  the	  Books:	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  
Historical	  Perspective;	  Huntington,	  The	  Third	  Wave:	  Democratization	  in	  the	  Late	  Twentieth	  Century;	  Linz	  and	  Stepan,	  
Problems	  of	  Democratic	  Transition	  and	  Consolidation:	  Southern	  Europe,	  South	  America,	  and	  Post-­‐Communist	  Europe.	  
3	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  violence	  and	  seeking	  some	  form	  of	  accountability	  in	  times	  of	  regime	  
change	  has	  been	  a	  frequent	  practice	  in	  history	  Elster,	  Closing	  the	  Books:	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Historical	  Perspective.	  
However,	  the	  study	  of	  this	  phenomenon,	  particularly	  the	  relationship	  between	  human	  rights	  law,	  political	  and	  
institutional	  transformations	  and	  society	  emerged	  more	  recently.	  For	  a	  critical	  and	  philosophical	  analysis	  of	  the	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proliferated,	   including	  not	  only	  scholars,	  but	  also	  practitioners	  and	  activists	   from	  different	  
fields,	  which	  range	  from	  legal	  studies	  to	  psychology.5	  Despite	  this	  diversity,	  dominant	  trends	  
in	  the	  study	  of	  these	  phenomena	  remain	  visible,	  such	  as	  the	  heavy	  influence	  of	  legalism—
which	  sets	  apart	  legal	  analysis	  from	  social	  or	  political	  sciences	  research6—and	  an	  inclination	  
to	  employ	  large	  data	  aggregation	  and	  quantitative	  studies	  7	  in	  the	  literature.	  Fortunately	  as	  
mentioned	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   legal	   scholars,	   such	   as	   Ruti	   Teitel,	   who	   work	   at	   the	  
borderlines	  of	   their	  discipline	  are	  aware	  of	   the	   lack	  of	   research	  between	  politics,	   law	  and	  
society	  8,	  and	  thus,	  joining	  the	  ranks	  of	  growing	  community	  of	  scholars	  who	  have	  decided	  to	  
emphasize	  the	  process	  character	  of	  transitional	  justice	  phenomena	  in	  society	  and	  who	  rely	  
on	   sociological	   and	  ethnographic	   tools	   to	  do	   so.9	  Building	  on	   the	   latter	  methodology,	   this	  
study	   takes	   a	   qualitative	   approach.	   While	   portraying	   a	   thick	   and	   in-­‐depth	   picture	   of	  
transitional	  justice	  processes,	  it	  also	  sketches	  and	  interprets	  the	  politics	  that	  are	  at	  stake.	  It	  
focuses	  on	  and	  analyzes	  the	  international	  networks	  and	  groups	  producing	  legal	  knowledge,	  
their	  practices	  and	  goals,	  and	  the	  relationship	  these	  driving	  forces	  sustain	  with	  national	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
evolution	  of	  human	  rights	  cf.	  Costas	  Douzinas,	  “The	  End	  (s)	  of	  Human	  Rights,”	  Melbourne	  University	  Law	  Review	  26	  
(2002):	  445.	  
4	  Huntington,	  The	  Third	  Wave:	  Democratization	  in	  the	  Late	  Twentieth	  Century;	  Kritz,	  Transitional	  Justice:	  How	  
Emerging	  Democracies	  Reckon	  with	  Former	  Regimes;	  Teitel,	  Transitional	  Justice.	  
5	  Vinjamuri	  and	  Snyder,	  “Advocacy	  and	  Scholarship	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  International	  War	  Crime	  Tribunals	  and	  Transitional	  
Justice”;	  Christine	  Bell,	  Colm	  Campbell,	  and	  Fionnuala	  Ní	  Aoláin,	  “Transitional	  Justice:(Re)	  Conceptualising	  the	  Field,”	  
International	  Journal	  of	  Law	  in	  Context	  3,	  no.	  2	  (2007):	  81–88.	  
6	  Shklar	  in	  Kieran	  McEvoy,	  “Beyond	  Legalism:	  Towards	  a	  Thicker	  Understanding	  of	  Transitional	  Justice,”	  Journal	  of	  Law	  
and	  Society	  34,	  no.	  4	  (2007):	  414.	  
7	  Tricia	  D.	  Olsen,	  Leigh	  A.	  Payne,	  and	  Andrew	  G.	  Reiter,	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Balance:	  Comparing	  Processes,	  
Weighing	  Efficacy	  (Washington,	  DC:	  United	  States	  Institute	  of	  Peace,	  2010);	  David	  Backer,	  “Understanding	  Victim’s	  
Justice:	  Evidence	  from	  Five	  Countries	  in	  African	  Countries,”	  in	  Conference	  “Accountability	  After	  Mass	  Atrocity:	  Latin	  
American	  And	  African	  Examples	  In	  Comparative	  Perspective”	  May	  6	  (Washington,	  DC,	  2009);	  Kathryn	  Sikkink	  and	  
Carrie	  B.	  Walling,	  “Errors	  About	  Trials:	  The	  Emergence	  and	  Impact	  of	  the	  Justice	  Cascade”	  (Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  
Princeton	  International	  Relations	  Faculty	  Colloquium,	  March	  27,	  2006).	  
8	  “Transitional	  Justice	  Genealogy,”	  85.	  
9	  Leigh	  Payne,	  Unsettling	  Accounts:	  Neither	  Truth	  nor	  Reconciliation	  in	  Confessions	  of	  State	  Violence	  (Duke	  University	  
Press,	  2008);	  Roht-­‐Arriaza,	  The	  Pinochet	  Effect:	  Transnational	  Justice	  In	  The	  Age	  Of	  Human	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local	   practitioners	   and	   activists.	   In	   order	   to	   analyze	   the	   politics	   of	   justice	   in	   these	   spaces	  
from	  a	  political	  science	  perspective	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  some	  methodological	  adjustments	  
are	   necessary.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   I	   employ	   two	   analytical	   tools,	   one	   based	   on	  
anthropological	  research	  and	  the	  other	  one	  drawing	  from	  sociological	  analysis:	  participant	  
observation	  and	  narrative	  interviews.	  
In	  fact,	  human	  rights	  and	  justice	  are	  not	  universal	  categories,	  but	  social	  constructs	  that	  are	  
created,	  employed	  and	  appropriated	  by	  each	  social	  actor	  according	  to	  their	  context,	  needs	  
and	   goals.	   Post-­‐conflict	   and	   accountability	   efforts	   in	   the	   Balkans	   reveal	   the	   difficulties	  
international	  and	  national	   judicial	  actors	  and	  human	  rights	  activists	   face	  when	  performing	  
their	   activities.	   Interestingly,	   the	   initial	   scholarship	   in	   transitional	   justice	   centered	   around	  
conceptions	  of	  justice	  and	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  war	  criminals	  and	  perpetrators	  of	  gross	  human	  
rights	  violations	   in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  II.10	   In	   its	  early	  epistemology	  the	  field	  thus	  
explored	   particularly	   the	   conceptual	   underpinnings	   of	   the	   war	   crimes	   and	   human	   rights	  
jurisprudence.	  A	   second	  wave	  of	   the	   literature	  as	  mentioned	  above	  and	   in	   chapter	  1	  was	  
subsequently	   concerned	   with	   democratization	   issues.	   The	   prevailing	   conflict	   resolution	  
literature,	  which	   also	   influenced	   transitional	   justice	   scholarship	   after	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Cold	  
war	   employed	  methods	   that	   were	   less	   concerned	   with	   capturing	   the	   dynamic	   processes	  
between	   various	   actors	   who	   interact	   on	   different,	   intermeshed	   levels.11	   Instead	   these	  
mainstream	  models	  were	   paying	  more	   attention	   to	   institutional	   change	   and	   state-­‐centric	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  See	  for	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  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Eichmann	  in	  Jerusalem:	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  Report	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  the	  Banality	  of	  Evil	  (The	  Viking	  Press,	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  See	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  Terror	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analyses	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   stability	   and	   peace	   in	   former	   war-­‐torn	   regions,	   notably	   in	  
areas	  of	  weak	  or	  failed	  states.12	  Although	  this	  research	  took	  into	  account	  certain	  structural	  
and	  contextual	  variables—particularly	  when	  for	   instance	  combined	  with	  process	   tracing,	  a	  
methodological	   tool	   that	   attempts	   to	   recreates	   multi-­‐faceted	   and	   accurate	   picture	   of	   a	  
situation	   by	   looking	   at	   different	   contextual	   and	   temporal	   variables—these	   analytical	  
frameworks	   do	   not	   intend	   to	   capture	   the	   interactive	   processes	   between	   actors.	   Jelena	  
Subotić’s	   recent	   work	   on	   international	   law	   and	   compliance	   mechanisms	   in	   international	  
relations	   theory	   serves	  as	  an	  excellent	   case	   in	  point.	  Relying	  on	  process-­‐tracing	   tools,	   she	  
provides	  a	  multi-­‐layered	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  international	  retributive	  justice	  processes	  
in	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia.	   Drawing	   on	   the	   cooperation	   requirements	   of	   Western	   Balkan	  
states	  with	  the	  ICTY	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  to	  launch	  membership	  negotiations	  with	  the	  EU,	  she	  
evaluates	  compliance	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  democratic	  transition	  trends	  in	  three	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslav	  
countries.13	   Yet,	  her	   level	  of	  analysis	   sacrifices	   sociopolitical	  processes	  within	   society	   for	  a	  
broad	   political	   lens	   that	   remains	   limited	   to	   the	   state	   level.	   Following	   the	   same	   line	   of	  
reasoning,	   yet	   focusing	   on	   judicial	   organization,	   Futamura’s	   work	   grapples	   with	   the	  
ramifications	  of	  retributive	  justice	  on	  Japan’s	  post-­‐World-­‐War-­‐II	  society.14	  Using	  time	  series	  
analysis	  he	   tests	   the	  Nuremberg	   legacy	  hypothesis—which	   is	  based	  on	   the	  assumption	   to	  
restore	  peace	  through	  justice—	  he	  draws	  from	  different	  fields	  to	  create	  an	  interdisciplinary	  
framework	   that	   combines	   international	   relations	   theory	   and	   law.	   His	   research	   thus	  
represents	   a	   constructivist	   design	   that	   reaches	   beyond	   the	   conventional	   research	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  See	  chapter	  1	  for	  detailed	  discussion.	  
13	  Subotić,	  Hijacked	  Justice:	  Dealing	  with	  the	  Past	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  
14	  Madoka	  Futamura,	  War	  Crimes	  Tribunals	  and	  Transitional	  Justice:	  The	  Tokyo	  Trial	  and	  the	  Nuremburg	  Legacy	  
(Routledge,	  2007).	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field.	   Yet,	   his	   research,	   similar	   to	   Subotić’s	  work,	   does	   not	   focus	   on	   interactive	   processes	  
between	  different	  actors	  either.15	  
Notwithstanding,	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  scholarship	  has	  emerged	  that	  centers	  on	  this	  sociopolitical	  
interaction	  between	  different	  actors	  within	  different	  spaces.16	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  1,	  my	  
study	   draws	   from	   this	   emerging	   scholarship,	   arguing	   that	   a	   political	   science	   perspective,	  
borrowing	  sociological	  tools,	  is	  better	  suited	  to	  analyze	  the	  politics	  of	  justice	  and	  truth	  and	  
to	  identify	  exchanges,	  challenges	  and	  consequences	  of	  practices	  by	  each	  of	  the	  actors.	  This	  
study	  thus	  uses	  a	  political	  sociology	  perspective,	  which	  focuses	  particularly	  on	  the	  relations	  
between	  state	  and	  society.	  While	   this	  perspective	  originated	   in	  works	  by	  Max	  Weber	  and	  
Karl	   Marx,	   American	   scholars	   such	   as	   Theda	   Skocpol	   and	   French	   academics,	   such	   as	   Luc	  
Boltanski,	   have	   further	   developed	   the	   scholarship	   in	   the	   field	   on	   topics	   ranging	   from	  
structural	  problems	  of	  capitalism	  to	  democracy	  issues.	  This	  framework,	  however,	  has	  found	  
little	  attention	   in	   the	  study	  of	   transitional	   justice.	   It	  nonetheless	  offers	   the	  opportunity	   to	  
analyze	  different,	  intersecting	  spaces	  and	  the	  role	  of	  key	  actors	  within	  these	  spaces	  to	  help	  
understand	  current	  practices	  of	  truth	  and	  justice	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  settings.	  By	  combining	  the	  
two	   above	   qualitative	   research	   methods—participant	   observation	   and	   narrative	  
interviews—I	   create	   a	   set	   of	   tools	   that	   can	   tackle	   these	   analytical	   and	   methodological	  
difficulties.	  With	  the	  former,	  human	  rights	  and	  judicial	  actors	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  different	  
environments,	   such	   as	   conferences,	  meetings,	   trials	   and	   hearings,	   while	   they	   perform	   or	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  see	  chapter	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  Roht-­‐Arriaza,	  The	  Pinochet	  Effect:	  Transnational	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  Transitional	  Justice,”	  of	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  International	  Journal	  of	  
Transitional	  Justice,	  November	  2009,	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discuss	   retributive	   and	   restorative	   justice	   practices	   or	   a	   combination	   of	   both.	   The	   latter	  
complements	  the	  first	  method,	  drawing	  on	  formal	  and	  informal	  in-­‐depth	  conversations	  with	  
key	   individuals	   from	  human	   rights	  organizations,	   judicial	   institutions	  and	   the	  government.	  
Although	  there	  are	  hundreds	  of	  organizations	  across	  the	  region	  that	  deal	  with	  human	  rights	  
issues,	  there	  is	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  active	  and	  influential	  NGOs	  whose	  work	  focuses	  specifically	  
on	   war	   crimes	   trials,	   collective	   memory	   issues	   and	   related	   accountability	   efforts	   in	   the	  
former	  Yugoslavia.	  I	  have	  listed	  the	  organizations	  and	  a	  partial	  list	  of	  the	  interviewees	  who	  
were	  part	  of	  my	  study	  in	  the	  Annex	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  	  Other	  source	  material	  this	  study	  is	  
based	   on	   includes	   scholarly	   publications	   and	   literature,	   government	   and	   NGO	   reports,	  
programmatic	   statements,	   policy	   recommendations,	   press	   releases,	   news	   articles	   and	  
archival	  material,	  such	  as	  UN	  documents,	  among	  others.	  
With	   this	   (slightly	  adapted	  socio-­‐anthropological)	  methodology	   (in	  order	   to	  meet	  practical	  
fieldwork	   needs)	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   observe	   the	   current	   context	   and	   environment	   in	   which	  
actors	   perform	   and	   hence	   understand	   the	   processes	   of	   how	   social,	   professional	   and	  
institutional	   boundaries	   affect	   each	   of	   their	   practices.	   Data	   collected	   from	   personal	  
narratives	  not	  only	  provide	  insights	  into	  particular	  roles	  played	  by	  individuals	  within	  and/or	  
outside	  of	  their	   institutions,	  but	  also	  disclose	  problems	  and	  challenges	   in	  the	  relationships	  
between	  different	   actors.	   Information	  obtained	   from	  official	   documents	   and	  publications,	  
on	  the	  contrary,	  can	  only	  partially	  reveal	  such	  trends.	  	  
We	  should	  not	  use	  documentary	  sources	  as	  surrogates	  for	  other	  kinds	  of	  
data.	   We	   cannot,	   for	   instance,	   learn	   though	   records	   alone	   how	   an	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organization	   actually	   operates	   day-­‐by-­‐day.	   Equally	   we	   cannot	   treat	  
records—however	   "official"—as	   firm	   evidence	   of	   what	   they	   report	   ...	  
That	   strong	   reservation	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   we	   should	   ignore	   or	  
downgrade	  documentary	  data.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  our	  recognition	  of	  their	  
existence	   as	   social	   facts	   alerts	   us	   to	   the	   necessity	   to	   treat	   them	   very	  
seriously	  indeed.	  We	  have	  to	  approach	  them	  for	  what	  they	  are	  and	  what	  
they	  are	  used	  to	  accomplish.17	  
This	  chapter	  aims	  at	  introducing	  the	  concept	  of	  international	  political	  sociology	  to	  the	  study	  
of	  transitional	  justice,	  which,	  until	  recently,	  was	  dominated	  by	  normative	  analysis,	  legalism	  
and	   more	   recently	   by	   causality-­‐driven	   and	   variable-­‐oriented	   scholarship.	   I	   point	   to	   the	  
weaknesses	  of	   the	   latter	   to	  address	   actor-­‐specific	   and	   sociopolitical	   research	  questions	   in	  
post-­‐conflict	  and	  accountability-­‐oriented	  studies	  to	  help	  expand	  the	  existing	  literature	  in	  the	  
field	   as	   mentioned	   earlier	   and	   in	   chapter	   1.	   I	   then	   show	   how	   grounding	   research	   in	  
anthropology	  and	  sociology-­‐inspired	  analysis	  can	  be	  a	  promising	  alternative	  methodology	  to	  
address	   these	   questions.	   For	   this,	   I	   describe	   two	   methods,	   participant	   observation	   and	  
narrative	  interviews	  and	  explain	  why	  the	  combination	  of	  both	  methods	  can	  help	  foster	  new	  
insights.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Atkinson	  and	  Coffey	  cited	  in	  David	  Silverman,	  “Analyzing	  Talk	  and	  Text,”	  in	  Handbook	  of	  Qualitative	  Research,	  ed.	  
Norman	  K.	  Denzim	  and	  Yvonna	  S.	  Lincoln	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage,	  2000),	  826.	  
	  48	  
Actors,	  Processes	  and	  Spaces	  of	  Transitional	  Justice	  from	  a	  
Political	  Sociology	  Perspective	  
The	  advent	  of	  what	  Samuel	  Huntington	  defined	  as	  the	  “third	  wave	  of	  democracy”	  in	  the	  late	  
20th	   century	   (particularly	   in	   Latin	   America	   and	   Eastern	   and	   Southern	   Europe)	   and	   the	  
increasing	  local	  and	  regional	  conflicts	  across	  the	  globe	  in	  the	  1990s	  have	  generated	  a	  new	  
subfield	   of	   international	   studies	   concerned	  with	   accountability	   issues	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   and	  
transition	   settings.	   The	   debate	   on	   whether	   so-­‐called	   transitional	   justice	   should	   be	  
considered	  a	  discipline	  is	  still	  ongoing	  and	  far	  from	  being	  settled.18	  Whether	  it	  constitutes	  a	  
league	  of	  its	  own,	  however,	  is	  secondary,	  notably	  since	  scholars	  addressing	  these	  issues	  and	  
publishing	   in	  new	  journals	  dedicated	  exclusively	  to	  the	  transitional	   justice	  field	  hail	   from	  a	  
variety	   of	   disciplines	   (ranging	   from	   anthropology	   to	   psychology)	   as	   well	   as	   professions,	  
including	   scholars,	   practitioners	   and	   activists.	   	   Instead,	   it	   is	   more	   important	   to	   address	  
methodological	  issues	  when	  studying	  the	  diverse	  mechanisms	  societies	  have	  developed	  and	  
deployed	   to	   address	   past	   mass	   atrocities	   and	   human	   rights	   violations	   in	   various	  
geographical	  contexts.	  	  
Current	  scholarship	  has	  largely	  relied	  on	  the	  use	  of	  traditional	  analytical	  tools	  and	  focused	  
on	  well-­‐established	  frameworks	  or	  categories	  for	  understanding	  problems	  ranging	  from	  trial	  
mechanisms	   to	   reconciliation	   processes	   in	   society.	   Alas,	   these	   instruments	   leave	   out	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  The	  Oxford	  International	  Journal	  of	  Transitional	  Justice	  claims	  its	  disciplinary	  status	  and	  certain	  scholars	  categorize	  
it	  as	  a	  new	  discipline	  in	  human	  rights,	  see	  for	  instance	  Kora	  Andrieu,	  “Transitional	  Justice:	  A	  New	  Discipline	  in	  Human	  
Rights,”	  Online	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Mass	  Violence,	  January	  18,	  2010,	  http://www.massviolence.org/Transitional-­‐Justice-­‐A-­‐
New-­‐Discipline-­‐in-­‐Human-­‐Rights	  -­‐	  citation.	  Others	  are	  more	  critical,	  underlining	  the	  interdisciplinary	  nature	  of	  it	  Bell,	  
Campbell,	  and	  Ní	  Aoláin,	  “Transitional	  Justice:(Re)	  Conceptualising	  the	  Field.”	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questions	   related	   to	   dynamic	   interactive	   process	   between	   different	   actors	   involved	   in	  
promoting	   post-­‐conflict	   justice.	   Additionally,	   current	   transitional	   justice	   research	   is	   at	   a	  
crossroads—partly	   because	   of	   the	   post-­‐World-­‐War-­‐II	   frenzy	   of	   social	   sciences	   to	   quantify	  
sociopolitical	   issues.	   Indeed,	   this	   trend	   has	   now	   reached	   a	   group	   of	   transitional	   justice	  
scholars	   who	   initially	   employed	   qualitative	   methods	   (particularly	   case	   studies	   or	  
comparative	  case	  studies)	  in	  their	  research.19	  Such	  a	  development	  is	  problematic	  as	  deeper	  
knowledge	   of	   complex	   processes	   and	   multiple	   interactions	   are	   buried	   and	   distorted	   in	  
numeric	   data	   and	   statistical	   equations	   that	   provide	   only	   a	   snapshot	   of	   the	   various	  
transitional	   justice	   questions	   and	   problems.20	   	   Some	   of	   these	   researchers,	   such	   as	   Leigh	  
Payne’s	   project	   “Transitional	   Justice	   Data	   Base”	   housed	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Wisconsin-­‐
Madison,	   however,	   have	   initiated	   detailed	   and	   much	   more	   focused	   follow	   up	   studies	   to	  
better	   understand	   the	   research	   results	   of	   their	   quantitative	   analysis	   with	   large	   case	  
numbers.21	  Thus,	  as	  illustrated	  already	  in	  chapter	  1,	  the	  following	  methodological	  discussion	  
aims	   at	   bringing	   politics	   back	   onto	   the	   research	   agenda.	   Grounding	   my	   research	   in	   the	  
tradition	  of	  political	  science,	  I	  develop	  an	  alternative	  and	  complementary	  epistemology	  for	  
transitional	  justice	  research.	  I	  thus	  produce	  knowledge	  that	  is	  able	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  
changing	  nature	  of	  human	  rights	  practices	   in	  truth	  and	  justice	  spaces,	   in	  other	  words	  how	  
are	  human	  rights	  perceived	  in	  restorative	  as	  well	  as	  retributive	  justice	  mechanisms.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  See	  for	  instance	  Payne,	  Unsettling	  Accounts:	  Neither	  Truth	  nor	  Reconciliation	  in	  Confessions	  of	  State	  Violence;	  
Olsen,	  Payne,	  and	  Reiter,	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Balance:	  Comparing	  Processes,	  Weighing	  Efficacy.	  
20	  The	  author	  is	  aware	  that	  quantitative	  analysis	  also	  offers	  tools,	  such	  as	  ‘time	  series	  analysis,’	  that	  attempt	  to	  
illustrate	  change	  over	  time.	  This	  method,	  however,	  still	  only	  provides	  a	  static	  picture	  of	  a	  given	  period	  instead	  of	  
capturing	  the	  interactive	  process	  of	  change	  in	  its	  complexity.	  
21	  See	  the	  project’s	  website	  at	  https://sites.google.com/site/transitionaljusticedatabase/home,	  accessed	  February	  19,	  
2012.	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Limits	  of	  Current	  Theories	  in	  Transitional	  Justice	  Contexts	  
With	   the	   increasing	   awareness	   of	   human	   rights	   issues	   in	   academia	   over	   the	   past	   few	  
decades,	  interest	  also	  grew	  in	  understanding	  retributive	  justice	  mechanisms	  to	  reckon	  with	  
the	   past,	   and	   in	   particular,	   how	   to	   bring	   to	   justice	   perpetrators	   of	   state	   crimes	   against	  
civilians.	  As	  of	  today,	  a	  prospering	  amount	  of	  academic	  literature	  exists	  that	  grapples	  with	  
the	   creation,	   functioning	   and	   impact	   of	   international,	   regional	   and	   local	   war	   crimes	  
tribunals.22	   These	   studies	   generally	   share	   a	   state-­‐centric	   perspective.	   In	   other	   words,	  
governments,	   or	   its	   official	   representatives	   sitting	   in	   international	   organizations	   are	  
portrayed	  as	  principal	   actors	   in	   international	   relations	  advocating	   the	   rule	  of	   law	   through	  
different	  types	  of	  institutions	  and	  legal	  procedures,	  such	  as	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  
(ICC).23	   Although	   certain	   political	   and	   some	   institutional	   changes	   can	   be	   demonstrated	   by	  
this	  approach	  24,	  it	  evolves	  around	  institutional	  concepts	  organization	  theory	  as	  well	  as	  legal	  
theory.	  Not	  only,	  however,	  do	  these	  above	  frameworks	  face	  difficulties	  with	  capturing	  more	  
complex	  actor	  constellations,	  but	  they	  also	  overlook	  ontological	   issues.	  Put	  differently,	  the	  
judiciary,	   for	   instance,	   is	   far	   from	   being	   a	  mechanism	   that	   renders	   justice	   only,	   but	   also	  
reconstructs	   and	   produces	   different	   versions	   of	   historical	   facts	   (some	   also	   refer	   to	   this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  See	  for	  instance	  Teitel,	  Transitional	  Justice;	  Mark	  Drumbl,	  Atrocity,	  Punishment,	  and	  International	  Law	  (Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  2007);	  Martha	  Minow,	  Between	  Vengeance	  and	  Forgiveness	  (Beacon	  Press	  Boston,	  1998),	  among	  
others.	  
23	  Exceptions	  to	  the	  rule	  do	  exist	  and	  certain	  authors	  have	  used	  a	  sociological	  perspective	  to	  address	  some	  of	  macro-­‐
level	  and	  micro-­‐level	  issues	  in	  the	  field.	  See	  for	  instance	  Ksenija	  Bilbija	  et	  al.,	  Accounting	  for	  Violence:	  Marketing	  
Memory	  in	  Latin	  America	  (Duke	  University	  Press,	  2011);	  Alexander	  Hinton,	  Transitional	  Justice:	  Global	  Mechanisms	  
and	  Local	  Realities	  After	  Genocide	  and	  Mass	  Violence	  (Rutgers	  University	  Press,	  2011);	  John	  Hagan,	  Justice	  in	  the	  
Balkans:	  Prosecuting	  War	  Crimes	  in	  the	  Hague	  Tribunal	  (University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2003),	  and	  discussion	  in	  chapter	  
1.	  	  
24	  Subotić,	  Hijacked	  Justice:	  Dealing	  with	  the	  Past	  in	  the	  Balkans;	  Roht-­‐Arriaza	  and	  Mariezcurrena,	  Transitional	  Justice	  
in	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century:	  Beyond	  Truth	  Versus	  Justice;	  Elster,	  Closing	  the	  Books:	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Historical	  
Perspective.	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process	  as	  reconstructing	  truth	  and/or	  memory).	  Social	  actors	  also	  occupy	  different	  roles	  in	  
these	   processes,	   ranging	   from	   fact-­‐finding	   missions	   to	   psychological	   and	   political	   victim	  
support.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  above	  concepts	  are	  based	  on	  research	  focused	  
on	  which	  decisions	  will	  be	  made	  in	  what	  situation.	  Yet,	  it	  neither	  explains	  why	  and	  how	  the	  
different	  options	  of	  a	  decision	  developed;	  nor	  how	  they	  might	  change	  based	  on	  interactions	  
between	   actors.	   Although	   institutionalist	   approaches	   and	   legal	   theory	   perspectives	   have	  
been	  complemented	  by	  more	  normative-­‐oriented	   theory,	  advocated	  by	  constructivist	  and	  
legal	   scholars	   in	   the	   field,	   it	   is	   still	   not	   clear,	   as	   discussed	   below,	   to	   what	   extent	   these	  
perspectives	  further	  interactive	  and	  procedural	  knowledge	  of	  these	  issues.	  
International	  humanitarian	  law—the	  increasing	  legal	  framing	  of	  international	  war	  crimes—
became	  a	  buzzword	  of	  the	  late	  1990s	  and	  early	  2000s,	  providing	  a	  normative	  framework	  to	  
the	  mushrooming	  international	  and	  hybrid	  judicial	  structures	  that	  dealt	  with	  war	  criminals	  
and	  human	  rights	  violators	  in	  different	  contexts	  and	  time	  periods	  in	  the	  world.	  While	  certain	  
scholars	   refer	   to	   the	  new	  era	  as	   ‘global	   transitional	   justice’25	   to	  describe	   the	  expansion	  of	  
legal	  mechanisms,	  others	  have	  developed	  concepts	  to	  explain	  the	  cascading	  effects	  of	  the	  
law	   from	   the	   international	   to	   the	   national	   level	   by	   illustrating	   how	   international	  
humanitarian	  law	  seeped	  through	  into	  domestic	  court	  systems.26	  	  Suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  such	  a	  
perspective	  merely	  accounts	  for	  a	  norms	  change	  of	  main	  actors	  over	  time—capturing	  global	  
political	  phenomena,	  such	  as	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War—yet,	   leaving	  questions	  of	  why	  and	  
how	   in	   the	   dark.	   These	   normative	   trends	   were	   supported	   by	   peace	   and	   conflict	   studies,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  See	  for	  instance	  Ruti	  G.	  Teitel,	  “The	  Law	  and	  Politics	  of	  Contemporary	  Transitional	  Justice,”	  Cornell	  International	  
Law	  Journal	  38	  (2005):	  838.	  
26	  Lutz	  and	  Sikkink,	  “The	  Justice	  Cascade:	  The	  Evolution	  and	  Impact	  of	  Foreign	  Human	  Rights	  Trials	  in	  Latin	  America.”	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highlighting	  the	  moral	  necessity	  to	  act	  and	  bring	  about	  justice.	  Thus,	  paralleling	  the	  wave	  of	  
retributive	   justice	   scholarship,	   certain	   scholars	   and	   practitioners	   developed	   concepts	   and	  
theories	   to	  understand	   truth	  and	   reconciliation	  processes	   in	  post-­‐conflict	   societies.27	   They	  
were	   mainly	   concerned	   with	   elaborating	   and	   advocating	   policy	   strategies	   to	   help	   and	  
provide	  solutions	  for	  democratic	  transitions	  in	  former	  conflict	  zones	  (See	  previous	  chapter).	  
The	   probably	  most	  well-­‐known	   tool—which	   has	   also	   sparked	   trenching	   discussions	   on	   its	  
impact	   and	   efficiency—is	   the	   concept	   of	   truth	   commissions	   to	   confront	   the	   past.28	   The	  
purpose	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   not,	   however,	   to	   evaluate	   which	   of	   the	   tools	   might	   be	   most	  
appropriate	   to	   tackle	   these	   issues.	   In	   fact,	   scholars	   have	   already	   underlined	   their	  
complementary,	   stressing	   the	   need	   to	   take	   into	   account	   sociopolitical	   and	   institutional	  
contexts.29	   Instead,	   this	   project	   continues	  where	  other	   scholars	   have	   struggled	   to	  provide	  
more	   convincing	   and	   alternative	   explanations	   due	   to	   their	   lack	   of	   appropriate	   analytical	  
tools.	   In	   fact,	   by	   overlooking	   processes,	   they	   have	   ignored	   two-­‐way	   phenomena	   and	  
progressive	  reciprocity	  among	  actors.	  This	  chapter	  explores	  these	  issues	  by	  deconstructing	  
traditional	  actors	  and	  opening	   the	  black	  box	  of	   transitional	   justice	  politics	   to	  examine	   the	  
dynamic	  relationships	  between	  several	  actors	  who	  operate	  within	  different	  and	  intersecting	  
spaces	  over	  time.	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Some	  of	  the	  main	  works	  include	  for	  instance	  Kritz,	  Transitional	  Justice:	  How	  Emerging	  Democracies	  Reckon	  with	  
Former	  Regimes;	  Robert	  Rotberg	  I.	  and	  Dennis	  Thompson,	  eds.,	  Truth	  V.	  Justice:	  The	  Morality	  of	  Truth	  Commissions	  
(Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2000);	  Hayner,	  Unspeakable	  Truths:	  Confronting	  State	  Terror	  and	  Atrocity.	  
28	  Other	  mechanisms	  include	  mediation,	  confessions,	  lustration	  or	  shaming.	  
29	  Roht-­‐Arriaza	  and	  Mariezcurrena,	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century:	  Beyond	  Truth	  Versus	  Justice.	  While	  
the	  impact	  of	  the	  South	  African	  truth	  commission	  remains	  a	  bone	  of	  contention,	  the	  failure	  of	  past	  truth-­‐seeking	  
mechanisms	  in	  the	  region	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  demonstrates	  the	  impact	  of	  political	  contexts	  on	  reconciliatory	  
processes.	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Political	  Sociology	  in	  Transitional	  Justice:	  Far	  more	  than	  just	  a	  
Sociological	  Redux	  
By	   adopting	   a	   political	   sociology	   perspective	   to	   study	   questions	   of	   post-­‐conflict	  
accountability,	   this	  study	   introduces	  an	  analytical	   framework,	  which	   focuses	  on	  the	  meso-­‐
level	   in	  order	   to	  explore	  not	  only	  what	   kind	  of	   relationship	  different	  actors	  maintain	  with	  
each	  other	  within	  certain	  structures	  and	  contexts,	  but	  it	  also	  examines	  how	  they	  interact	  in	  
space	  and	  time.	  In	  so	  doing,	  this	  study	  goes	  beyond	  the	  statist	  and	  static	  analysis	  model	  and	  
maintains	  complexity—which,	  alas,	   is	  too	  often	   lost	   in	  variable-­‐oriented	  research.	   It	  hence	  
provides	   a	   more	   complete	   understanding	   of	   particular	   transitional	   justice	   problems	   by	  
emphasizing	   the	   dynamic	   processes	   that	   occur,	   for	   instance	   between	   activists	   and	  
practitioners	   on	   the	   local,	   national	   and	   international	   level.	   Two	   aspects	   are	   of	   particular	  
research	   interest	   in	   this	   context:	   the	   relationship	   between	   law	   and	   society	   in	   transition	  
settings	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  social	  movements	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  societies	  on	  the	  
other	  hand.	  	  
Notwithstanding	   scholarly	  work	  on	   traditional	   and	   customary	  differences	   in	   societies	   that	  
grapple	   with	   past	   mass	   atrocities30	   and	   the	   attempt	   to	   trace	   a	   genealogy	   of	   transitional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  For	  an	  introduction	  to	  the	  local	  grass	  root	  court	  system	  in	  Rwanda,	  so-­‐called	  gacaca,	  and	  a	  discussion	  of	  their	  use	  in	  
transitional	  justice	  cf.	  Peter	  E.	  Harrell,	  Rwanda’s	  Gamble:	  Gacaca	  and	  a	  New	  Model	  of	  Transitional	  Justice	  (New	  York:	  
Writers	  Club	  Press,	  2003);	  Phil	  Clark,	  “Hybridity,	  Holism,	  and	  Traditional	  Justice:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  Gacaca	  Courts	  in	  
Post-­‐Genocide	  Rwanda,”	  George	  Washingon	  International	  Law	  Review	  39	  (2007):	  765;	  Linda	  E.	  Carter,	  “Justice	  and	  
Reconciliation	  on	  Trial:	  Gacaca	  Proceedings	  in	  Rwanda,”	  New	  England	  Journal	  of	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  
14	  (2007):	  41–309.	  For	  hybrid	  courts	  in	  Timor	  Leste	  and	  Cambodia,	  cf.	  Suzanne	  Katzenstein,	  “Hybrid	  Tribunals:	  
Searching	  for	  Justice	  in	  East	  Timor,”	  Harvard	  Human	  Rights	  Journal	  16	  (2003):	  245–278;	  Suzannah	  Linton,	  “Cambodia,	  
East	  Timor	  and	  Sierra	  Leone:	  Experiments	  in	  International	  Justice,”	  Criminal	  Law	  Forum	  12	  (2001):	  185–246;	  Padraic	  J.	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justice	   31,	   the	   interactions	   between	   legal	   experts—i.e.	   elite,	   academic	   and	   professional	  
networks—and	   their	   relationship	   to	   society	   in	   diverse	   sociopolitical	   contexts	   remains	   a	  
widely	  neglected	  in	  studies.	  With,	  maybe,	  the	  exception	  of	  political	  sociology	  work	  by	  Yves	  
Dezalay	  and	  Bryant	  Garth,	  which	  they	  applied	  to	  international	  and	  regional	  contexts.	  In	  one	  
of	   their	   books,	   The	   Internationalization	   of	   Palace	   Wars:	   Lawyers,	   Economists,	   and	   the	  
Contest	   to	   Transform	   Latin	   American	   States,	   they	   draw	   on	   Latin	   America,	   exploring	   the	  
export	  of	  globalized	  legal	  knowledge	  by	  Western	  elites	  and	  their	  relationship	  to	  local	  elites	  
educated	  in	  the	  West	  in	  order	  to	  scrutinize	  the	  emergence	  of	  specific	  rule	  of	  law	  trends	  in	  
this	  region.32	  Thus,	   important	  sociological	  work	  in	   international	  relations	  to	  examine	  which	  
actors	  have	  been	   involved	   in	  exporting	   international	  humanitarian	   law	  to	  other	  regions	  of	  
the	  world	  and	  how,	  where	  and	  when	  these	  processes	  have	  been	  put	  in	  place	  remains	  yet	  to	  
be	  done.	  As	  for	  recent	  trends	   in	  transitional	   justice	  processes	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  human	  
rights	   law	   in	   this	   context,	   Latin	   America	   has	   been	   a	   source	   and	   a	   laboratory	   of	   dynamic	  
interactions,	   which	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   seminal	   work	   of	   transitional	   networks	   and	   the	  
dissemination	   of	   ideas	   across	   borders	   by	   Margret	   Keck	   and	   Kathryn	   Sikkink	   discussed	  
below.33	   	   I	  address	  the	  above	  shortcoming	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  by	  describing	  
how	  to	  apply	  specific	  qualitative	  methods	  for	  the	  Balkan	  region	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  capture	  
the	  topography	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  phenomenon	  and	  its	  consequences.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Glaspy,	  “Justice	  Delayed-­‐Recent	  Developments	  at	  the	  Extraordinary	  Chambers	  in	  the	  Courts	  of	  Cambodia,”	  Harvard	  
Human	  Rights	  Journal	  21	  (2008):	  143–154.	  
31	  Teitel,	  “Transitional	  Justice	  Genealogy.”	  
32	  The	  Internationalization	  of	  Palace	  Wars:	  Lawyers,	  Economists,	  and	  the	  Contest	  to	  Transform	  Latin	  American	  States	  
(Chicago,	  IL:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2002).	  
33	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  Activists	  Beyond	  Borders:	  Advocacy	  Networks	  in	  International	  Politics.	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At	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  worthwhile	  to	  address	  a	  phenomenon	  that—despite	  some	  recent	  efforts	  
to	  broach	  a	  broader	  cross-­‐regional	  debate—has	  found	  little	  attention,	  in	  the	  discussions	  of	  
the	  politics	  of	   transitional	   justice:	   the	   impact	  of	   transnational	  social	  actors.	  Some	  authors,	  
such	   as	   Keck	   and	   Sikkink,	   have	   used	   network	   theory	   concepts	   to	   analyze	   transnational	  
advocacy	   networks	   and	   trace	   the	   rise	   of	   human	   rights	   activists	   in	   the	   late	   19th	   and	   20th	  
century.34	  To	  this	  end,	  their	  work	  illustrates	  these	  interactive	  processes	  between	  civil	  society	  
and	  states,	  using	  a	  number	  of	  different	  case	  studies,	  including	  human	  rights,	  women’s	  rights	  
and	   environmental	   issues,	   among	   others.	   Drawing	   on	   historical	   developments	   in	   their	  
chapter	  on	  human	  rights	  in	  Latin	  America,	  they	  use	  sociological	  network	  concepts	  to	  show	  
how	  transnational	  coordination	  between	  national	  and	  international	  NGOs	  pressured	  human	  
rights	   violators,	   such	   as	   Argentine	   army	   general,	   Martin	   Balza,	   to	   acknowledge	   his	  
responsibility	   in	   illegal	   methods,	   including	   executions,	   offering	   condolences	   to	   victims’	  
families.35	  Their	  various	  case	  studies	  serve	  to	  illustrate	  their	  so-­‐called	  ‘boomerang	  pattern’—
a	  concept	  which	  describes	  the	  transnational	  relationship	  between	  activists	  in	  authoritarian	  
states	   and	   civil	   society	   actors	   in	   democratic	   countries	   who	   put	   pressure	   on	   their	   own	  
democratic	  governments	   to	   impose	  sanctions	  on	  repressive	  political	   institutions	  abroad	   in	  
order	  to	  generate	  democratic	  transition.36	  Yet,	  while	  this	  model	  has	  been	  useful	  to	  explain	  a	  
variety	  of	  cases	  regarding	  different	  empirical	  cases,	  it	  nonetheless	  ignores	  the	  autonomous	  
character	  of	   local	  NGOs.	  Often,	   local	  NGOs	  are	  struggling	  for	   international	  recognition	  and	  
are	  left	  to	  mobilize	  their	  own	  resources.	  Other	  times,	  the	  policy	  strategies	  and	  activities	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Ibid.	  
35	  Ibid.,	  chap.	  3.	  
36	  Ibid.,	  12.	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not	  necessarily	  in	  line	  with	  the	  vision	  of	  bigger	  more	  established	  international	  NGOs.	  More	  
recent	   research	   in	   transitional	   justice	   has	   stressed	   the	   need	   to	   point	   to	   these	   nuances.37	  
Cath	   Collins,	   for	   instance,	   who	   examines	   transnational	   human	   rights	   activism	   and	  
accountability	  for	  mass	  atrocity	  in	  Chile	  and	  El	  Salvador	  has	  argued	  that	  it	  “overstate[s]	  the	  
extent	   of	   co-­‐ordination	   and	   strategic	   collaboration	   between	   home	   and	   external	  
accountability	  actors.”38	   In	   vein	  with	  Collins	  analysis	  and	  contrary	   to	   the	  premises	  of	  Keck	  
and	   Sikkink’s	   model	   recent	   fieldwork	   data	   illustrates	   that	   human	   rights	   activists	   in	   the	  
Balkans	  maintain	  strong	  network	  ties	  among	  one	  another.	  Despite	  connections	  with	  and	  the	  
support	   of	   international	   non-­‐profit	   organizations	   and	   regional	   intergovernmental	  
organizations,	  such	  as	  the	  Organization	  for	  Security	  and	  Cooperation	  in	  Europe	  (OSCE),	  local	  
actors	   are	   skeptical	   as	   external	   players	   are	   seen	   as	   entities	   with	   their	   proper	   roadmap.	  
Human	   rights	   organizations	   in	   various	   parts	   of	   Southeastern	   Europe,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  
support	  of	  Western	  non-­‐profit	  organizations,	  have	  developed	  their	  own	  network	  structures	  
with	  local	  and	  national	  social	  actors	  across	  the	  region	  in	  different	  transition	  contexts.	  They	  
have	  engaged	  in	  different	  activities,	  sometimes	  taking	  on	  several	  roles	  at	  once,	  in	  order	  to	  
face	  the	  past.	  These	  nuances	  are	  crucial	  when	  trying	  to	  understand	  the	  impact	  of	  activists	  in	  
post-­‐conflict	  states	  and	  merit	  further	  attention.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Roht-­‐Arriaza,	  The	  Pinochet	  Effect:	  Transnational	  Justice	  In	  The	  Age	  Of	  Human	  Rights;	  Cath	  Collins,	  “Grounding	  
Global	  Justice:	  International	  Networks	  and	  Domestic	  Human	  Rights	  Accountability	  in	  Chile	  and	  El	  Salvador,”	  Journal	  of	  
Latin	  American	  Studies	  38	  (2006):	  711–38;	  Burt,	  “Guilty	  as	  Charged:	  The	  Trial	  of	  Former	  Peruvian	  President	  Alberto	  
Fujimori	  for	  Human	  Rights	  Violations.”	  
38	  Collins,	  “Grounding	  Global	  Justice:	  International	  Networks	  and	  Domestic	  Human	  Rights	  Accountability	  in	  Chile	  and	  
El	  Salvador,”	  715.	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In	   fact,	   over	   twenty	   years	   after	   the	   offset	   of	   the	   tumultuous	   situation	   in	   the	   former	  
Yugoslavia	  that	  precipitated	  the	  region	  into	  over	  a	  decade	  of	  violent	  and	  atrocious	  conflict,	  
societies	   are	   only	   slowly	   recovering,	   both	   physically	   and	   psychologically.	   Among	   the	  
solutions	  to	  find	  answers	  and	  deal	  with	  the	  past	  are	  for	  instance	  war	  crimes	  tribunals—on	  
the	   international	   and	   (to	   a	   lesser,	   but	   still	   noticeable	   extent)	   national	   level—and	   truth-­‐
seeking	   and	   fact-­‐finding	   initiatives.	   In	   both	   settings,	   social	   activists	   and	  members	   of	   civil	  
society	  organizations	  occupy	  a	  crucial	  intermediary	  function,	  communicating	  and	  interacting	  
between	   two	   distinct	   spaces:	   a	   justice	   space	   and	   a	   truth	   space.	   The	   former	   consists	   of	  
primarily	   political	   and	   state	   actors,	   such	   as	   the	   judiciary,	   in	  which	   laws	   regulate	  practices	  
and	  interactions	  between	  different	  actors.	  The	  latter,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  my	  research,	  is	  made	  up	  
of	  individuals	  and	  groups	  of	  people	  (mainly	  civil	  society	  activists),	  and	  constitutes	  an	  arena	  
to	  form	  a	  voice	  for	  victims.39	  In	  fact,	  outside	  the	  courtroom,	  such	  as	  during	  public	  hearings,	  
more	   victims	  will	   be	   able	   to	   testify	   under	   less	   stringent	   conditions—less	   formal	   protocol	  
than	   in	   judicial	   proceedings.	   Yet,	   these	   forms	  of	  memory	   creation	   in	   society	   are	   far	   from	  
being	  a	  panacea.	  Indeed	  both	  spaces	  face	  a	  number	  of	  challenges	  that	  I	  discuss	  in	  chapter	  3	  
and	  6.	  The	  phenomenon	  of	  interacting	  actors	  in	  these	  spaces	  is	  complex	  and	  raises	  several	  
important	  research	  questions,	  for	  which	  the	  tools	  of	  political	  sociology	  are	  especially	  fit	  to	  
address	  prima	  facie:	  (1)	  who	  exactly	  are	  these	  civil	  society	  actors	  (who	  are	  they	  composed	  
of	   and	   who	   provides	   their	   operational	   resources);	   (2)	   how	   do	   they	   interact	   in	   different	  
spaces	   (in	   other	   words:	   what	   practices	   do	   they	   use	   depending	   on	   their	   interlocutor	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Interestingly,	  the	  notion	  of	  victimhood	  has	  been	  a	  source	  of	  debate	  as	  well.	  Some	  of	  the	  veterans’	  associations	  in	  
the	  region	  claim	  victim	  status,	  as	  they	  feel	  betrayed	  by	  society	  for	  the	  wars	  the	  fought	  in	  the	  name	  of	  their	  respective	  
nations.	  The	  issue	  is	  developed	  further	  in	  Chapter	  5.	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objectives?);	  (3)	  where	  do	  these	  interactive	  process	  occur	  (which	  calls	  for	  a	  closer	  analysis	  of	  
the	   contextual	   settings,	   such	   as	   public	   conferences,	   closed	   meetings,	   and	   court	   rooms,	  
among	  others);	  (4)	  when	  do	  these	  processes	  take	  place;	  and	  finally	  (5)	  why	  do	  they	  shift	  or	  
change	  over	  time?	  
Such	  a	  research	  puzzle	  faces	  a	  couple	  of	  conceptual	  hurdles,	  notably	  because	  the	  politics	  of	  
transnational	  justice	  issues	  do	  not	  play	  out	  at	  a	  “higher”	  aggregated	  or	  homogenous	  level,	  
i.e.	   the	   national	   or	   international	   level.	   Rather	   they	   occur	   at	   the	   boundaries	   where	   these	  
spaces	   meet.	   To	   cope	   with	   these	   challenges	   properly,	   it	   is	   both	   methodologically	   and	  
epistemologically	  advantageous	  to	  subscribe	  to	  a	  political	  sociology	  perspective.	  In	  fact,	  the	  
interactions	  of	  various	  actors	  is	  not	  only	  complex	  and	  elusive—as	  it	  includes	  multiple	  actors	  
such	   as	   different	   government	   officials	   (ranging	   from	   defense	   ministry	   employees	   to	   civil	  
servants	   in	  the	   judiciary),	  human	  rights	  activist	   (who,	   in	  this	  case,	   fight	  against	  war	  crimes	  
and	   impunity)	   and	   individuals	   (both,	   victims	   and	   alleged	   perpetrators)—	   but	   these	  
interactions	  also	  occur	  in	  several	  separate	  and	  overlapping	  spaces.	  To	  capture	  and	  interpret	  
these	   processes	   it	   is	   therefore	   pivotal	   to	   ground	   observations	   and	   analyses	   of	   these	  
intertwined	  processes	   in	  multiple	   rich	  and	  deep	   layers	  of	  material	   sources.	   These	   sources	  
include	   in-­‐depth	  semi-­‐structured	   interviews	  with	  key	  actors,	  and	  detailed	  descriptions	  and	  
interpretations	   recorded	   by	   the	   author	   while	   participating	   and	   observing	   interactions	   of	  
different	   individuals	   and	   groups	   throughout	   retributive	   and	   restorative	   justice	   processes.	  
Only	  then,	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  address	  the	  question	  of	  how	  normative	  practices	  of	  both	  justice	  
and	  truth	  advocates	  affect	  each	  other	  and	  as	  a	  consequence,	  also	  shape	  transitional	  justice	  
	  59	  
practices	  in	  the	  Balkan	  region.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  concept	  of	  transitional	  justice	  as	  a	  norm	  
model	  is	  not	  set	  in	  stone,	  but	  a	  dynamic	  interactive	  process	  with	  activists	  and	  practitioners	  
as	  an	  intrinsic	  part	  of	  the	  political	  debates	  on	  accountability,	  reconciliation	  and	  reparations,	  
among	   others.40	   The	   variable-­‐oriented	   and	   causality-­‐driven	   analytical	   tools	   mentioned	  
earlier,	   however,	   are	  unable	   to	   face	   this	   challenge	   and	   to	  provide	   a	   satisfactory	   scholarly	  
account	  of	  the	  previously	  described	  issues.	  
	  
Mixing	  Methods:	  The	  Strength	  of	  Combining	  Participant	  
Observation	  and	  Narrative	  Interviews	  for	  Research	  on	  Post-­‐
Conflict	  Justice	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Issues	  
Having	   presented	   the	   epistemological	   importance	   of	   alternative	   qualitative	  methodology	  
for	   capturing	   the	   dynamic	   relationship	   between	   actors	   in	   changing	   transition	   contexts	  
earlier	  in	  this	  chapter,	  it	  is	  at	  order	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  actual	  tools	  used	  for	  collecting	  the	  data.	  
Two	   ethnographical	   and	   sociological	   methods	   are	   particularly	   helpful	   to	   foster	   a	   better	  
understanding:	   participant	   observation	   and	   narrative	   interviews.	   The	   first	   part	   of	   this	  
section	  describes	  each	  of	   the	  methods,	  discussing	  what	   they	  are	  and	  how	   they	  are	  used,	  
highlighting	   their	   strengths,	   and	   explaining	   why	   they	   are	   central	   for	   transitional	   justice	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Despite	  the	  need	  for	  progress,	  reparations	  have	  slowly	  but	  surely	  found	  their	  place	  in	  the	  public	  debate	  over	  the	  
years.	  The	  voices	  of	  other	  victims,	  such	  as	  rape	  victims,	  have	  also	  been	  heard	  and	  integrated	  in	  some	  of	  the	  
transitional	  justice	  mechanisms	  “Forum	  for	  Transitional	  Justice	  #2”	  (Humanitarian	  Law	  Center,	  March	  2009).	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research,	  illustrated	  by	  empirical	  evidence	  from	  the	  field.	  Subsequently,	  the	  author	  clarifies	  
why	   the	   combination	   of	   both	   tools	   is	   especially	   advantageous	   to	   cope	   with	   the	  
methodological	  challenges	  that	  the	  field	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  studies	  poses.	  	  
	  
Understanding	  Contexts	  and	  Dynamics	  in	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Settings:	  The	  Use	  
of	  Participant	  Observation	  
The	  method	  of	  participant	  observation,	  as	  its	  name	  indicates,	  is	  a	  tool	  developed	  by	  social	  
scientists,	  primarily	   anthropologists	  and	   sociologists,	   in	  order	   to	   capture	   specific	  behavior	  
within	   a	   small	   group	  of	   individuals	   or	   local	   community.	   Applied	   techniques	   to	   gather	   the	  
information	   range	   from	   informal	   interviews	   and	   observation	   to	   participation	   in	   certain	  
group	  activities	  and	  living	  with	  the	  community.	  As	  I	  pointed	  out	  earlier,	  however,	  I	  will	  apply	  
it	   for	   political	   science	   related	   research.	  One	   of	   its	   early	   advocates,	   Bronislaw	  Malinowski	  
(1884-­‐1942)	  a	  Polish	  anthropologist,	  describes	  some	  of	  its	  methodological	  characteristics	  in	  
his	  widely	  acclaimed	  published	  dissertational	  work	  Argonauts	  of	  the	  Western	  Pacific	  (1922),	  	  
It	   is	   necessary	   for	   an	   Ethnographer	   to	   listen	   several	   times	   to	   such	   a	  
narrative,	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  fair	  chance	  of	  forming	  some	  coherent	  idea	  
of	  its	  trend.	  Afterwards,	  by	  means	  of	  direct	  examination,	  he	  can	  succeed	  
in	   placing	   the	   facts	   in	   their	   proper	   sequence.	   By	   questioning	   the	  
informants	  about	  details	  of	  rite	  and	  magic,	   it	   is	  possible	  then	  to	  obtain	  
interpretations	  and	  commentaries.	  Thus	  the	  whole	  of	  a	  narrative	  can	  be	  
constructed,	  the	  various	  fragments,	  with	  all	  their	  spontaneous	  freshness,	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can	  be	  put	  in	  their	  proper	  places,	  and	  this	  is	  what	  I	  have	  done	  in	  giving	  
this	  account	  of	  shipwreck.41	  
Applying	  techniques	  developed	  by	  anthropologists	  and	  sociologists	  to	  analyze	  problems	  of	  
democratization	  of	  human	   rights	   in	  post-­‐conflict	   societies	   is	  an	  original	  approach.	   It	   looks	  
beyond	  institutional	  mechanisms	  and	  state-­‐centric	  analyses	  because	  individuals	  and	  groups	  
of	   individuals	   become	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   study.	   It	   helps	   to	   explore	   the	   motivations	   and	  
practices	  of	  human	  right	  activists	  as	  a	  response	  to	  practices	  of	  legal	  professionals	  and	  other	  
international	  actors	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  settings.	  
The	   following	   presents	   an	   example	   of	   how	   participant	   observation	   was	   used	   during	   a	  
regional	   conference	   on	   transparency	   of	   courts	   and	   media	   responsibility	   in	   transitional	  
justice	   processes	   in	   the	   Balkans,	   held	   in	   Sarajevo,	   Bosnia	   and	  Herzegovina,	   in	   September	  
2009.	  Participants	  of	  the	  three-­‐day	  symposium	  included	  representatives	  from	  international	  
institutions,	   such	   as	   the	   ICTY,	   national	   judiciaries	   from	   Southeast	   Europe,	   journalists	   and	  
human	  rights	  activists,	  among	  others.	   It	  was	  a	  warm	  Indian	  summer	  day,	  when	   I	   took	  the	  
beige	  and	  grass-­‐green-­‐painted,	   shabby	  and	  dirty	   looking	   tram	  with	   faded	  Raiffeisenbank42	  
stickers	  along	  its	  sides—a	  Viennese	  second-­‐hand	  tram	  bought	  by	  the	  city	  of	  Sarajevo	  public	  
transport	  company	  GRAS	  after	  the	  siege	  was	  over43—to	  the	  World	  Trade	  Center	  in	  Sarajevo.	  
I	  was	   headed	  west,	   leaving	   from	   old	   town,	   the	   Baščaršija,	   a	  market	   and	   bazaar-­‐like	   area	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Branislaw	  Malinowski,	  Argonauts	  of	  the	  West	  Pacific	  (London:	  George	  Rutledge	  &	  Sons,	  1922),	  258.	  Other	  scholars	  
have	  also	  contributed	  to	  establish	  participant	  observation	  including,	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  Frank	  Hamilton	  Cushing,	  
Edward	  Evans-­‐Pritchard,	  Clifford	  Geertz	  and	  Margret	  Mead.	  
42	  It	  is	  the	  name	  of	  an	  Austrian	  banking	  group,	  created	  in	  1927.	  
43	  During	  the	  siege	  Sarajevo’s	  tram	  rail	  system,	  one	  of	  the	  oldest	  in	  Europe,	  was	  damaged	  badly	  and	  needed	  major	  
repairs.	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which	  had	  been	  renovated	  after	   the	  war	  and	   is	  at	  present	   the	   tourist	  epicenter	   in	  Bosnia	  
and	  Herzegovina’s	  capital.	  The	  tramline	  runs	  two	  streets	  north	  paralleling	  the	  Miljacka	  river	  
along	  Mula	  Mustafe	  Bašeskije44	   street	  which	   turns	   into	  Marshall	   Tito	   avenue,	   passing	   the	  
eternal	   flame	  of	  the	  unkown	  solider.	   It	  struck	  me	  that	  some	  of	  the	  buildings	  still	  bear	  the	  
marks	  of	  the	  nearly	  4-­‐year	  siege	  of	  the	  city,	  such	  as	  bullet	  holes	  and	  mortar-­‐shell	   impacts,	  
almost	   15	   years	   after	   armed	   conflict	   ended.	   When	   I	   arrived	   at	   my	   destination,	   the	  
environment	  had	  completely	  changed.	  Only	  a	  few	  miles	  from	  the	  centar,	   in	  New	  Sarajevo,	  
the	   construction	   of	   a	   mall	   next	   to	   the	   World	   Trade	   Center	   was	   underway	   and	   diverse	  
shopping	   facilities	   dominated	   the	   landscape.	   Although	   the	   conference	   organized	   by	   the	  
Balkan	   Investigative	   Reporting	   Network’s	   (BIRN)45	   was	   public,	   I	   only	   had	   heard	   of	   it	   by	  
chance	  perusing	  BIRN’s	  website	   a	   few	  days	   earlier	   for	   information	  on	   a	  war	   crimes	   case.	  
When	   I	  entered	  the	  high-­‐rise	  two-­‐tower	  building,	   I	  had	  to	  walk	  up	  a	   flight	  of	  stairs	   to	  the	  
conference	  room,	  which	  was	  located	  on	  the	  same	  level	  as	  the	  entrance	  to	  the	  offices	  of	  the	  
OSCE	   Mission.	   Interestingly,	   while	   much	   of	   the	   discussion	   during	   the	   international	  
symposium	   focused	   on—and	   even	   stressed	   the	   need	   for—transparency	   and	   access	   to	  
information	  and	  how	  the	  media	  played	  bore	  an	  important	  responsibility	  to	  present	  the	  facts	  
(rather	  than	  a	  distorted	  and	  manipulated	  yellow-­‐press	  story	  when	  reporting	  on	  war	  crimes	  
issues)	   I	  was	  surprised	  of	  how	   little	  ordinary	  citizens	  were	  present	   that	  day.	   In	   fact,	  while	  
the	   room,	  which	   could	   seat	   around	   200	   people,	  was	   only	   less	   than	   half	   full,	  most	   of	   the	  
attendees	   in	   the	   seats	   were	   either	   members	   of	   the	   international	   diplomatic	   community	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Named	  after	  a	  famous	  Bosnian	  18th	  century	  writer.	  
45	  BIRN	  is	  a	  network	  of	  professionals	  who	  promote	  investigative	  journalism	  on	  sociopolitical	  topics	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  
including	  war	  crimes	  trials.	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(such	   as	   the	   EU,	   OSCE	   or	   other	   embassy	   staff),	   representatives	   of	   major	   human	   rights	  
associations	  across	  the	  region,	  and	  members	  of	  the	  local	  press	  as	  well	  as	  from	  neighboring	  
countries	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  	  Hence	  I	  found	  myself	  in	  a	  very	  closed-­‐off	  environment	  
of	   selective	   actors,	   who	   were	   attempting	   to	   negotiate	   their	   conflicting	   interests	   during	  
meetings	  and	  panel	  discussions	  over	  the	  span	  of	  three	  days.	  	  
Attending	   and	   observing	   the	   conference	   helped	   me	   to	   explore	   and	   understand	   the	  
relationships	  between	  these	  different	  actors.	  As	  a	  case	  in	  point,	  Nataša	  Kandić,	  director	  of	  
the	  Serbian	  non-­‐profit	  organization	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center	  was	  cited	  in	  a	  publication	  put	  
out	   by	   the	   organizers	   of	   the	   event:	   “Neither	   judges	   nor	   prosecutors	   are	   fond	   of	   human	  
rights	   organizations.	   They	   are	   neither	   fond	   of	   me	   nor	   the	   Humanitarian	   Law	   Center	   in	  
general.	  They	  cannot	  however	  function	  without	  us.”46	  Yet,	  what	  the	  report	  didn’t	  mention	  is	  
the	   interaction	   between	   an	   attendee—David	   Re	   a	   then-­‐international	   judge	   at	   the	   Bosnia	  
and	  Herzegovina	  state	  court	  war	  crimes	  chamber—and	  Ms.	  Kandić	  during	  the	  question	  and	  
answer	  session	  of	  the	  discussion	  panel.	  His	  comments	  about	  the	  differences	  of	  the	  work	  of	  
documentation	  centers,	   such	  as	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center,	  and	  courts	  or	   the	  prosecution,	  
underline	   the	   vocational	   and	  professional	   gap	   that	  exists	  between	   social	   actors	   and	   state	  
actors.	  	  
Additionally,	   it	   raises	  questions	  about	   the	   current	   role	  of	   activists	   in	   transition	  processes.	  
These	  questions	  include,	  but	  are	  not	  limited	  to:	  To	  what	  extend	  can	  the	  work	  of	  non-­‐profit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Nidžara	  Ahmetaševic	  and	  Anna	  McTaggart,	  eds.,	  “Court	  Transparency	  and	  Media	  Responsibility:	  Regional	  
Conference	  1-­‐3	  September	  2009”	  (The	  Balkan	  Investigative	  Reporting	  Network	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  BIRN	  BiH,	  
2009).	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organizations	   support	   the	   role	   of	   the	   judiciary	   in	   its	   accountability	   efforts?	   And	   how	   do	  
legal-­‐oriented	   human	   rights	   practices—in	   other	   words	   any	   support	   of	   the	   judicial	  
institutions	  that	   involves	   legal	  practices	  or	  the	  knowledge	  thereof—affect	  the	  relationship	  
between	  activists	  and	  their	  base	   (in	  particular	  victims	  of	  human	  rights	  violations)?	  Formal	  
interview	  techniques	  would	  have	  required	  multiple	  sessions.	  And	  in	  some	  cases,	  particularly	  
for	   interviews	   with	   high-­‐level	   officials,	   such	   as	   the	   then-­‐President	   of	   the	   War	   Crimes	  
Chamber	   of	   the	   Belgrade	   District	   Court,	   Siniša	   Važić,	   the	   value	   of	   collected	   data	   is	   very	  
limited.	   The	   President's	   responses	   merely	   reflected	   the	   general	   official	   discourse	   of	   the	  
Serbian	   government	   in	   view	   of	   ICTY	   war	   crimes	   cooperation	   criteria	   and	   the	   EU	  
enlargement	  process.47	  	  
Participant	   observation	   has	   several	   other	   advantages	   for	   a	   transitional	   justice	   research	  
agenda.	   Paul	   Atkinson	   and	   Martyn	   Hammersley	   perceptively	   point	   out	   that	   “[t]he	  
epistemology	   of	   participant	   observation	   rests	   on	   the	   principle	   of	   interaction	   and	   the	  
"reciprocity	   of	   perspectives"	   between	   social	   actors.”48	   As	   the	   researcher	   becomes	   part	   of	  
the	  community	  or	  of	  the	  group	  he	  or	  she	  is	  studying	  an	  extended	  fieldwork	  period	  facilitates	  
reciprocity	  while	  the	  researcher	  builds	  mutual	  trust	  with	  his	  or	  her	  subjects.	   It	  also	  allows	  
for	  observations	  or	  changes	  that	  develop	  over	  time,	  which—in	  the	  case	  of	  regular	  face-­‐to-­‐
face	  interviews—would	  require	  multiple	  interventions	  and/or	  field	  trips.	  More	  importantly,	  
however,	   the	   established	   relationship	   between	   the	   researcher	   and	   his	   or	   her	   subjects	  
results	  in	  a	  change	  of	  how	  the	  researcher’s	  role	  is	  perceived	  within	  the	  community	  and	  can	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Interview	  conducted	  in	  Belgrade,	  Serbia,	  on	  14	  September	  2009.	  
48	  “Ethnography	  and	  Participant	  Observation,”	  in	  Handbook	  of	  Qualitative	  Research	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage	  
Publications,	  1994),	  256.	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help	   disclose	   information	   that	   the	   subjects	   are	   generally	   hesitant	   to	   reveal	   publicly,	  
especially	  during	  a	  more	   formal	  or	  official	   interview.	  While	   in	   the	  eyes	  of	  his	  subjects	   the	  
researcher’s	  role	  has	  changed,	  it	  is	  not	  set	  in	  stone;	  rather	  it	  constantly	  evolves.	  
Interaction	   is	   always	   a	   tentative	   process	   that	   involves	   the	   continuous	  
testing	   by	   all	   participants	   of	   the	   conceptions	   they	  have	  of	   the	   roles	   of	  
others.	   In	   other	   words,	   ethnographers	   and	   their	   collaborators	   do	   not	  
step	   into	   fixed	   and	   fully	   defied	   positions;	   rather	   their	   behaviors	   and	  
expectations	  of	  each	  other	  are	  part	  of	  a	  dynamic	  process	  that	  continues	  
to	  grow	  ...	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  single	  research	  projects.49	  
The	  following	  fieldwork	  experience	  underlines	  Angrosino	  and	  Mays	  de	  Pérez’s	  point.	  While	  
conducting	   research	   in	   Croatia,	   a	   human	   rights	   leader	   from	   the	   organization	   Documenta	  
Center	   for	   Dealing	   with	   the	   Past	   (Documenta)	   scheduled	   an	   interview	   with	   another	  
international	   academic	   researcher,	   inviting	   me	   to	   join	   the	   meeting.	   This	   situation	   was	  
epistemologically	   very	   valuable,	   as	   I	   was	   able	   to	   observe	   the	   interaction	   between	   the	  
researcher	   and	   his	   subject,	   thus	   taking	   on	   a	   third-­‐person	   view	   during	   the	   interview.	  
Although	   the	   international	   researcher	   asked	   pertinent	   questions	   throughout	   the	   entire	  
interview	  process,	  it	  became	  obvious	  that	  the	  activist	  (in)voluntarily	  held	  back	  information.	  
The	   point	   here	   is	   not	   to	   stress	   and	   interpret	   the	   politics	   of	   human	   rights	   activists’	   public	  
relations	  strategy	  when	  reporting	  on	  their	  activities.	  Instead	  this	  experience	  underlines	  the	  
importance	   of	   immersing	   oneself	   into	   the	   research	   context.	   Notwithstanding,	   interviews	  
constitute	  an	  essential	  part	  of	  gathering	  valuable	  data	  during	  fieldwork.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Michael	  V.	  Angrosino	  and	  Kimberly	  A.	  Mays	  de	  Pérez,	  “Rethinking	  Observation:	  From	  Method	  to	  Context,”	  in	  
Handbook	  of	  Qualitative	  Research,	  ed.	  Norman	  K.	  Denzim	  and	  Yvonna	  S.	  Lincoln	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage	  
Publications,	  2000),	  683.	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Complementing	  Observations:	  Employing	  Narrative	  Interviews	  
Interviews,	   despite	   some	   of	   the	   limitations	   described	   above,	   can	   still	   serve	   as	   useful	  
analytical	   tools	   when	   studying	   the	   relationship	   between	   justice	   and	   human	   rights.	   This	  
section	  concerns	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  interviews	  that	  is	  particularly	  beneficial	  for	  research	  on	  
process-­‐oriented	  and	  relational	  questions,	  so	  called	  narrative	  interviews.	  In	  order	  to	  explain	  
this	   method	   in	   further	   detail,	   it	   might	   be	   helpful	   to	   put	   it	   into	   the	   appropriate	   socio-­‐
academic	   context.	   Until	   the	   early	   1980s,	   little	   literature	   on	   interviewing	   for	   qualitative	  
research	  purposes	  was	  available.	  Yet,	  already	  in	  Ancient	  Greek,	  Thucydides	  or	  Socrates	  used	  
a	   form	   of	   interviews	   to	   obtain	   knowledge.	   Of	   course,	   at	   the	   time,	   it	   wasn’t	   labeled	   as	  
“interview”	  per	  se;	  rather	  it	  was	  conversations	  that	  both	  thinkers	  relied	  on.	  Only	  in	  recent	  
decades	   have	   interviews	   become	   a	   more	   structured	   analytical	   tool	   and	   have	   developed	  
more	   systematically.	   This	   evolution	   was	   in	   part	   fueled	   by	   the	   technical	   progress	   such	   as	  
small	  portable	   tape	  recording	  devices	   in	   the	  1950s	   that	  allowed	  researchers	   to	  accurately	  
capture	  interview	  conversations	  and	  finally,	  the	  advent	  of	  computer	  technology	  and	  tools	  to	  
transcribe	  data	   in	   the	  1980s.50	   As	   a	   result,	   in	   recent	  decades	   industrialized	   societies	   have	  
veritably	  turned	  into	  “interview	  societies.”51	  	  With	  the	  open-­‐ended	  interview	  style	  of	  many	  
TV	  talk	  shows	  or	  news	   interviews	  “we	  see	  a	  persistent	  romantic	   impulse	   in	  contemporary	  
sociology:	  the	  elevation	  of	  the	  experiential	  as	  the	  authentic.”52	  This	  authenticity	  is	  fueled	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  For	  a	  detailed	  history	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  interview	  techniques	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  cf.	  Steinar	  Kvale,	  Interviews:	  An	  
Introduction	  to	  Qualitative	  Research	  Interviewing	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage	  Publications,	  Inc.,	  1996).	  
51	  Jaber	  F.	  Gubrium	  and	  James	  A.	  Holstein,	  “From	  the	  Individual	  Interview	  to	  the	  Interview	  Society,”	  in	  Postmodern	  
Interviewing,	  ed.	  Jaber	  F.	  Gubrim	  and	  James	  A.	  Holstein	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage	  Publications,	  2003),	  21–50.	  
52	  Silverman,	  “Analyzing	  Talk	  and	  Text,”	  823.	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a	  highly	  descriptive	  technique	  in	  the	  field,	  which	  is	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “realist	  approach	  to	  
interview	  data.”53	  
Notwithstanding	   Silverman’s	   critique,	   the	   selected	   interview	   type	   for	   this	   research,	  
narrative	   interviews	   (or	   in-­‐depth	   interviews),	   could	   best	   be	   described	   as	   a	   constructivist	  
research	   tool.	   When	   applying	   this	   form	   of	   interviews,	   the	   researcher	   is	   aware	   that	   the	  
stories	   of	   his	   subjects	   are	   embedded	   in	   different	   sociopolitical	   contexts.	   Respondents	   do	  
not	   only	   answer	   according	   to	   their	   cultural	   settings—which	   requires	   a	   cultural	  
understanding	  on	   the	  part	  of	   the	   researcher—but	  additionally,	   their	   stories	  might	  also	  be	  
associated	   with	   different	   meanings,	   depending	   on	   their	   experiences	   and	   situations.54	  
Fieldwork	   experience	   interviewing	   international	   representatives	   at	   the	  Office	   of	   the	   High	  
Representative	   (OHR)55	   and	   at	   the	   United	   Nations	   Development	   Program	   (UNDP)	   in	  
Sarajevo,	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina,	   illustrates	   the	   benefits	   of	   this	   type	   of	   interview	  
technique	   for	  my	   post-­‐conflict	   justice	   research.	   During	   interviews	   in	   fall	   2009	   and	   spring	  
2011	  I	  noticed	  that	  the	  sociopolitical	  and	  cultural	  context	  on	  the	  ground—in	  which	  staff	  of	  
international	   organizations	   operate—constituted	   several	   challenges	   despite	   their	  
professional	  experience,	  which	  should	  have	  readied	  the	  international	  aid	  workers	  for	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Ibid.,	  823.	  Emphasized	  in	  original.	  
54	  Ibid.,	  823–825.	  
55	  The	  OHR	  is	  an	  international	  organization	  in	  charge	  of	  overseeing	  in	  particular	  the	  political	  and	  institutional	  
implementation	  of	  the	  Dayton	  Peace	  Agreement,	  signed	  in	  1995.	  The	  High	  Representative	  is	  also	  the	  European	  Union	  
Special	  Representative	  (EUSR)	  for	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina.	  The	  OHR	  has	  used	  his	  veto	  power	  several	  times	  in	  the	  past	  
to	  push	  for	  reforms	  in	  the	  security,	  defense	  and	  judicial	  sector.	  One	  of	  the	  more	  recent	  and	  spectacular	  interventions	  
was	  when	  the	  High	  Representatives,	  Valentin	  Inzko,	  decided	  to	  unilaterally	  extend	  the	  mandate	  of	  international	  
judges	  at	  the	  Bosnian	  State	  Court	  in	  Sarajevo	  shortly	  before	  it	  expired	  in	  December	  2009.	  The	  delegates	  of	  the	  
Republika	  Srpska	  (one	  of	  the	  two	  main	  politico-­‐institutional	  entities	  that	  constitute	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina;	  the	  other	  
one	  is	  the	  Federation	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina)	  had	  voted	  against	  it	  earlier	  in	  September	  2009,	  heightening	  tensions	  
between	  the	  different	  ethnic	  groups	  within	  the	  federation.	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tasks	  on	  the	  ground.56	  As	  a	  result,	  practices	  in	  the	  field	  aim	  to	  include	  increasingly	  local	  staff	  
who	  works	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  their	   international	  colleagues.	  “Every	  interview…is	  [thus]	  an	  
interpersonal	   drama	   with	   a	   developing	   plot.”57	   And	   embracing	   this	   particular	   quality	   of	  
interview	   techniques	   opens	   the	   door	   to	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   context	   the	  
interviewee	  is	  situated	  in,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  or	  her	  relationship	  to	  other	  important	  actors.	  	  
	  
Combining	  Methods	  to	  Gain	  Adaptable	  Tools	  to	  Capture	  Changing	  
Contexts	  
The	  strength	  of	  a	  mixed	  method	  qualitative	  approach—in	  this	  case	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  
two	   aforementioned	   analytical	   tools,	  participant	   observation	   and	  narrative	   interviews—is	  
that	  scholars	  can	  use	  their	  “theoretical	  resources”	  to:	  i)	  analyze	  a	  small	  set	  of	  data	  in	  which	  
context	  and	  change	  are	  crucial;	  ii)	  underline	  that	  coding	  plays	  a	  less	  important	  role,	  as	  data	  
is	  dynamic	  and	  subject	  to	  change;	  and	   iii)	  “show	  how	  the	  (theoretically	  defined)	  elements	  
we	   have	   identified	   are	   assembled	   or	   mutually	   laminated.”58	   Empirical	   evidence	   from	  my	  
field	  experience	  during	  data	  collection	  procedures	   further	  corroborates	   the	  advantages	  of	  
such	  a	  combined	  approach.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Their	  past	  professional	  experiences	  generally	  consist	  of	  a	  patchwork	  of	  diverse	  field	  missions	  in	  various	  conflict	  
regions	  of	  the	  world	  that	  generally	  last	  for	  three	  to	  four	  years.	  
57	  Pool,	  1957,	  193	  quoted	  in	  Andrea	  Fontana	  and	  James	  H.	  Frey,	  “The	  Interview:	  From	  Structured	  Questions	  to	  
Negotiated	  Text,”	  in	  Handbook	  of	  Qualitative	  Research	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage	  Publications,	  2000),	  663.	  
58	  Silverman,	  “Analyzing	  Talk	  and	  Text,”	  828.	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A	   number	   of	   factors	   support	   my	   claim	   why	   researchers	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   justice	   settings	  
should	   employ	   these	   analytical	   tools,	   including	   in	   particular	   feasibility,	   externality,	   and	  
confidentiality.	  	  In	  fact,	  a	  research	  project	  is	  generally	  limited	  to	  a	  specific	  time	  period	  and	  
the	  studied	  community	  is	  not	  isolated	  from	  outside	  effects,	  but	  rather	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  social	  
system.	   I	   have	   thus	   followed	   and	   ‘lived’	   with	   leaders	   and	   activists	   of	   human	   rights	  
organizations	   during	   their	   daily	   activities	   across	   the	   region,	   reminiscent	   of	   the	   work	   of	  
ethnographers	  who	  explore	  remote	  and	  indigenous	  tribes.	  However,	   it	  was	  not	  feasible	  to	  
apply	   these	  participant	  observation	   techniques	   to	  all	  of	   the	   involved	  actors	   in	   transitional	  
justice	   processes	   in	   the	   region.	   In	   order	   to	   reconcile	   the	   paradox	   of	   collecting	   sufficient	  
information	   of	   different	   actors	   crucial	   to	   understand	   the	   dynamics	   I	   relied	   on	   additional	  
open-­‐ended	   formal	   and/or	   informal	   interviews	   with	   other	   key	   transitional	   actors	   to	  
complement	   the	   constantly	   collected	   data	   through	   participant	   observation.	   Moreover,	  
supplementing	   participant	   observation	  with	   interviews	   can	   help	   overcome	   confidentiality	  
issues.	   Indeed,	  while	   the	   researcher	   becomes	   part	   of	   the	   community	   it	  might	   occur	   that	  
information	  sharing	  through	  informal	  conversations	  reveals	  findings	  that	  are	  not	  meant	  for	  
public	   use.59	   Sometimes,	   the	   subjects	   specifically	   mention	   not	   to	   use	   certain	   types	   of	  
information	   for	   research	   purposes,	   whereas	   other	   times,	   it	   might	   be	   more	   implicit.	   To	  
ensure	   that	   all	   the	   gathered	   information	   during	   participant	   observation	   can	   be	   used	   for	  
research	  purposes,	  it	   is	  very	  practical	  to	  rely	  on	  periodical	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  
the	   community	   members.	   The	   more	   formal	   character—as	   compared	   to	   the	   informal	  
conversations	  and	  daily	  interactions	  with	  the	  members—of	  the	  conversation	  allows	  thus	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Here	  I	  refer	  to	  facts	  and	  information	  that	  cannot	  be	  found	  in	  public	  records	  or	  documents	  in	  hindsight.	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double-­‐check	  which	   information	   is	   available	  with	   the	   community’s	   consent.	  Any	   concerns	  
that	   this	   self-­‐censorship	  might	   come	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   crucial	   research	   information	   that	  
might	  not	  be	  used	  anymore	  are	  ungrounded,	  as	  certain	  specific	  details	  do	  not	  always	  play	  




This	   chapter	   has	   sought	   to	   provide	   a	   complementary	   methodological	   approach	   for	  
scholarship	   on	   global	   accountability	   efforts	   for	   mass	   atrocities,	   state	   violence	   and	   grave	  
human	   rights	   violations,	   which	   has	   been	   very	   influenced	   by	   a	   variable-­‐oriented	   and	  
causality-­‐driven	  methodology.	  More	   precisely,	   it	   helps	   better	   understand	   the	   changes	   of	  
transnational	   contexts,	   such	   as	   during	   post-­‐conflict	   justice	   processes,	   to	   which	   various	  
actors,	  and	  in	  particular	  human	  rights	  activists,	  are	  exposed	  and	  in	  which	  they	  have	  played	  
an	  increasingly	  important	  role.	  To	  this	  end,	  my	  research	  design	  helps	  especially	  to	  examine	  
(1)	  who	   these	   civil	   society	   actors	   are;	   (2)	  how	   they	   interact	   in	  different	   spaces;	   (3)	  where	  
these	   interactive	  process	  occur;	   (4)	  when	   these	  processes	   take	  place;	  and	   finally	   (5)	  what	  	  
shifts	  and	  changes	  happen	  over	  time.	  	  
I	  have	  shown	  that	  despite	  the	  panoply	  of	  disciplines	  engaged	  in	  transitional	  justice	  studies,	  
including	  not	  only	  scholars,	  but	  also	  practitioners	  and	  activists	   from	  different	   fields,	   larger	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categorical	  trends	  in	  the	  study	  of	  these	  phenomena	  remain	  visible.	  The	  heavy	  influence	  of	  
legalism	   (when	   transitional	   justice	   studies	   emerged)	   and	   the	   current	   inclination	   towards	  
quantitative	   studies	   in	   the	   literature	   highlight	   this	   trend.	   Notwithstanding,	   transitional	  
justice	   studies	   benefits	   from	   complementary	   thick	   and	   in-­‐depth	   qualitative	   methods	   to	  
analyze	   post-­‐conflict	   justice	   from	   a	   political	   science	   perspective.	   Thanks	   to	   participant	  
observation	   and	   narrative	   interviews,	   international	   networks	   and	   groups	   can	   be	   studied	  
using	   political	   sociology	   tools	   to	   elucidate	   how	   these	   actors	   produce	   legal	   knowledge;	   to	  
understand	   their	   practices	   and	   goals;	   as	   well	   as	   to	   examine	   the	   relationship	   between	  
different	   actors	   and	  how	   their	   activities	   affect	   each	  of	   the	   groups	   and	   transitional	   justice	  
processes	   more	   broadly.	   	   In	   sum,	   this	   alternative	   and	   complementary	   methodology	  
proposed	   in	   this	   chapter	   is	   not	   intended	   to	   turn	   legal	   scholars,	   social	   scientists	   and	  
practitioners	  into	  anthropologists,	  ethnographers	  or	  sociologists.	  Instead,	  it	  aims	  at	  opening	  
the	   burgeoning	   studies	   of	   transitional	   justice	   to	   an	   alternative	   epistemology	   grounded	   in	  
political	   science	   that	   will	   provide	   a	   different	   perspective	   and	   offer	   unique	   theoretical	  
















In	   the	   previous	   chapters,	   I	   have	   introduced	   some	   of	   the	   fundamental	   social	   differences	  
between	   the	  professional	  habitus	  of	   legal	  practitioners	  and	  human	   rights	  activists.	   	   In	   the	  
following	   chapters	   I	   expand	   this	   discussion,	   providing	   some	  of	   the	   ‘socio-­‐legal’	   context	   in	  
which	   current	   NGOs	   engage	   in	   transitional	   justice	   initiatives	   against	   war	   crimes	   in	   the	  
region.	  In	  fact,	  their	  activities	  and	  prevailing	  struggles	  to	  promote	  accountability	  efforts	  are	  
conditioned	   by	   a	   problematic	   evolution	   of	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   that	   the	   ICTY	  
spearheaded,	   in	   order	   to	   promote	   international	   criminal	   law	   not	   only	   across	   the	   former	  
Yugoslavia,	  but	  also	  around	   the	  world.	   The	  continuous	  difficulties	   the	   ICTY	   faced	  when	  of	  
putting	  into	  practice	  humanitarian	  law	  on	  the	  ground	  finally	  helped	  increase	  role	  of	  human	  
rights	  activists	  and	  NGOs	  in	  the	  field	  of	  transitional	  justice.	  The	  next	  two	  chapters	  therefore	  
trace	  the	  rise	  of	  these	  actors	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  development	  of	  the	  ICTY’s	  activities.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Michel	  Foucault	  and	  Colin	  Gordon,	  Power/knowledge:	  Selected	  Interviews	  and	  Other	  Writings,	  1972-­‐1977	  (Harvester	  
Press,	  1980),	  131.	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Far	  from	  being	  a	  linear	  and	  smooth	  process	  of	  applying	  legal	  norms	  to	  a	  war-­‐torn	  area	  with	  
the	  goal	  of	  restoring	  peace	  and	  stability	  in	  the	  conflict	  zone,	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  UN	  ad	  hoc	  
tribunal	  was	  beset	  by	  numerous	  difficulties.	  Some	  are	  more	  obvious	  than	  others.	  The	  idea	  of	  
an	  international	  court	  in	  charge	  of	  sentencing	  war	  criminals	  and	  human	  rights	  violators—as	  
elaborated	   earlier—has	   been	   a	   watershed	   moment	   in	   international	   human	   rights	   and	  
criminal	  law	  as	  it	  moved	  beyond	  the	  concept	  of	  victors’	  justice,	  an	  issue	  that	  scholars	  have	  
pointed	  to	  by	  referring	  particularly	  to	  the	  post-­‐World-­‐War-­‐II	  trials	  in	  Tokyo	  or	  Nuremberg.2	  
Yet,	   in	  order	  to	  operate,	  such	  an	  international	   judicial	  body	  infringes	  on	  state	  sovereignty,	  
which	  requires	  a	  UN	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  backed	  by	  its	  members.	  Putting	  in	  place	  the	  
ICTY	   was	   therefore	   a	   shaky	   and	   difficult	   mission,	   in	   which	   its	   advocates—including	  
international	   lawyers,	   politicians	   and	   diplomats—had	   to	   rely	   on	   diplomatic	   relations,	  
endless	  negotiations	  and	  back	  channeling,	  so	  that	  the	  tribunal	  could	  see	  the	  light	  of	  day.	  On	  
May	   25,	   1993,	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council	   finally	   passed	   a	   resolution	   827,	   establishing	   the	  
statute	  of	  the	  ICTY.3	  	  	  
This	  process	  occurred	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  conflict,	  and	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  goal	  to	  cease	  fighting,	  
restore	   peace,	   and	   guarantee	   stability	   by	   deterring	   future	   acts	   of	   violence.	   One	   main	  
concern	   the	   drafters	   of	   the	   statute	   expressed	  was	   to	   avoid	   a	   self-­‐contained	   criminal.	   Put	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Viktor	  Peskin,	  “Beyond	  Victor’s	  Justice?	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Prosecuting	  the	  Winners	  at	  the	  International	  Criminal	  
Tribunals	  for	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Rwanda,”	  Journal	  of	  Human	  Rights	  4,	  no.	  2	  (2005):	  213–231;	  James	  Meernik,	  
“Victor’s	  Justice	  or	  the	  Law?	  Judging	  and	  Punishing	  at	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia,”	  
Journal	  of	  Conflict	  Resolution	  47,	  no.	  2	  (2003):	  140–162.	  For	  a	  historical	  analysis	  on	  the	  Nuremberg	  and	  Tokyo	  Trials	  
after	  World	  War	  II	  see	  for	  instance	  Philippe	  Sands,	  From	  Nuremberg	  to	  The	  Hague:	  The	  Future	  of	  International	  
Criminal	  Justice	  (Cambridge,	  NY:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003);	  Richard	  Minear,	  Victors’	  Justice:	  The	  Tokyo	  War	  
Crimes	  Trial	  (Princeton	  University	  Press	  Princeton,	  NJ,	  1971).	  
3	  Cf.	  UN	  resolution	  827,	  UN	  Doc	  S/Res/827	  (1993),	  available	  at	  http://daccess-­‐dds-­‐
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/306/28/IMG/N9330628.pdf?OpenElement,	  accessed	  January	  3,	  2012.	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differently,	  the	  drafters	  granted	  the	  ICTY	  jurisdiction	  over	  a	  very	  general	  set	  of	  crimes,	  with	  
the	  specific	  definition	  and	  content	  available	  in	  customary	  international	  law.	  As	  a	  result	  the	  
crimes	  that	  are	  listed	  in	  articles	  2,	  4,	  and	  5	  of	  the	  state	  remain	  very	  broadly	  defined.	  Article	  
2,	   for	   instance,	   grants	   the	   tribunal	   the	   right	   to	   try	   “grave	   breaches”	   of	   the	   Geneva	  
Conventions.4	  While	  article	  3	  confers	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  laws	  and	  customs	  of	  war,	  articles	  
4	  and	  5	  refer	  to	  genocide	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  respectively.	  War	  crimes	  include	  for	  
instance	  the	  use	  of	  illegal	  weapons	  and	  the	  “wanton	  destruction	  of	  cities,	  towns	  or	  villages,	  
or	  devastation	  not	  justified	  by	  military	  necessity.”5	  Moreover,	  it	  sanctions	  the	  destruction	  or	  
seizure	   of	   educational,	   religious	   and	   charity-­‐related	   buildings.	   Crimes	   against	   humanity	  
include	  according	  to	  the	   list	   in	  article	  5	  murder,	  extermination,	  enslavement,	  deportation,	  
imprisonment,	  torture,	  rape	  and	  persecutions,	  among	  ”other	  inhuman	  acts.”6	  
In	  fact,	  this	  intricate	  conflict	  situation	  also	  meant	  that	  transitional	  justice	  mechanisms	  that	  
had	   been	   used	   in	   the	   past,	   such	   as	   truth	   commissions,	   to	   help	   democratic	   transitions	   in	  
countries	   like	  Argentina,	  were	  not	  part	  of	   the	  peacemakers’	   repertoire.	   The	   reluctance	  of	  
using	   a	   truth	   commission	   were	   the	   continuing	   war-­‐like	   conditions	   in	   the	   Balkans,	   which	  
crushed	  the	  idea	  of	  inviting	  different	  heads	  of	  state	  across	  the	  region	  sit	  down	  and	  discuss	  
the	  prospects	  of	  such	  a	  commission,	  let	  alone	  to	  negotiate	  a	  ceasefire.	  In	  fact,	  the	  ongoing	  
fighting	  during	  the	  1990s	  in	  the	  Balkans	  contrasted	  sharply	  from	  the	  transitional	  contexts	  in	  
other	   countries	   around	   the	   world,	   such	   as	   Peru	   or	   South	   Africa	   that	   initially	   used	   truth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  Geneva	  conventions	  date	  from	  August	  12,	  1949	  and	  comprise	  four	  treaties	  and	  three	  additional	  protocols	  that	  
establish	  the	  standards	  of	  international	  law	  for	  the	  humanitarian	  treatment	  of	  the	  victims	  of	  war.	  
5	  See	  ICTY	  statute	  available	  at	  http://www.icty.org/sid/135,	  accessed	  March	  1,	  2012.	  
6	  Ibid.	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commissions	  to	  cope	  with	  past	  atrocities.	  The	  initial	  difficulties	  that	  the	  ICTY	  was	  facing	  as	  it	  
started	   its	  prosecutions	  and	  trials—which,	  according	  to	  the	  general	  view	  of	   the	   ICTY	  staff,	  
could	  have	  potentially	  been	  undermined	  by	  alternative	  post-­‐conflict	   justice	  measures—led	  
to	   ICTY’s	   founders	   and	   legal	   practitioners’	   very	   skeptical	   view	   of	   restorative	   justice	  
instruments.	  	  
In	   addition	   to	   supranational	   legal	   issues,	   the	   legal	   procedures	   at	   the	   tribunal	   itself	   were	  
inexistent	  at	  first	  and	  the	  initial	  team	  of	  lawyers,	  judges,	  prosecutors	  and	  legal	  aids,	  among	  
others,	   had	   to	   elaborate	   and	   define	   the	   procedural	   rules	   for	   indicting	   and	   trying	   alleged	  
perpetrators	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  ICTY	  statute.	  This	  task	  was	  much	  easier	  conceptualized	  
than	  put	   into	  practice.	   I	  describe	  this	   in	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  when	  I	  present	  an	  
overview	  of	  the	  ICTY’s	  early	  years.	  The	  above	  obstacles	  concern	  issues	  at	  the	  international	  
level.	   Yet,	   the	   implementation	   of	   these	   legal	   concepts	   on	   a	   national	   level—such	   as	   the	  
ICTY’s	   request	  of	  urging	  governments	   in	   the	   region	   to	   cooperate	  with	   the	   tribunal	   and	   to	  
prosecute	  their	  own	  war	  criminals	  under	  domestic	   jurisdiction—constitutes	  another	  set	  of	  
problems	   situated	   at	   the	   border	   of	   international	   and	   national	   law.	   Conflicting	   interests	  
between	   international	   actors,	   such	   as	   the	   ICTY,	   and	   domestic	   governments	   are	   a	   case	   in	  
point	  of	  the	  persisting	  tensions	  and	  struggles	  to	  implement	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  
in	  a	  national	  context.	  States	  still	   insist	  on	  the	  prerogative	  principle	  of	  state	  sovereignty	   to	  
protect	  political	  interests	  on	  the	  domestic	  level.	  	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  in	  the	  chapters	  following	  
this	   one	   that	   interestingly,	   it	   is	   this	   state-­‐centric	   logic	   that	   remains	   one	   of	   the	   basic	  
problems	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  democratizing	  human	  rights	  issues	  in	  the	  Balkans.	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This	  chapter	  looks	  at	  some	  of	  the	  initial	  problems	  international	  lawyers	  had	  to	  grapple	  with	  
while	  advocating	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  international	  tribunal	  to	  stop	  the	  warring	  factions	  in	  
the	   former	   Yugoslavia	   and	   deter	   further	   violence.	   It	   particularly	   explains	   their	   early	  
reticence	   to	   rely	  on	   truth	  commissions.	  Moreover,	   I	  analyze	   the	   legacy	  of	   the	  UN	  tribunal	  
after	   over	   16	   years	   of	   operation,	   in	   order	   to	   outline	   changes	   in	   legal	   practices	   and	  
ideologies.	   Last,	   I	   focus	   on	   the	   issues	   encountered	   at	   the	   national	   level	   when	   applying	  
international	  humanitarian	  law	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  relying	  on	  a	  case	  study	  of	  Croatia.	  	  
	  	  	  
The	  ICTY’s	  Early	  Years:	  Problems	  Getting	  off	  the	  Ground	  
In	  order	   to	  understand	   the	   tremendous	  difficulties	   the	   ICTY	   faced	   in	   the	  early	  years	  of	   its	  
existence,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   provide	   some	   historical	   and	   sociopolitical	   background	   of	   the	  
conflict	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  the	  international	  political	  climate	  at	  the	  time.	  Despite	  
Marshal	   Tito’s	   motto	   “brotherhood	   and	   unity,”	   the	   SFRY—which	   the	   emblematic	  
communist	  leader	  ruled	  for	  over	  35	  years	  since	  World-­‐War-­‐II	  until	  his	  death	  in	  1980—was	  a	  
very	   heterogeneous	   federalist	   state	   facing	   power	   struggles	   from	   different	   political	   and	  
ethnic	  groups	  (as	  seen	  in	  chapter	  1).	  While	  in	  the	  beginning,	  he	  crushed	  early	  threats	  to	  his	  
emerging	   state	   apparatus—including	   peasants,	   political	   opponents	   and	   other	   potential	  
dissidents—he	  nonetheless	  had	  to	  cede	  politically,	  amending	  for	  instance	  the	  constitution	  in	  
1974	   in	  order	   to	  provide	  Albanians	   in	   the	  Kosovo	  region	  an	  autonomous	  status.7	  After	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Sabrina	  Ramet,	  The	  Three	  Yugoslavias:	  State-­‐building	  and	  Legitimation,	  1918-­‐2005	  (Indiana	  University	  Press,	  2006).	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death,	   however,	   nationalist	   tendencies	   increased,	   and	   in	   the	   late	   1980s	   the	   region	  
witnessed	   the	   rise	   of	   Slobodan	  Milošević	   (as	   discussed	   earlier),	   a	   Serbian	   political	   leader	  
whose	  nationalistic	  zeal	  and	  ambitions	  were	  to	  assure	  Serbia’s	  dominant	  position	  within	  the	  
federation.	   In	   order	   to	   do	   so,	   he	   stripped	   ethnic	   Albanians	   of	   the	   formerly	   autonomous	  
Kosovo	  region	  of	  their	  constitutional	  freedoms,	  thus	  supporting	  Kosovo	  Serbs’	  demands	  to	  
be	  part	  of	   Serbia	   again.	   This	  was	   the	  beginning	  of	   a	  decade-­‐long	  occupation,	   ending	  only	  
when	  NATO-­‐strikes	  hit	  Serbia	  in	  1999.8	  Yet,	  the	  Kosovo	  issue	  was	  only	  one	  of	  many	  political	  
issues	  that	  led	  to	  the	  escalation	  and	  eventually	  to	  the	  conflict.	  	  
The	   1980s	   remained	   very	   tumultuous,	   economically	   and	   politically,	   in	   particular	   with	   the	  
rotating	   presidency	   that	   Yugoslavian	   leaders	   had	   established	   after	   Tito’s	   rule.	   Serbia	   had	  
taken	  over	  the	  presidency	   in	  1987,	  when	  at	  the	  Congress	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Communists	  of	  
Yugoslavia	  (LCY)	  in	  January	  1990,	  Milošević	  tried	  to	  impose	  his	  political	  agenda	  against	  the	  
will	  of	   the	  other	   republics	  within	   the	   federation.	  This	  congress	  was	   the	   last	  meeting	  of	  all	  
communist	  leaders	  across	  the	  region,	  before	  the	  SFRY	  fell	  apart.	  In	  fact,	  during	  the	  session,	  
the	   Slovenian	   and	  Croatian	   delegations	  walked	   out,	   disagreeing	  with	   the	   Serbian	   political	  
plans	   and	   domination	   in	   the	   League:	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   end	   of	   the	   LCY.	   	   Only	   a	   few	  
months	   later,	   in	   June	  1990,	   the	  Slovenian	  parliament	  declared	   its	   independence	   from	   the	  
SFRY,	  seceding	  and	   leaving	  a	  crumbling	  federation	  with	  a	  fading	  Serbian	  role	  and	   inspiring	  
other	  republics	  within	  the	  region	  to	  follow	  its	   lead.9	   	  The	  secession	  of	  Slovenia,	  one	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Florian	  Bieber,	  “Nationalist	  Mobilization	  and	  Stories	  of	  Serb	  Suffering:	  The	  Kosovo	  Myth	  from	  600th	  Anniversary	  to	  
the	  Present,”	  Rethinking	  History	  6,	  no.	  1	  (2002):	  95–110.	  
9	  This	  development	  resulted	  also	  in	  a	  wave	  of	  multi-­‐party	  elections	  during	  1990s,	  including	  countries	  such	  as	  Croatia,	  
Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  Montenegro,	  Macedonia	  and	  Serbia,	  among	  others.	  The	  series	  of	  events	  also	  has	  to	  be	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former	  Yugoslavia’s	   richest	   republics	  happened	   relatively	  peaceful—the	  Yugoslav	  National	  
Army	   (YNA)	  was	  defeated	  and	   retreated	  within	  a	  matter	  of	  days.	  Yet,	   the	   spillover	  effect,	  
which	   incited	  the	  Croatian	  republic	   to	   follow	  suit,	   resulted	   in	  a	  devastating	  armed	  conflict	  
that	   lasted	   several	   years,	   spreading	   East	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   region,	   including	   Bosnia	   and	  
Herzegovina	   and	   Kosovo	   (as	   already	   described	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter).10	   Unfortunately,	  
external	   interventions	  to	  stop	  these	  mass	  atrocities	  were	  doomed	  from	  the	  beginning	  due	  
to	  a	  number	  of	  factors.	  
The	   international	  political	   climate	  during	   the	  Yugoslavian	  breakup	  consisted	  of	   a	   series	  of	  
reactions,	   ranging	   from	   oblivious	   disbelief	   to	   dismal	   unpreparedness.	   Several	   tectonic	  
geopolitical	  shifts	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  contributed	  to	  the	  reluctant	  and	  questionable	  
responses	   of	   various	   states	   and	   international	   organizations	   to	   stop	   the	   bloodshed	   in	   the	  
region.	  First,	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Iron	  Curtain	  and	  the	  peaceful	  democratic	  transitions	  in	  Central	  
Europe11	   buttressed	   European	   leaders’	   beliefs	   in	   democratic	   institutions	   and	   the	   EU	   as	   a	  
vehicle	   to	   foster	   stability,	  peace	  and	  prosperity.12	   In	   this	   context,	   it	   is	   also	   telling	   that	   the	  
German	   government,	   reunified	   since	   the	   early	   1990s,	   dissented	   from	   the	   international	  
cooperation	  when	   the	   Slovenian	   and	  Croatian	   governments	   declared	   their	   independence.	  
Instead	  of	  deciding	  to	  back	  the	  central	  power	  in	  Belgrade	  to	  keep	  the	  federation	  intact,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
looked	  at	  from	  a	  global	  perspective	  of	  the	  demise	  of	  communism,	  after	  Gorbachev’s	  glasnost	  and	  perestroika	  reforms	  
led	  to	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  right	  to	  auto-­‐determination	  across	  Central	  Europe	  also	  inspired	  leaders	  in	  the	  
republics	  of	  the	  SFRY.	  
10	  Misha	  Glenny,	  The	  Balkans:	  Nationalism,	  War	  and	  the	  Great	  Powers,	  1804-­‐1999	  (Viking	  Books,	  1999).	  
11	  The	  violent	  and	  bloody	  regime	  change	  in	  Romania,	  with	  the	  execution	  of	  former	  leader	  Nicolae	  Ceaușescu,	  remains	  
an	  exception.	  
12	  See	  Maastricht	  treaty	  and	  enlargement	  process	  of	  Central	  Europe.	  The	  EU	  treaty	  is	  available	  at	  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm,	  accessed	  on	  May	  
14,	  2011.	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German	   Foreign	   Minister,	   Hans-­‐Dietrich	   Genscher,	   supported	   the	   independence	   of	   both	  
secessionist	  republics,	  shaping	  a	  bold,	  new	  German	  foreign	  policy.13	  The	  decision	  ineluctably	  
led	  to	  the	  armed	  confrontation	  between	  the	  dissident	  factions	  in	  the	  region.14	  Furthermore,	  
when	   the	   violence	   in	   the	   Balkans	   intensified	   in	   1991-­‐1992	   (particularly	   with	   the	   war	   in	  
Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina),	  the	  EU	  was	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  negotiating	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty,	  the	  
foundation	  of	   its	  political	  pillar	   that	   included	  a	  Common	  Security	  and	  Defense	  Policy.	  This	  
policy	   comprised	   the	   Petersberg	   tasks—military	   and	   security	   priorities—that	   consist	   of	  
peacemaking	   and	   peacekeeping	   missions.15	   Predictably,	   however,	   the	   embryonic	  
humanitarian	  and	  peacekeeping	   cooperation	  among	  European	   countries	  was	   incapable	  of	  
facing	   the	   challenges	   that	   lay	   ahead	   in	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia,	   therefore	   requiring	   an	  
intervention	  of	  UN	  forces.	  The	  above	  overview	  of	  the	  intricate	  internal	  and	  external	  politics	  
during	   the	  breakup	  of	   the	   former	  Yugoslavia	  helps	  us	   to	  better	  understand	  the	  context	   in	  
which	   the	  early	  work	  of	   the	   ICTY	   took	  place.16	  Below,	   I	  will	  describe	   the	   initial	   challenges,	  
drawing	  on	  existing	  scholarship	  as	  well	  as	  data	  from	  fieldwork	  gathered	  at	  the	  tribunal.	  
In	   his	   book	   Justice	   in	   the	   Balkans:	   Prosecuting	   War	   Crimes	   in	   The	   Hague	   Tribunal,	   John	  
Hagan	   provides	   a	   substantial	   scholarly	   contribution	   with	   a	   thorough	   examination	   of	   the	  
inner	  workings	  of	  the	  ICTY.	  	  He	  takes	  a	  close	  look	  at	  the	  actors	  involved,	  their	  intentions	  and	  
their	   impact	   on	   the	   development	   of	   the	   court.	   His	   analysis	   is	   helpful	   for	   our	   case,	   as	   it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Beverly	  Crawford,	  “Explaining	  Defection	  from	  International	  Cooperation:	  Germany’s	  Unilateral	  Recognition	  of	  
Croatia,”	  World	  Politics	  48,	  no.	  04	  (1996):	  482–521.	  
14	  Ibid.	  
15	  See	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  at	  http://eur-­‐lex.europa.eu/en	  /treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html,	  accessed	  January	  
15,	  2012.	  	  
16	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  principal	  factors	  that	  led	  to	  the	  political	  violence	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  see	  chapter	  1.	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furthers	  our	  general	  understanding	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  humanitarian	  law,	  because	  he	  avoids	  
to	   merely	   assessing	   the	   successes	   and	   failures	   of	   the	   ICTY.	   Drawing	   on	   individuals	   who	  
contributed	  a	  great	  deal	   to	  build	   the	   institutions	   from	  the	  ground	  up—a	  “loosely	   coupled	  
system,”17	  as	  he	  calls	   it—his	  research	  traces	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  ICTY	  into	  an	  effective	  
international	   judicial	   body.	   The	   ICTY	   is	   fuelled	   by	   liberal	   idealism,	   a	   concept	   that	   other	  
scholars,	   such	   as	   Ruti	   Teitel	   and	   Gary	   Bass	   discuss	   in	   their	   own	   work.	  	  
Interestingly,	   all	   three	   authors	   directly	   or	   indirectly	   refer	   to	   Judith	   Shkar’s	   notion	   of	  
legalism,	  which	  she	  defines	  “the	  ethical	  attitude	  that	  holds	  moral	  conduct	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  
rule	  following,	  and	  moral	  relationships	  to	  consist	  of	  duties	  and	  rights	  determined	  by	  rules.”18	  
In	   this	   context,	   Bass’s	   comparative	   study	   of	   tribunals,	   for	   instance,	   focuses	  more	   on	   the	  
evolution	   of	   ideas	   and	   themes	   in	   international	   relations.	   Based	   on	   international	   relations	  
theory—such	  as	  realist	  theory	  and	  other	  mainstream	  concepts	  of	  the	  field—he	  argues	  that	  
liberal	  states	  might	  be	  reluctant	  to	  support	  international	  criminal	  justice	  mechanisms:	  
liberal	   states	   almost	   never	   put	   their	   own	   soldiers	   at	   risk	   in	   order	   to	   bring	   war	  
criminals	   to	   book	   [and	   they]	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   seek	   justice	   for	   war	   crimes	  
committed	  against	  their	  own	  citizens,	  not	  against	  innocent	  foreigners.19	  
As	   we	   will	   see	   later,	   Teitel’s	   reasoning	   is	   similar	   to	   Bass’s	   argument,	   stressing	   the	  
importance	  of	   political	   contexts	   for	   the	   functioning	  of	   international	   justice.	   Yet,	   as	  Hagan	  
illustrates,	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   court	   was	   not	   only	   the	   evolution	   of	   ideas	   and	   ideological	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Hagan,	  Justice	  in	  the	  Balkans:	  Prosecuting	  War	  Crimes	  in	  the	  Hague	  Tribunal,	  129.	  
18	  Judith	  Shklar,	  Legalism:	  Law,	  Morals,	  and	  Political	  Trials	  (Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1964),	  1.	  
19	  Gary	  Bass,	  Stay	  the	  Hand	  of	  Vengeance:	  The	  Politics	  of	  War	  Crimes	  Tribunals	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  8.	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concepts,	   but	   in	   particular	   the	   diverse	   and	   unique	   experiences	   and	   professional	  
backgrounds	  of	  the	  persons	  involved.20	  	  	  
Describing	   the	   Nuremburg	   trials,	   Hagan	   provides	   key	   insights	   into	   the	   ideology	   and	  
perspectives	  that	  led	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  international	  humanitarian	  law.	  Two	  legal	  practitioners,	  
for	   instance,	   Sheldon	   Glueck	   (a	   law	   professor	   at	   Harvard	   University	   and	   pragmatist	  
advocating	   for	  an	   international	   tribunal)	  and	  Ben	  Ferencz	   (an	  activist	  who	  became	  one	  of	  
the	   prosecutors	   at	   Nuremberg)	   were	   instrumental	   in	   planning	   the	   Nuremburg	   trials	   and	  
helping	  to	  bring	  alleged	  perpetrators	  of	  World-­‐War-­‐II	  war	  crimes	  to	  justice.21	  
Almost	   half	   a	   century	   later,	   liberal	   legalism	   became	   the	   instrument	   of	   last	   resort	   by	   a	  
number	  of	  concerned	  and	  committed	   international	   legal	  practitioners	  and	  experts,	  among	  
them,	  Cherif	  Bassiouni—a	  an	  Egyptian	  Muslim	  international	  UN	  war	  crimes	  expert	  who	  led	  
the	   1992	   UN	   commission	   to	   investigate	   grave	   human	   rights	   violations	   in	   the	   former	  
Yugoslavia22—once	   it	  became	  apparent	   that	  war	   crimes	  were	  being	   committed	  across	   the	  
former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  that	  international	  military	  interventions,	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  the	  UN,	  
were	   difficult	   to	   implement,	   as	   discussed	   earlier.23	   Crime	   sites	   then	   included	   not	   only	  
Sarajevo	  and	  other	  parts	  of	  Bosnia,	  but	  also	  Croatia	  and	  Kosovo.	  Bassiouni,	   the	  UN’s	   first	  
war	   crimes	   investigator,	   faced	   enormous	   difficulties	   due	   to	   the	   political	   situation	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Hagan,	  Justice	  in	  the	  Balkans:	  Prosecuting	  War	  Crimes	  in	  the	  Hague	  Tribunal.	  
21	  Ibid.,	  chap.	  1.	  
22	  The	  commission	  was	  created	  following	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  780	  from	  8	  October	  1992.	  See	  also	  
http://daccess-­‐ods.un.org/TMP/7327786.08798981.html,	  accessed	  on	  December	  12,	  2011.	  	  	  
23	  Then	  US	  ambassador,	  Madeleine	  Albright,	  urged	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  commission	  as	  a	  political	  substitute	  for	  
meaningful	  military	  intervention	  in	  the	  region	  to	  stop	  mass	  atrocities.	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region	   during	   the	   initial	   evidence-­‐collecting	   stage.24	   Additionally,	   he	   had	   to	   fight	   against	  
reluctant	   persons	   within	   the	   ranks	   of	   the	   international	   community.	   A	   British	   politician-­‐
diplomat,	  David	  Owen,	  for	  instance,	  was	  working	  against	  Bassiouni’s	  efforts,	  afraid	  that	  they	  
were	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   peace	   negotiations	   process.	   	   Despite	   the	   politics	   to	   obstruct	   the	  
commission's	  work,	  Bassiouni	  eventually	  created	  a	  database	  centre	   in	  Chicago,	  along	  with	  
the	  evidence	  collection	  project	  in	  Sarajevo	  directed	  by	  a	  Canadian	  lawyer,	  Bill	  Fenrick.	  Both	  
of	   these	   efforts	   led	   to	   the	   necessary—and	   impressive—case	   building,	   which	   was	  
indispensable	  to	  the	  emergence	  and	  creation	  of	  the	  tribunal.25	  
Hagan’s	  book	  traces	  several	  of	  the	  key	  figures	  that	  helped	  get	  the	  Tribunal	  off	  the	  ground	  
and	   shaped	   its	   development	   over	   time,	   notably	   including:	   Richard	  Goldstone26,	   the	   ICTY’s	  
first	  chief	  prosecutor,	  and	  Louis	  Arbour27	  his	  successor	  who	  was	  chief	  prosecutor	  at	  the	  ICTY	  
and	   the	   ICTR	   from	   1996-­‐2000.	   Although	   he	   fondly	   writes	   about	   the	   latter—criticizing	  
extensively	  the	  former’s	  little	  meaningful	  attempts	  to	  set	  the	  tone	  of	  the	  tribunal’s	  work—
he	   eventually	   gives	   Goldstone	   some	   credit	   toward	   the	   end	   of	   his	   book,	   underlining	   the	  
difficult	   political	   and	   international	   circumstances	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	   ICTY’s	   existence.	  
His	   sociological	  analysis	  of	   the	   ICTY’s	   initial	  years	   is	   surprising,	  as	  most	  of	   the	  mainstream	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Since	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  UN,	  fighting	  war	  crimes	  was	  an	  important	  issue	  of	  the	  organization’s	  agenda.	  The	  
Nuremberg	  trials	  and	  the	  difficulties	  of	  establishing	  a	  legal	  procedure	  after	  World	  War	  II	  in	  order	  to	  punish	  
perpetrators	  for	  mass	  atrocities	  is	  telling	  in	  this	  context.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  case	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  however,	  
lawyers,	  prosecutors,	  judges	  and	  other	  legal	  professionals,	  worked	  in	  an	  Allied	  occupied	  territory	  and	  the	  trials	  had	  
the	  more	  of	  a	  symbolic,	  showcase	  trial,	  function.	  	  As	  for	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  the	  ICTY’s	  staff	  faced	  enormous	  
difficulties	  regarding	  state	  cooperation,	  because	  the	  involved	  countries	  were	  still	  at	  war	  and	  the	  alleged	  perpetrators	  
still	  in	  power.	  
25	  Hagan,	  Justice	  in	  the	  Balkans:	  Prosecuting	  War	  Crimes	  in	  the	  Hague	  Tribunal,	  chap.	  2.	  
26	  In	  addition	  to	  his	  international	  career,	  he	  was	  a	  former	  South	  African	  judge,	  and	  very	  important	  in	  helping	  set	  up	  
the	  South	  African	  TRC.	  
27	  Before	  her	  appointment	  she	  was	  a	  legal	  scholar	  and	  held	  numerous	  legal	  functions	  in	  the	  Canadian	  judiciary.	  Since	  
the	  end	  of	  her	  term,	  she	  served	  as	  the	  UN	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  and	  as	  a	  justice	  at	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  
of	  Canada.	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literature	  in	  transitional	  justice	  thinks	  highly	  of	  Goldstone’s	  work	  to	  help	  set	  up	  the	  ICTY	  in	  
the	  beginning.28	  	  	  
Interestingly,	  the	  author	  also	  criticizes	  Goldstone’s	  media-­‐savvy	  role	  and	  even	  compares	  his	  
efforts	   to	   advance	   the	  work	   of	   the	   prosecution	   to	   a	   show	   trial.	   According	   to	   Hagan,	   the	  
tribunal	  turned	  into	  a	  virtual	  court	  under	  Goldstone’s	  term:	  
The	   Rule	   61[29]	   hearing	   of	   Karadžić[30]	   and	   Mladić[31]	   in	   the	   closing	   months	   of	   the	  
Goldstone	  period	  was	  the	  most	  significant	  effort	  to	  aim	  tribunal	  resources	  at	  more	  
highly	   placed	   targets.	   […	  However]	   the	   statute	   that	   created	   the	   tribunal	   explicitly	  
forbade	   trials	   in	   absentia,	   because	   without	   a	   defendant	   and	   a	   defense,	   the	  
procedure	  risked	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  theatrical	  performance,	  or	  worse,	  a	  show	  trial.	  
The	  absence	  of	  defendants	  or	  their	  legal	  representatives	  in	  the	  Rule	  61	  proceeding	  
gave	  the	  tribunal	  [therefore]	  a	  “virtual”	  quality.32	  
While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  Louise	  Arbour’s	  style	  differed	  from	  Goldstone’s	  strategy—attempting	  to	  
alter	   the	  organizational	  pattern	  of	   the	   fragmented	  tribunal	  at	   the	  time—it	   is	   important	   to	  
recall	   that	   the	   former	   South	  African	   judge	  had	   to	   tackle	   substantial	   logistical	   issues	  when	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  See	  for	  instance,	  Laura	  Moranchek,	  “Protecting	  National	  Security	  Evidence	  While	  Prosecuting	  War	  Crimes:	  
Problems	  and	  Lessons	  for	  International	  Justice	  from	  the	  ICTY,”	  Yale	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  31	  (2006):	  477;	  
Meernik,	  “Victor’s	  Justice	  or	  the	  Law?	  Judging	  and	  Punishing	  at	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Former	  
Yugoslavia”;	  Carla	  Del	  Ponte,	  “Prosecuting	  the	  Individuals	  Bearing	  the	  Highest	  Level	  of	  Responsibility,”	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Criminal	  Justice	  2,	  no.	  2	  (2004):	  516–519.	  Interviews	  between	  October	  2009	  and	  June	  2006	  with	  several	  
official	  employees	  at	  the	  ICTY	  further	  underline	  the	  pride	  expressed	  of	  Goldstone	  as	  someone	  who	  helped	  establish	  
the	  tribunal’s	  international	  reputation.	  
29	  Rule	  61	  of	  the	  ICTY	  statute	  enabled	  the	  court	  to	  have	  hearings	  in	  absentia,	  notably	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  
indict	  a	  suspect	  and	  issue	  and	  arrest	  warrant.	  	  The	  rule	  was	  subsequently	  applied	  as	  a	  quasi-­‐absentia	  trial.	  .	  Shuichi	  
Furuya,	  “Rule	  61	  Procedure	  in	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia:	  a	  Lesson	  for	  the	  ICC,”	  
Leiden	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  12,	  no.	  3	  (1999).See	  also	  ICTY	  rules	  of	  procedures	  and	  evidence	  at	  
http://www.icty.org/sid/136,	  accessed	  November	  11,	  2011.	  
30	  Radovan	  Karadžić,	  a	  former	  Bosnian	  Serb	  politician,	  is	  currently	  standing	  trial	  at	  the	  ICTY.	  He	  is	  accused	  of	  war	  
crimes	  committed	  against	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  and	  Bosnian	  Croats	  during	  the	  Siege	  of	  Sarajevo,	  as	  well	  as	  ordering	  the	  
Srebrenica	  massacre.	  
31	  	  Ratko	  Mladić	  is	  a	  former	  Bosnian	  Serb	  military	  leader	  accused	  of	  committing	  war	  crimes,	  including	  the	  siege	  of	  
Sarajevo	  and	  the	  Srebrenica	  massacre.	  He	  is	  currently	  standing	  trial	  in	  The	  Hague.	  
32	  Hagan,	  Justice	  in	  the	  Balkans:	  Prosecuting	  War	  Crimes	  in	  the	  Hague	  Tribunal,	  90.	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the	   court	   first	   started	   its	   work.	   Hence,	   what	   exactly	   were	   Arbour’s	   contribution	   to	   the	  
tribunal	   and	   the	   evolution	   of	   international	   criminal	   law,	   and	   what	   were	   some	   of	   the	  
principal	  initial	  shortcomings	  that	  early	  members	  of	  the	  ICTY	  had	  to	  grapple	  with?	  
	  Arbour	  and	  her	   team,	   including	  Nancy	  Paterson33	   (an	   international	  war	  crimes	  prosecutor	  
who	  helped	  develop	  the	  Foča	  rape	  case)	  and	  Jean-­‐Rene	  Ruez	  (a	  French	  police	  officer	  who	  
carried	   out	   the	   Srebrenica	   genocide	   investigation)	   contributed	   significantly	   to	   ground	   the	  
tribunal.	  Their	  first	  hand	  experience,	  such	  as	  Arbour's	  work	  in	  Rwanda	  prosecuting	  alleged	  
perpetrators	  who	  committed	  genocidal	  crimes,	  and	  Ruez's	  frequent	  visits	  to	  excavation	  sites	  
where	   he	   supported	   the	   work	   to	   uncover	   and	   document	   the	   systemic	   ethnic	   cleansing	  
particularly	   in	  Srebrenica,	  motivated	  and	   inspired	  all	  of	   them	   to	   form	  a	  powerful	   team	   to	  
indict	  and	  try	  alleged	  war	  criminals	  and	  human	  rights	  violators	  in	  the	  region.34	  	  
In	   this	   context,	  Arbour	   also	   altered	   the	  original	   strategy	  of	   obtaining	   indictments.	   In	   fact,	  
secret	  indictments	  were	  found	  to	  be	  more	  effective	  in	  minimizing	  the	  risk	  of	  violence	  after	  
arresting	   suspects	   compared	   to	   public	   ones.	   These	   fundamental	   changes,	   however,	   were	  
only	  possible	  thanks	  to	  the	  continuous	  funding	  that	  the	   ICTY	  eventually	  received	  from	  the	  
UN.	  Secured	  funding,	  however,	  was	   far	   from	  being	  obvious	  at	   the	  beginning.	  Originally,	   in	  
the	   summer	   of	   1992,	   the	   budget	   was	   only	   projected	   for	   the	   first	   six	  month	   and	   the	   UN	  
Security	   Council	   had	   to	   incrementally	   extend	   the	   budget	   authorization	   before	   the	   ICTY	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Prior	  to	  her	  U.N.	  commission,	  Paterson	  was	  a	  prosecutor	  for	  the	  Manhattan	  district	  attorney's	  office.	  
34	  Hagan	  refers	  to	  social	  movement	  theory	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘alternation	  experience’—a	  turning	  point	  in	  someone’s	  
life	  that	  leads	  to	  drastic	  changes,	  in	  Hagan’s	  case	  to	  intensive	  work	  of	  the	  ICTY	  team	  members—when	  he	  describes	  
the	  strategy	  of	  Arbour’s	  team.	  McAdam	  in	  Justice	  in	  the	  Balkans:	  prosecuting	  war	  crimes	  in	  the	  Hague	  Tribunal,	  32.	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eventually	   was	   able	   to	   operate	   with	   secured	   funding.35	   	   In	   fact,	   the	   tribunal	   was	   also	  
confronted	  several	  logistical	  shortcomings	  in	  its	  early	  stage,	  including	  not	  only	  the	  issue	  of	  
ad	  hoc	  salaries	  for	  its	  personnel36,	  but	  also	  problems	  with	  its	  facilities—the	  first	  court	  room	  
was	   a	   rebuilt	   conference	   room	   that	   used	   to	   house	   businessmen	   working	   for	   one	   of	   the	  
world’s	   largest	   insurance	   companies	   called	  Aegon—and	  procedural	   issues,	   such	   as	   during	  
the	  ICTY’s	  first	  case,	  the	  trial	  of	  Blaškić.37	  	  Gary	  Bass	  points	  out	  the	  problematic	  situation	  at	  
the	  time:	  
The	  mere	   fact	   that	  Blaskic	  was	   in	   court	   at	   all	  was	  an	  anomaly.	  On	   the	  day	  Blaskic	  
walked	   into	   the	   dock,	   only	   eight	   of	   the	   seventy-­‐five	  men	   publicly	   indicted	   by	   the	  
tribunal	   were	   in	   custody.3	   Blaskic	   was	   the	   only	   high-­‐ranking	   one.	   Over	   the	   three	  
years	  after	  the	  UN	  set	  up	  the	  first	  international	  war	  crimes	  tribunal	  since	  World	  War	  
II,	  all	  it	  had	  to	  show	  for	  it	  were	  these	  eight	  men:	  whiling	  away	  their	  days	  by	  playing	  
chess,	   reading	   a	   spy	   novel	   by	   John	   Le	   Carré,	   and,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	  man	  who	   had	  
brutalized	  prisoners	  at	  the	  Omarska	  concentration	  camp,	  doing	  a	  series	  of	  paintings	  
for	   an	   exhibition	   in	   a	   London	   restaurant.	   […]	  What	  was	  missing,	   as	   the	   tribunal’s	  
staff	  constantly	  says,	  was	  the	  world’s	  political	  will.38	  
The	   political	   context,	   as	   pointed	   out	   earlier,	   is	   without	   a	   doubt	   crucial	   for	   the	  
implementation	   of	   international	   justice	   and	   “contemporary	   legal	   responses	   do	   not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  In	  the	  last	  part	  of	  his	  book	  Hagan	  concedes	  that	  Goldstone	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  of	  international	  support	  and	  
recognition	  for	  the	  tribunal	  that	  gave	  Arbour	  the	  resources	  to	  improve	  drastically	  its	  internal	  structure.	  
36	  See	  ICTY’s	  annual	  report	  1994,	  A/49/342,	  S/1994/1007,	  29	  August,	  p.	  15-­‐17,	  at	  http://www.icty.org/sid/14,	  
accessed	  on	  March	  3,	  2011.	  The	  staff	  was	  eventually	  put	  on	  a	  regular	  UN	  payroll	  after	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  
approved	  the	  ICTY’s	  annual	  budget	  in	  1994.	  The	  staff	  was	  eventually	  put	  on	  a	  regular	  UN	  payroll	  after	  the	  UN	  Security	  
Council	  approved	  the	  ICTY’s	  annual	  budget	  in	  1994.	  
37	  The	  author	  interviewed	  ICTY	  officials	  and	  had	  several	  informal	  conversations	  with	  staff	  in	  the	  period	  of	  September	  
2009	  and	  June	  2011.	  
38	  Bass,	  Stay	  the	  Hand	  of	  Vengeance:	  The	  Politics	  of	  War	  Crimes	  Tribunals,	  3–4.	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necessarily	  express	  an	  unequivocal	  sense	  of	  a	  progressive	  rule	  of	  law.”39	   	   In	  fact,	  when	  the	  
cruel	   pictures	   of	   the	   hundreds	   of	   thousands	   of	   refugees	  made	   it	   onto	   the	   TV	   screens	   in	  
millions	   of	   homes	   after	   the	   war	   broke	   out	   in	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia	   in	   1991—spreading	  
steadily	   east,	   contaminating	   Croatia,	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina	   and	   eventually	   Kosovo	   and	  
Macedonia—the	   media	   across	   the	   world	   called	   for	   an	   international	   intervention.	   Yet,	  
Western	  democracies,	   including	   the	  US	   and	  Britain,	  were	   slow	   to	   take	   a	   decisive	   political	  
stance—despite	   the	   risk	   of	   a	   European	   Vietnam.	   Additionally,	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council,	  
which	  had	  only	  operated	  on	  a	  limited	  scale	  during	  the	  Cold	  War,	  lacked	  experience	  to	  take	  
effective	  measures	  to	  stop	  the	  bloodshed.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  UN	  decided	  to	  act,	  after	  a	  series	  
of	  preliminary	  resolutions	  and	  warnings	  to	  the	  fighting	  parties	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.40	  In	  
1993,	  resolution	  808	  of	  the	  Security	  Council	  eventually	  requested	  that	  the	  Secretary	  General	  
prepare	  a	   report	  on	   the	   creation	  of	   an	   international	   criminal	   tribunal	   to	  deal	  with	   crimes	  
that	  had	  been	  committed	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  since	  1991.41	  
As	   discussed	   above	   and	   in	   chapter	   1,	   the	   work	   of	   the	   ICTY	   since	   the	   beginning	   of	   its	  
existence	   was	   marked	   by	   a	   rocky	   international	   cooperation	   (including	   indictment	  
procedures	  and	  arrest	  warrants,	  all	  of	  which	  required	  the	  collaboration	  of	  the	  perpetrator’s	  
country	  of	  origin),	  which	  also	  hampered	  the	  work	  of	  the	  prosecution	  and	  as	  a	  consequence	  
the	   overall	   trial	   procedures	   in	   The	   Hague.	   Notwithstanding,	   the	   countless	   efforts	   of	   the	  
tribunal’s	   staff	   and	  a	   changing	   international	  political	   climate	   that	   led	   to	   the	   fall	  of	   former	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Teitel,	  “The	  Law	  and	  Politics	  of	  Contemporary	  Transitional	  Justice,”	  840.	  
40	  Grant	  Niemann,	  “The	  Life	  and	  Times	  of	  a	  Senior	  Trial	  Attorney	  at	  the	  ICTY	  from	  1994	  to	  2000,”	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Criminal	  Justice	  2	  (2004):	  435.	  
41	  See	  UN	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  808,	  S/RES/808	  (1993),	  at	  http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm,	  
accessed	  June	  20,	  2011.	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Serbian	   president	   Slobodan	   Milošević	   and	   his	   extradition	   to	   The	   Hague—where	   he	   was	  
eventually	   tried	   in	   2002—were	   remarkable.	   The	   prosecution	   of	   a	   political	   leader	   in	   an	  
international	   court	   could	   thus	   be	   considered	   as	   a	  watershed	  moment—despite	   the	   trial’s	  
abrupt	  halt	  due	  to	  Milošević's	  death	  in	  his	  prison	  cell	  in	  2006.	  Furthermore,	  the	  evolution	  of	  
the	  ICTY’s	  sentencing	  demonstrates	  the	  complementary	  character	  of	  international	  criminal	  
law	  due	  to	  the	  spillover	  effect	  on	  domestic	  prosecutions.42	   	  However,	   these	  developments	  
depend	   on	   the	   democratic	   processes	   and	   institutional	   changes	   in	   each	   of	   the	   political	  
settings,	  which	  vary	  in	  each	  country.	  The	  sociopolitical	  underpinnings	  are	  also	  a	  reason	  why	  
alternative	   transitional	   justice	  mechanisms,	   such	   as	   truth	   commission,	   failed	   in	   the	   early	  
years	  of	  the	  ICTY’s	  operation.	  
	   	  
Opting	  Out	  of	  Truth	  Commission	  
The	  political	  situation	  and	  persistent	  armed	  conflict	  in	  the	  early	  to	  mid-­‐1990s	  in	  the	  former	  
Yugoslavia	   is	   one	   of	   the	   main	   reasons	   why—contrary	   to	   other	   democratic	   transition	  
contexts,	  including	  countries	  such	  as	  South	  Africa	  or	  Peru,	  in	  which	  truth	  commission	  have	  
been	  used	  to	  cope	  with	  mass	  atrocities—restorative	  justice	  mechanisms	  were	  not	  employed	  
by	  international	  peacemakers.	  In	  fact,	  due	  to	  the	  ongoing	  conflict	  that	  lasted	  until	  the	  late	  
1990s,	   and	   the	   political	   stronghold	   of	   former	   war	   criminals	   such	   as	   Franjo	   Tuđman	   and	  
Slobodan	   Milošević,	   who	   continued	   to	   stay	   in	   power	   even	   after	   the	   end	   of	   the	   war,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Teitel,	  “The	  Law	  and	  Politics	  of	  Contemporary	  Transitional	  Justice,”	  841–842.	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international	  actors,	  such	  as	  the	  UN	  and	  the	  EU,	  opted	  for	  peacekeeping	  operations	  and	  the	  
creation	  of	  the	  UN	  tribunal	  to	  restore	  peace	  and	  stability	   in	  the	  region.	  On	  one	  hand,	  this	  
decision	  led	  to	  a	  watershed	  moment	  in	  international	  criminal	  law,	  establishing	  a	  precedent	  
with	  an	  ad	  hoc	  UN	  tribunal	   that	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  model	   for	  an	  entire	  series	  of	  additional	  
courts	   and	   hybrid	   tribunals	   across	   the	   world—ranging	   from	   Sierra	   Leone	   in	   Africa	   to	  
Cambodia	   in	  Asia.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   this	   evolution	   of	   retributive	   justice	  mechanisms	   as	  
compared	   to	   restorative	   justice	   instruments	  was	   also	   to	   some	   extent	   unsurprising,	   when	  
comparing	   the	   conditions	   for	   democratic	   transition	   in	   the	   Balkans	   to	   the	   African	   and	  
Peruvian	  context	  during	  these	  political	  shifts.	  	  
The	  South	  African	  TRC,	  for	  instance,	  was	  the	  work	  of	  the	  leaders	  who	  took	  power	  after	  the	  
abolition	   of	   the	   apartheid	   system	   in	   order	   to	   account	   for	   gross	   human	   rights	   violations	  
during	  the	  period	  from	  1960	  to	  1994.	  In	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  war-­‐torn	  Balkans,	  however,	  in	  
1994,	  the	  political	  situation	  in	  South	  Africa	  was	  peaceful	  and	  the	  country	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  
democratic	  transition	  phase.	  Its	  first	  multi-­‐racial	  elections	  were	  held	  in	  1994	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  
series	  of	  negotiations	  from	  1990	  to	  1993	  that	  eventually	  dismantled	  the	  apartheid	  regime.43	  
The	   commission	   was	   thus	   created	   by	   national	   legislation	   in	   1995	   and	   the	   body’s	  
administrative	   and	   institutional	   seat	   was	   established	   in	   Cape	   Town.	   While	   the	  
commissioners	  investigated	  human	  rights	  abuses,	  they	  were	  also	  in	  charge	  of	  restoring	  the	  
dignity	   of	   victims	   and	   formulating	   proposals	   to	   rehabilitate	   affected	   communities.	   Many	  
public	  hearings	  were	  held	  and	  to	  avoid	  politicization	  of	  the	  body,	  no	  side	  was	  exempt	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  For	  a	  detailed	  account	  on	  South	  Africa’s	  transition	  cf.	  Ramet,	  The	  Three	  Yugoslavias:	  State-­‐building	  and	  
Legitimation,	  1918-­‐2005.	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appearing	  in	  front	  of	  the	  commission.	  It	  also	  had	  the	  right	  to	  grant	  amnesty	  to	  perpetrators,	  
as	   long	   as	   the	   persons	   “make	   full	   disclosure	   of	   all	   the	   relevant	   facts	   relating	   to	   acts	  
associated	  with	  a	  political	  objective	  committed	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  conflicts.”44	  The	  impact	  
and	  legacy	  of	  the	  South	  African	  TRC	  was	  has	  been	  the	  object	  of	  different	  studies,	  including	  
peace	   and	   conflict	   research	   and	   psychological	   research.	   Richard	  Wilson,	   for	   instance,	   has	  
conducted	   anthropological	   fieldwork	   and	   provided	   an	   analysis	   that	   suggests	   that	   the	   TRC	  
was	   put	   in	   place	   by	   the	   elites	   of	   the	   African	   National	   Congress	   (ANC)45—South	   Africa’s	  
Africanist	   political	   party	   often	   seen	   as	   the	   symbol	   of	   national	   liberation	   in	   the	   post-­‐
apartheid	  period	  —to	  legitimize	  their	  power.	  It	  has	  been	  the	  ruling	  party	  since	  1994.	  In	  fact,	  
Wilson	   argues	   that	   contrary	   to	   human	   rights	   discourses	   elsewhere,	   the	   South	   African	  
leadership	   pursued	   a	   nation-­‐building	   strategy	   that	   deprived	   victims	   from	   their	   right	   to	  
punitive	  justice:	  	  
[R]etributive	  justice	  was	  defined	  as	  ‘un-­‐African’	  by	  some,	  such	  as	  former	  Archbishop	  
Desmond	   Tutu.	   Human	   rights	   became	   the	   language	   of	   restorative	   justice	   and	  
forgiveness	  of	  human	  rights	  offenders	  in	  South	  Africa,	  whereas	  at	  the	  same	  time	  in	  
international	  contexts,	  human	  rights	  were	  developing	  in	  just	  the	  opposite	  (punitive)	  
direction	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  and	  the	  prosecutions	  
brought	  by	  the	  UN	  war	  crimes	  tribunal	  for	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Rwanda.	  46	  
As	   Wilson	   unequivocally	   points	   out,	   there	   is	   a	   difference	   between	   transitions	   fueled	   by	  
domestic	  actors	  versus	  change	  in	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  context	  fostered	  by	  external	  actors.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  See	  Promotion	  of	  National	  Unity	  and	  Reconciliation	  Act,	  No.	  34	  of	  1995,	  available	  at	  
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rsa/act95_034.htm,	  accessed	  January	  20,	  2012.	  
45	  Its	  predecessor	  organization	  was	  the	  South	  African	  National	  Congress	  (SAANC)	  created	  in	  1911.	  
46	  The	  Politics	  of	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  in	  South	  Africa:	  Legitimizing	  the	  Post-­‐apartheid	  State	  (Cambridge,	  United	  
Kingdom:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  xvi–xvii.	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The	   Peruvian	   case	   is	   another	   example	   in	   which	   society	   dealt	   with—and	   is	   currently	   still	  
grappling	   with—its	   atrocious	   past	   on	   a	   national	   and	   local	   level	   instead	   of	   international	  
actors	  taking	  on	  the	  lead	  role	  to	  carry	  out	  these	  processes.	  It	  also	  highlights	  the	  preliminary	  
use	  of	  truth	  commissions,	  before	  domestic	  retributive	  steps	  were	  initiated	  in	  order	  to	  cope	  
with	  the	  years	  of	  state	  violence	  and	  Marxist	  terror	  from	  1980	  to	  2000.	  More	  precisely,	  the	  
Maoist	   insurgent	   group	   Shining	   Path	   launched	   a	   bloody	   quest	   to	   overthrow	   the	   Peruvian	  
state	   in	   1980,	   while	   the	   state’s	   response	   resulted	   in	   its	   own	   brand	   of	   terror.	   It	   included	  
scorched-­‐earth	   tactics	   that	   resulted	   in	   the	  destruction	  of	  more	   than	  300	   indigenous	   rural	  
communities,	   extrajudicial	   executions,	   forced	   disappearances,	   and	   the	  widespread	   use	   of	  
sexual	   violence	   and	   torture.47	   When	   the	   responsible	   political	   leader,	   former	   President	  
Alberto	   Fujimori,	   lost	   the	   elections	   in	   2000,	   the	   path	   was	   clear	   to	   address	   these	   mass	  
atrocities.	  Hence,	  in	  2001,	  the	  Peruvian	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  was	  created	  to	  
analyze	   the	   political,	   social	   and	   cultural	   conditions	   that	   contributed	   to	   the	   situation	   of	  
violence;	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  administration	  of	  justice;	  and	  to	  make	  proposals	  for	  moral	  and	  
material	   redress	   of	   violations.	  As	   a	   result,	   the	   TRC	  emitted	   a	   9-­‐volume	   report	   in	   2003.	   In	  
order	   to	  get	  at	   the	   truth	   it	  was	   trying	   to	   reveal,	   the	  TRC	  also	  compiled	  a	   registry	  of	  1700	  
photographs	   documenting	   the	   years	   of	   violence.	   At	   present,	   Peruvian	   society	   is	   still	  
grappling	   with	   the	   legacy	   of	   political	   violence	   and	   human	   rights	   abuses.	   In	   recent	   years,	  
however,	  the	  national	  judiciary,	  fueled	  by	  a	  few	  bold	  judges,	  has	  stepped	  up	  to	  prosecute	  its	  
former	   head	   of	   state—after	   a	   long	   struggle	   of	   requesting	   the	   extradition	   of	   the	   fugitive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  More	  than	  69,000	  Peruvian	  citizens	  perished	  in	  the	  conflict,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  them	  poor,	  indigenous,	  rural	  
peasants.	  More	  than	  15,000	  people	  were	  forcibly	  disappeared;	  in	  most	  cases,	  their	  fate	  remains	  unknown	  to	  this	  day.	  
Over	  600,000	  people	  were	  displaced,	  and	  some	  200,000	  children	  left	  as	  orphans.	  See	  also	  Burt,	  Political	  Violence	  and	  
the	  Authoritarian	  State	  in	  Peru:	  Silencing	  Civil	  Society.	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former	   president	   Fujimori	   from	   Chile—	   sentencing	   him	   to	   25	   years	   in	   prison	   in	   2009.48	  
Similar	  to	  the	  case	  of	  the	  South	  African	  transition,	  it	  was	  the	  political	  situation,	  namely	  the	  
peaceful	   and	  democratic	  elections	   in	   this	  process	   that	  allowed	   for	   the	   creation	  of	   a	   truth	  
commission.	   	   Yet,	   the	  historical	   and	   sociopolitical	   context	   in	   the	  Balkans	  during	   the	   same	  
period	  differed	  enormously	  from	  both	  of	  the	  above	  comparisons.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  the	  situation	  was	  far	  from	  being	  
peaceful	  at	  the	  time.	  Thus,	   international	  criminal	   justice	  was	  envisaged	  as	  a	  means	  to	  halt	  
the	  violence,	  long	  before	  the	  Dayton	  Peace	  Agreement	  was	  signed	  in	  1995.	  It	  is	  unsurprising	  
then,	   that	   international	   lawyers—who	  had	   invested	   time	  and	  energy	   in	   the	  years	  prior	   to	  
international	  diplomats	  and	  policymakers	  meeting	  in	  Paris	  to	  sign	  the	  peace	  deal	  reached	  in	  
Ohio—insisted	   on	   the	   tribunal	   being	   the	   only	   instrument	   to	   manage	   the	   post-­‐conflict	  
situation	  in	  the	  region.	  Indeed,	  the	  first	  chief	  prosecutor	  of	  the	  ICTY,	  Richard	  Goldstone,	  was	  
instrumental	  in	  advocating	  against	  amnesties	  during	  the	  negotiations	  that	  led	  to	  the	  Dayton	  
Accords.49	  The	  adamant	  agenda	  that	  Goldstone	  pursued	  was	  politically	  motivated,	  as	  he	  did	  
not	  want	  to	  jeopardize	  the	  work	  of	  the	  nascent	  UN	  tribunal	  in	  The	  Hague.	  Sequencing	  and	  
the	   issue	   of	   other	   alternative	   transitional	   justice	   mechanisms	   (as	   discussed	   in	   the	  
introduction)	   were	   therefore	   not	   within	   the	   broader	   peace	   and	   stability	   strategy	   of	   the	  
ICTY’s	  advocates.	  This	  also	  meant	  that	  truth	  commissions	  or	  similar	  fact-­‐finding	  bodies	  were	  
not	  on	  the	  radar	  of	  the	  international	  actors	  involved	  in	  transitional	  justice	  processes	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  BBC	  News,	  “Fujimori	  Gets	  Lengthy	  Jail	  Term,”	  BBC	  News	  Americas,	  April	  7,	  2009,	  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7986951.stm	  	  
49	  Peskin,	  International	  Justice	  in	  Rwanda	  and	  the	  Balkans:	  Virtual	  Trials	  and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  State	  Cooperation,	  41–
43.	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region.	   Notwithstanding,	   since	   its	   creation	   the	   tribunal	   had	   to	   face	   numerous	   obstacles.	  
Below,	   I	  will	   draw	  on	  a	   few	  key	   issues,	  which	  help	   illustrate	   the	   case	  why	  eventually,	   the	  
idea	  of	  restorative	  justice	  mechanisms	  has	  gained	  ground	  in	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  Balkans.	  
	  
The	  ICTY	  Legacy:	  A	  Bumpy	  Justice	  Cascade	  
In	   December	   2009	   during	   one	   of	   the	  multiple	   discussions	   on	   the	   closure	   of	   the	   ICTY,	   its	  
presiding	   judge,	   Patrick	   Robinson,	   addressed	   the	   UN	   Security	   Council	   underlining	   the	  
challenges	   that	   the	   court	   is	   facing	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   its	   completion	   strategy.50	  He	   stressed	   that	   the	  
failure	   to	  arrest	  war	  criminals,	   such	  as	   former	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  of	   the	  Army	  of	   the	  Republika	  
Srpska,	  Ratko	  Mladić,	  would	  “tarnish	   the	  Security	  Council’s	  historic	  contribution	   to	  peace-­‐
building	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.”51	  	  While	  Mladić	  was	  eventually	  arrested	  in	  spring	  2011,52	  
the	  ICTY’s	  days	  are	  numbered.	  In	  chapter	  7	  I	  present	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  cases	  tried	  before	  
the	  ICTY	  and	  the	  BiH	  Court’s	  War	  Crimes	  Chamber	  over	  several	  years	  of	  operations	  of	  both	  
judiciaries.	   	   In	   fact,	   since	   2003,	   when	   the	   ICTY	   was	   working	   at	   its	   full	   capacity,	   the	   UN	  
Security	  Council	   decided	   in	   resolution	  1503	  and	  1534	   to	   layout	   a	   three-­‐phase	   completion	  
strategy	   for	   the	   tribunal.	   The	   first	   phase	   consisted	   of	   finishing	   all	   investigations	   by	   2004,	  
completing	   the	   first	   instance	   trials	   by	   2008	   and	   wrapping	   up	   appeals	   trials	   by	   2010.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  The	  ICTY	  completion	  strategy	  is	  the	  slow	  phasing-­‐out	  of	  the	  court	  operations	  in	  The	  Hague	  launched	  in	  2000,	  but	  
which	  has	  been	  continuously	  postponed	  due	  to	  various	  circumstances,	  including	  e.g.	  still-­‐at-­‐large	  indictees	  and	  
difficulties	  in	  transferring	  cases	  to	  domestic	  judicial	  institutions.	  
51	  See	  ICTY	  website	  at	  http://www.icty.org/sid/10280,	  accessed	  January	  19,	  2010.	  	  
52	  Radio	  Free	  Europe/Radio	  Liberty,	  “Serbian	  Police	  Arrest	  War	  Crimes	  Fugitive	  Ratko	  Mladic”,	  May	  26,	  2011.	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Different	   circumstances,	   such	   as	   the	   late	   arrest	   of	   fugitive	   Goran	   Hadžić	   in	   July	   2011—a	  
Serbo-­‐Croatian	  politician	  and	  former	  president	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Serbian	  Krajina	  accused	  of	  
war	  crimes,	   including	   the	  expulsion	  of	  non-­‐Serb	  populations	   in	   the	  Krajina	   region	  and	   the	  
persecution	  of	  non-­‐Serbs	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Vukovar,	  Croatia—have	  led	  to	  postponing	  the	  closure	  
of	  the	  ICTY.	  Recent	  projections	  published	  on	  the	  ICTY’s	  website	  suggest	  that	  the	  tribunal	  will	  
be	  operating	  until	  at	  least	  2016.	  After	  that	  a	  residual	  mechanism	  will	  be	  in	  place	  to	  process	  
any	  remaining	  case	  of	  issue	  on	  an	  ad	  hoc	  basis.53	  	  
Once	   the	   ICTY	   passes	   a	   sentence,	   the	   convicted	   person	   does	   not	   remain	   in	   the	   ICTY’s	  
detention	   unit,	   as	   it	   is	   not	   a	   penitentiary.	   In	   fact,	   several	   states	   have	   signed	   bilateral	  
agreements	  on	  the	  enforcement	  of	  ICTY	  sentences.	  Although	  the	  tribunal	  is	  an	  international	  
UN	  ad	  hoc	  institution,	  most	  agreements	  have	  been	  established	  with	  European	  countries	  or	  
states	   adjacent	   to	   the	   EU.	   The	   majority	   of	   sentences	   are	   served	   in	   Scandinavian	   and	  
Western	   European	   countries,	   including	   Sweden,	   Norway,	   Finland,	   France,	   the	   United	  
Kingdom,	  Germany,	  and	  Austria,	  among	  others,	  with	  an	  average	  of	  3	  to	  4	  convicted	  persons	  
serving	   their	   sentences	   in	   each	   of	   the	   countries.	   Non-­‐EU	   countries,	   such	   as	   the	   Ukraine,	  
have	  also	  signed	  agreements	  with	  the	   ICTY,	  but	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Ukraine,	   the	  treaty	  has	  not	  
been	  ratified	  yet.	  The	  only	  Southeast	  European	  country	  with	  an	  agreement	  is	  Albania,	  which	  
does	  not	  have	  any	  transferred	  cases	  at	  present.54	  In	  this	  context,	  it	  is	  opportune	  to	  ask	  what	  
role	   justice	   has	   played	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   national	   contexts	   of	   the	   Balkans.	   While	   several	  
scholars	   have	   discussed	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   ICTY	   in	   generating	   stability	   and	   peace	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  See	  ICTY	  website	  at	  	  http://www.icty.org/sid/10016,	  accessed	  February	  3,	  2012.	  
54	  For	  a	  detailed	  map	  and	  the	  specific	  transfer	  cases	  of	  convicts	  see	  the	  ICTY	  website	  at	  
http://www.icty.org/sid/10276,	  accessed	  March	  5,	  2012.	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region,	  at	  present,	   little	   research	  has	  addressed	   the	  work	  and	  ramifications	  of	  war	  crimes	  
trials	  on	  the	  domestic	  level.	  	  
Indeed,	  past	  scholarship	  on	  the	  special	  court	  has	  focused	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  issues,	  including	  its	  
creation,	  mandate	  and	  effect	  on	  peace	  efforts.	  For	  examples,	   it	  was	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  cohesive	  
international	  military	  intervention	  strategy	  during	  the	  Balkan	  conflict	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  that	  
incited	  the	  elaboration	  of	  diplomatic,	  political	  and	  legal	  alternatives,	  which,	  in	  1993,	  led	  to	  
the	   creation	   of	   the	   UN	   ad	   hoc	   court.55	   Although	   the	   court	   was	   in	   charge	   of	   prosecuting	  
serious	  war	  crimes	  committed	  during	  the	  Balkan	  wars	  and	  trying	  their	  alleged	  perpetrators,	  
its	   early	  mandate	  was	   undermined	   by	   the	   implementation	   of	   low-­‐level	   perpetrator	   trials	  
only,	  with	  high-­‐profile	  war	  criminals	  remaining	  at	  large	  and	  in	  power	  until	  the	  late	  1990s.56	  
In	  retrospect,	  however,	  the	  ICTY	  did	  not	  only	  produce	  questionable	  results.	  Several	  authors	  
have	   highlighted	   the	   positive	   impact	   of	   its	   work	   in	   the	   region	   and	   globally,	   notably	   with	  
regards	   to	   the	   norms	   cascade—a	   phenomenon	   that	   describes	   how	   international	   law	  
permeates	   domestic	   politics57—and	   benchmarks	   for	   practice	   standards	   in	   local	   trials	   and	  
prosecutions.58	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Fausto	  Pocar,	  “Completion	  or	  Continuation	  Strategy?:	  Appraising	  Problems	  and	  Possible	  Developments	  in	  Building	  
the	  Legacy	  of	  the	  ICTY,”	  656.	  
56	  Minna	  Schrag,	  “Lessons	  Learned	  from	  ICTY	  Experience,”	  Journal	  of	  International	  Criminal	  Justice	  2,	  no.	  2	  (2004):	  
428–9;	  Lilian	  Barria	  and	  Steve	  Roper,	  “How	  Effective	  Are	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunals?	  An	  Analysis	  of	  the	  ICTY	  and	  
the	  ICTR,”	  The	  International	  Journal	  of	  Human	  Rights	  9,	  no.	  3	  (2005):	  349–368.	  	  The	  court	  also	  fell	  short	  of	  launching	  a	  
broad	  public	  education	  campaign	  that	  could	  have	  generated	  support	  from	  society,	  especially	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  
Herzegovina	  Schrag,	  “Lessons	  Learned	  from	  ICTY	  Experience,”	  429.	  	  The	  topic	  of	  court	  transparency	  and	  media	  
responsibility	  was	  recently	  discussed	  for	  the	  first	  time	  during	  a	  regional	  conference,	  including	  representatives	  of	  the	  
judiciary,	  the	  government,	  the	  media	  and	  non-­‐profit	  sector	  from	  BiH,	  Croatia	  and	  Serbia.	  The	  symposium,	  
“Transitional	  Justice	  in	  the	  Balkans—Judicial	  Transparency	  and	  Media	  Responsibility,”	  was	  held	  in	  Sarajevo,	  BiH,	  
between	  September	  1	  and	  3,	  2009.	  
57	  For	  a	  general	  discussion	  on	  norms	  in	  international	  politics	  cf.	  Martha	  Finnemore	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  “International	  
Norm	  Dynamics	  and	  Political	  Change,”	  International	  Organization	  52,	  no.	  04	  (1998):	  887–917.	  See	  also	  Ellen	  Lutz	  and	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Since	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   ICTY,	   legal	   experts,	   practitioners	   and	   advocates,	   particularly	   its	  
presiding	  judges,	  have	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  court’s	  broader	  mission	  that	  goes	  
beyond	  retribution	  and	  deterrence.59	  Some	  of	  the	  judges	  that	  have	  served	  or	  are	  currently	  
still	   on	   the	  bench	   include	  Theodore	  Merton	   (USA),	   Jean	  Claude-­‐Antonetti	   (France),	  Alfons	  
Orie	  (Netherlands)	  and	  Patrick	  Robinson	  (Jamaica),	  among	  many	  others.	  This	  sample	  nicely	  
illustrates	  the	  ethnic	  and	  national	  diversity	  of	  the	  ICTY	  judges.	  More	  importantly,	  however,	  
the	  diverse	  backgrounds	  of	  the	  judges	  and	  other	  practitioners	  at	  the	  tribunal	  have	  shaped	  
the	  functioning	  and	  output	  of	  the	  cases	  that	  were	  seized	  by	  each	  of	  the	  chambers,	  as	  I	  have	  
demonstrated	   relying	   on	   Jon	   Hagan’s	   work	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter.	   Judge	   Merton,	   for	  
instance,	   is	   a	   leading	   scholar	   of	   international	   humanitarian	   law,	   human	   rights,	   and	  
international	  criminal	  law	  and	  the	  former	  co-­‐editor	  of	  the	  American	  Journal	  of	  International	  
Law.	  In	  several	  watershed	  decisions,	  he	  even	  described	  the	  tribunal’s	  work	  as	  almost	  taking	  
on	  a	   legislative	   role.60	  Hence,	   the	  court	  has,	  at	   least	  on	  a	  macro-­‐level,	   fueled	  a	  normative	  
spillover	   effect	  with	   hundreds	   of	   indictees	   awaiting	   or	   currently	   standing	   trial	   in	   national	  
judicial	  institutions	  in	  Croatia,	  BiH	  and	  Serbia,	  among	  others.61	  Since	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  ICTY,	  
the	  sentences	  and	  precedents	  set	  in	  its	  encompassing	  case	  law—ranging	  from	  precedents	  of	  
genocide	   to	   rape—have	   pressured	   national	   judiciaries	   in	   the	   region	   to	   integrate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  “Justice	  Cascade:	  The	  Evolution	  and	  Impact	  of	  Foreign	  Human	  Rights	  Trials	  in	  Latin	  America,	  The,”	  
Chicago	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  2	  (2001):	  1	  for	  initial	  article	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  justice	  cascade.	  
58	  Jon	  Hagan	  and	  Ron	  Levi,	  “Social	  Skill,	  the	  Milosevic	  Indictment,	  and	  the	  Rebirth	  of	  International	  Criminal	  Justice,”	  
European	  Journal	  of	  Criminology	  1,	  no.	  4	  (2004):	  445;	  Sikkink	  and	  Walling,	  “Errors	  About	  Trials:	  The	  Emergence	  and	  
Impact	  of	  the	  Justice	  Cascade,”	  25–6.	  Drumbl	  also	  highlights	  the	  significant	  impact	  of	  the	  international	  tribunals	  in	  
terms	  of	  substantive	  international	  criminal	  law.	  More	  precisely,	  he	  analyzes	  e.g.	  the	  evolution	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  
meaning	  of	  the	  term	  genocide,	  which	  now	  also	  includes	  sexual	  violence	  against	  women	  Atrocity,	  Punishment,	  and	  
International	  Law,	  131.	  
59	  Nadège	  Ragaru,	  “Les	  Réceptions	  Du	  TPIY	  En	  Croatie	  Et	  En	  Serbie”	  (Centre	  d’analyse	  et	  de	  prevision,	  Ministere	  des	  
Affaires	  Etrangeres,	  France,	  August	  2006).	  
60	  Theodor	  Meron	  cited	  in	  Teitel,	  “Transitional	  Justice	  Genealogy,”	  13.	  
61	  Teitel,	  “Global	  Transitional	  Justice.”	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international	  humanitarian	   law	  concepts	   into	   their	   legal	   frameworks.	  Several	  Ministries	  of	  
Justice,	   such	   as	   Serbia	   and	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina,	   created	   for	   instance	   a	   war	   crimes	  
chamber	  within	   the	   institutional	   judicial	   structures	   to	  prosecute	  alleged	  perpetrators	  on	  a	  
national	  level.	  Moreover,	  the	  11	  bis	  rule	  of	  the	  ICTY,	  a	  legal	  rule	  that	  allows	  the	  transfer	  of	  
ICTY	   cases	   to	   national	   courts,	   also	   demonstrates	   the	   increasing	   cooperation	   between	   the	  
tribunal	  in	  The	  Hague	  and	  national	  judiciaries.62	   In	  this	  context,	  however	  it	   is	  opportune	  to	  
point	   to	   a	   critical	   gap	   between	   the	   symbolic	   values	   of	   the	   law—or,	   put	   differently,	   the	  
perception	  of	  institutional	  and	  legal	  structures	  as	  well	  as	  the	  work	  of	  war	  crimes	  tribunals	  in	  
society63—and	  the	  actual	  daily	  judicial	  procedures	  held	  at	  the	  institutions	  and	  the	  eventual	  
application	   of	   legal	   decisions	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   societies.	   To	   understand	   this	   problem,	   it	   is	  
useful	   to	   review	   some	   of	   the	   practical	   challenges	   the	   ICTY	   has	   grappled	   with	   since	   its	  
creation	  and	  subsequently,	  expand	  the	  discussion	  to	  national	  institutions	  that	  have	  started	  
to	  take	  over	  the	  tasks	  of	  the	  judges	  and	  prosecutors	  working	  in	  The	  Hague.	  
Notwithstanding	  the	  many	  tributes	  paid	  to	  the	  ICTY,	  its	  work,	  particularly	  in	  the	  beginning,	  
has	  been	  conducted	  in	  geographical,	  political	  and	  legal	  isolation	  from	  the	  affected	  societies.	  
The	  decision	  to	  hold	  trials	  in	  a	  remote	  location	  from	  the	  conflict	  region	  was	  mainly	  based	  on	  
the	  fact	  that	  hostilities	  were	  still	  ongoing	  in	  former	  Yugoslavia.64	  Understandably,	  however,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  See	  for	  instance	  Thierry	  Cruvellier	  and	  Marta	  Valiñas,	  Croatia:	  Selected	  Developments	  in	  Transitional	  Justice,	  
Occasional	  Paper	  Series	  (New	  York,	  December	  2006);	  Bogdan	  Ivanisevic,	  “Against	  the	  Current	  -­‐	  War	  Crimes	  
Prosecutions	  in	  Serbia”	  (International	  Center	  for	  Transitional	  Justice,	  2007);	  OSCE,	  Delivering	  Justice	  in	  BiH:	  An	  
Overview	  of	  War	  Crimes	  Processing	  from	  2005	  to	  2010.	  
63	  Ragaru,	  “Note	  De	  Consultance.”	  
64	  Marie	  Ursula	  Kind	  cited	  in	  Janine	  Clark,	  “International	  War	  Crimes	  Tribunals	  and	  the	  Challenge	  of	  Outreach,”	  
International	  Criminal	  Law	  Review	  9,	  no.	  1	  (2009):	  100.	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this	  remoteness	  sparked	  also	  criticism,65	  as	  the	  cathartic	  effect	  of	  a	  tribunal66	  is	  limited	  to	  a	  
narrow	   circle	   of	   witnesses	   who	   are	   willing	   to	   travel.	   	   Furthermore,	   as	   Laura	   Moranchek	  
candidly	  points	  out	   “using	   secret	  evidence	   [such	  as	   confidential	  documents	  provided	  by	  a	  
state’s	  intelligence	  service]	  may	  win	  individual	  battles	  in	  court,	  but	  lose	  the	  broader	  war	  of	  
reforming	  societies	  and	  healing	  victims.”67	  The	  politicization	  of	  the	  death	  of	  former	  Serbian	  
president	   Slobodan	   Milosevic	   in	   his	   detention	   cell	   in	   The	   Hague68	   is	   perhaps	   the	   most	  
emblematic	   case,	   which	   fueled	   particularly	   populist	   propaganda	   that	   was	   carried	   out	   by	  
various	   media	   in	   Serbia.	   A	   couple	   of	   authors	   show	   for	   instance,	   how	   one	   of	   the	   most	  
popular	  Serbian	  newspapers	  Večernje	  novosti	  reframed	  the	  former	  Serbian	  leader’s	  death	  in	  
line	   with	   the	   prevailing	   media	   discourse	   of	   his	   regime	   years	   (1987-­‐2000),	   which	   helped	  
generate	  and	  propagate	  the	  Serbian	  myth	  of	  Milošević	  as	  a	  great	  Serbian	  leader.69	  	  
Yet	  with	  the	  court’s	  legitimacy	  still	  under	  question	  in	  the	  region	  BIRN,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier	  
in	  chapter	  2,	  convened	  a	  cross-­‐regional	  symposium	  in	  September	  2009	  in	  Sarajevo,	  BiH,	  that	  
brought	  together	  practitioners,	  policy	  makers	  and	  activists	   to	  discuss	   issues	  related	  to	  the	  
transparency	   of	   justice	   and	   the	   responsibility	   of	   the	   media.	   	   For	   instance,	   with	   the	   ICTY	  
example	   of	   having	   initially	   failed	   to	   integrate	   local	   judges	   on	   the	   bench	   as	   reference,	  
subsequent	   war	   crimes	   courts,	   such	   as	   the	   special	   court	   for	   Sierra	   Leone,	   East	   Timor	   or	  
Cambodia,	  have	  adapted	  a	  hybrid	  approach	  to	  cope	  with	  this	  shortcoming	  and	  strengthen	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Cf.	  “Transitional	  Justice	  in	  the	  Balkans—Judicial	  Transparency	  and	  Media	  Responsibility,”	  conference	  organized	  by	  
the	  Balkan	  Investigative	  Reporting	  Network	  (BIRN),	  Sarajevo,	  BiH,	  September	  1-­‐3,	  2009.	  
66	  Aurélien	  Colson,	  “The	  Logic	  of	  Peace	  and	  the	  Logic	  of	  Justice,”	  International	  Relations	  15,	  no.	  1	  (2000):	  59–61.	  
67	  “Protecting	  National	  Security	  Evidence	  While	  Prosecuting	  War	  Crimes:	  Problems	  and	  Lessons	  for	  International	  
Justice	  from	  the	  ICTY,”	  479.	  
68	  (Ibid.)	  
69	  Karmen	  Erjavec	  and	  Zala	  Volcic,	  “Rehabilitating	  Milosevic:	  Posthumous	  Coverage	  of	  the	  Milosevic	  Regime	  in	  Serbian	  
Newspapers,”	  Social	  Semiotics	  19,	  no.	  2	  (2009):	  125–147.	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the	  ties	  between	  the	  tribunals	  and	  society.70	  In	  spite	  of	  realizing	  that	  communication	  is	  key	  
to	  create	  a	  sustainable	  relationship	  between	  the	  court	  and	  society—fostered	  by	  numerous	  
public	   events,	   training	   sessions	   and	   workshops	   after	   the	   official	   launch	   of	   an	   outreach	  
program	   in	   1999—the	   court’s	   public	   image	   still	   doesn’t	   shine.71	  While	   special	   courts	   and	  
other	   human	   rights	   tribunals	   following	   the	   ICTY	   created	   outreach	   programs	   immediately	  
after	   they	   began	   operating,72	   the	   issue	   of	   improving	   the	   relationship	   between	   law	   and	  
society	  might	  not	   lie	   in	  more	  personnel,	  better	  strategies	  and	  on-­‐site	  presence,	  but	   in	  the	  
way	  that	  those	  who	  suffered	  most	  during	  the	  conflicts,	  are	   integrated	   into	  efforts	  to	  cope	  
with	   the	  past.	   This	   is	   particularly	   the	   view	  of	  human	   rights	   activists,	  who	   in	   spite	  of	   their	  
support	   for	   retributive	   justice	   mechanisms	   have	   criticized	   also	   its	   shortcomings.	   The	  
activities	  of	  several	  non-­‐profit	  organizations—that	  often	  started	  working	  at	  the	  outbreak	  of	  
violence	   in	   the	   early	   1990s73	   or	   shortly	   after—highlight	   the	   role	   of	   victims	   in	   transitional	  
justice	  processes	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  Yet,	  these	  conflicting	  views	  of	  who	  might	  best	  serve	  society	  
to	   promote	   justice	   and	   establish	   a	   memory	   of	   past	   atrocities	   beg	   the	   question	   of	   who	  
prevails	  in	  the	  battle	  over	  memory?	  In	  the	  next	  couple	  of	  chapters	  I	  explore	  this	  tension	  in	  
the	   relationship	   between	   the	   judiciaries	   (at	   the	   international	   and	   national	   levels)	   and	  
human	   rights	   activists.	   Before	   exploring	   and	   understanding	   the	   crucial	   link	   between	  
international	  and	  domestic	  judiciaries	  and	  human	  rights	  activism	  in	  the	  region	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  Gabrielle	  McDonald,	  “Problems,	  Obstacles	  and	  Achievements	  of	  the	  ICTY,”	  Journal	  of	  International	  Criminal	  Justice	  
2,	  no.	  2	  (2004):	  569–70.	  
71	  Clark,	  “International	  War	  Crimes	  Tribunals	  and	  the	  Challenge	  of	  Outreach.”	  
72	  Ibid.,	  116.	  
73	  Cf.	  for	  instance	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center	  in	  Belgrade,	  Serbia,	  that	  documents	  war	  crimes	  in	  the	  
former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  promotes	  victims	  rights,	  based	  on	  various	  initiatives,	  at	  http://www.hlc-­‐
rdc.org/stranice/Linkovi-­‐modula/About-­‐us.en.html,	  accessed	  on	  December	  5,	  2009.	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pay	  further	  attention	  to	  the	  problematic	  implementation	  of	  global	  humanitarian	  law	  on	  the	  
ground.	  
Perhaps	   the	   toughest	   nut	   to	   crack	   is	   the	   establishment	   of	   legally	   binding	   norms	  with	   the	  
power	  to	  enforce	  them.74	  When	  the	  ICTY	  started	  its	  trials,	  it	  was	  working	  in	  a	  legal	  vacuum,	  
filled	  by	   local	  and	  domestic	  political	  power	  structures	   in	  the	  region	  that	  were	  reluctant	  to	  
abide	   by	   international	   norms	   to	   extradite,	   let	   alone	   prosecute	   alleged	   perpetrators.	   The	  
dilemma	  of	  issuing	  arrest	  warrants	  serves	  as	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  Lacking	  the	  means	  to	  arrest	  at-­‐
large	  war	   criminals,	   the	   ICTY	  has	  depended	   (and	   still	   depends)	  on	   the	   cooperation	  of	   the	  
indictee’s	  country	  of	  origin	  or	  any	  neighboring	  country	  if	  the	  person	  were	  to	  travel	  in	  order	  
to	   bring	   at-­‐large	   criminals	   to	   justice	   in	   The	  Hague.75	   Interestingly,	   however,	   this	   handicap	  
has	  much	  broader	  ramifications,	  including	  not	  only	  the	  ICTY	  and	  the	  states	  in	  question,	  but	  
also	  affecting	  the	  EU.	  In	  fact,	  it	  turned	  into	  a	  crucial	  bargaining	  chip	  for	  an	  entire	  region	  to	  
become	   members	   of	   the	   EU.	   During	   EU	   accession	   negotiations,	   for	   instance,	   the	  
cooperation	  with	  the	  ICTY	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  pillars	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  the	  EU	  requires	  
states	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  to	  fulfill	  before	  advancing	  to	  a	  potential	  membership	  status	  
in	  pre-­‐accession	   talks.	  Notwithstanding,	   such	  a	  narrow	   transitional	   justice	   view	  of	  dealing	  
with	  past	  atrocities	  that	  primarily	  focuses	  on	  war	  crimes	  trials	  is	  questionable,	  as	  suggested	  
by	  certain	  authors.76	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Moranchek,	  “Protecting	  National	  Security	  Evidence	  While	  Prosecuting	  War	  Crimes:	  Problems	  and	  Lessons	  for	  
International	  Justice	  from	  the	  ICTY,”	  559–67.	  
75	  Ibid.	  
76	  Subotić,	  Hijacked	  Justice:	  Dealing	  with	  the	  Past	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  Some	  authors	  have	  criticized	  the	  single-­‐track	  
transitional	  justice	  approach	  of	  the	  EU,	  which	  solely	  focuses	  on	  retributive	  justice	  mechanisms	  (cf.	  “European	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Moreover,	  establishing	  the	  rule	  of	   law	  on	  the	  domestic	   level—using	  rules,	  which	  originally	  
were	   created	  on	   the	   international	   level—was,	  and	   still	   remains,	   a	  difficult	  undertaking.	   In	  
certain	  cases,	  such	  as	  the	  EU	  during	  its	  member	  talks,	  pressure	  from	  the	  international	  level	  
is	  not	  always	  sufficient	  to	  sustain	  sustainable	  reforms	  on	  the	  national	  level.	  	  Certain	  states,	  
such	  as	  Croatia,	  serve	  as	  a	  good	  case	  in	  point	  to	  illustrate	  this	  dilemma.	  After	  the	  Croatian	  
government	   finished	   its	   negotiations	  with	   the	   EU	   to	   become	   a	   candidate	   country	   in	   June	  
2011,	   the	   formal	   signature	   ceremony	  was	   scheduled	   for	  December	   2011.	   Yet,	   during	   this	  
process,	   a	   few	   months	   after	   the	   negotiations	   were	   closed,	   the	   national	   parliament,	   the	  
Sabor,	   passed	   legislation	   in	   October	   2011	   that	   prohibits	   any	   war	   crimes	   investigation	   in	  
Croatia	  by	  the	  judiciary	  of	  Serbia	  or	  any	  other	  former	  body	  of	  the	  Yugoslav	  state.77	  Needless	  
to	  say	  that	  such	  an	  evolution	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  a	  EU	  accession	  country	  is	  evidently	  against	  
Brussels’	  intention	  of	  promoting	  accountability	  against	  war	  crimes	  and	  regional	  cooperation	  
within	  the	  geographic	  space	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  
Despite	   these	   praises	   of	   the	   ICTY’s	   global	   justice	   mission,	   recent	   research	   has	   painted	   a	  
more	  nuanced	  picture	  of	  transitional	  norms	  dynamics,	  focusing	  especially	  on	  political	  actors	  
and	  the	  state.78	  In	  her	  work,	  Jelena	  Subotić	  concludes	  that	  in	  international	  relations	  theory,	  
state	  compliance	  with	  global	  norms	   is	  not	   linear	  but	  a	   complex	  phenomenon.	   In	   fact,	  her	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  Transitional	  Justice:	  From	  Retributive	  To	  Restorative	  Justice”	  conference	  organized	  by	  the	  
Humanitarian	  Law	  Center,	  Belgrade,	  Serbia,	  February	  7,	  2009).	  
77	  Boris	  Pavelić,	  “Croatia	  Risks	  Row,	  Annuls	  Serb	  War	  Crimes	  Charges,”	  BalkanInsight.com,	  October	  21,	  2011,	  sec.	  
Croatia,	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  Boris	  Pavelić,	  
“Croatia’s	  HDZ	  Shifts	  Right	  in	  Hunt	  for	  Votes,”	  BalkanInsight.com,	  October	  26,	  2011,	  sec.	  Croatia,	  
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatia-­‐s-­‐hdz-­‐shifts-­‐right-­‐in-­‐hunt-­‐for-­‐votes.	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  Justice:	  Dealing	  with	  the	  Past	  in	  the	  Balkans.	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case	  studies	  of	  states	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  reveal	  that	  domestic	  elites	  have	  “hijacked”	  
transitional	  justice	  norms	  for	  domestic	  political	  ends,	  such	  as	  aspirations	  to	  enter	  the	  EU.79	  
All	  of	  these	  examples	  represent	  macro-­‐analyses	  of	  globalized	  humanitarian	  law,	  leaving	  an	  
in-­‐depth	   exploration	   of	   the	   application	   of	   these	   meta-­‐models	   of	   transitional	   justice	   in	  
domestic	   institutions	   in	   the	   dark.	   Yet,	   since	   2003,	   Serbia,	   Croatia,	   and	   BiH	   have	   passed	  
legislation	   and	   implemented	   institutional	   changes	   to	   prepare	   their	   national	   judiciaries	   for	  
taking	  on	  war	  crimes	  prosecutions.	  At	   first	  sight,	   these	  developments	  confirm	  concepts	  of	  
complementarity	   positing	   that	   the	   effects	   of	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   have	   spilled	  
over	   into	   the	   national	   level	   (or	   are	   cascading	   down	   to	   the	   domestic	   level—to	   use	   for	  
instance	   Ellen	   Lutz	   and	   Kathryn	   Sikkink’s	   metaphor).80	   Yet,	   to	   what	   extent	   did	   the	  
establishment	  of	  the	  ICTY	  help	  create	  incentives	  for	  reforms	  in	  domestic	  judiciaries	  and	  trial	  
procedures?	  Although	  local	  courts	  already	  rendered	  justice	  shortly	  after	  end	  of	  the	  violent	  
conflicts	   in	  Croatia	  and	  BiH	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1990s,	   their	   sentences	  did	  not	   follow	   international	  
standards.81	   In	  each	  of	  these	  cases	  the	  application	  of	   legal	   instruments	  to	  account	  for	  past	  
human	   rights	   violations	   is	   far	   from	   obvious.	   Various	   national	   political	   contexts	   and	  
international	   conditions	   have	   played	   out	   differently	   within	   the	   three	   countries,	   generally	  
hampering	  transfer	  efforts.	  What	   institutional,	  political	  and	  ideological	  challenges	  did	  (and	  
still	  do)	  war	  crimes	  prosecution	  face?	  In	  the	  following	  I	  will	  draw	  on	  the	  case	  of	  Croatia	  to	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  Ibid.,	  6.	  
80	  Lutz	  and	  Sikkink,	  “The	  Justice	  Cascade:	  The	  Evolution	  and	  Impact	  of	  Foreign	  Human	  Rights	  Trials	  in	  Latin	  America.”	  
81	  “War	  Crimes	  Trials	  Before	  the	  Domestic	  Courts	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina:	  Progress	  and	  Obstacles”	  (Organization	  
for	  Cooperation	  and	  Security	  in	  Europe,	  Human	  Rights	  Department,	  March	  2005),	  4;	  Ivana	  Nizich,	  Zeljka	  Marki,	  and	  
Jeri	  Laber,	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  in	  Croatia	  (New	  York:	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  1995),	  84–9.	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explore	   some	   of	   the	   sociopolitical	   underpinnings	   that	   affect	   the	   global-­‐to-­‐local	   justice	  
cascade	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  	  
	  
Croatia’s	  Selective	  Justice:	  The	  EU,	  the	  ICTY	  and	  Domestic	  Trials	  
To	   comprehend	   the	   difficulties	   of	   Croatian	   judicial	   structures	   in	   order	   to	   implement	   a	  
transitional	   justice	   agenda	   in	   line	   with	   the	   ICTY	   objectives,	   calls	   for	   analyzing	   potential	  
procedural,	  political	  and	  ideological	  issues	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  EU	  enlargement	  process.	  
While	  trying	  to	  implement	  its	  integration	  strategy	  with	  Croatia,	  the	  EU	  has—with	  regards	  to	  
its	   war	   crimes	   requirements—mainly	   focused	   on	   one	   international	   compliance	   condition:	  
the	   extradition	   of	   former	   war	   hero,	   General	   Ante	   Gotovina.82	   As	   a	   consequence,	   the	  
pressure	   exerted	   by	   international	   norms	   to	   foster	   institutional	   and	   normative	   change	  
stopped	  at	  Croatia’s	  border,	   leaving	  the	  country’s	  elites	  with	  ample	  leeway	  in	  their	  efforts	  
to	  advance	  domestic	  attempts	   to	  account	   for	  mass	  violence.83	  Despite	  Subotić’s	  optimistic	  
outlook	   of	   Croatia’s	   path	   to	   justice	   and	   truth	   in	   the	   larger	   context	   of	   acquiring	   the	   long	  
hoped-­‐for	  EU	  membership	  in	  the	  foreseeable	  future,84	  national-­‐level	  practices	  to	  try	  alleged	  
perpetrators	  for	  war	  crimes	  remain	  a	  victim	  of	  Croatia’s	  national	  identity	  dilemma.	  I	  refer	  to	  
it	  as	  a	  dilemma,	  because	  in	  its	  haste	  to	  forge	  a	  homogenous	  and	  united	  nation,	  the	  Croatian	  
government	  has	  maintained	  a	  state	  discourse	  that	  glorifies	  the	  nation-­‐state’s	  military	  forces	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  He	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Croatian	  army,	  indicted	  by	  the	  ICTY	  in	  2001	  for	  war	  crimes	  against	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  Serbs	  from	  
Croatia	  in	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  during	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83	  Subotić,	  Hijacked	  Justice:	  Dealing	  with	  the	  Past	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  120.	  
84	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and	   their	   heroic	   engagement	   in	   the	   1992-­‐1995	   Homeland	   War,	   as	   the	   Croatian	   war	   is	  
generally	  referred	  to	  in	  official	  discourses,	  statements	  or	  documents.	  This	  discourse	  explains	  
the	  armed	  forces’	  involvement	  as	  a	  purely	  defensive	  act	  in	  order	  to	  free	  the	  nascent	  nation	  
of	   terrorist	   and	  other	   enemies	   that	   represented	  a	   threat	   to	   its	   institutional	   structure	   and	  
territorial	  integrity	  of	  the	  country.	  	  
In	   particular	   the	   conservative	   political	   party,	   the	   Hrvatska	   Demokratska	   Zajednica	   (HDZ,	  
engl.	   Croatian	   Democratic	   Union)	   has	   promoted	   this	   discourse	   of	   impunity	   despite	   the	  
knowledge	   of	   human	   rights	   abuses	   by	   Croatian	   armed	   forces.	   In	   fact,	   HDZ	   has	   been	   in	  
power,	  holding	   the	  majority	  of	   the	  seats	   in	   the	  Sabor	  until	   the	   last	  elections	   in	  December	  
2011.	  It	  was	  also	  then-­‐president	  Franjo	  Tuđman’s	  political	  party.	  He	  was	  responsible	  for	  war	  
crimes	  during	  Croatia’s	  war	  of	  independence,	  but	  died	  eventually	  in	  December	  1999	  before	  
any	   legal	   procedure	  was	   put	   in	   place	   to	   prosecute	   him.	   I	   will	   elaborate	   on	   these	   politics	  
further	   below.	   As	   for	   the	   alleged	   war	   crimes	   of	   the	   Croatian	   armed	   forces,	   during	   the	  
military	  operations	  “Operation	  Storm”	  and	  “Operation	  Lightening”	  the	  Croatian	  military	  did	  
not	   only	   oblige	   Serbian	   forces	   to	   retreat,	   but	   that	   also	   forced	   hundreds	   of	   thousands	   of	  
civilians	   to	   flee	   their	  homes,	  mostly	  Croatian	  Serbs,	   from	  the	  occupied	   territories	   in	  1995,	  
thus	  establishing	  Croatia’s	  current	  borders.	  	  
Hence	   this	   collective	   identity	  and	   strong	   feeling	  of	  unity	  among	  Croatian’s	   is	  based	  on	  an	  
image	  and	  understanding	  society	  has	  of	  the	  country	  during	  the	  Homeland	  War	  and	  its	  role	  
in	   it.	  Although	  Croatia	  has	  also	  prosecuted	  an	  important	  number	  of	  perpetrators	   in	  recent	  
years,	   trial	   records	   show	   that	   the	   judiciary	   indicted	  an	  uneven	  number	  of	  Croatian	   Serbs,	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sparing	   Croatian	  military	   leaders.	   The	   politicization	   of	   accountability	   efforts	   poses	   still	   an	  
obstacle	   to	   fair	   and	   impartial	   trials	   in	   the	   country.85	   These	   selective	   justice	   trends	   are	  
grounded	   in	   the	  nation’s	  persisting	   identity	  struggle	   that	   is	  a	  consequence	  of	   its	   relatively	  
recent	   independence.	   In	   order	   to	   pursue	   its	   quest	   for	   historical	   memory,	   political	   elites	  
fueled	   patriotic	   beliefs	   and	   a	   foundational	  myth,	   which	   ignore	   war	   crimes	   against	   ethnic	  
Serbs.	  
During	  the	  1990s,	  Croatia’s	  political	  elite	  was	  confronted	  with	  the	  elusive	  task	  of	  not	  only	  
defining	  a	  national	  image	  distinct	  enough	  from	  Tito’s	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Serbian	  patriotism	  and	  
that	   would	   provide	   sufficient	   glue	   to	   hold	   together	   its	   imagined	   community,	   but	   also	  
legitimize	   the	  new	  nation-­‐	   and	   statehood.	  Moreover,	   it	   needed	   to	   break	  with	   its	  Ustasha	  
past—a	  dark	  period	  of	  its	  history	  when	  it	  acted	  as	  a	  Nazi	  puppet	  regime	  during	  World	  War	  
II.86	  The	  image	  of	  the	  ‘1991-­‐95	  Homeland	  War,’	  created	  by	  the	  Tuđman	  regime—a	  reference	  
to	   Croatian	   military	   operations	   against	   non-­‐ethnic	   Croats,	   particularly	   ethnic	   Serbs	   in	  
Eastern	  Croatia,	  as	  a	   legitimate	  defense	  against	  rebels	  and	  terrorists—therefore	   illustrates	  
how	   politicians	   manipulated	   and	   constructed	   a	   national	   myth	   to	   legitimize	   Croatia’s	  
embryonic	   identity.87	   Yet,	   the	   crushing	   defeat	   of	   the	   right-­‐wing	   party	   HDZ	   in	   the	   2000	  
parliamentary	   elections	   following	   Franjo	   Tuđman’s	   death	   underscores	   the	   dynamic	  
character	   of	   identity	   formation.88	   While	   internationally,	   Croatian	   political	   elites	   have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Amnesty	  International,	  Behind	  a	  Wall	  of	  Silence:	  Prosecution	  of	  War	  Crimes	  in	  Croatia.	  
86	  Ramet,	  Balkan	  Babel:	  The	  Disintegration	  of	  Yugoslavia	  from	  the	  Death	  of	  Tito	  to	  the	  War	  for	  Kosovo.	  
87	  Viktor	  Peskin	  and	  Mieczyslaw	  Boduszynski,	  “International	  Justice	  and	  Domestic	  Politics:	  Post-­‐Tudjman	  Croatia	  and	  
the	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia,”	  Europe-­‐Asia	  Studies	  55,	  no.	  7	  (November	  2003):	  1124.	  
88	  Alex	  J.	  Bellamy,	  The	  Formation	  of	  Croatian	  National	  Identity:	  A	  Centuries-­‐Old	  Dream	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  
University	  Press,	  2003),	  1–2.	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managed	   to	  walk	   a	   very	   thin	   line	   of	   reshaping	   national	   identity	   according	   to	   a	   politically	  
acceptable	   image	   in	   the	   context	   of	   EU	   accession	   talks,	   domestically,	   strong	   national	  
symbolism	  remains	  a	  bone	  of	   contention	  and	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	  questionable	   institutional	  
practices	   of	   Croatia’s	   justice	   system.	   Referring	   to	   the	   case	   of	   General	   Gotovina	   and	   the	  
Medak	  Pocket	  trial	  helps	  explain	  persisting	  shortcomings	  of	  court	  decisions	  in	  national	  war	  
crimes	  trials.	  
Before	  Ante	  Gotovina	  a	  former	  commander	  of	  the	  Croatian	  armed	  forces	  eventually	  had	  to	  
stand	   trial	   in	   The	  Hague,	   however,	   years	  went	   by.	   Croatian	   authorities	  were	   reluctant	   to	  
cooperate	  with	   the	   ICTY	   and	   extradite	   the	   indicted	   general	   allegedly	   responsible	   for	   war	  
crimes	  committed	  during	  the	  liberation	  of	  Croatia,	  a	  military	  strike	  Operation	  Storm	  in	  1995.	  
The	  Croatian	  government	  was	  hesitant	  because	  at	  home,	  and	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  central	  and	  
southern	  coastal	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  he	  had	  gained	  a	  strong	  popularity	  among	  the	  people	  
as	  a	  war	  hero	  who	  helped	  free	  Croatians	  from	  the	  yoke	  of	  the	  Serbian	  oppressor.	  I	  explain	  
the	   identity	   politics	   of	   this	   case	   in	   more	   detail	   in	   chapter	   5.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   judicial	  
cooperation	   and	   Croatia’s	   goal	   to	   join	   the	   EU—which	   required,	   among	   other	   things,	   the	  
cooperation	  with	   the	   ICTY—the	   reluctance	   to	  comply	  with	   international	  humanitarian	   law	  
did	  not	  bode	  well	  for	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  Croatia’s	  process	  of	  democratic	  transition	  and	  efforts	  
to	  account	  for	  past	  atrocities.	  While	  international	  pressure	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  stalemate	  in	  
the	  EU	  accession	  negotiations	  with	   the	  Croatian	   conservative	  HDZ	  government	  eventually	  
led	  to	  Gotovina’s	  extradition,	  judicial	  practices	  on	  the	  domestic	  level	  are	  still	  heavily	  biased,	  
sparing	  alleged	  Croatian	  war	  criminals	  from	  prison	  sentences	  in	  Croatian	  courtrooms.	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As	  a	  case	   in	  point,	  recent	  war	  crimes	  prosecutions,	  such	  as	  the	  Medak	  Pocket	  case	  before	  
the	   Zagreb	   County	   Court	   in	   2008—a	   trial	   in	   which	   two	   former	   Croatian	   generals	   were	  
accused	  of	   crimes	  against	  ethnic	  Serbian	  civilians	  during	  a	  military	  operation	   in	   the	   fall	  of	  
1993	   in	   the	   south-­‐central	   region	   of	   Croatia—highlight	   the	   judiciary’s	   reluctance	   to	   apply	  
legal	  procedures	  in	  compliance	  with	  international	  transitional	  justice	  norms.89	  Human	  rights	  
organizations	   monitoring	   trials	   have	   criticized	   the	   prosecution’s	   lack	   of	   interest	   “in	  
identifying	  and	  punishing	  other	  commanders	  and	  direct	  perpetrators	   in	  the	  Medak	  Pocket	  
crime,	   in	   spite	   of	   evidence	   pointing	   to	   certain	   persons,	   members	   of	   certain	   military	  
formation.”90	  These	  drawbacks	  within	  national	  judicial	  institutions	  are	  not	  exceptions,	  but	  a	  
trend	   in	   how	   transitional	   justice	   is	   struggling	   to	   permeate	   from	   the	   international	   to	   the	  
national	  level.91	  	  
While	   the	   number	   of	   indictments	   and	   trials	   in	   Croatia	   is	   impressive	   compared	   to	   the	  
selected	  symbolic	  cases	  at	  the	  ICTY—and	  increased	  following	  Croatia’s	  application	  to	  access	  
the	  EU	  in	  2003—a	  2010	  Amnesty	  International	  report	  still	  criticizes	  the	  lack	  of	  transparency	  
and	   the	   selective	   justice	   process	   that	   besets	   the	   Croatian	   justice	   system	   in	   its	   efforts	   to	  
account	  for	  war	  crimes	  during	  the	  1991-­‐1995	  Homeland	  War.92	  The	  human	  rights	  watch	  dog	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  In	  an	  unpublished	  manuscript,	  “Croatia:	  Parody	  of	  Justice,	  Case	  Đermanović,”	  	  (2010),	  Mia	  Psorn	  highlights	  the	  
problematic	  rule	  of	  law	  situation	  in	  Croatian	  county	  courts.	  
90	  Nataša	  Kandić,	  “Trials	  for	  War	  Crimes	  and	  Ethnically	  and	  Politically	  Motivated	  Crimes	  in	  Post-­‐Yugoslav	  Countries”	  
(Humanitarian	  Law	  Center,	  2009),	  131.	  
91	  Mirjana	  Lazić,	  Eldar	  Jahić,	  and	  K.	  Kruhonja,	  eds.,	  “War	  Crime	  Trials	  Monitoring-­‐Regional	  Trial	  Monitoring	  Team	  
Report	  2004-­‐2008”	  (Center	  for	  Peace,	  Non-­‐Violence	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Osijek,	  2009),	  18–24;	  Subotić,	  Hijacked	  Justice:	  
Dealing	  with	  the	  Past	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  101–106;	  Vjeran	  Pavlaković,	  “Better	  the	  Grave	  Than	  a	  Slave:	  Croatia	  and	  the	  
International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia,”	  in	  Croatia	  Since	  Independence.	  War	  Politics,	  Society	  and	  
Foreign	  Relations,	  ed.	  Sabrina	  P.	  Ramet,	  Konrad	  Clewing,	  and	  Reneo	  Lukić	  (München:	  Oldenburg	  Verlag,	  2008),	  446–
477.	  
92	  Amnesty	  International,	  Behind	  a	  Wall	  of	  Silence:	  Prosecution	  of	  War	  Crimes	  in	  Croatia,	  6.	  
	  107	  
organization	  based	  its	  numbers	  on	  a	  report	  by	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  of	  
the	  Council	  for	  Europe	  Thomas	  Hammarberg	  who	  visited	  Croatia	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2010.	  In	  
his	  final	  report	  Hammarberg	  noted	  in	  his	  report	  that	  	  
since	   1991	   more	   than	   600	   people	   have	   been	   convicted	   for	   war-­‐related	   crimes,	  
another	  600	  have	  been	  indicted	  and	  several	  hundred	  more	  are	  under	  investigation	  
in	   Croatia.	   Croatia	   has	   issued	   700	   international	   arrest	   warrants	   for	   war	   crime	  
suspects.	   However,	   it	   has	   been	   reported	   that	   from	   to	   2005	   to	   2009	   only	   80	  war-­‐	  
related	   criminal	   cases	   have	   been	   prosecuted.	  Many	   cases	   still	   remain	   unresolved,	  
and	   in	   a	   number	   of	   cases	   the	   perpetrators	   of	   war-­‐related	   crimes	   have	   not	   been	  
identified.93	  
Additionally,	  despite	  the	  2009	  Criminal	  Procedure	  Act,	  which	  allows	  re-­‐opening	  in	  particular	  
in	   absentia	   cases	   of	   primarily	   Croatian	   Serb	   indictees	   concerning	   war-­‐related	   cases,	   in	  
absentia	   trials	   continue	   to	   be	   practiced	   by	   Croatian	   courts.94	   While	   Croatian	   authorities’	  
awareness	  of	  ethnic	  bias	  in	  war	  crimes	  trials	  is	  increasing,	  overall	  progress	  remains	  relatively	  
slow.	  	  
As	  a	  result,	   trials	  have	  raised	  the	  question	  of	  some	  fundamental	  principles	   that	   lie	  behind	  
the	   concept	   of	   justice.	   While	   the	   ICTY	   had	   not	   only	   set	   the	   goal	   of	   promoting	   an	  
international	  humanitarian	   law	  model	  and	  deter	  future	  mass	  atrocities	  by	  punishing	  those	  
responsible	   for	   grave	   crimes	   against	   humanity,	   its	   mandate	   also	   aimed	   at	   promoting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93	  Thomas	  Hammarberg,	  Report	  by	  the	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe:	  Following	  His	  Visit	  to	  
Croatia	  (Strasbourg,	  June	  17,	  2010),	  16.	  
94	  Ibid.	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reconciliation	   in	   the	   formerly	   war-­‐torn	   region.95	   The	   intention	   here	   is	   not	   to	   assess	   the	  
efficacy	   of	   retributive	   justice	   in	   fostering	   healing	   of	   society,	   but	   instead	   to	   underline	   the	  
consequences	  of	  a	  particular	  modus	  operandi	  of	  judicial	  institutions	  for	  society.	  As	  a	  case	  in	  
point,	  despite	  the	  claim	  of	  serving	  society,	  courts	  often	  operate	  in	  isolation	  from	  the	  public,	  
protected	   by	   intricate	   procedures	   and—particularly	   in	   the	   context	   of	   war	   crimes	  
prosecutions—to	   a	   certain	   extent	   by	   confidentiality.96	   Suffice	   it	   to	   say	   that	   the	   facts	  
generated	   by	   trials—due	   to	   the	   limited	   capacity	   of	   the	   judiciary	   to	   try	   all	   the	   cases—
represent	   only	   glimpses	   of	   the	   full	   story.	   Non-­‐governmental	   human	   rights	   organizations	  
have	  deplored	  these	  issues	  and	  gained	  sufficient	  momentum	  to	  counteract	  and	  advocate	  for	  
victims’	  rights	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  supporting	  the	  positive	  developments	  in	  international	  
and	  domestic	  prosecutions.	  
Several	   human	   rights	   activists,	   with	   the	   help	   of	   international	   non-­‐profit	   and	   government	  
donors	  have	  set	  out	  to	  complement	  these	  processes	  by	  collecting	  testimonies	  and	  creating	  
immense	  archives	  of	  audio,	  video,	  and	  written	  files	  and	  documents	  of	  survivors.	  These	  social	  
actors	  have	  set	  in	  motion	  a	  wave	  of	  restorative	  justice	  processes	  that,	  by	  now,	  have	  taken	  
cross-­‐regional	   proportions.	   Despite	   their	   ambitions,	   however,	   they	   are	   also	   struggling	   to	  
institutionalize	   their	  current	  efforts.97	  Notwithstanding,	  non-­‐profit	  activities	   to	  support	   the	  
work	  of	  war	  crimes	  trials	  in	  each	  national	  context	  run	  in	  parallel	  to	  bottom-­‐up	  accountability	  
attempts.	   In	   the	   next	   chapter	   I	   draw	   on	   a	   concept	   called	   travel	   theory,	   to	   explain	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Cf.	  UN	  resolution	  827	  available	  at	  http://daccess-­‐dds-­‐
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/306/28/IMG/N9330628.pdf?OpenElement,	  accessed	  January	  3,	  2010.	  
96	  See	  for	  instance	  Harvey	  Weinstein	  and	  Laura	  Fletcher,	  “Violence	  and	  Social	  Repair:	  Rethinking	  the	  Contribution	  of	  
Justice	  to	  Reconciliation,”	  Human	  Rights	  Quarterly	  24,	  no.	  3	  (2002):	  573–639.	  
97	  See	  chapter	  5	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  these	  issues.	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difficult	   rise	  of	  human	   rights	  activists	   in	  post-­‐conflict	   societies	  by	  analyzing	   the	  process	  of	  




The	   goal	   of	   this	   chapter	   was	   twofold.	   Initially,	   I	   provided	   background	   analysis	   of	   the	  
ideological	   and	   institutional	   underpinnings	   of	   the	   ICTY’s	   early	   years.	   I	   have	   not	   only	  
demonstrated	  the	  importance	  of	  emerging	  concepts	  and	  ideas,	  but	  also	  underlined	  how	  key	  
figures	   have	   influenced	   the	   course	   of	   the	   ICTY’s	   evolution	   through	   their	   agency.	  	  
Subsequently,	   I	   also	   discussed	   the	   intricate	   relations	   among:	   the	   tribunal’s	   work	   in	   The	  
Hague	   that	   is	   currently	  winding	  down;	   struggling	  domestic	   judiciary	  efforts	   to	  account	   for	  
war	  crimes;	  and	  the	  growing	  requests	  by	  victims	  to	  establish	  the	  facts	  about	  the	  war	  in	  the	  
former	  Yugoslavia	  due	  to	  a	  continuing	  culture	  of	  impunity,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  1.	  In	  the	  
first	  section	  I	  thus	  highlighted	  the	  initial	  struggles	  of	  international	  experts	  and	  politicians	  to	  
create	  enough	  momentum	  to	  pass	  a	  UN	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  and	  then	  maintain	  it	  in	  
order	   to	  get	   the	  ad	  hoc	  UN	  court	   started.	   In	   the	  next	  part	   I	   revealed	   the	  difficulties	  even	  
after	   the	   preliminary	   obstacles	  were	   overcome.	   In	   fact,	   applying	   international	   norms	   and	  
rules	  on	  a	  domestic	  level	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  bone	  of	  contention	  that	  different	  actors,	  such	  
as	   international	   policymakers,	   legal	   experts	   and	   domestic	   political	   actors	   in	   favor	   of	   war	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  For	  spatial	  analysis	  of	  international	  law	  concepts	  and	  the	  role	  of	  human	  rights	  activists	  cf.	  chapter	  5.	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crimes	  prosecutions	  still	  grapple	  with.	   	  To	  highlight	   these	  problems	  empirically,	   I	  used	  the	  
case	   of	   Croatian	   politics.	   These	   struggles	  within	   national	   judiciaries,	   however,	   are	   not	   an	  
exception	  limited	  to	  the	  Balkans,	  as	  several	  authors	  have	  pointed	  to.99	  Instead	  they	  are	  part	  
of	   a	   trend	   showing	   that	   transitional	   justice	   is	   grappling	  with	   in	  order	   to	   expand	   from	   the	  
international	  to	  the	  national	  level.	  In	  the	  following	  chapters,	  I	  will	  turn	  my	  attention	  to	  NGO	  
actors	  in	  order	  to	  portray	  their	  understanding	  of	  international	  humanitarian	  law,	  their	  early	  
involvement	   in	   transitional	   justice	   processes	   as	   well	   as	   their	   motivations	   to	   implement	  
alternative	  and	  complementary	  mechanisms	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  past.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  See	  for	  instance	  Burt,	  “Impunity	  and	  Accountability:	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Transitional	  Justice	  Struggles	  in	  Latin	  
America”,	  forthcoming;	  Clark,	  Critical	  Perspectives	  in	  Transitional	  Justice;	  Collins,	  Post-­‐Transitional	  Justice:	  Human	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Above	  I	  have	  discussed	  the	  role	  of	   international	  humanitarian	  law	  in	  the	  sociopolitical	  and	  
geographical	  context	  of	  the	  ICTY	  and	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  underlined	  the	  obstacles	  of	  
applying	  legally	  binding	  international	  norms	  on	  a	  national	  level.	  The	  selective	  case	  choice	  by	  
the	  ICTY—guided	  by	  the	  need	  to	  establish	  precedents	  in	  international	  criminal	  law,	  including	  
chain	   of	   command,	   genocide,	   and	   rape,	   among	   the	  most	   important	  war	   crimes—and	   the	  
problematic	   use	   of	  witnesses	   during	   court	   hearings	   caught	   the	   attention	   of	   human	   rights	  
advocates.	   Indeed,	   the	   ICTY	   trial	   record	   illustrates	   the	   great	   importance	   judges	   and	  
prosecutors	   accorded	   to	   humanitarian	   law,	   applied	   from	   the	   top	   down	   in	   the	   former	  
Yugoslavia.	  The	  intention	  of	  the	  tribunal	   is	  to	  leave	  behind	  a	  normative	  legacy	  that	  can	  be	  
applied	   to	   cases	   of	  mass	   atrocities	  worldwide.	   Yet,	   such	   a	   strategy	   has	   left	   the	   voices	   of	  
many	  victims	  silent	  or	  diminished	  their	   importance	  along	  the	  way.	   	  For	  a	   large	  number	  of	  
victims,	   their	   cases	   could	   not	   be	   processed	  due	   to	   the	   limited	   procedural	   capacity	   of	   the	  
ICTY.	  For	  others,	  who	  had	  the	  chance	  to	  testify	   in	  front	  of	  the	  tribunal,	  many	  other	   issues	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have	  been	  looming.	  They	  range	  from	  post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  disorder	  to	  death	  threats	  upon	  
their	   return	   home.	   This	   chapter	   looks	   in	   particular	   at	   those	   victims	   who	   were	   called	   to	  
testify	   and	   consequently	   had	   to	   face	   some	   of	   the	   above	   issues.	   Drawing	   on	   examples	   of	  
NGO	  programs	   focused	  around	  witness	  protection,	   including	  support	   in	  The	  Hague	  and	   in	  
the	   witnesses’	   home	   country,	   the	   following	   chapter	   explores	   the	   understanding	   of	  
international	  humanitarian	  law	  that	  activists	  have	  gained	  since	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  ICTY	  and	  
how	  they	  have	  integrated	  the	  normative	  work	  of	  the	  court	  in	  their	  own	  agenda	  to	  promote	  
the	   voices	   of	   victims	   in	   society.	   Thus,	  my	   research	   builds	   on	   an	   emerging	   field	   of	   victim-­‐
centered	   literature	   in	   transitional	   justice	   that	   underlines	   the	   complexity	   of	   issues	   that	  
victims	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   settings	   are	   exposed	   to	   and	   that	   go	   beyond	   a	   stereotypical	  
dichotomy	  of	  perpetrator	  versus	  victim	  narratives.1	  	  
For	  this,	  I	  turn	  away	  from	  state	  institutions	  and	  focus	  my	  attention	  on	  civil	  society	  actors,2	  in	  
particular	   human	   rights	   activists,	   to	   describe	   not	   only	   how	   they	   perceive	   these	   legal	  
concepts,	  but	  also	  how	  they	  reinterpret	  them	  and	  apply	  them	  using	  alternative	  transitional	  
justice	  mechanisms	  that	  complement	  the	  work	  of	  war	  crimes	  tribunals	  in	  a	  domestic	  setting.	  
The	  emphasis	  of	  the	  next	  few	  chapters,	  however,	  lies	  not	  in	  providing	  a	  detailed	  description	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Erica	  Bouris,	  Complex	  Political	  Victims	  (Kumarian	  Press,	  2007);	  Claire	  Hackett	  and	  Bill	  Rolston,	  “The	  Burden	  of	  
Memory:	  Victims,	  Storytelling	  and	  Resistance	  in	  Northern	  Ireland,”	  Memory	  Studies	  2,	  no.	  3	  (2009):	  355–376;	  
Margaret	  Urban	  Walker,	  Moral	  Repair:	  Reconstructing	  Moral	  Relations	  After	  Wrongdoing	  (Cambridge,	  United	  
Kingdom:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006);	  Roman	  David	  and	  Susanne	  Choi	  Yuk-­‐ping,	  “Victims	  on	  Transitional	  
Justice:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Reparation	  of	  Human	  Rights	  Abuses	  in	  the	  Czech	  Republic,”	  Human	  Rights	  Quarterly	  27,	  no.	  
2	  (2005):	  392–435.	  
2	  Civil	  society	  actors	  are	  an	  umbrella	  term,	  including,	  among	  others,	  veterans’	  associations	  that	  advocate	  for	  a	  status	  
quo	  on	  impunity	  and	  thus	  hamper	  the	  work	  of	  NGOs	  promoting	  accountability	  for	  war	  crimes.	  I	  briefly	  address	  the	  
conflicting	  issues	  between	  different	  civil	  society	  actors	  in	  chapter	  5.	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of	   these	   NGO	   activities—and	   potential	   obstacles	   thereof.3	   Instead,	   I	   examine	   the	   local	  
meaning	  of	   international	  humanitarian	   law	  that	  activists	  have	  attributed	  to	   the	  normative	  
work	   of	   the	   ICTY	   since	   the	   creation	   and	   how	   they	   have	   integrated	   these	   abstract	   legal	  
concepts	   into	   their	   own	   work,	   in	   particular	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   their	   efforts	   to	   support	   victims	   in	  
society.	  
In	   order	   to	   trace	   the	   impact	   of	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   society,	   I	  
focus	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  law	  in	  different	  sociopolitical	  contexts.	  Laws,	  in	  fact,	  are	  not	  simply	  
rules	   to	   be	   followed,	   but	   constitute	   a	   set	   of	   social	   practices	   that	   change	   and	   evolve	  
depending	  on	  the	  sociocultural	  milieu	  or	  environment	  in	  a	  given	  society.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  my	  
goal	  is	  to	  describe	  the	  process	  of	  how	  legal	  concepts	  travel	  from	  one	  set	  of	  social	  actors	  to	  
another	  group	  of	  actors.	  More	  precisely,	   I	  discuss	  how	  international	  humanitarian	   law—as	  
defined	   and	   practiced	   by	   lawyers,	   judges	   and	   legal	   practitioners—has	   influenced	   human	  
rights	   activists	   in	   their	   own	   daily	   practices	   and	   how	   their	   concept	   of	   these	   international	  
norms	   varies.	   To	   this	   end,	   I	   examine	  why	   their	   perception	   of	   international	   human	   rights	  
differs	  and	  then	  analyze	  how	  they	  apply	  these	  reinterpreted	  concepts	  locally.	  Drawing	  on	  a	  
large	  data	  set	  of	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  government	  officials,	  international	  actors,	  
activists	   and	  experts,	   I	   thus	   illustrate	  how	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   is	   undergoing	   a	  
process	  of	  democratization.	  In	  other	  words,	  human	  rights	  activists	  have	  given	  it	  a	  new,	  more	  
individualized	  importance,	  including	  victims’	  needs.	  Yet,	  as	  I	  will	  further	  develop	  in	  chapter	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  	  Chapter	  5	  provides	  discussion	  on	  some	  of	  the	  key	  issues	  during	  the	  campaign	  of	  the	  fact-­‐finding	  initiative	  RECOM.	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6	   when	   I	   focus	   on	   the	   local-­‐regional	   divide	   between	   NGO	   activists,	   such	   a	   local,	   more	  
democratic	  meaning	  of	  human	  rights	  is	  also	  problematic	  and	  not	  always	  desirable.	  
To	  analyze	  this	  phenomenon,	  I	  use	  a	  sociology-­‐of-­‐law	  concept,	  which	  is	  the	  systematic	  and	  
empirical	  study	  of	  law	  as	  a	  set	  of	  social	  practices.	  The	  French	  Belle-­‐Époque	  sociologist	  Émile	  
Durkheim	   and	   his	   German	   counterpart	   Max	   Weber	   were	   both	   founders	   of	   studying	  
sociological	   theories	  of	   the	   law	   in	   society.	  Weber	   in	  particular	  defined	   sociology	  of	   law	   in	  
relation	  to	  other	  conceptual	  frameworks	  of	  the	  rule	  of	   law	  in	  society.4	   It	  wasn’t	  until	  after	  
World	  War	  II	  that	  Talcott	  Parson,	  Niklas	  Luhman	  and,	  especially,	  French	  philosopher	  Michel	  
Foucault	   brought	   a	   revival	   to	   the	   study	   of	   law	   in	   society.	   While	   the	   former	   scholars	  
developed	  a	  system-­‐based	  theory	  of	  law	  arguing	  that	  legal	  systems	  are	  operating	  in	  a	  closed	  
system,	  the	  latter,	  using	  a	  poststructuralist	  perspective	  addressed	  issues	  of	  power	  relations	  
of	  various	  social	  actors	  in	  society.5	  
To	   introduce	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   democratization	   of	   human	   rights	   in	   the	   case	   of	   my	  
selected	  NGO	  examples—this	  discussion	  is	  expanded	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  chapters	  of	  
this	   study—I	   divided	   this	   chapter	   in	   three	   sections.	   Based	   on	   some	   of	   the	   difficulties	  
witnesses	  in	  war	  crimes	  trials	  have	  to	  face,	  I	  first	  describe	  the	  challenges	  of	  NGOs	  providing	  
support	  in	  this	  context.	  Then	  I	  conceptualize	  the	  changing	  meaning	  of	  human	  rights	  from	  a	  
grand	   narrative	   promoted	   by	   the	   ICTY,	   to	   individualized	   stories	   of	   victims	   supported	   by	  
human	   rights	   activists.	   Last,	   I	   draw	   on	   the	   case	   study	   of	   the	   International	   Center	   for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Nonetheless,	  the	  field	  gained	  very	  little	  traction	  besides	  a	  handful	  of	  scholars	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  
century,	  including	  Eugen	  Ehrlich,	  Nicholas	  Timasheff	  and	  George	  Gurvitch,	  among	  others.	  	  
5	  Mathieu	  Deflem,	  “Sociological	  Theories	  of	  Law,”	  in	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Law	  and	  Society:	  American	  and	  Global	  
Perspectives,	  ed.	  David	  Clark	  (Thousand	  Oaks,	  CA:	  Sage	  Publications,	  2007),	  1410–1413.	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Transitional	   Justice	   (ICTJ)	   in	   order	   to	   discuss	   a	   general	   trend	   shift	   in	   transitional	   justice	  
strategies	   in	   which	   restorative	   justice	   mechanisms	   have	   found	   their	   place	   within	   the	  
broader	  discourse	  of	  the	  ICTY,	  and	  ultimately,	  the	  UN’s	  retributive	  justice	  approach.	  
	  
Witnesses,	  Victims	  and	  NGOs:	  A	  Bottom	  Up	  View	  of	  Human	  
Rights	  
One	   of	   the	   goals	   of	   creating	   the	   ICTY	   and	   prosecuting	   “persons	   responsible	   for	   serious	  
violations	   of	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   ...	   [was	   to	   ensure	   that]	   such	   violations	   are	  
halted	   and	   effectively	   redressed.”6	   In	   other	  words,	   the	   punitive	   effect,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  
deterrence	   factor	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	  3,	  aimed	  at	  bringing	   justice	   to	  victims	  and	  victims’	  
families.	  Several	  authors,	  even	  until	   recently,	  have	  stressed	  this	   important	   function	  of	   the	  
UN	  ad	  hoc	   tribunal.	  While	  Vesna	   Zimonjic	   criticizes	  delays	   in	   the	   ICTY’s	  Radovan	  Karadžić	  
case	   as	   a	   hindrance	   to	   the	   demands	   of	   justice	   by	   victims	   and	   survivors,	   Amnesty	  
International	   announces	   in	   one	   of	   its	   statements	   after	   The	   Hague	   tribunal	   sentenced	  
Croatian	  general	  Ante	  Gotovina7	  in	  April	  2011,	  that	  justice	  has	  been	  brought	  to	  victims	  after	  
all.8	  Such	  broad	  claims	  about	  victims	  and	  their	  call	  for	  justice,	  however,	  tell	  only	  part	  of	  the	  
story,	   not	   fully	   appreciating	   the	   experiences	   and	   demands	   of	   victims	   and	   survivors	   after	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Cf.	  UN	  resolution	  827,	  UN	  Doc	  S/Res/827	  (1993),	  available	  at	  http://daccess-­‐dds-­‐
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/306/28/IMG/N9330628.pdf?OpenElement,	  accessed	  January	  3,	  2012.	  
7	  See	  chapter	  3	  for	  more	  details	  on	  the	  case.	  
8	  Vesna	  Zimonjic,	  “War	  Crime	  Victims	  Stretch	  Wait	  for	  Justice,”	  Inter	  Press	  Service	  News	  Agency,	  November	  10,	  2009;	  
Amnesty	  International,	  “Croatia:	  Key	  International	  Court	  Ruling	  Delivers	  Justice	  to	  Victims	  of	  War	  Crimes”,	  April	  15,	  
2011.	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mass	   atrocity.	   One	   of	   the	   recurring	   requests	   from	   victims'	   communities,	   such	   as	   the	  
Association	  of	  the	  Women	  of	  Srebrenica—a	  non-­‐profit	  organization	  representing	  the	  victims	  
and	   survivors	   of	   the	   Srebrenica	   massacre	   in	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina	   in	   1995—is	   the	  
excavation	  of	  their	  family	  members'	  remains	  so	  that	  they	  can	  be	  buried	  properly	  to	  mark	  a	  
symbolic	   closure.9	   Thus,	   victims	   do	   not	   necessarily	   long	   for	   a	   sentence	   by	   the	   tribunal;	  
especially,	   since	  many	   trials	   only	   affect	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   victims,	   leaving	  many	   other	  
cases	  unprocessed.	   In	   fact,	  while	   in	   the	   Inter-­‐American	  human	   rights	   system	  victims	  have	  
the	   right	   to	   truth	   and	   justice,	   including	   not	   only	   trials,	   but	   also	   reparations10,	   reports	   by	  
international	  organizations	  working	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  such	  as	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  
have	   made	   similar	   claims11;	   yet	   with	   little	   impact	   on	   actual	   policies	   to	   implement	   these	  
victims'	  rights.12	  
In	  his	  book,	  The	  Witnesses:	  War	  Crimes	  and	  the	  Promise	  of	  Justice	  in	  The	  Hague,	  Eric	  Stover	  
discusses	   some	  of	   the	   issues	   that	   have	   surfaced	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   demands	   to	   bring	   justice	   to	  
victims	  and	  the	  work	  of	  the	  ICTY.13	  	  He	  focuses	  on	  the	  role	  of	  witnesses	  who	  have	  testified	  at	  
the	   ICTY,	   thus	   providing	   several	   noteworthy	   observations	   which	   further	   underline	   why	  
NGOs	  have	  emerged	  in	  the	  transitional	  justice	  space	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  which	  was	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  See	  comments	  by	  an	  association’s	  representative	  during	  the	  Question	  &	  Answer	  session	  at	  the	  BIRN	  regional	  
conference,	  “Court	  Transparency	  and	  Media	  Responsibility,”	  in	  Sarajevo,	  1-­‐3	  September	  2009.	  
10	  See	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Commission	  on	  Human	  Rights	  website	  at	  http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/,	  accessed	  on	  
February	  2,	  2012.	  
11	  See	  for	  instance	  Jean-­‐Charles	  Gardetto,	  The	  Protection	  of	  Witnesses	  as	  a	  Cornerstone	  for	  Justice	  and	  Reconciliation	  
in	  the	  Balkans,	  Report	  -­‐	  Committee	  on	  Legal	  Affairs	  and	  Human	  Rights	  (Council	  of	  Europe,	  January	  12,	  2011).	  
12	  See	  for	  instance	  Linda	  Popić	  and	  Belma	  Panjeta,	  Compensation,	  Transitional	  Justice	  and	  Conditional	  International	  
Credit	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  (Sarajevo:	  Royal	  Norwegian	  Embassy	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  and	  Embassy	  of	  
Switzerland	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  2010).	  
13	  Eric	  Stover,	  The	  Witnesses:	  War	  Crimes	  and	  the	  Promise	  of	  Justice	  in	  The	  Hague	  (University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Press,	  
2007).	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space	   initially	   created	   by	   the	   ICTY’s	   legal	   procedures.	   First,	   the	   author	   explains	   how	  
witnesses	  have	  not	  always	  occupied	  a	  crucial	  role	  during	  past	  war	  crimes	  trials,	  such	  as	  the	  
Nuremberg	  Trials	  after	  World	  War	  II.	  In	  fact,	  Justice	  Jackson	  was	  determined	  “to	  put	  on	  no	  
witnesses	  that	  we	  could	  reasonably	  avoid.”14	  At	  the	  time	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  Allies	  to	  stage	  
war	   crimes	   trials	   was	   to	   showcase	   the	   atrocities	   committed	   by	   Nazi	   Germany	   as	   well	   as	  
making	   sure	   that	   the	   world	   knew	   that	   justice	   had	   been	   done.	   In	   the	   end,	   it	   was	   an	  
illustration	  of	  the	  Allied	  forces’	  power	  and	  their	  willingness	  to	  render	  victors’	  justice.	  Almost	  
half	   a	   century	   later,	   international	   criminal	   justice	   rendered	   through	   the	   institutional	  
framework	  of	  the	  ICTY	  was	  based	  on	  a	  very	  different	  strategy.	  The	  multipolar	  world	  that	  had	  
emerged	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  called	  for	  a	  justice	  approach	  that	  was	  legitimate	  in	  
the	  eyes	  of	   a	   diverse	   international	   community,	   and	  more	   importantly,	   from	   the	   region	   in	  
question.	  Hence,	  during	  the	  trials	  at	  the	  UN	  ad	  hoc	  tribunal	  witnesses	  became	  very	  central	  
to	   hold	   together	   certain	   cases	   the	   office	   of	   the	   prosecutor	   was	   processing,	   since	   the	  
prosecution	   relied	   heavily	   on	   eyewitnesses.	   This	   was	   particularly	   important	   during	   the	  
ICTY’s	   first	   years	   of	   operation,	   while	   the	   conflict	   was	   still	   ongoing	   in	   the	   region	   and	  
cooperation	  efforts	  of	  states	   in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  were	  either	   inexistent	  or	  unreliable.	  
Yet,	  this	  strategy	  also	  bore	  many	  shortcomings.	  
While	  there	  are	  several	  cases	  that	  could	  serve	  as	  an	  example	  here,	  Stover	  provides	  valuable	  
background	   information	   for	   the	   Lašva	   valley	   cases,	   which	   refer	   to	   numerous	   war	   crimes	  
committed	   by	   the	   Bosnian	   Croats	   against	   Bosnian	  Muslim	   civilians	   in	   the	   Lašva	   Valley	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Cited	  in	  ibid.,	  19.	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Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  during	  the	  Bosnian	  war	  of	  1992-­‐1995.15	  The	  first	  round	  of	  ICTY	  trials	  
related	   to	   these	   crimes	   concerned	   cases	   of	   high-­‐ranking	   military	   personnel	   and	   political	  
leaders,	   as	   the	   prosecution	   was	   trying	   to	   prove	   the	   chain	   of	   command	   and	   command	  
responsibility.	   In	   the	  sentencing	  of	   the	   ICTY	  a	   local	  politician,	  Dario	  Kordić,	  was	  eventually	  
found	   to	   be	   the	   planner	   and	   instigator	   of	   this	   plan.	   The	   prosecution	   drew	   less	   on	  
eyewitnesses	   in	   these	   first	   few	   cases,	   but	   instead	   examined	   criminal	   design	   or	   plans	   by	  
those	   in	  charge.	  The	  second	  round	  of	  trials,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  aimed	  at	  proving	  the	  guilt	  of	  	  
“the	   so-­‐called	   small	   fry,	   like	   the	   Kupreskic,	   the	   foot	   soldiers	   that	   allegedly	   committed	  
atrocities	   on	   their	   own	   or	   while	   following	   orders.”16	   	   These	   prosecutions	   relied	   on	  
eyewitness	   accounts,	   including	   fellow	   combatants	   who	   happened	   to	   be	   present	   as	   the	  
perpetrator	  committed	  the	  crime.	  In	  this	  particular	  case,	  the	  dropout	  rate	  of	  eyewitnesses	  
was	   very	   high17	   and	   those	  who	   testified	   during	   the	   trial	   were	   disappointed,	   as	   the	   initial	  
sentences	  of	  the	  alleged	   low-­‐level	  perpetrators	  were	   later	  overturned,	  acquitting	  them	  on	  
appeal.	  Additionally,	  the	  limited	  capacity	  to	  carry	  out	  adequate	  witness	  protection	  was	  also	  
expressed	  by	  death	  threats	  against	  some	  of	  the	  witnesses.18	  	  
At	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  briefly	  describe	  the	  initial	  logistical	  issues	  at	  the	  ICTY,	  as	  its	  
staff	  tried	  to	  provide	  witness	  protection.	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  have	  mentioned	  some	  of	  
the	   difficulties	   regarding	   courtroom	   space	   and	   salary	   payments	   of	   the	   staff.	   In	   fact,	   the	  
ICTY’s	  early	  budgetary	  difficulties	  also	  resulted	  in	  improper	  preparation	  and	  handling	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  	  See	  also	  ICTY	  indictments	  relating	  to	  the	  case	  at	  http://www.icty.org/case/bralo/4#ind,	  accessed	  on	  June	  12,	  2010.	  
16	  Stover,	  The	  Witnesses:	  War	  Crimes	  and	  the	  Promise	  of	  Justice	  in	  The	  Hague,	  108.	  
17	  Reasons	  for	  witnesses	  dropping	  out	  include:	  social	  pressure,	  fear	  and	  stigma,	  among	  others.	  
18	  Stover,	  The	  Witnesses:	  War	  Crimes	  and	  the	  Promise	  of	  Justice	  in	  The	  Hague,	  106–108.	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first	   witnesses	   from	   the	   Balkans	   to	   The	   Hague.	   According	   to	  Wendy	   Lobwein19,	   a	   former	  
support	  officer	  at	  the	  victims	  and	  witnesses	  unit	  of	  the	  ICTY,	  as	  the	  first	  individuals	  arrived	  
at	  the	  ICTY	  to	  testify	  the	  tribunal	  received	  them	  “without	  anything	  in	  place	  with	  regard	  to	  
their	  physical	  and	  psychological	  comfort	  and	  security.”20	  Undoubtedly,	  in	  this	  first	  phase	  of	  
the	   ICTY’s	   work,	   the	   tribunal	   was	   preoccupied	   finding	   witnesses	   across	   the	   region	   and	  
bringing	  them	  to	  The	  Hague.	  This	  was	  a	  very	  elusive	  task,	  since	  many	  witnesses	  did	  not	  have	  
the	  required	  travel	  documents,	  such	  as	  passports	  and	  visas.	  As	  the	  war	  was	  still	  ongoing	  in	  
some	  of	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  region,	  it	  was	  a	  challenge	  to	  obtain	  any	  of	  these	  documents	  from	  
the	  local	  authorities.	  One	  staff	  member	  of	  Lobwein’s	  team,	  drawing	  on	  a	  story	  of	  the	  initial	  
set	  of	  witnesses,	  explained	  that	  they	  “put	  the	  first	  set	  of	  witnesses	  in	  bulletproof	  vests	  and	  
got	  them	  in	  a	  helicopter	  to	  Split	  [in	  Croatia]	  where	  they	  could	  be	  photographed	  and	  issued	  
identification,	  and	   then	  brought	   them	  back	   to	  Bosnia	   for	   transport	   to	  The	  Hague.”21	  Once	  
they	   arrived	   in	   the	   Dutch	   capital,	   however,	   there	  were	   no	  witness	  waiting	   rooms.	  When	  
they	  eventually	  built	   rooms,	   they	  were	   lacking	  bathrooms,	   smoking	  areas,	  and	  a	  cafeteria	  
area,	  among	  others.	  Very	  little	  was	  done	  initially	  to	  ensure	  witnesses’	  basic	  comfort	  during	  
the	  trial	  process,	  thus	  not	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  witness’	  human	  dignity.	  
Notwithstanding,	  dignity	  in	  this	  context	  should	  also	  be	  looked	  at	  from	  a	  larger	  perspective	  
and	  not	  only	  with	  regards	  to	  these	  basic	  needs	  of	  comfort	  and	  respect.	  In	  fact,	  the	  choice	  of	  
a	   victim	   to	   get	   involved	   in	   the	   entire	   process	   of	   testifying	   during	   a	   war	   crimes	   trial	   has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Lobwein	  is	  now	  based	  in	  Cambodia,	  where	  she	  is	  coordinating	  the	  Witnesses	  and	  Experts	  support	  unit	  for	  the	  
Khmer	  Rouge	  Tribunal.	  
20	  Cited	  in	  Julie	  Mertus,	  Women’s	  Participation	  in	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia	  (ICTY):	  
Transitional	  Justice	  for	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Hunt	  Alternatives	  Fund,	  2004),	  15.	  
21	  Cited	  in	  ibid.	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consequences	  that	  reach	  far	  beyond	  the	  act	  of	  appearing	  in	  the	  courtroom	  and	  either	  telling	  
a	   narrative	   that	   provides	   evidence	   to	   the	   accusations	   or	   identifying	   alleged	   perpetrators.	  
While	  many	  of	  the	  witnesses	  were	  also	  victims	  of	  war	  crimes,	  their	  statement	  during	  a	  trial	  
was	   only	   recorded	   and	   archived	   as	   a	   piece	   of	   information	   in	   the	   larger	   mosaic	   of	  
prosecuting	   and	   sentencing	   war	   criminals.	   They	   did	   not	   appear	   in	   their	   role	   as	   victims22,	  
having	  suffered	  emotional	  and	  physical	  distress	  and	  bound	  to	  relive	  the	  past	  trauma	  again	  in	  
the	   courtroom	  when	   they	  were	   asked	   to	   retell	   their	   version	   of	   the	   events.	   Instead,	   they	  
were	  merely	  witnesses.23	  	  The	  role	  of	  female	  witnesses	  is	  telling	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  
Female	   testimonies	  have	  generally	  played	  a	   less	   important	   role	   in	  hearing	  proceedings	   at	  
the	  ICTY.	  The	  percentage	  of	  women	  versus	  men	  who	  have	  given	  eyewitness	  testimony	  in	  a	  
trial	  at	  The	  Hague	  is	  only	  around	  21	  percent.24	  	  The	  cases	  in	  which	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  testify	  
primarily,	  unsurprisingly,	  were	  rape	  or	  sexual	  violence	  cases,	  such	  as	  the	  Foča	  case.	  During	  
the	  massacres	   in	   the	   Foča	   region	   of	   Bosnia	   and	  Herzegovina	   committed	   by	   Serb	  military,	  
police	   and	   paramilitary	   forces	   against	   non-­‐Serb	   civilians	   during	   1992	   and	   1994,	   many	  
women	  and	  girls	  were	  sexually	  abused.	  They	  were	  held	   in	  so	  called	  rape	  camps,	   including	  
the	   infamous	   Karaman’s	   house,	   in	   which	  minors	   as	   young	   as	   age	   15	   were	   detained	   and	  
raped	   repeatedly,	   including	   mass	   rapes.25	   These	   crimes	   were	   committed	   with	   the	   full	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  The	  notion	  of	  victim	  and	  victimhood,	  more	  generally,	  has	  drawn	  much	  scholarly	  attention,	  as	  alleged	  perpetrators	  
have	  also	  claimed	  this	  status	  when	  telling	  their	  version	  of	  the	  events.	  See	  for	  instance	  Stover,	  The	  Witnesses:	  War	  
Crimes	  and	  the	  Promise	  of	  Justice	  in	  The	  Hague.	  
23	  Hendrik	  Kaptein	  and	  Marijke	  Malsch,	  Crime,	  Victims	  and	  Justice:	  Essays	  on	  Principles	  and	  Practice	  (Ashgate	  
Publishing,	  Ltd.,	  2004),	  133.	  
24	  Mertus,	  Women’s	  Participation	  in	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia	  (ICTY):	  Transitional	  
Justice	  for	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  15.	  
25	  See	  also	  the	  ICTY	  ruling	  against	  Dragoljub	  Kunarac	  et	  al.	  at	  http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-­‐
aj020612e.pdf,	  accessed	  November	  3,	  2011.	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knowledge	  of	   local	  Serbian	  authorities,	  such	  as	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Foča	  police	  forces,	  Dragan	  
Gagović,	  who	  was	  also	   indicted	  by	   the	   ICTY,	  but	  died	  during	   the	  attempt	   to	  arrest	  him	   in	  
1999.26	   	   Although	   the	   ICTY	   investigated	   and	  eventually	   established	   a	   legal	   precedent	  with	  
rape	  charges	   in	   international	  criminal	   law	  with	  the	  Foča	  case	   in	  2001,	   in	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  
these	   investigations,	   the	   prosecution	   focused	   on	   other	   mass	   atrocities,	   such	   as	   the	  
execution	  of	  civilians.27	  Furthermore,	  similar	  to	  the	  witness-­‐victim	  issue	  mentioned	  above,	  a	  
report	   of	   the	   Institute	   of	   War	   &	   Peace	   Reporting	   points	   to	   the	   limited	   moral	   support	  
provided	  by	   the	   judiciary	  and	   few	  convictions	  despite	  wide-­‐spread	  practices	  of	   rape	  as	  an	  
ethnic	  cleansing	   tool	  during	   the	  war.28	  With	   its	  eyes	   focused	  on	   the	  advancement	  of	   legal	  
norms	   of	   international	   criminal	   law,	   the	   work	   of	   the	   ICTY	   did	   not	   leave	   much	   room	   for	  
individualized	   support	   of	   witnesses	   (despite	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   victim	   support	   unit	   at	   the	  
ICTY)	   and	   the	   tribunal	   therefore	   relied	   for	   the	  most	   part	   on	   the	   cooperation	   of	   NGOs	   to	  
provide	   adequate	   assistance	   and	   support.29	   This	   legalistic	   approach	   and	   the	   ambition	   to	  
implement	  the	  rule	  of	  law—which	  many	  times	  leaves	  the	  needs	  and	  demands	  of	  individual	  
victims	  to	  the	  side—have	  created	  a	  strong	  relationship	  between	  NGO	  representatives	  and	  
the	  victim	  community.	  	  The	  following	  example	  of	  a	  court	  contempt	  case	  of	  several	  Croatian	  
journalists	  in	  this	  context	  highlights	  the	  critical	  response	  of	  activists	  to	  the	  formalist	  strategy	  
of	  the	  ICTY.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  “Foca	  Confronts	  Its	  Past”,	  October	  14,	  2004,	  http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/10/14/foca-­‐
confronts-­‐its-­‐past.	  
27	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  women	  at	  the	  ICTY	  trials,	  see	  Sara	  Sharratt,	  Gender,	  Shame	  and	  Sexual	  
Violence:	  The	  Voices	  of	  Witnesses	  and	  Court	  Members	  at	  War	  Crimes	  Tribunals	  (Surrey,	  PT:	  Ashgate	  Publishing,	  2011).	  
28	  Institute	  for	  War	  and	  Peace	  Reporting,	  International	  Justice	  Failing	  Rape	  Victims,	  Special	  Report,	  International	  
Justice	  -­‐	  ICTY	  (Washington,	  DC,	  February	  15,	  2010),	  http://iwpr.net/report-­‐news/international-­‐justice-­‐failing-­‐rape-­‐
victims.	  
29	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  Annual	  Report	  (The	  Hague,	  Netherlands,	  1994),	  24–26.	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In	   2005,	   the	   ICTY	   indicted	   several	   Croatian	   journalists	   for	   contempt	  of	   court,	   as	   they	  had	  
allegedly	  revealed	  the	  identity	  and	  parts	  of	  the	  statements	  of	  two	  protected	  witnesses	  who	  
testified	   in	   the	  Blaskić30	   case.31	  One	  of	   the	   indicted	   journalists	  was	   Josip	   Jović,	   the	   former	  
editor-­‐in-­‐chief	  of	  Slobodna	  Dalmacija	  a	  Croatian	  daily	  newspaper.	  He	  continued	  to	  publish	  
extracts	   of	   the	   transcript	   of	   the	   testimony	   of	   the	   protected	   witness,	   the	   then-­‐Croatian	  
president	   Stjepan	   Mesić,	   even	   after	   the	   tribunal	   had	   ordered	   him	   to	   stop	   any	   future	  
publication	  of	   the	  confidential	  material,	  and	  sentenced	  him	  to	  pay	  a	   fine	  of	  20,000	  Euros.	  	  
Interestingly,	  while	  the	  ICTY	  affirmed	  in	  its	  sentence	  that	  the	  deliberate	  violation	  of	  a	  court	  
order	  would	  undermine	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  ICTY	  to	  protect	  its	  witnesses,	  one	  of	  the	  judges	  
expressed	   concerns	   about	   the	   inappropriate	   use	   of	   court	   resources.	   As	   a	   result,	   in	   the	  
course	  of	  the	  trial	  the	  prosecution	  requested	  to	  withdraw	  the	  indictments	  against	  three	  of	  
the	  five	   initially	   indicted	   journalists,	  stating	  that	   it	  would	  be	   in	  the	   interests	  of	   justice	  and	  
judicial	   economy.	   The	   tribunal	   then	   accepted	   the	   motion.32	   	   A	   similar	   contempt	   case	  
involved	   for	   instance	   a	   former	   ICTY	   spokesperson,	   Florence	   Hartmann33,	   who	   published	  
confidential	   information	   from	   her	   time	   at	   the	   tribunal	   in	   her	   book	   on	   the	   politics	   of	   the	  
ICTY.34	  In	  other	  cases,	  however,	  such	  as	  the	  judgment	  of	  Jelena	  Rašić,	  former	  case	  manager	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  In	  this	  case	  the	  ICTY	  sentenced	  Tihomir	  Blaškić,	  a	  Bosnian	  Croat	  army	  officer,	  to	  45	  years	  in	  prison	  in	  2000.	  The	  ICTY	  
found	  him	  responsible	  for	  war	  crimes	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Lašva	  valley	  ethnic	  cleansing.	  His	  sentence	  was	  commuted	  to	  9	  
years	  after	  the	  appeal	  in	  2004,	  as	  his	  command	  responsibility	  for	  most	  of	  the	  charges	  was	  found	  non-­‐existent.	  
31	  See	  for	  instance	  Ivica	  Marijačić	  and	  Markica	  Rebić,	  contempt	  case	  at	  http://www.icty.org/sid/8809,	  accessed	  May	  
5,	  2011.	  
32	  For	  the	  summary	  of	  the	  sentence	  see	  the	  ICTY	  website	  at	  
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/contempt_jovic/tjug/en/060830_summary_en.pdf,	  accessed	  December	  8,	  2011.	  	  
33	  She	  was	  the	  official	  spokesperson	  to	  Carla	  Del	  Ponte,	  chief	  prosecutor	  of	  the	  ICTY,	  from	  October	  2000	  until	  October	  
2006.	  
34	  Florence	  Hartmann,	  Paix	  Et	  Châtiment:	  Les	  Guerres	  Secretes	  De	  La	  Politique	  Et	  De	  La	  Justice	  Internationale	  (Paris:	  
Flammarion,	  2007).	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of	  the	  defense	  team	  of	  Milan	  Lukić35,	  the	  contempt	  of	  court	  cases	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  to	  the	  
core	  function	  of	  the	  tribunal	  to	  carry	  out	  its	  mission.	  In	  this	  case,	  Rašić	  pled	  guilty	  to	  having	  
bribed	  witnesses	  to	  give	  false	  testimonies	  during	  the	  Lukić	  trial.36	  	  	  
In	   the	   first	   two	   cases,	   the	   ICTY	   judgment—despite	   its	   legal	   dimension	   of	   violating	   court	  
orders—had,	   more	   importantly,	   a	   political	   dimension.	   The	   protected	   witnesses	   in	   the	  
Croatian	  case	  were	  not	  victim-­‐witnesses,	  but	  public	  figures.	  Human	  rights	  activists	  in	  Croatia	  
reacted	   immediately	  to	  this	  situation,	  stating	  that	  “[i]t	  compromises	  the	  whole	  concept	  of	  
witness	  protection,”	  which	  in	  their	  eyes	  was	  a	  measure	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  vulnerable	  victim	  
witnesses	   would	   not	   be	   harassed,	   threatened	   or	   harmed	   upon	   their	   return	   home	   by	  
malevolent	   neighbors	   or	   other	   individuals.	   Activists	   were	   thus	   defending	   the	   journalists’	  
freedom	  of	  expression.37	  While	  high-­‐profile	  witnesses	  deserve	  the	  right	  to	  be	  protected,	  it	  is	  
easy	  to	  imagine	  that	  a	  head	  of	  state	  benefits	  already	  from	  high-­‐security	  measures	  even	  after	  
he	  or	  she	  leaves	  office.	  Witness	  protection	  measures	  for	  ordinary	  citizens,	  however,	  are	  still	  
at	  a	  deplorable	  stage	  across	  the	  Balkans.38	  	  
Given	   the	   lack	  of	   a	   state-­‐sponsored	   support	   system,	   it	   is	   little	   surprising	   then,	   that	  NGOs	  
have	  stepped	  in	  offering	  witnesses	  helpful	  assistance	  during	  legal	  proceedings,	  ranging	  from	  
arranging	  travel	  to	  the	  war	  crimes	  court	  to	  providing	  psychological	  support.	  The	  emotional	  
support	   is	   important,	   as	   many	   of	   the	   witnesses	   have	   never	   traveled	   outside	   their	   own	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  He	  was	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Serbian	  paramilitary	  group	  White	  Eagles	  and	  sentenced	  to	  life	  in	  prison.	  He	  was	  in	  particular	  
responsible	  for	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  during	  the	  Bosnian	  war	  notably	  in	  the	  municipality	  of	  Višegrad	  between	  
1992-­‐1995.	  
36	  See	  ICTY	  website	  at	  http://www.icty.org/sid/10907,	  accessed	  February	  6,	  2012.	  
37	  Cruvellier	  and	  Valiñas,	  Croatia:	  Selected	  Developments	  in	  Transitional	  Justice,	  12.	  
38	  Gardetto,	  The	  Protection	  of	  Witnesses	  as	  a	  Cornerstone	  for	  Justice	  and	  Reconciliation	  in	  the	  Balkans.	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country	   and	   are	   generally	   unfamiliar	   with	   the	   court	   procedures.39	   Additionally,	   the	  
testimony,	   far	   from	   being	   a	   cathartic	   moment,	   is	   often	   only	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  
reemergence	  of	  post-­‐trauma,	  as	  witnesses	  relive	  their	  past	  in	  hearings	  while	  exposed	  to	  the	  
sometimes	   technical	   and	   discomforting	   questions	   from	   the	   prosecution	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
defense.	   In	   the	   following	   I	   will	   draw	   on	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Humanitarian	   Law	   Center,	   a	  
Belgrade-­‐based	  human	  rights	  organization	  that	  has	  helped	  victims	  since	  1992.	  The	  center’s	  
executive	   director,	   Nataša	   Kandić,	   is	   a	   long-­‐time	   Serbian	   human	   rights	   activist	   who	   was	  
already	  seriously	   involved	   in	  fighting	  human	  rights	  abuses	  under	  Tito’s	  regime	  long	  before	  
she	   was	   recognized	   internationally	   for	   her	   instrumental	   work	   during	   in	   the	   anti-­‐war	  
movement,	   including	   the	   Candles	   for	   Peace	   Campaign	   in	   1991	   and	   the	   Ribbon	  March	   in	  
1992.	  Ever	  since,	  she	  has	  pursued	  a	  provocative	  working	  style,	  not	  missing	  an	  opportunity	  to	  
reveal	   elusive	   war	   crimes	   cases,	   which	   has	   irritated	   many	   fellow	   Serbian	   citizens,	   in	  
particular	   military	   leaders.40	   When	   she	   founded	   the	   Humanitarian	   Law	   Center,	   George	  
Soros’s	  foundation,	  the	  Open	  Society	  Institute,	  provided	  the	  necessary	  financial	  support	  to	  
get	   the	  center	  off	   the	  ground.41	  Since	  then,	   the	  center	  has	  managed	  to	  build	  an	  extensive	  
donor	   list,	   including	   governmental	   development	   agencies,	   embassies,	   several	   foundations	  
and	  international	  organizations,	  such	  as	  the	  UN	  and	  EU.42	   	  All	  these	  funds	  are	  necessary	  to	  
implement	   her	   agenda	   of	   documenting	   past	   and	   present	   human	   rights	   and	   humanitarian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Since	  the	  war	  crimes	  occurred	  across	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  as	  of	  today,	  several	  new	  states	  have	  emerged.	  Yet,	  
war	  crimes	  trial	  often	  require	  witnesses	  from	  bordering	  countries	  thus	  requiring	  the	  proper	  travel	  documents	  and	  
enough	  courage	  to	  leave	  to	  go	  to	  a	  former	  enemy	  country.	  
40	  See	  interview	  with	  Nataša	  Kandić	  on	  19	  May	  2011.	  Rachel	  Tiplady,	  “Natasa	  Kandic,”	  Bloomberg	  Businessweek.com,	  
May	  30,	  2005,	  sec.	  2005	  Stars	  of	  Europe	  -­‐	  Agenda	  Setters,	  
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_22/b3935405.htm.	  
41	  Open	  Society	  Institute,	  Building	  Open	  Society	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  1991-­‐2011	  (New	  York,	  2011),	  13.	  
42	  For	  more	  details	  on	  the	  donors	  go	  to	  the	  center’s	  website	  at	  http://www.hlc-­‐rdc.org/?page_id=14397,	  accessed	  
February	  1,	  2012.	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law	   violations	   across	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia.	   	   As	   mentioned	   above,	   victim-­‐witnesses	  
particularly	  benefitted	  from	  her	  support.	  
The	   repeated	   involvement	   in	   witness	   protection	   activities	   led	   the	   Humanitarian	   Law	  
Center’s	   team	   to	  write	   a	   report	   outlining	   a	   counseling	   and	   legal	   representation	   guide.	   	   It	  
includes	   detailed	   case	   studies	   of	   several	   Serbian	   war	   crimes	   trials	   and	   stresses	   the	  
importance	  of	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center’s	  tireless	  commitment:	  
The	  victim	  participation	  was	  critically	   important	  to	  determine	  accountability	  of	  the	  
accused	   and	   acknowledge	   crimes	   committed	   against	   the	   victims.	   Legal	  
representation	  proved	  to	  be	  very	  important	  also	  because	  of	  attempts	  of	  prosecutors	  
and	   the	   defense	   of	   the	   accused	   to	   hide	   or	   misinterpret	   facts	   regarding	   Serbian	  
institution’s	  role	   (police	  and	  the	  military)	   in	  armed	  conflicts	  on	  the	  territory	  of	   the	  
former	  Yugoslavia.43	  
The	   report	   further	   underlines	   the	   importance	   of	   not	   only	   encouraging	   victims,	   but	   also	  
securing	  and	  identifying	  them.	  More	  precisely,	  in	  the	  Suva	  Reka	  Case44	  for	  which	  the	  Serbian	  
Office	   of	   the	   War	   Crimes	   Prosecutor	   initiated	   investigation	   in	   2005,	   Nataša	   Kandić	   was	  
unable	  to	  get	  the	  consent	  of	  victim	  witnesses	  to	  testify	  at	  the	  court	   in	  Belgrade.	  A	  former	  
ICTY	  witness,	  who	  was	  part	  of	  the	  Suva	  Reka	  community	  refused	  to	  testify	  before	  a	  Serbian	  
court	  and	  had	  enough	  influence	  to	  impose	  his	  views	  to	  other	  potential	  victim	  witnesses.45	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center,	  Victim/Witness	  Counselling	  and	  Legal	  Representation:	  A	  Model	  of	  Support	  -­‐	  Project	  
Implementation	  Report	  (Belgrade,	  February	  27,	  2007),	  1.	  
44	  This	  case	  refers	  to	  the	  Suva	  massacres	  when	  Albanian	  civilians	  were	  killed	  by	  Serbian	  police	  forces	  on	  26	  March	  
1999	  in	  Suva	  Reka,	  Kosovo.	  
45	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center,	  Victim/Witness	  Counselling	  and	  Legal	  Representation:	  A	  Model	  of	  Support	  -­‐	  Project	  
Implementation	  Report,	  10.	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Moreover,	  in	  the	  several	  other	  cases	  before	  the	  Serbian	  War	  Crimes	  Chamber	  related	  to	  war	  
crimes	   committed	   in	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina,	   the	   Humanitarian	   Law	   Center	   was	   able	   to	  
convince	  several	  victims,	  former	  prisoners,	  to	  travel	  from	  BiH	  to	  Belgrade	  in	  order	  to	  testify	  
at	  a	  hearing.	  Yet,	  two	  members	  of	  the	  group	  refused	  to	  embark	  on	  the	  journey,	  stating	  they	  
did	   not	   trust	   Serbian	   institutions.	   Upon	   arrival,	   the	   group	   was	   afraid	   to	   be	   under	   the	  
protection	  of	  the	  Serbian	  interior	  ministry	  and	  the	  witness	  protection	  unit.	  All	  of	  them	  were	  
anxious	  to	  be	  escorted	  by	  Serbian	  police,	  requesting	  the	  director	  of	  the	  Humanitarian	  Law	  
Center	  to	  accompany	  them.46	  While	  the	  above	  examples	  pertinently	  illustrate	  the	  problems	  
related	  to	  witnesses	  in	  war	  crimes	  trials	  and	  the	  tasks	  and	  challenges	  NGOs	  are	  confronted	  
with	  when	  striving	  to	  support	  victims,	  activists	  have	  also	  engaged	  in	  victim	  support	  outside	  
the	  courtroom,	  which	  I	  will	  discuss	  below.	  
NGOs	  across	  the	  regions	  have	  established	  programs	  and	  projects	   in	  order	  to	  raise	  victims’	  
voices	   to	   respond	   to	   practical	   needs	   in	   each	   of	   the	   post-­‐conflict	   contexts,	   including	   for	  
instance	   Croatia,	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina	   and	   Serbia.	   However,	   the	   scope	   and	   nature	   of	  
their	  work	  varies,	  as	  the	  conditions	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  each	  of	  the	  countries’	  societies	  faces	  
different	   challenges.47	   To	  emphasize	   some	  of	   the	  programmatic	  differences	   I	   draw	  on	   the	  
Croatian	  case	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  organization,	  Documenta,	  which	  was	  created	  in	  the	  mid-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Ibid.,	  3–4.	  The	  report	  also	  goes	  into	  issues	  of	  legal	  representation	  and	  war	  crimes	  trials	  monitoring.	  	  	  
47	  Croatia	  became	  an	  ethnically	  homogenous	  country	  after	  Operation	  Storm,	  a	  military	  operation	  in	  1995,	  chasing	  the	  
remaining	  Croatian	  Serb	  population	  off	  Croatia’s	  current	  territory.	  Bosnia,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  has	  still	  all	  three	  main	  
ethnic	  groups	  on	  its	  territory,	  including	  Bosnian	  Muslims,	  Bosnian	  Croats	  and	  Bosnian	  Serbs,	  causing	  political	  and	  
social	  tensions.	  Serbia	  has	  remained	  homogenous	  as	  well,	  with	  the	  exception	  to	  its	  former	  Kosovo	  province,	  in	  which	  
tensions	  rose	  between	  Kosovo	  Serbs	  and	  the	  Albanian	  population.	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1990s.48	   In	   comparison	   to	   the	   Humanitarian	   Law	   Center	   above,	   this	   organization’s	  
activities—despite	  its	  involvement	  in	  judicial	  processes,	  such	  as	  trial	  monitoring—focuses	  in	  
particular	  on	  a	  project	  called	  ‘Oral	  History,’49	  which	  consists	  of	  documenting	  (often	  untold)	  
memories	  of	  the	  war.	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  project,	  as	  put	  by	  the	  activists,	  is	  	  
to	  hear	  and	  to	  save	  from	  oblivion	  the	  memories	  and	  experiences	  and	  put	  them	  back	  
in	   the	   form	  of	   publications	   or	   videos	   in	   order	   to	   affirm	   their	   view	  of	   the	  war	   and	  
documented	  the	  multifaceted	  nature	  of	  events.50	  	  
In	  order	  to	  document	  and	  collect	  these	  personal	  accounts,	  a	  team	  of	  trained	  human	  rights	  
activists	  travel	  through	  the	  different	  rural	  and	  urban	  regions	  of	  Croatia,	  seeking	  individuals	  
and	  groups	   to	   record	   their	  experience	  and	  memories	  of	   the	  war.	   It	   suffices	   to	   say	   that	   in	  
certain	   cases,	   victims	   and	   survivors	   relive	   their	   trauma,	   requiring	   team	  members	   to	   also	  
function	  as	  psychologist.	   	   This	   constitutes	  a	  difficult	  balancing	  act,	   combining	   the	  need	   to	  
work	   for	   a	   greater	   goal,	   that	   of	   transmitting	   different	   stories	   of	   past	   mass	   atrocities	   to	  
society	   at	   large,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   providing	   suffering	   individuals	   psychological	  
support.	   	  More	   recently,	   the	  NGO	   has	   uploaded	   an	   entire	   series	   of	   narratives	   in	   form	   of	  
video	   clips	   onto	   its	   website,	   including	   a	   selection	   of	   divers	   stories.	   Some	   narratives	   or	  
testimonies	   of	   the	   past,	   however,	   can	   be	   shocking,	   traumatizing	   and	   accusatory.	   In	   post-­‐
conflict	   Croatia,	  where	   a	   culture	   of	   denial	   and	   oblivion	   of	   past	  war	   crimes	   has	   until	   now	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Other	  organizations,	  such	  as	  the	  Research	  and	  Documentation	  Center	  in	  Sarajevo,	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  could	  
also	  have	  served	  as	  an	  empirical	  example.	  
49	  The	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center	  also	  has	  documentation	  programs,	  but	  its	  past	  work	  has	  mainly	  focused	  on	  witness	  
support	  and	  legal	  representation.	  
50	  See	  Documenta	  website	  at	  http://www.documenta.hr,	  accessed	  on	  September	  12,	  2011.	  Translated	  by	  the	  author.	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dominated	  the	  political	  scene51,	  Documenta	  carefully	  chose	  a	  select	  number	  of	  testimonies	  
for	   their	   website.	   This	   auto-­‐censorship	   could	   be	   criticized;	   yet,	   it	   is	   a	   cautiously	   tailored	  
strategy	  that	  the	  activists	  at	  the	  Zagreb-­‐based	  NGO	  pursued	  to	  avoid	  jeopardizing	  the	  slow	  
and	  elusive	  process	  of	  dealing	  the	  past.52	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  Croatian	  case,	  the	  collection	  of	  
testimonies	   and	   narratives	   of	   victims	   during	   the	   Bosnian	   war	   by	   the	   Research	   and	  
Documentation	  Center,	   a	   Bosnian	  NGO	  documenting	  human	  war	   losses,	   are	   entirely	   kept	  
locked	   away	   from	   the	   public	   in	   the	   center’s	   archives.	   Only	   researchers	   and	   government	  
officials	  are	  granted	  access.53	  It	  serves	  as	  an	  example	  of	  how	  the	  political	  situation	  in	  BiH	  is	  
still	  very	  unstable,	  making	  a	  public	  debate	  on	  memories	  of	  the	  past	  very	  difficult.54	  
Interestingly,	   the	   origins	   of	   Documenta’s	   victim-­‐oriented	   work	   go	   back	   to	   activism	   that	  
focused	  on	  conflict	   resolution	  practices	  during	   the	  Balkan	  war.	   In	   fact,	   carried	  by	  political	  
activism	  and	  pacifist	  movements	  of	  the	  1980s	   in	  the	  Western	  Balkans55,	  Katarina	  Kruhonja	  
(director	   of	   the	   Center	   for	   Peace,	   mentioned	   below)	   and	   Vesna	   Teršelić	   (Documenta’s	  
current	  director)	  launched	  a	  Croatian	  peace	  and	  non-­‐violence	  movement	  at	  the	  outbreak	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Until	  last	  fall,	  the	  conservative	  party	  HDZ,	  led	  by	  Jadranka	  Kosor,	  who	  has	  been	  directly	  implicated	  in	  the	  country’s	  
war	  of	  independence,	  promoted	  the	  Homeland	  War	  discourse	  (see	  chapter	  3	  for	  more	  details).	  Since	  the	  last	  elections	  
in	  December	  2011,	  however,	  a	  left-­‐wing-­‐led	  coalition	  has	  taken	  over	  the	  reins	  of	  the	  government,	  which	  has	  already	  
engaged	  in	  a	  more	  constructive	  dialogue	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  past.	  
52	  See	  informal	  discussions	  with	  Vesna	  Teršelić,	  the	  director	  of	  the	  NGO	  in	  May	  2011.	  
53	  This	  is	  also	  true	  for	  most	  of	  the	  archived	  testimonies	  of	  victims	  and	  survivors	  collected	  by	  the	  Humanitarian	  Law	  
Center.	  
54	  See	  interview	  with	  Research	  and	  Documentation	  Center	  director,	  Mirsad	  Tokača	  on	  17	  May	  2011	  in	  Sarajevo.	  	  
55	  Mladina	  (a	  political	  radical	  magazine),	  Pankriti	  (a	  punk	  band)	  and	  NSK	  (Neue	  Slovenische	  Kunst	  or	  New	  Slovenian	  
Art)	  are	  some	  of	  the	  examples	  that	  constituted	  driving	  vectors	  of	  a	  new	  social	  movement	  in	  the	  Slovenian	  Republic	  of	  
Yugoslavia.	  	  In	  the	  Ljubljana	  trial,	  or	  the	  ‘proces	  proti	  četverici’	  (the	  Trial	  against	  the	  Four),	  for	  instance,	  four	  men	  
(some	  of	  which	  were	  employed	  by	  the	  provocative	  magazine	  Mladina)	  were	  arrested	  in	  1984	  for	  publicizing	  sensitive	  
military	  documents	  found	  at	  the	  Mladina	  offices.	  While	  this	  incident	  boosted	  the	  publication’s	  reputation	  in	  Slovenia	  
and	  across	  Yugoslavia,	  it	  paradoxically	  underlines	  the	  growing	  pacifist	  support	  to	  counter	  rising	  national	  tendencies	  
during	  this	  period	  and	  increasing	  Slovenian	  aspirations	  for	  independence	  from	  the	  federation.	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the	   war	   in	   1991.56	   The	   latter,	   of	   Slovenian	   descent,	   was	   instrumental	   in	   setting	   up	   the	  
Antiwar	  Campaign	  of	  Croatia	  (AWCC)57	   in	  1991,	  which	  today,	  consists	  of	  a	  network	  of	  over	  
two	   dozen	   member	   organizations.	   AWCC	   engages,	   among	   other	   things,	   in	   educational	  
activities	   for	   nonviolent	   conflict	   transformation,	   human	   rights	   protection,	   social	  
reconstruction	  and	  reconciliation,	  support	  for	  refugees	  and	  displaced	  persons.	  In	  particular,	  
it	  aims	  at	  acting	  as	  a	  spokesperson	  and	  missing	  link	  between	  refugees	  and	  governments	  and	  
to	  provide	  practical	   conflict	   resolution	   training.58	   Yet,	  as	  a	  Croatian	  history	  professor	   from	  
the	  University	  of	  Rijeka,	  Vjeran	  Pavlaković,	  underlined,	  all	  of	  these	  peace-­‐building	  activities	  
were	  the	  collective	  work	  of	  a	  young	  and	  dynamic	  network	  of	  activists	  who	  lend	  their	  help	  
and	  support	  to	  this	  cause.59	  	  The	  second	  woman,	  Kruhonja,	  a	  physician	  specialized	  in	  nuclear	  
medicine	  from	  the	  East	  Slavonia	  region	  in	  Croatia,	  eventually	  created	  the	  Centre	  for	  Peace,	  
Non-­‐Violence	  and	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Osijek	  in	  1992.	  According	  to	  her	  vision,	  she	  believes	  that	  	  
We,	   as	   citizens	   or	   members	   of	   people's	   organizations,	   can	   preserve	   and	  
nourish	  basic	  principles	  needed	  for	  long-­‐term	  efforts	  aimed	  at	  transforming	  
a	  totalitarian	  and	  war-­‐torn	  society	  into	  a	  democratic	  one.60	  
While	   her	   words	   emphasize	   the	   political	   engagement	   and	   grassroots	   efforts	   in	   order	   to	  
bring	  about	  changes	   in	  society	  from	  within,	  certain	  authors	  have	  been	  more	  critical	  about	  
conflict	   resolution	   and	   non-­‐violence	   activism,	   arguing	   that	   the	   restrained	   political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Other	  peace	  movements,	  in	  the	  Eastern	  parts	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  include	  the	  famous	  Candles	  for	  Peace	  Campaign	  in	  
1991	  in	  Belgrade	  (Serbia),	  led	  by	  Serbian	  human	  rights	  activist	  Nataša	  Kandić.	  	  
57	  Also	  referred	  to	  as	  ARK	  in	  Croatian,	  which	  stands	  for	  Anti	  Ratna	  Kampanja.	  
58	  Goran	  Božičević,	  “Antiratni	  čin	  Prkosa,”	  H-­‐Alter,	  July	  5,	  2010,	  http://www.h-­‐alter.org/vijesti/ljudska-­‐prava/antiratni-­‐
cin-­‐prkosa.	  
59	  See	  interview	  with	  Vjeran	  Pavlaković,	  historian	  (University	  of	  Rijeka),	  and	  member	  of	  the	  RECOM	  for	  overview	  of	  
human	  rights	  activism	  in	  Croatia.	  6	  September	  2010.	  	  
60	  The	  Right	  Livelihood	  Award,	  http://www.rightlivelihood.org/kruhonja.html,	  accessed	  September	  14,	  2010.	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interpretation	  of	  such	  activism	  would	  result	  in	  a	  lack	  of	  engagement	  with	  the	  political	  party	  
sphere.61	  	  
The	  current	   interactions	  of	   this	  generation	  of	  activists	  on	   the	   local,	  national,	   regional	  and	  
international	   level	   with	   lawmakers,	   practitioners,	   scholars	   and	   other	   activists	   (which	   I	  
expand	   upon	   by	   further	   drawing	   on	   their	   transnational	   fact-­‐finding	   initiative	   in	   the	   next	  
chapter)	   illustrates	   that	   these	  concerns	  were	  unfounded.	  Notwithstanding,	   the	  early	  main	  
goal	  of	  the	  AWCC,	  to	  stop	  the	  war,	  could	  not	  be	  maintained	  in	  the	  long	  run,	  as	  the	  members	  
of	   the	   coalition	   pursued	   diverging	   sociopolitical	   goals.62	   While	   Kruhonja’s	   center	   was	  
originally	  part	  of	  the	  AWCC,	  it	  eventually	  became	  an	  independent	  body.	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  
for	  this	   is	  the	   large	  number	  of	  activities	   in	  the	  city	  of	  Osijek,	  as	  well	  as	  across	  the	  country	  
and	   the	   region,	   which	   requires	   a	   local	   anchor	   to	   work	   effectively.	   While	   still	   remaining	  
associated	  with	   the	  AWCC,	  many	  other	  members	   of	   the	   coalition	   also	   pursued	   their	   own	  
sociopolitical	  goals,	  leaving	  behind	  a	  loosely	  structured	  network.63	  The	  Human	  Rights	  House	  
in	  Zagreb,	  Croatia,	  established	  in	  200864	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  the	  diverging	  interests	  of	  each	  
of	   the	   original	   AWCC	   members.	   While	   several	   non-­‐governmental	   human	   rights	  
organizations,	  most	  of	  which	  were	  part	  of	   the	  AWCC	  founders,	  share	  a	  common	  space—a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Bogdan	  Denitch,	  “Seeds	  of	  Change	  in	  the	  Former	  Yugoslav	  States,”	  War	  Report	  27	  (1994):	  6–7.	  
62	  Srdjan	  Dvornik,	  Croatia:	  The	  Politics	  of	  the	  Yugoslav	  Breakup:	  War	  and	  Reconstruction	  in	  Yugoslavia	  (Institute	  for	  
War	  &	  Peace	  Reporting,	  1992).	  
63	  In	  2006,	  AWCC’s	  15th	  anniversary,	  its	  members,	  led	  by	  one	  of	  its	  founders,	  Vesna	  Teršelić,	  gathered	  in	  order	  to	  
revive	  the	  organization’s	  political	  momentum	  and	  discuss	  the	  fate	  of	  its	  archives,	  in	  order	  to	  create	  an	  institutional	  
memory	  and	  establish	  a	  legacy	  about	  the	  movement	  for	  future	  generations	  Marina	  Kelava,	  “Antiratna	  Kampanja	  
Hrvatske:	  15	  Godina	  Poslje,”	  H-­‐Alter,	  April	  24,	  2006,	  http://www.h-­‐alter.org/vijesti/hrvatska/antiratna-­‐kampanja-­‐
hrvatske-­‐15-­‐godina-­‐poslije.	  
64	  Already	  in	  2001,	  several	  human	  rights	  organizations	  expressed	  their	  interest	  in	  collaborating	  and	  signed	  an	  open	  
letter	  to	  create	  a	  human	  rights	  house	  in	  Zagreb.	  This	  project	  is	  in	  large	  part	  supported	  by	  funding	  from	  the	  Norwegian	  
Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs.	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building	   located	  east	  of	  the	  Croatian	  capital’s	  center—the	   implemented	  programs	  by	  each	  
NGO	   do	   not	   (or	   barely)	   overlap,	   ranging	   from	   Documenta’s	   past	   war	   crimes	   issues	   to	  
B.a.b.e.’s65	  focus	  on	  present	  gender	  and	  equality	  problems	  in	  Croatia.66	  	  	  
In	  the	  above	  section,	  I	  provided	  several	  illustrations	  of	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  victims	  face	  within	  
society	   when	   grappling	   with	   past	   mass	   atrocities.	   Starting	   with	   witness	   support	   and	  
protection	  problems	  not	  only	  in	  places	  such	  as	  The	  Hague,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  national	  level,	  I	  
segued	   into	   related	  activities	   that	  NGOs	  are	  performing	   to	  help	   create	  a	  voice	   for	   victims	  
across	  the	  region.	  Subsequently,	  I	  shift	  from	  the	  more	  empirical	  and	  descriptive	  analysis	  to	  a	  
conceptual	   framework	   of	   the	   changing	   notion	   of	   human	   rights	   among	   activists.	   In	   fact,	   I	  
conceptualize	   the	   NGOs’	   awareness	   of	   shortcomings	   and	   their	   reinterpretation	   of	   the	  
meaning	  of	  human	  rights	  to	  bring	  the	  victim’s	  voices	  into	  the	  center	  of	  attention.	  	  I	  do	  this	  
also	   in	  view	  of	   the	  next	   chapter,	  when	   I	  discuss	   the	   fact-­‐finding	   initiative	   spearheaded	  by	  
these	   NGOs,	   its	   challenges	   and	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   activists	   understanding	   of	   human	  
rights	  in	  their	  particular	  context.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  B.a.b.e.	  stands	  for	  “Be	  active,	  be	  emancipated.”	  
66	  See	  formal	  and	  informal	  interviews	  with	  some	  of	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  member	  organizations	  conducted	  between	  
August	  2010	  and	  January	  2011.	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Conceptualizing	  the	  Democratization	  of	  International	  
Humanitarian	  Law	  and	  Human	  Rights	  
In	  the	  past,	  some	  literature	  has	  already	  grappled	  with	  normative	  issues	  on	  the	  international	  
level	  and	  examined	  how	  globally	  institutionalized	  norms	  are	  applied	  on	  a	  national	  and	  even	  
local	  level.	  Certain	  authors	  argue,	  for	  instance,	  that	  
human	   rights	   norms	   are	   well	   institutionalized	   in	   international	   regimes	   and	  
organizations,	   and	   finally	   they	   are	   contested	   and	   compete	   with	   other	   principled	  
ideas.67	  
Focusing	   on	   transnational	   advocacy	   networks,	   they	   then	   delineate	   the	   process	   of	  
implementing—or	   rather	   socially	   reconstructing—international	   law	   on	   a	   domestic	   level.68	  
These	  scholars	  thus	  explore	  the	  conditions	  of	  how	  transnational	  actors	  are	  able	  to	  change	  
domestic	  settings	  to	  build	  an	  argument	  about	  transnational	  network’s	  norm	  diffusion.	  Some	  
parts	   of	   their	   conceptual	   framework	   are	   indeed	   relevant	   to	   the	   case	   of	   the	   former	  
Yugoslavia—such	   as	   the	   general	   spillover	   effect	   of	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   in	  
domestic	  courts.	  Yet,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  my	  selected	  geographic	  area,	  
region-­‐specific	  characteristics	  apply.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  striking	  distinction	  to	  be	  made	  here:	  
domestic	   NGOs	   working	   on	   war	   crimes	   issues	   in	   the	   Balkans,	   despite	   their	   openness	  
towards	  international	  actors	  and	  institutions,	  are	  rooted	  in	  particular	  sociopolitical	  contexts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Thomas	  Risse,	  Steve	  Ropp,	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  The	  Power	  of	  Human	  Rights:	  International	  Norms	  and	  Domestic	  
Change	  (Cambridge,	  United	  Kingdom:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  4.	  
68	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  “Construction	  of	  Legal	  Rules,”	  in	  Global	  Prescriptions:	  The	  Production,	  Exportation,	  and	  Importation	  
of	  a	  New	  Legal	  Orthodoxy,	  ed.	  Yves	  Dezalay	  and	  Bryant	  G.	  Garth	  (Ann	  Arbor,	  MI:	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press,	  2002),	  
38.	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that	   show	   less	   of	   a	   international-­‐national	   linkage	   than	   previously	   expected	   by	   scholars.69	  
While	   past	   research	   focused	   on	   large	   categorizations,	  more	   recent	   research	   has	   explored	  
increasingly	   and	   extensively	   the	   sociology	   of	   individuals,	   groups	   and	   processes—including	  
courts	   and	   judges,	   among	   others.	   Yves	   Dezalay	   and	   Bryant	   Garth,	   for	   instance,	   integrate	  
Bourdieusian	   concepts—such	   as	   social	   capital	   and	   habitus—in	   order	   to	   show	   that	   “social	  
capital	   and	   political	   capital	   can	   be	   turned	   into	   legitimate	   legal	   capital.”70	   Drawing	   on	  
Bourdieu’s	  work	  they	  show	  that	  the	  higher	  education	  system	  is	  a	  space	  in	  which	  social	  and	  
political	   capital	   is	   rearranged,	   and	   that	   law	   schools	  have	   therefore	  become	  central	   to	   the	  
legitimacy	   of	   the	   law.71	   According	   to	   these	   concepts,	   the	   transformation	   of	   ideas	   is	   thus	  
contingent	  on	  education,	  time	  and	  space.	  
At	  this	  point,	  it	  suffices	  to	  say	  that	  academic	  work	  on	  concepts	  traveling	  through	  time	  and	  
space	   is	   not	   a	   new	   idea.	   Edward	   Said	   has	   extensively	   written	   on	   the	   topic,	   providing	   a	  
detailed	   archeology	   of	   traveling	   theory,	   discussing	   particularly	   the	   scholarship	   of	   Georg	  
Lukács,	  a	  20th-­‐century	  Hungarian	  Marxist	  philosopher,	  whose	  ideas	  reverberated	  during	  the	  
heydays	   of	   French	   postconstructuralism	   in	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s.	   In	   the	   following	   I	   will	  
outline	  some	  of	  Said’s	  conceptual	  underpinnings	  to	  help	  us	  understand	  the	   importance	  of	  
changing	   and	   adapting	   existing	   ideas	   into	   a	   new	   temporal	   and	   spatial	   context,	   which	   I	  
consequently	  apply	  to	  my	  case	  study.	  One	  immediate	  and	  important	  question	  in	  this	  regard	  
is:	  what	  exactly	  is	  theory?	  “Theory	  for	  [Lukács]	  was	  what	  consciousness	  produced,	  not	  as	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  The	  Power	  of	  Human	  Rights:	  International	  Norms	  and	  Domestic	  Change.	  
70	  Yves	  Dezalay	  and	  Bryant	  G.	  Garth,	  Global	  Prescriptions:	  The	  Production,	  Exportation,	  and	  Importation	  of	  a	  New	  
Legal	  Orthodoxy	  (Ann	  Arbor,	  MI:	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press,	  2002),	  264.	  
71	  Ibid.	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avoidance	   of	   reality	   but	   as	   a	   revolutionary	  will	   completely	   committed	   to	  worldliness	   and	  
change,”	  Said	  wrote.72	  This	  is	  a	  relatively	  large	  meaning	  of	  theory,	  but	  it	  underlines	  Lukács’s	  
concern	   about	   applying	   theory	   to	   the	   real	   world.	   In	   fact,	   the	   ideas	   he	   referred	   to	   were	  
eventually	   implemented	  into	  policies,	  social	  practices	  or	  other	  tangible	  ways	  for	  society	  to	  
regulate	  the	  collective.	  His	  interpretation	  is	  therefore	  very	  useful	  for	  the	  transformation	  of	  
international	  human	  rights	  and	  criminal	  law	  into	  social	  practices	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  	  
Despite	  Said’s	  different	  stages,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  my	  current	  study	  I	  concentrate	  only	  on	  
the	  process	  itself,	  that	  is	  the	  moment	  when	  ideas	  get	  a	  new	  use	  and	  are	  employed	  in	  a	  new	  
place	  by	  different	  users.73	  This	  excludes	  origins,	  travel	  distance	  and	  conditions.	  Time	  and	  
space	  remain	  nonetheless	  crucial	  for	  understanding	  the	  phenomenon,	  as	  Said	  made	  clear:	  
I	   am	   arguing,	   however,	   that	   we	   distinguish	   theory	   from	   critical	   consciousness	   by	  
saying	   that	   the	   latter	   is	   a	   sort	   of	   spatial	   sense,	   a	   sort	   of	   measuring	   faculty	   for	  
locating	   or	   situating	   theory,	   and	   this	  means	   that	   theory	   has	   to	   be	   grasped	   in	   the	  
place	  and	  the	  time	  out	  of	  which	  it	  emerges	  as	  a	  part	  of	  that	  time,	  working	  in	  and	  for	  
it,	   then,	  consequently,	   that	   first	  place	  can	  be	  measured	  against	   subsequent	  places	  
where	  the	  theory	  turns	  up	  for	  use.74	  
For	   my	   analysis,	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   legal	   and	   conceptual	   underpinnings	   of	   international	  
human	  rights,	  and	  in	  particular	  international	  humanitarian	  law,	  are	  secondary	  and	  the	  brief	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  “Traveling	  Theory,”	  The	  World,	  the	  Text,	  and	  the	  Critic	  (1983):	  165.	  
73	  See	  Chapter	  5.	  
74	  Said,	  “Traveling	  Theory,”	  173–174.	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discussion	  of	  its	  evolution	  in	  chapter	  3	  is	  largely	  sufficient	  for	  my	  analytical	  purposes.75	  It	  is	  
the	   question	   of	  when,	   how	  and	  why	   the	   human	   rights	   legacy	   is	   applied	   by	   various	  NGOs	  
across	  the	  region	  that	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  me.	  For	  this,	  I	  will	  trace	  the	  historical	  and	  
sociopolitical	  development	  of	  the	  truth	  versus	  justice	  debate	  below	  using	  an	  empirical	  case	  
study.	   As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   however,	   my	   goal	   is	   not	   to	   expand	   the	   discussion	   on	   the	  
normative	   foundations	   of	   each	   of	   the	   concepts.	   Rather	   I	   aim	   at	   sketching	   a	   conceptual	  
crossroads	  when	  jurists,	  scholars	  and	  peace-­‐and-­‐conflict	  practitioners	  initiated	  a	  dialogue	  in	  
the	  early	  1990s	  that	  fueled	  important	  changes	  in	  policy	  strategies	  in	  the	  field	  of	  transitional	  
justice.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	   fact,	  not	  only	  did	   it	   lead	   to	   the	   integration	  of	   the	  concept	  of	   truth	  
commissions	   into	   the	   repertoire	   of	   state-­‐centric	   institutions,	   such	   as	   the	   UN,	   but	   it	   also	  
helped	  shape	  and	  define	  a	  less	  politicized	  notion	  of	  truth	  commissions.	  	  
	  
From	  Truth-­‐Seeking	  to	  Fact-­‐Finding76:	  The	  Rise	  of	  the	  
International	  Center	  for	  Transitional	  Justice	  
In	  chapter	  3	  I	  have	  laid	  out	  the	  political	  realities	  of	  why	  truth	  commission	  did	  not	  appear	  as	  
a	   viable	   option	   in	   the	   war-­‐torn	   former	   Yugoslavia.	   Bearing	   in	   mind	   these	   sociopolitical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  See	  for	  instance	  Teitel,	  “Transitional	  Justice	  Genealogy”;	  Dezalay	  and	  Garth,	  The	  Internationalization	  of	  Palace	  
Wars:	  Lawyers,	  Economists,	  and	  the	  Contest	  to	  Transform	  Latin	  American	  States;	  Sikkink,	  “Construction	  of	  Legal	  
Rules.”	  
76	  The	  notion	  of	  truth	  has	  been	  widely	  debated	  in	  the	  literature.	  The	  title	  here	  refers	  to	  the	  attempt	  of	  scholars	  and	  
practitioners	  to	  establish	  mechanisms	  that	  avoid	  biased	  narratives	  of	  the	  past,	  but	  instead	  focus	  on	  revealing	  the	  facts	  
about	  mass	  atrocities.	  See	  for	  instance	  Hayner,	  Unspeakable	  Truths:	  Confronting	  State	  Terror	  and	  Atrocity;	  Roht-­‐
Arriaza	  and	  Mariezcurrena,	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  Century:	  Beyond	  Truth	  Versus	  Justice.	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conditions	   mentioned	   earlier,	   next	   I	   examine	   how	   international	   legalism	   in	   transitional	  
justice—dominated	   by	   legal	   scholars	   and	   jurists—has	   seen	   the	   rise	   of	   conflict-­‐resolution	  
practitioners	   in	   the	   field77,	   who	   in	   turn	   have	   pursued	   their	   agenda,	   advocating	   for	  
restorative-­‐oriented	   instruments	   in	   transitional	   and	   post-­‐conflict	   conditions.	   In	   order	   to	  
emphasize	  this	  trend,	  below	  I	  present	  a	  brief	  history	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  ICTJ,	  a	  2001-­‐
created	   US-­‐based	   non-­‐profit	   organization	   with	   the	   goal	   of	   “assist[ing]	   countries	   pursuing	  
accountability	   for	   past	   mass	   atrocity	   or	   human	   rights	   abuse.”78	   While	   the	   ICTJ	   provides	  
services	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   or	   transitional	   societies,	   it	   also	  works	   in	   established	   democracies	  
where	   past	   injustices	   still	   remain	   unresolved.	   During	   the	   past	   decade,	   the	   New-­‐York-­‐
headquartered	   organization	   has	   grown	   rapidly,	   opening	   field	   offices	   across	   the	   world,	  
including	   Beirut,	   Bogotá,	   Brussels,	   Cape	   Town,	   Geneva,	   Jakarta,	   Kampala,	   Monrovia,	  
Nairobi,	   and	   Nepal.79	   Although	   it	   serves	   as	   an	   excellent	   example	   to	   illustrate	   these	  
developments	  in	  the	  field	  of	  transitional	  justice,	  I	  could	  also	  have	  used	  other,	  less	  prominent	  
organizations	  as	  my	  empirical	  case.80	  
The	   Center	   opened	   its	   doors	   a	   year	   after	   a	   strategy	   meeting	   organized	   by	   the	   Ford	  
Foundation	  in	  April	  2000.	  During	  this	  workshop,	  over	  two-­‐dozen	  participants,	  consisting	  of	  
legal	   scholars,	   human	   rights	   activists,	   and	   practitioners,	   among	   others,	   came	   together	   to	  
brainstorm	  about	  ways	  to	  put	  the	  concepts	  of	  the	  quickly	  rising	  field	  of	  transitional	  justice	  to	  
practice.	   The	   overall	   consensus	   reached	   at	   the	  meeting	   consisted	   of	   large	   support	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Charles	  Tenenbaum,	  La	  Médiation	  Internationale.	  Acteurs	  Et	  Pratiques	  De	  La	  Résolution	  Des	  Conflits	  (Paris:	  Presses	  
de	  Sciences	  Po,	  2012).	  
78	  International	  Center	  for	  Transitional	  Justice,	  Annual	  Report	  2004/2005	  (New	  York,	  2006),	  3.	  
79	  	  See	  ICTJ	  website	  at	  http://ictj.org/about/contact,	  accessed	  December	  6,	  2011.	  
80	  See	  for	  instance	  organizations	  such	  as	  Interpeace,	  swisspeace,	  or	  TRANSCEND,	  among	  others.	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participating	   workshop	   members	   to	   establish	   an	   organization	   whose	   work	   centers	   on	  
transitional	   justice.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   the	   Ford	   Foundation	   hired	   three	   consultants	   who	  
eventually	   became	   co-­‐founders	   of	   the	   center	   to	   develop	   a	   business	   plan	   for	   such	   an	  
organization.	  When	  they	  applied	  for	  funding	  for	  various	  grants	  to	  support	  their	  project,	  they	  
managed	  to	  receive	  funding	  for	  their	  original	  5-­‐year	  proposal	  from	  the	  Ford	  Foundation,	  the	  
John	  D.	  and	  Catherine	  T.	  MacArthur	  Foundation,	  the	  Carnegie	  Corporation	  of	  New	  York,	  the	  
Rockefeller	  Brothers	  Fund,	  and	  the	  Andrus	  Family	  Fund.	  The	  organization’s	  total	  revenue	  for	  
2001	  was	   about	   5	  million	   US	   dollars	   of	   which	   4	  million	   dollars	   were	   a	   grant	   of	   the	   Ford	  
Foundation	  to	  the	  Tides	  Center,	  a	  San-­‐Francisco	  based	  non-­‐profit	  organization	  specializing	  in	  
launching	  NGOs.81	  	  
All	   three	   co-­‐founders	   had	   gained	   extensive	   experience	   working	   in	   transitional	   and	   post-­‐
conflict	  contexts.82	  First,	  there	  was	  Alex	  Boraine,	  a	  South	  African	  politician	  who	  became	  its	  
first	  president,	  who	  was	  instrumental	   in	  crafting	  the	  South	  African	  truth	  and	  reconciliation	  
commission	  and	  was	  appointed	  in	  1996	  by	  President	  Nelson	  Mandela	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  TRC’s	  
deputy	   chair	   under	   chairman	   Archbishop	   Desmond	   Tutu	   for	   two	   years.	   At	   present,	   he	  
remains	   involved	   with	   the	   organization,	   sitting	   on	   its	   advisory	   board.	   Then	   there	   was	  
Priscilla	  Hayner,	  an	  expert	  on	  truth	  commission	  who	  strategically	  published	  a	  comparative	  
study	   of	   20	   truth	   commissions	   the	   year	   of	   the	   center’s	   creation.83	   She	   also	   held	   different	  
director	  positions	  at	   the	   ICTJ	   in	   the	  past.	  The	   third	  co-­‐founding	  member	   is	  Paul	  van	  Zyl,	  a	  
‘pracademic’	  currently	  directing	  the	  New	  York	  University	  School	  of	  Law’s	  Transitional	  Justice	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Ford	  Foundation,	  Annual	  Report	  (New	  York,	  2001),	  127.	  
82	  See	  informal	  conversation	  with	  ICTJ	  official	  in	  March	  2011.	  
83	  Hayner,	  Unspeakable	  Truths:	  Confronting	  State	  Terror	  and	  Atrocity.	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Program.	  Growing	  up	  under	  the	  South	  African	  apartheid	  system,	  he	  was	  trained	  as	  a	  lawyer	  
and	  has	  worked	  as	  an	  advisor	  to	  many	  NGOs	  and	  governments.	  Since	  its	  creation,	  the	  center	  
has	  been	  a	  social	  platform	  for	  transitional	  justice	  professionals,	  including	  prominent	  figures	  
such	   as	   Juan	   Méndez	   (former	   political	   prisoner	   under	   the	   Argentinean	   military	   regime,	  
General	   Counsel	   at	   Human	   Rights	   Watch,	   UN	   Special	   Rapporteur	   for	   the	   Prevention	   of	  
Genocide—all	   well	   before	   he	   became	   president	   at	   the	   ICTJ—and	   currently	   UN	   Special	  
Rapporteur	  on	  Torture,	  among	  others)	  and	  its	  current	  president	  David	  Tolbert	  (a	  former	  UN	  
employee	  who	  served	  as	  Assistant	  Secretary	  General	  and	  former	  Deputy	  Chief	  Prosecutor	  at	  
the	  ICTY).	  	  
Although	  the	  mission	  statement	  of	  the	  ICTJ	  emphasizes	  that	  it	  “assists	  in	  the	  development	  
of	   integrated,	   comprehensive,	   and	   localized	   approaches	   to	   transitional	   justice,“84	   the	   ICTJ	  
provides	  consulting	  services	  around	  the	  world	  to	  advise	  governments	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  
on	   different	   strategies	   to	   employ	   adequate	   tools	   during	   the	   post-­‐conflict	   transition	  
process.85	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  Eduardo	  Gonzalez,	  a	  former	  member	  of	  the	  
Peruvian	   truth	   and	   reconciliation	   commission	   and	   director	   of	   the	   transitional	   justice	   and	  
memory	   program	   at	   the	   ICTJ,	   has	   consulted	   for	   the	   Coalition	   for	   RECOM	   Initiative	   in	   the	  
Balkans	   several	   times.	   In	   addition	   to	   traveling	   to	   Belgrade,	   Serbia,	   he	   has	   also	   supported	  
several	  transitions	  in	  regions	  ranging	  from	  Africa	  to	  Southeast	  Asia.86	  While	  ICTJ	  sponsored	  
workshops	   focus	  on	   local	   contexts,	  needs	  and	  capacity	  building,	   its	  professionals,	  drawing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  International	  Center	  for	  Transitional	  Justice,	  Annual	  Report	  2004/2005.	  
85	  See	  for	  instance	  Sandrine	  Lefranc,	  “La	  Professionnalisation	  D’un	  Militantisme	  Réformateur	  Du	  Droit:	  L’Invention	  De	  
La	  Justice	  Transitionnelle,”	  Droit	  Et	  Société,	  no.	  3	  (2010):	  561–589.	  
86	  See	  interview	  with	  Eduardo	  Gonzalez	  on	  10	  September	  2010	  in	  Belgrade,	  Serbia.	  See	  also	  financial	  report	  of	  RECOM	  
available	  at	  http://zarekom.org/documents/Financial-­‐Report.en.html,	  accessed	  November	  3,	  2011.	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oftentimes	  on	  their	  own	  extensive	  experience	  in	  transitional	  contexts,	  have	  contributed	  to	  
the	  construction	  of	  a	  globalized	  discourse	  of	   transitional	   justice.	   In	   this	  context,	  chapter	  5	  
and	   6	   further	   discuss	   how	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   Peruvian	   truth	   and	   reconciliation	   has	  
served	  as	  a	  model	  during	  the	  constitution	  phase	  of	  the	  RECOM	  Initiative.	  
As	   I	   have	   shown	   above,	   some	   of	   the	   center’s	   past	   and	   current	   members	   are	   strongly	  
implanted	  in	  the	  international	  community,	  particularly	  UN	  institutions.	  The	  experts’	  sphere	  
of	  influence	  within	  the	  UN	  structure	  has	  led	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  these	  concepts	  to	  policy	  
and	  strategy	  guidelines.	  As	  a	  case	   in	  point,	  one	  of	   the	   ICTJ’s	  co-­‐founders,	  Priscilla	  Hayner,	  
has	   also	  worked	   as	   a	   consultant	   for	   the	  Office	   of	   the	   UN	  High	   Commissioner	   for	   Human	  
Rights.	  In	  a	  report	  published	  in	  2004,	  The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  and	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Conflict	  and	  
Post-­‐Conflict	  Societies,	  then-­‐Secretary	  General,	  Kofi	  Annan,	  not	  only	  defines	  key	  terms,	  such	  
as	  transitional	  justice,	  retributive	  justice	  and	  restorative	  justice,	  but	  it	  also	  integrates	  all	  of	  
these	   tools	   into	   the	   international	   repertoire	   to	  deal	  with	  post-­‐conflict	   settings	  around	  the	  
world.	   The	   publication	   of	   this	   report	   nicely	   illustrates	   the	   concept	   of	   traveling	   ideas	  
mentioned	   in	   the	  previous	  section	  of	   this	  chapter.	  However,	  as	   I	  will	  discuss	   in	  chapter	  5,	  
the	  integration	  of	  these	  tools	  into	  policy	  strategies	  at	  the	  international	  level,	  such	  as	  the	  UN,	  
does	   not	   imply	   that	   this	   evolution	   necessarily	   translates	   to	   the	   local	   level.	   In	   fact,	  
international	   organizations	   in	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia	   were	   reluctant	   to	   the	   fact-­‐finding	  
initiative	  RECOM.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  selected	  approach	  in	  the	  report	  still	  emphasizes	  the	  rule	  
of	   law	   and	   retributive	   justice	  mechanisms	   as	   the	  main	   objective.	   It	   remains	   a	   very	   state-­‐
centric	  model.	   In	   fact,	   it	   is	   only	   after	   an	   extensive	   discussion	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   the	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lessons	   learned	   from	   ad	   hoc	   war	   crimes	   tribunals	   and	   the	   current	   work	   at	   the	   ICC	   that	  
Annan	   provides	   two	   short	   paragraphs	   on	   restorative	   justice	   measures.	   One	   evokes	   the	  
importance	  of	  fact-­‐finding	  to	  cope	  with	  past	  mass	  atrocities:	  
Another	  important	  mechanism	  for	  addressing	  past	  human	  rights	  abuses	  is	  the	  truth	  
commission.	   Truth	   commissions	   are	   official,	   temporary,	   non-­‐judicial	   fact-­‐finding	  
bodies	   that	   investigate	   a	   pattern	   of	   abuses	   of	   human	   rights	   or	   humanitarian	   law	  
committed	  over	  a	  number	  of	  years.	  These	  bodies	   take	  a	  victim-­‐centered	  approach	  
and	  conclude	  their	  work	  with	  a	  final	  report	  of	  findings	  of	  fact	  and	  recommendations.	  
[…]	   Truth	   commissions	   have	   the	   potential	   to	   be	   of	   great	   benefit	   in	   helping	   post-­‐
conflict	   societies	   establish	   the	   facts	   about	   past	   human	   rights	   violations,	   foster	  
accountability,	  preserve	  evidence,	  identify	  perpetrators	  and	  recommend	  reparations	  
and	   institutional	   reforms.	   They	   can	   also	   provide	   a	   public	   platform	   for	   victims	   to	  
address	   the	   nation	   directly	   with	   their	   personal	   stories	   and	   can	   facilitate	   public	  
debate	  about	  how	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  past.87	  
The	  subsequent	  paragraph	  enumerates	  the	  conditions	  that	  have	  to	  be	  met	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  
be	  successful:	  
Factors	  that	  can	   limit	   these	  potential	  benefits	   include	  a	  weak	  civil	   society,	  political	  
instability,	   victim	   and	   witness	   fears	   about	   testifying,	   a	   weak	   or	   corrupt	   justice	  
system,	   insufficient	   time	   to	   carry	   out	   investigations,	   lack	   of	   public	   support	   and	  
inadequate	   funding.	   Truth	   commissions	   are	   invariably	   compromised	   if	   appointed	  
through	  a	  rushed	  or	  politicized	  process.	  They	  are	  best	  formed	  through	  consultative	  
processes	   that	   incorporate	   public	   views	   on	   their	   mandates	   and	   on	   commissioner	  
selection.	   To	   be	   successful,	   they	   must	   enjoy	   meaningful	   independence	   and	   have	  
credible	   commissioner	   selection	   criteria	   and	   processes.	   Strong	   public	   information	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  This	  definition	  concisely	  captures	  Priscilla	  Hayner’s	  analysis	  of	  truth	  commission	  aims,	  see	  Unspeakable	  Truths:	  
Confronting	  State	  Terror	  and	  Atrocity,	  21.	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and	   communication	   strategies	   are	   essential	   to	   manage	   public	   and	   victim	  
expectations	   and	   to	   advance	   credibility	   and	   transparency.	   Their	   gender	   sensitivity	  
and	   responsiveness	   to	   victims	   and	   to	   victims	   of	   discrimination	   must	   be	   assured.	  
Finally,	  many	  such	  commissions	  will	  require	  strong	  international	  support	  to	  function,	  
as	  well	  as	  respect	  by	  international	  partners	  for	  their	  operational	  independence.88	  
Particularly	  the	  last	  sentence	  of	  the	  second	  paragraph,	  stressing	  the	  need	  for	  international	  
actors,	  underlines	  how	  these	  pracademics	  have	  established	  and	  consolidated	  their	  expertise	  
in	   the	   field.	  Much	   like	  Bourdieusian	   concepts	   in	   the	  higher	  education	   system	   that	  explain	  
education,	  time	  and	  space	  as	  central	  variables	  for	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  law	  in	  Dezalay	  and	  
Garth’s	  work	  mentioned	  earlier,	  89	  transitional	  justice	  practitioners	  have	  sought	  to	  legitimize	  
their	   status	   and	  expertise.	   The	   case	  of	   the	   current	   ICTJ	   director,	  David	   Tolbert,	   illustrates	  
this	  trend.	  In	  an	  interview	  given	  for	  the	  ICTJ’s	  10-­‐year	  anniversary,	  he	  describes	  the	  tasks	  of	  
his	   center	  as	  a	  valuable	  addition	   to	   the	  work	  of	   the	   ICC	  and	  other	  ad	  hoc	   tribunals.	  Their	  
work,	   in	   his	   words,	   “is	   now	  much	  more	   focused	   on	  making	   complementary	  work	   on	   the	  
ground.”90	  The	  implementation	  of	  this	  groundwork,	  however,	  is	  a	  very	  elusive	  process.91	  As	  I	  
will	   show	   in	   the	  next	  chapter,	  obstacles	   to	  put	   transition	  models	   into	  practice	   range	   from	  
external	  lack	  of	  support	  to	  internal	  differences	  of	  involved	  actors.	  These	  global	  trends	  shifts	  
of	   ideas	   including	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   transitional	   justice	   concept	   to	   the	   post-­‐conflict	  
discourse	  in	  international	  relations	  are	  therefore	  an	  important	  evolution.	  This	  is	  particularly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  Kofi	  Annan,	  The	  Rule	  of	  Law	  and	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Conflict	  and	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Societies:	  Report	  of	  the	  Secretary-­‐
General	  (United	  Nations,	  2004),	  17.	  
89	  Dezalay	  and	  Garth,	  Global	  Prescriptions:	  The	  Production,	  Exportation,	  and	  Importation	  of	  a	  New	  Legal	  Orthodoxy.	  
90	  Geraldine	  Coughlan,	  “ICTJ:	  One	  Decade	  of	  Justice,”	  Radio	  Netherlands	  Worldwide,	  April	  22,	  2011,	  
http://m.rnw.nl/international-­‐justice/node/41924.	  
91	  As	  a	  case	  in	  point,	  on	  March	  23,	  2012,	  the	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Council	  appointed	  Pablo	  de	  Greiff	  as	  the	  first	  Special	  
Rapporteur	  on	  Truth,	  Justice,	  Reparation	  and	  Guarantees	  of	  Non-­‐Recurrence.	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true	   for	   the	   integration	   of	   fact-­‐finding	   bodies	   into	   the	   repertoire	   of	   international	  
organizations,	  such	  as	  the	  UN.	  The	   implications	  and	  consequences	  of	  this	  global	  trend	  will	  
also	   help	   us	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   human	   rights	   activist’s	   struggle	   to	   establish	   the	  
regional	  fact-­‐finding	  initiative	  RECOM,	  which	  I	  discuss	  next.	  
	  
Conclusion	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   looked	   at	   accountability	   practices	   of	   different	   NGOs	   across	   the	   former	  
Balkan	  region	  to	  highlight	  how	  these	  activists	  have	  not	  only	  helped	  to	  promote	  the	  human	  
rights	  discourse	  of	  fighting	  impunity	  and	  war	  crimes,	  but	  more	  importantly,	  how	  they	  have	  
also	  contributed	  to	  strengthen	  bottom-­‐up	  approaches.	  Humanitarian	  law	  and	  human	  rights	  
as	   interpreted	   by	   the	   early	   ICTY	   cases	   have	   therefore	   gained	   a	   new	   victim-­‐centered	  
dimension.	   By	   redefining	   the	  meaning	   of	   who	   should	   be	   the	   object	   in	   focus,	   NGOs	   have	  
taken	   the	   first	   steps	   towards	   democratizing	   human	   rights.	   They	   have	   underlined	   the	  
importance	   of	   the	   local	   space	   and	   increased	   the	   victims’	   voices	   in	   societies	   across	   the	  
region.	  The	  first	  part,	  which	  discussed	  the	  difficulties	  witnesses	  (who	  are	  also	  often	  former	  
war	  victims)	  have	   to	   face	   in	  war	  crimes	   trials,	  also	  described	   the	  challenges	  of	  NGOs	   that	  
provide	  support	  in	  this	  context.	  After	  the	  more	  empirical	  and	  descriptive	  analysis,	  I	  provided	  
a	   theoretical	   framework	   to	   conceptualize	   the	   changing	  meaning	   of	   human	   rights	   from	   a	  
grand	   narrative,	   promoted	   by	   the	   ICTY,	   to	   individualized	   stories	   of	   victims	   supported	   by	  
human	   rights	   activists.	   In	   the	   last	   part,	   I	   pointed	   to	   a	   broader	   shift	   in	   transitional	   justice	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strategies	   in	   which	   restorative	   justice	   mechanisms	   have	   found	   their	   place	   within	   the	  
broader	  discourse	  of	  the	  ICTY’s	  retributive	  justice	  approach.	  In	  Chapter	  5	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  
politics	  during	  the	  campaign	  to	  establish	  a	   fact-­‐finding	  body	  across	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  
focusing	  on	   internal	   and	  external	   difficulties	  of	  NGOs	   to	  expand	   their	   sphere	  of	   influence	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In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  have	  analyzed	  several	  victim	  issues	  in	  trial	  processes	  and	  the	  role	  
of	  NGOs	   supporting	  victims	   in	   these	   retributive	   justice	   settings.	   In	   fact,	  despite	   the	   ICTY’s	  
advocacy	  and	  strategy	  to	  account	  for	  past	  war	  crimes	  and	  human	  rights	  violations	  and	  the	  
spillover	  effect	  of	  international	  criminal	  law	  into	  domestic	  judicial	  systems	  in	  the	  region3—as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  author	  is	  grateful	  for	  Iva	  Vukušić’s	  research	  assistance	  and	  editorial	  suggestions.	  The	  author	  also	  wishes	  to	  thank	  
Jo-­‐Marie	  Burt,	  Earle	  Reybold,	  Olga	  Martin-­‐Ortega,	  Peter	  Mandaville,	  Harvey	  Weinstein	  and	  Nahla	  Valji	  for	  reading	  
earlier	  drafts	  of	  this	  chapter	  and	  providing	  valuable	  comments	  to	  help	  clarify	  certain	  aspects	  and	  is	  indebted	  to	  Vjeran	  
Pavlaković,	  Christopher	  Lamont,	  and	  other	  colleagues	  and	  friends	  for	  the	  many	  conversations	  that	  helped	  improve	  
this	  chapter.	  
2	  Fyodor	  Dostoyevsky,	  Crime	  and	  Punishment,	  trans.	  Keith	  Carabine	  (Wordsworth	  Editions,	  2000),	  226.	  
3	  Teitel,	  “Global	  Transitional	  Justice”;	  Olga	  Martin-­‐Ortega	  and	  Johanna	  Herman,	  Hybrid	  Tribunals	  &	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  
Notes	  from	  Bosnia	  &	  Herzegovina	  &	  Cambodia,	  Working	  Paper	  (Department	  of	  Political	  Science,	  Lund	  University,	  
Sweden,	  2010).	  	  
	  145	  
mentioned	  earlier—the	   impact	  of	   this	   justice	   cascade	   is	  questionable.4	   	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  
civil	   society	   actors	   have	   supported	   these	   retributive	   justice	   efforts	   participating	   in	   and/or	  
running	  various	  programs,	  including	  witness	  protection	  support	  and	  trial	  monitoring.	  On	  the	  
other	   hand,	   recent	   research	   on	   this	   topic	   affirmed	   that	   civil	   society	   actors,	   as	   a	   result,	  
expanded	   their	   influence	   and	   impact.	   NGOs	   went	   beyond	   the	   initial	   judicial	   support	   to	  
which	   they	   are	   invited	   to	   participate	   by	   state	   actors	   and	   created	   a	   deliberative	   space	   to	  
increase	   victims’	   voices	   in	   society,	   so-­‐called	   ‘invented	   spaces.’5	   Such	   scholarly	   insight	   is	  
important,	   as	   several	   past	   restorative	   justice	   attempts	   across	   different	   countries	   in	   the	  
region	   resulted	   in	   only	   limited	   success.6	   Notwithstanding,	   social	   activists	   and	   civil	   society	  
organizations	   have	   incrementally	   increased	   their	   role	   and	   reach	   in	   transitional	   justice	  
processes.7	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   discuss	   the	  ongoing	  2008-­‐transnational	   fact-­‐finding	   initiative,	  
called	   Coalition	   for	   RECOM	   Initiative,	   to	   elucidate	   the	   sociopolitical	   struggle	   of	   coalition	  
members	   to	   advocate	   for	   alternative	   models	   to	   cope	   with	   mass	   atrocity	   in	   the	   former	  
Yugoslavia.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Some	  authors	  and	  reports	  have	  criticized	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  this	  justice	  cascade.	  See	  for	  instance	  Jelena	  Subotić,	  
Hijacked	  Justice:	  Dealing	  with	  the	  Past	  in	  the	  Balkans	  (Ithaca,	  London:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2009)	  and	  annual	  
activity	  reports	  of	  NGOs,	  such	  as	  Documenta	  and	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center,	  among	  others.	  
5	  Alex	  Jeffrey,	  “The	  Political	  Geographies	  of	  Transitional	  Justice,”	  Transactions	  of	  The	  Institute	  of	  British	  Geographers	  
(2011).	  
6	  Cécile	  Jouhanneau,	  “Les	  Mésaventures	  Des	  Projets	  De	  Commission	  Vérité	  Et	  Réconciliation	  Pour	  La	  Bosnie-­‐
Herzégovine	  (1997-­‐2006):	  Une	  Étude	  De	  La	  Circulation	  Des	  Modèles	  Internationaux	  De	  Résolution	  Des	  Conflits	  
Mémoriels,”	  in	  Le	  Passé	  Au	  Présent:	  Gisements	  Mémoriels	  Et	  Politiques	  Publiques	  En	  Europe	  Centrale	  Et	  Orientale,	  ed.	  
George	  Mink	  and	  Pascal	  Bonnard	  (Paris:	  Michel	  Houdiard	  Editeur,	  2010);	  Brian	  Grodsky,	  “International	  Prosecutions	  
and	  Domestic	  Politics:	  The	  Use	  of	  Truth	  Commissions	  as	  Compromise	  Justice	  in	  Serbia	  and	  Croatia,”	  International	  
Studies	  Review	  11,	  no.	  4	  (2009):	  687–706;	  Jelena	  Pejic,	  “The	  Yugoslav	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission:	  A	  Shaky	  
Start,”	  Fordham	  International	  Law	  Journal	  25	  (2001):	  1.	  
7	  Several	  authors	  have	  addressed	  the	  question	  of	  human	  rights	  activism	  in	  transitional	  justice	  processes	  and	  in	  
particular	  highlighting	  the	  important	  impact	  of	  local	  NGOs	  in	  different	  regions	  Roht-­‐Arriaza,	  The	  Pinochet	  Effect:	  
Transnational	  Justice	  In	  The	  Age	  Of	  Human	  Rights;	  Collins,	  “Grounding	  Global	  Justice:	  International	  Networks	  and	  
Domestic	  Human	  Rights	  Accountability	  in	  Chile	  and	  El	  Salvador”;	  Burt,	  “Guilty	  as	  Charged:	  The	  Trial	  of	  Former	  
Peruvian	  President	  Alberto	  Fujimori	  for	  Human	  Rights	  Violations.”	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Drawing	   on	   concepts	   of	   sociology	   of	   spaces—based	   on	   the	   study	   of	   establishing	   spaces	  
through	  action	  and	  the	   interdependence	  of	  action	  on	  spatial	   structures	   8—I	   illustrate	  how	  
activists	  move	  between	  different	  spaces	  constituted	  by	  narratives	  of	  justice	  and	  truth.	  The	  
study	   is	   based	   on	   over	   two-­‐dozen	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   with	   key	   actors,	   such	   as	  
human	   rights	   activists,	   representatives	   of	   domestic	   and	   international	   judicial	   institutions,	  
and	  international	  organizations,	  among	  others.9	  Early	  on,	  human	  rights	  organizations	  in	  the	  
region	  acted	  primarily	  within	  the	  legal	  space.	  As	  we	  can	  see,	  they	  contributed	  for	  instance	  
to	   improving	   domestic	   war	   crimes	   prosecutions	   by	   providing	   support	   to	   witnesses	   and	  
victims.	  Some	  the	  witnesses	  and/or	  victims	  were	  initially	  exposed	  to	  intimidation	  and	  death	  
threats	  due	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  anonymous	  testimonies	  in	  the	  courtroom	  during	  hearings	  and	  
the	   lack	  of	  media	  responsibility.10	  Subsequent	  projects	  of	  human	  rights	  activists	  were	  (and	  
still	   are)	   an	   attempt	   to	   expand	   their	   space	   from	   domestic	   justice-­‐oriented	   activities	   to	  
regional	  fact-­‐finding	  efforts.	  	  
Interestingly,	  however,	  the	  expansion	  of	  so-­‐called	  truth	  spaces	  poses	  myriad	  challenges.	  The	  
attempt	   of	   establishing	   a	   fact-­‐finding	   body	   for	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia	   has	   faced	   different	  
types	   of	   opposition,	   ranging	   from	  external	   critique	   and	   politicization	   across	   the	   region	   to	  
internal	  disapproval	  by	   certain	  of	   its	  members.	  With	   the	  aim	  of	   creating	  a	  broad	   regional	  
fact-­‐finding	  initiative,	  the	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  campaign	  also	  grapples	  with	  different	  types	  
of	  victims	  (including	  families	  of	  victims,	  prisoners,	  and	  veterans,	  among	  others)	  who	  have,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  John	  Urry,	  “Sociology	  of	  Time	  and	  Space,”	  in	  The	  Blackwell	  Companion	  to	  Social	  Theory	  (Oxford,	  United	  Kingdom:	  
Blackwell	  Publishers,	  2000),	  416–444.	  
9	  Additionally,	  the	  study	  draws	  from	  various	  reports	  and	  other	  documentation.	  
10	  See	  chapter	  4.	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sometimes,	   conflicting	   needs	   and/or	   demands.	   Different	   narratives	   of	   the	   past,	   however,	  
also	   result	   in	   elusive	   consensus	   building	   attempts.	   Conceptually,	   I	   base	   this	   part	   of	   the	  
chapter	   on	   framing	   and	   social	   movement	   theories	   coined	   by	   sociological	   work	   of	   Erving	  
Goffman	  and	  further	  developed	  by	  social	  movement	  theorists	  such	  as	  Jeffrey	  Goodwin	  and	  
Jaswin	  Jasper.11	  In	  other	  words	  the	  question	  on	  how	  to	  frame	  the	  collective	  action—in	  order	  
to	  guarantee	   that	   the	  social	  movement	  RECOM	   is	  eventually	  able	   to	  gain	  enough	   traction	  
and	   support	   from	   its	   actors	   to	   realize	   its	   initially	  defined	  goals—is	  a	  delicate	  process	   that	  
merits	  further	  attention.	  This	  is	  particularly	  true,	  since	  the	  initiative’s	  members	  are	  part	  of	  a	  
regional	  network	  from	  different	  states	  that	  were	  initially	  united	  under	  of	  one	  federal	  nation-­‐
state	  before	  the	  conflict.	  As	  I	  will	  explain	  later,	  concepts	  of	  collective	  action	  framing,	  such	  as	  
the	  work	  of	  David	  Snow	  et	  al.	  are	  especially	  noteworthy	  in	  this	  context,	  since	  they	  provide	  
insights	   into	   the	   challenges	   of	   mobilizing	   transnational	   actors.12	   In	   fact,	   in	   spite	   of	  
commonalities	  among	  participating	  actors	  across	  the	  region	  several	  obstacles	  still	  impede	  a	  
successful	  mobilization	  as	  of	  today.	  
This	   chapter	   is	   organized	   in	   three	   sections.	   First,	   I	   describe	   the	   continuous	   struggle	   of	  
human	   rights	   activists	   to	   create	   a	   transnational	   extra-­‐legal	   space—in	   particular	   a	   fact-­‐
finding	   commission—to	   deal	  with	   past	   atrocities	   across	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia.	   I	   focus	   on	  
internal	   and	   external	   obstacles	   the	  movement	   faces.	   Second,	   I	   discuss	   issues	   of	  multiple	  
narratives	   of	   victimhood,	   partly	   because	   of	   the	   transnational	   character	   of	   the	   restorative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  See	  for	  instance	  Erving	  Goffman,	  Frame	  Analysis:	  An	  Essay	  on	  the	  Organization	  of	  Experience	  (New	  York:	  Harper	  
Colophon,	  1974);	  Jeffrey	  Goodwin	  and	  Jaswin	  Jasper,	  “Caught	  in	  a	  Winding,	  Snarling	  Vine:	  The	  Structural	  Bias	  of	  
Political	  Process	  Theory,”	  Sociological	  Forum	  14	  (1999):	  27–54.	  
12	  David	  Snow	  et	  al.,	  “Frame	  Alignment	  Processes,	  Micromobilization,	  and	  Movement	  Participation,”	  American	  
Sociological	  Review	  (1986):	  464–481.	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justice	  efforts.	   In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	   I	  draw	  on	  several	  different	  cases.	  Third,	   I	  examine	   issues	  
associated	  with	  framing	  collective	  action.	   In	  other	  words,	   I	  analyze	  the	  difficulties	  that	  the	  
main	  NGO	  actors	  during	  the	  RECOM	  campaign	  had	  to	  cope	  with	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  support	  for	  
their	  cause.	  
	  
The	  RECOM	  Initiative:	  Struggling	  to	  Create	  an	  Extra-­‐Judicial	  
Space	  	  
Several	  authors	  have	  explored	  the	  sociopolitical	  role	  of	  NGOs	  in	  society	  using	  a	  sociology-­‐of-­‐
space	   perspective	   in	   order	   to	   illustrate	   their	   active	   involvement	   in	   shaping	   policy	  
processes.13	   Drawing	   on	   Miraftab	   and	   Wills’	   notion	   of	   invited	   spaces—more	   precisely,	  
spaces	   in	   which	   state	   institutions	   provide	   opportunities	   for	   civil	   society	   to	   participate	  
actively	   in	   certain	   problem	   areas—Alex	   Jeffrey	   recently	   analyzed	   the	   creation	   of	   space	  
(invented	   space)	   by	   human	   rights	   organizations	   in	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina	   to	   allow	   for	  
deliberate	  conceptions	  of	  justice	  that	  go	  beyond	  legal	  institutions	  and	  processes.14	  His	  study	  
defies	   a	   legalist	   approach,	   illustrating	   how	   activists	   who	   initially	   cooperated	   with	   the	  
judiciaries	   have	   established	   alternative	   ways	   to	   implement	   transitional	   justice	   in	   post-­‐
conflict	   settings.	  While	   I	  employ	   these	  concepts	   to	   investigate	   regional	   transitional	   justice	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Faranak	  Miraftab	  and	  Shana	  Wills,	  “Insurgency	  and	  Spaces	  of	  Active	  Citizenship,”	  Journal	  of	  Planning	  Education	  and	  
Research	  25,	  no.	  2	  (2005):	  200.	  For	  an	  extensive	  discussion	  on	  time	  and	  space,	  see	  Urry,	  “Sociology	  of	  Time	  and	  
Space.”	  
14	  Jeffrey,	  “The	  Political	  Geographies	  of	  Transitional	  Justice.”	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activities	  of	  a	  number	  of	  NGOs	  across	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  in	  this	  chapter,	  I	  concentrate	  on	  
the	   difficulties	   human	   rights	   activists	   are	   confronted	   with	   during	   the	   creation	   of	   these	  
regional	  restorative	  justice	  efforts.	  
The	  recent	  attempts	  to	  institutionalize	  an	  interstate	  fact-­‐finding	  body—to	  account	  for	  past	  
human	  rights	  violations	  and	  war	  crimes	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia—emerged	  as	  a	  response	  to	  
the	  rising	  critique	  of	  international	  and	  domestic	  war	  crimes	  prosecutions	  in	  the	  region.15	  In	  
fact,	  retributive	  justice	  mechanisms	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  past,	  such	  as	  the	  ICTY,	  despite	  its	  great	  
global	  impact	  on	  and	  model	  character	  for	  international	  humanitarian	  and	  criminal	  law,	  has	  
only	  partially	  fulfilled	  its	  mandate	  to	  help	  war-­‐torn	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  societies	  in	  the	  region	  
transition.16	  Some	  of	  the	  issues	  include:	  the	  geographical	  distance	  of	  the	  court	  between	  the	  
Netherlands	   and	   the	   crime	   scene	   sites—which	   has	   often	   been	   criticized	   by	  
victims/witnesses;	   the	   trial	   of	   selective	   cases	   only	   (both	   on	   the	   international	   as	   well	   as	  
domestic	   level);	   and	   the	  politicization	  of	   cooperation	  processes	   between	   countries	   of	   the	  
former	   Yugoslavia	   and	   the	   UN	   tribunal	   in	   The	   Hague.17	   Victims	   thus	   felt	   alienated	   by	  
international	  and	  domestic	  accountability	  efforts.	  	  
Increasing	  critique	  from	  victim	  associations	  and	  human	  rights	  organizations	  were	  therefore	  
crucial	   in	   helping	   launch	   an	   alternative	   process	   to	   improve	   the	   relationship	   between	   law	  
and	  society.	  The	   idea	  was	   that	  progress	  does	  not	   lie	   in	  more	  personnel,	  better	   strategies,	  
and	  on-­‐site	  presence	  of	  the	  judiciary	  system,	  but	  in	  the	  way	  that	  those	  who	  suffered	  most	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  See	  chapter	  3.	  
16	  Subotić,	  Hijacked	  Justice:	  Dealing	  with	  the	  Past	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  
17	  Teitel,	  “The	  Law	  and	  Politics	  of	  Contemporary	  Transitional	  Justice.”	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during	   the	   conflicts	   are	   integrated	   into	   projects	   to	   cope	   with	   the	   past.	   The	   activities	   of	  
several	  non-­‐profit	  organizations—many	  of	  which	  often	  started	  working	  at	   the	  outbreak	  of	  
violence	   in	   the	   early	   1990s18	   or	   shortly	   after—demonstrate	   the	   increasing	   efforts	   to	   raise	  
victims’	  voices	  in	  transitional	   justice	  processes	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  In	  fall	  2005,	  three	  
established	  non-­‐profit	  organizations	  in	  the	  region—all	  of	  which	  I	  introduced	  already	  in	  more	  
depth	   in	   the	   previous	   chapters—the	   Humanitarian	   Law	   Center	   in	   Serbia,	   Documenta	   in	  
Croatia,	   and	   the	   Research	   and	   Documentation	   Center	   in	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina,19	  
discussed	   the	   prospects	   of	   an	   independent	   regional	   commission	   that	   investigates	   and	  
discloses	   the	   facts	   about	   war	   crimes	   and	   other	   serious	   human	   rights	   violations	   in	   the	  
territory	  of	   the	   former	  Yugoslavia.20	   By	  May	  2008,	   these	  organizations	  had	  gained	  enough	  
momentum	  and	   launched	  the	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  Initiative	   in	  Priština,	  Kosovo,	  with	  over	  
100	   NGOs	   from	   the	   region.21	   Due	   to	   the	   still	   highly	   politicized	   landscape	   of	   war-­‐crimes-­‐
related	   issues	   in	   the	   region,	   the	   founders	   of	   the	   initiative	   stressed	   the	   importance	   of	  
establishing	   a	   platform	   offering	   victims	   an	   opportunity	   to	   express	   themselves	   and	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  See	  chapter	  4.	  The	  activities	  of	  the	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center	  in	  Belgrade,	  Serbia,	  are	  a	  good	  example	  of	  
documenting	  war	  crimes	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  The	  center	  also	  promotes	  victims	  rights,	  based	  on	  various	  
initiatives,	  at	  http://www.hlc-­‐rdc.org/stranice/Linkovi-­‐modula/About-­‐us.en.html	  ,	  accessed	  December	  5,	  2009.	  	  
19	  These	  various	  organizations	  have	  as	  their	  core	  mission	  to	  document	  and	  disclose	  facts	  about	  the	  human	  rights	  
violations	  and	  war	  crimes	  committed	  during	  the	  1990s	  to	  educate	  society	  and	  create	  a	  voice	  for	  victims.	  	  Various	  
forms	  of	  implementing	  this	  mission	  exist.	  Documenta,	  for	  instance,	  among	  other	  things,	  engages	  in	  commemorative	  
culture,	  history	  teaching,	  and	  dealing	  with	  the	  past	  initiatives,	  thus	  emphasizing	  the	  interactive	  dialogue	  with	  society.	  
The	  Research	  and	  Documentation	  Center,	  concentrates	  its	  work	  on	  documenting	  missing	  persons,	  and	  has	  published	  
a	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  all	  the	  war	  victims	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  The	  Bosnian	  book	  of	  the	  dead	  (2009),	  as	  
well	  as	  an	  interactive	  Google	  map	  that	  shows	  location,	  nature	  of	  the	  crime	  and	  number	  of	  victims.	  The	  Humanitarian	  
Law	  Center,	  despite	  its	  involvement	  in	  commemorative	  culture,	  is	  known	  for	  its	  strong	  legal	  activities,	  providing	  
support	  for	  victims	  in	  court	  and	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  state	  institutions.	  
20	  The	  International	  Center	  for	  Transnational	  Justice	  (ICTJ)	  and	  other	  prominent	  NGOs	  in	  the	  region	  also	  participated	  
in	  this	  discussion.	  
21	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM,	  Report	  About	  the	  Consultative	  Process	  on	  Instruments	  of	  Truth-­‐	  Seeking	  About	  War	  Crimes	  
and	  Other	  Serious	  Violations	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Post-­‐Yugoslav	  Countries,	  2009,	  http://www.korekom.org/,	  accessed	  
June	  6,	  2010.	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counter	  the	  relativization	  of	  any	  crimes	  against	  humanity	  by	  local	  and	  national	  authorities	  or	  
justification	  of	  crimes	  committed	  against	  opposing	  sides	  in	  the	  conflict.22	  	  
The	  movement	  was	   organized	   in	   three	   phases.	   The	   first	   phase	   consisted	   of	   assessing	   the	  
needs	   and	   expectations	   of	   victims	   in	   view	   of	   creating	   an	   extra-­‐judicial	   mechanism	   to	  
establish	  facts	  about	  past	  mass	  atrocities	  across	  the	  region.	  In	  phase	  two	  participants	  were	  
incited	   to	   provide	   suggestions	   and	   recommendations	   for	   creating	   a	   regional	   commission.	  
This	   took	  place	   in	   local,	   national	   and	   regional	   consultations	   and	  meetings.	   The	   last	   phase	  
aimed	  at	  discussing	  and	  crafting	  a	  draft	  statute	  for	  the	  commission	  and	  started	  in	  May	  2010	  
and	  lasted	  until	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  draft	  statute	  in	  on	  March	  26,	  2011.23	  The	  initiative	  comes	  
as	  a	  response	  to	  other	  transitional	  justice	  mechanisms,	  such	  as	  international	  and	  domestic	  
courts,	  which	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  limited	  in	  their	  success	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  violent	  past	  in	  the	  
region.24	  
According	   to	   article	   13	   of	   RECOM’s	   final	   draft	   statute	   the	   commission	   has	   six	   primary	  
objectives.	   The	  main	   goal	   is	   to	   establish	   facts	   about	   war	   crimes	   and	   other	   grave	   human	  
rights	  abuses	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  conflicts	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  from	  January	  1	  to	  
December	  31,	  2001.25	  Moreover,	  it	  will	  also	  look	  at	  the	  sociopolitical	  circumstances	  that	  led	  
to	   these	   crimes	   and	   their	   consequences.	   The	   commission	   also	   aims	   at	   acknowledging	  
“injustices	   inflicted	   upon	   victims	   in	   order	   to	   help	   create	   a	   culture	   of	   compassion	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM,	  “Why	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM?”,	  2010,	  http://www.zarekom.org/,	  accessed	  September	  12,	  2010.	  
23	  The	  statute	  is	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  6.	  
24	  See	  chapters	  3	  and	  4.	  See	  also	  reports	  published	  by	  human	  rights	  organizations,	  including	  Documenta,	  the	  
Humanitarian	  Law	  Center,	  Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  Amnesty	  International,	  among	  others.	  
25	  See	  chapter	  6	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  how	  the	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  Initiative	  members	  decided	  to	  define	  this	  specific	  
timeframe.	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solidarity	  with	  victims.”26	  Other	  goals	  consist	  of	  promoting	  victims’	  rights,	  clarify	  the	  fate	  of	  
missing	  persons	  and	  help	  prevent	  future	  human	  rights	  violations	  and	  atrocities.	  The	  RECOM	  
commission’s	   specific	   functions	   are	   listed	   in	   article	   14	   of	   the	   final	   draft	   statute.	   Its	  main	  
tasks	   consist	   of	   collecting	   information	   on	   war	   crimes	   and	   other	   gross	   human	   rights	  
violations	   as	   well	   as	   information	   on	   missing	   persons.	   The	   collected	   information	   is	   then	  
stored	  in	  a	  regional	  database.	  Public	  hearings	  of	  victims	  and	  other	  persons	  about	  war	  crimes	  
and	   human	   rights	   violations	   are	   also	   part	   of	   the	   commission’s	   functions.	   Finally	   the	  
commissioners	  will	  provide	  policy	  recommendations	  to	  help	  prevent	  further	  atrocities	  and	  
human	  rights	  abuses,	  which	  will	  be	  published	  in	  a	  final	  report.	  	  
As	   a	   result,	   RECOM	   aims	   at	   creating	   a	   space	   for	   victims	   to	   be	   heard	   in	   society,	   fueling	  
sympathy	  and	  understanding.	  According	  to	  its	  advocates,	  RECOM	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  mechanism	  
that	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  context	  of	  past	  conflicts.	  Several	  countries	  were	  involved	  in	  the	  
breakup	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  thus	  dealing	  with	  past	  war	  crimes	  issues	  does	  not	  stop	  at	  
national	  borders,	  but	  goes	  beyond	  the	  sovereign	  territory	  of	  the	  current	  states.	  Additionally,	  
RECOM	  coalition	  members	  plan	  on	  creating	  a	  comprehensive	  database	  of	  victims	  to	  end	  the	  
perpetual	  politicization	  of	  the	  number	  of	  victims	  in	  the	  region.	  RECOM	  also	  aspires	  to	  help	  
war	   crimes	   prosecutors	  with	   evidentiary	  material,	  witness	   handling	   and	   searching	   for	   the	  
missing.	  The	  initiative’s	  ambitious	  goals,	  however,	  are	  tainted	  by	  internal	  disagreements	  of	  
different	  coalition	  members.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  See	  final	  draft	  RECOM	  draft	  statute	  of	  March	  26,	  2011.	  Available	  at	  the	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  website,	  
http://www.zarekom.org/,	  accessed	  on	  March	  1,	  2012.	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Since	   the	   official	   constitutional	   meeting	   of	   the	   RECOM	   coalition	   in	   Priština	   in	   2008	   the	  
initiative	   has	   faced	   internal	   politicking	   and	   difficulties.	   	   The	   driving	   coalition	   partners	   of	  
RECOM,	  such	  as	  Documenta	  and	  the	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center,	  in	  particular,	  have	  grappled	  
with	   mobilizing	   coalition	   partners	   from	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina,	   after	   the	   head	   of	   the	  
Bosnian	   Research	   and	   Documentation	   Center,	   for	   different	   reasons,	   refused	   to	   give	   his	  
official	  support	  to	  the	  coalition	  at	  one	  of	  the	  meetings	  in	  winter	  2008.27	  Void	  of	  an	  essential	  
Bosnian	  member—BiH	   constitutes	   a	   symbolic	  member	   country	   due	   to	   its	  weighty	   history	  
during	  the	  1992-­‐1995	  conflict—Humanitarian	  Law	  Center	  director,	  Nataša	  Kandić,	  managed	  
to	  fill	  the	  gap	  created	  by	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  influential	  Research	  and	  Documentation	  Center	  by	  
partnering	  with	  the	  Association	  of	  BiH	  Journalists.28	  Yet,	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  organization	  does	  
not	  essentially	   concentrate	  on	  war	   crimes	   reporting	  has	  affected	   its	   legitimacy	  within	   the	  
coalition,	  according	  to	  a	  prominent	  member	  of	  the	  initiative.29	  Critique	  has	  also	  come	  from	  
participating	   organizations	   that	   have	   deplored	   the	   lack	   of	   transparency	   in	   RECOM’s	  
decision-­‐making	   process.30	  Moreover,	   the	   uncertain	   outcome	   of	   whether	   the	   commission	  
will	   be	   created	   and	   the	   long	   process	   in	   rallying	   financial	   and	   political	   support—both	   of	  
which	  have	  been	  fluctuating	  and	  vague—has	  also	  led	  to	  a	  RECOM	  fatigue	  with	  each	  of	  the	  
main	   partner	   organizations	   focusing	   their	   energy	   and	   resources	   on	   domestic	   and	   local	  
programs	   in	   their	   respective	   home	   countries.31	   In	   addition	   to	   internal	   obstacles,	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  See	  interview	  with	  Mirsad	  Tokača,	  director	  of	  the	  Research	  and	  Documentation	  Center	  in	  June	  2011.	  
28	  See	  interview	  with	  Nataša	  Kandić,	  director	  of	  the	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center,	  in	  May	  2011.	  
29	  See	  interview	  with	  official	  member	  of	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  in	  Zagreb	  in	  February	  2011.	  
30	  B92,	  “NGOs	  Fall	  Out	  over	  Donations,”	  Život,	  June	  30,	  2011.	  
31	  See	  supra	  note	  29.	  See	  also	  programs	  by	  Documenta,	  http://www.documenta.hr	  or	  the	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center	  
http://www.hlc-­‐rdc.org,	  accessed	  November	  23,	  2010.	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initiative’s	   institutionalization	   process	   has	   faced	   difficulties	   fueled	   by	   other	   political	   and	  
international	  actors	  in	  the	  region.	  
Although	   the	   political	   and	   institutional	   structures	   in	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia	   have	   become	  
more	  favorable	  for	  the	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  Initiative	   in	  recent	  years,	  numerous	  obstacles	  
still	   impede	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   fact-­‐finding	   body.32	   In	   the	   following	   I	   describe	   the	   fragile	  
political	   progress	   across	   the	   region	   and	   outline	   some	   of	   the	   inherent	   problems.	   The	   first	  
important	   political	  wave	   of	   change	   in	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia	   occurred	   in	   the	   early	   2000s.	  
Tudjman’s	   death	   in	   1999	   allowed	   the	   conservative	   nationalist	   era	   to	   end	   in	   which	   the	  
narrative	  of	  the	  glorious	  homeland	  war	  to	  defend	  the	  young	  nation	  didn’t	   leave	  any	  room	  
for	  discussion	  of	  war	  crimes	  and	  human	  rights	  violations.	  Serbia’s	  notorious	  leader	  Milošević	  
was	   booted	   out	   of	   power	   after	   his	   2000	   electoral	   defeat	   amid	   rising	   protests	   from	   the	  
streets	  after	  he	  attempted	  to	  unilaterally	   remain	   in	  power.33	  This	   reckoning	  with	  the	  past,	  
however,	  was	  only	  the	  tip	  of	  the	  iceberg	  of	  a	  long	  process	  that	  is	  still	  ongoing.	  	  
Indeed,	   current	   political	   leaders	   in	   both	   countries,	   Ivo	   Josipović	   the	   president	   of	   the	  
Republic	   of	   Croatia	   (who	   began	   his	   first	   term	   in	   February	   2010),	   and	   Boris	   Tadić	   the	  
president	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	   Serbia	   (in	   his	   second	   term,	  which	   started	   in	   February	   2008),	  
have	  both	  made	  important	  strides	  to	  foster	  a	  climate	  of	  rapprochement	  in	  the	  region.	  They	  
represent	  a	  new	  political	  generation	  that	  has	  not	  been	  personally	  involved	  (be	  it	  directly	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  Particularly	  during	  electoral	  campaigns,	  history	  is	  manipulated	  and	  old	  nationalist	  sentiments	  exploited	  by	  certain	  
political	  parties	  or	  social	  groups.	  
33	  Sabrina	  Ramet,	  “Politics	  in	  Croatia	  Since	  1990,”	  in	  Central	  and	  Southeast	  European	  Politics	  Since	  1989,	  2010,	  chap.	  
12	  and	  13.	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indirectly)	  in	  war	  crimes	  or	  the	  human	  rights	  violations	  of	  the	  1990s	  conflicts.34	  In	  2007,	  for	  
instance,	   Tadić	   released	  a	   statement	  on	  Croatian	  national	   TV	  on	   the	  eve	  of	   Croatia’s	   16th	  
independence	   anniversary,	   June	   24,	   2007,	   apologizing	   for	   crimes	   committed	   against	   the	  
Croatians	  by	  members	  of	  the	  Serbian	  population.35	  While	  then-­‐president	  of	  Croatia,	  Stjepan	  
Mesić	   welcomed	   the	   remarks,	   nationalist	   hardliners	   at	   home,	   such	   as	   Aleksandar	   Vučić,	  
secretary	   general	   of	   the	   Serbian	   Radical	   Party,	   ferociously	   criticized	   him	   as	   a	   national	  
traitor.36	  Already	  in	  2004,	  the	  Serbian	  president	  has	  made	  similar	  remarks	  while	  on	  a	  visit	  to	  
Sarajevo,	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina.37	  More	  recently,	  on	  November	  4,	  2010,	  Tadić	  apologized	  
for	  the	  massacre	  that	  took	  place	  19	  years	  ago	  in	  Vukovar,	  a	  town	  in	  Northeastern	  Croatia.38	  
He	  said	  that	  “[b]y	  acknowledging	  the	  crime,	  by	  apologizing	  and	  regretting,	  we	  are	  opening	  
the	  way	  for	  forgiveness	  and	  reconciliation”;	  yet	  not	  everyone	  received	  him	  with	  wide	  open	  
arms.	  Several	  mothers	  of	  those	  killed	  in	  Vukovar,	  for	  instance,	  turned	  their	  backs	  while	  he	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  In	  the	  1980s,	  Josipović	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Communists	  of	  Croatia,	  playing	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  democratic	  
transformation	  of	  this	  party	  as	  the	  author	  of	  the	  first	  statute	  of	  the	  Social	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Croatia	  (SDP)	  after	  
Croatia’s	  independence.	  He	  left	  politics	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  pursuing	  his	  academic	  career	  as	  a	  law	  professor	  at	  the	  
University	  of	  Zagreb	  and	  only	  reentered	  the	  political	  realm	  in	  2003,	  when	  Ivica	  Račan,	  then	  acting	  Prime	  Minister,	  
invited	  him	  to	  join	  the	  government.	  Serbia’s	  president,	  Boris	  Tadić,	  a	  trained	  psychologist,	  was	  part	  of	  the	  Democratic	  
Opposition	  of	  Serbia,	  which	  was	  key	  in	  overthrowing	  Milosević	  in	  2000.	  	  Politically	  part	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Party,	  he	  
has	  made	  multiple	  symbolic	  reconciliatory	  public	  statements	  that	  are	  a	  sign	  of	  collaboration	  and	  understanding	  of	  
both	  countries.	  	  
35	  The	  rising	  wave	  of	  apologies	  in	  the	  region	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  Serbia	  and	  Croatia.	  In	  November	  
2010,	  Bakir	  Izetbegovic,	  Bosniak	  member	  of	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina's	  tripartite	  presidency,	  apologized	  for	  deaths	  caused	  
by	  his	  ethnic	  group	  among	  other	  ethnicities.	  This	  trend	  started	  in	  2000	  with	  Montenegrin	  President	  Milan	  Djukanovic,	  
when	  he	  apologized	  for	  the	  1991	  shelling	  of	  the	  Croatian	  coastal	  city	  of	  Dubrovnik	  in	  which	  his	  country	  was	  involved.	  
Since,	  the	  Serbian	  and	  Croat	  heads	  of	  state	  have	  apologized	  in	  2003,	  and	  Tadić	  apologized	  to	  Bosnians	  in	  Sarajevo	  in	  
2004	  for	  Serbian	  atrocities	  committed	  there.	  Additionally,	  Josipović	  has	  apologized	  at	  Jasenovac,	  a	  World	  War	  II	  
concentration	  camp,	  where	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  people	  were	  killed	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  Public	  apologies	  are	  not	  the	  
only	  trend,	  as	  there	  have	  been	  political	  and	  judicial	  conciliation	  as	  well.	  The	  Parliament	  of	  Serbia,	  for	  instance,	  voted	  
on	  a	  resolution	  on	  the	  1995	  Srebrenica	  massacre,	  while	  Croatia	  is	  assisting	  Serbia	  in	  its	  bid	  to	  join	  the	  EU	  Nenad	  Pejic,	  
“The	  Weight	  Of	  Wreaths	  And	  Words,”	  Radio	  Free	  Europe	  /	  Radio	  Liberty,	  November	  4,	  2010,	  
http://www.rferl.org/content/The_Weight_Of_Wreaths_And_Words/2211082.html.	  
36	  Lidija	  Popovic,	  “Tadic	  Apology	  to	  Croats	  Divides	  Serbia,”	  Balkan	  Investigative	  Reporting	  Network,	  June	  26,	  2007,	  
http://birn.eu.com/en/89/10/3417/?tpl=30.	  
37	  See	  “Tadić	  se	  izvinio	  građanima	  Hrvatske,”	  B92,	  24	  June	  2007.	  	  
38	  Vukovar	  is	  situated	  close	  to	  the	  Serbian	  border	  and	  a	  war	  site	  where	  Serbian	  forces	  took	  over	  200	  hospitalized	  
Croats	  to	  a	  nearby	  pig	  farm	  in	  Ovčara	  and	  massacred	  them	  in	  November	  1991.	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gave	   his	   speech.39	   Both	   of	   these	   examples	   illustrate	   how	   the	   political	   landscape	   equals	   a	  
minefield,	  as	  not	  only	  right-­‐wing	  nationalist	  veterans	  feel	  betrayed,	  but	  also	  victims	  express	  
their	  discontent	  with	  political	  symbolism	  that	  does	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  in	  their	  eyes.	  Tadić’s	  
Croatian	   counterpart,	   Josipović,	   reciprocated	   these	   symbolic	   steps,	   and	   during	   the	  
November	  4,	  2010	  ceremony	  in	  Vukovar,	  he	  laid	  down	  a	  wreath	  in	  commemoration	  of	  over	  
a	  dozen	  Serbs	  that	  had	  been	  killed	  in	  a	  nearby	  village.40	  In	  addition,	  both	  leaders	  expressed	  
their	   political	   backing	   of	   the	   Coalition	   for	   RECOM	   initiative	   in	   fall	   2010	   when	   RECOM	  
members	  publicly	  asked	  for	  their	  support.41	  
However,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  symbolic	  gestures	  and	  discourses	  by	  heads	  of	  state	  in	  both	  of	  these	  
countries	  (and	  across	  the	  region)	  institutional	  drawbacks	  remain—ranging	  from	  the	  lack	  of	  
investigations	  of	  war	   crimes	   involving	  high-­‐profile	  Croatian	  politicians,	   such	  as	   the	   former	  
speaker	   of	   the	   parliament,	   Vladimir	   Šeks42,	   to	   the	   appointment	   by	   the	   current	   Serbian	  
government	  of	  Zoran	  Stanković	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Serbian	  Ministry	  of	  Health,	  despite	  his	  close	  
ties	  with	  indicted	  war	  criminal	  Bosnian	  Serb	  General	  Ratko	  Mladić.43	  	  
Interestingly,	   support	   from	   international	   organizations	   to	   create	   RECOM’s	   institutional	  
framework	   also	   remains	   limited	  and	   further	   complicates	  human	   rights	   activists’	   efforts	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  Associated	  Press,	  “Serbian	  President	  Apologizes	  for	  Wartime	  Massacre”,	  November	  4,	  2010,	  
http://www.wtop.com/?sid=2105540&nid=105.	  
40	  Ibid.	  Already	  in	  spring	  2010,	  when	  giving	  a	  talk	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  Parliament,	  Josipović	  apologized	  for	  crimes	  
committed	  against	  Bosnians	  by	  the	  Croatian	  people.	  He	  also	  visited	  the	  site	  of	  the	  Ahmići	  massacre	  with	  Bosnian	  
Catholic	  archbishop	  cardinal	  Vinko	  Puljić	  and	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Community	  reis	  Mustafa	  Cerić.	  See	  “Josipović	  
apologizes	  for	  Croatia’s	  role	  in	  war	  in	  Bosnia,”	  Croatian	  Times,	  15	  April	  2010.	  
41	  Gordana	  Andrić	  and	  Eldin	  Hadžović,	  “REKOM	  Initiative	  Collects	  Signatures	  Across	  Balkans,”	  BalkanInsight.com,	  April	  
26,	  2011,	  http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/million-­‐signatures-­‐for-­‐the-­‐victims-­‐of-­‐balkan-­‐wars.	  
42	  Amnesty	  International,	  Behind	  a	  Wall	  of	  Silence:	  Prosecution	  of	  War	  Crimes	  in	  Croatia.	  
43	  Radio	  Free	  Europe/Radio	  Liberty,	  “Mladic	  Friend	  Approved	  As	  Serbian	  Health	  Minister,”	  News,	  March	  17,	  2011,	  
http://www.rferl.org/content/mladic_friend_serbian_health_minister/2339279.html.	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account	  for	  war	  crimes.	  While	  the	  Political	  Affairs	  Committee	  of	  the	  Parliamentary	  Assembly	  
of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   (CoE)	   has	   released	   a	   report	   expressing	   its	   support	   for	   regional	  
reconciliatory	   justice	   mechanisms	   among	   states	   of	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia,	   such	   as	   the	  
regional	   fact-­‐finding	   initiative	  RECOM	   44,	   other	   organizations,	   including	   the	  UNDP	  and	   the	  
EU,	   among	   others,	   avoid	   public	   statements	   that	   engage	   in	   direct	   political	   or	   financial	  
support	  of	  RECOM.45	  Politicking	  among	  Coalition	  members	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  external	  support,	  
however,	   are	   not	   the	   only	   challenges	   the	   RECOM	   initiative	   has	   to	   overcome.	   During	   the	  
creation	   of	   this	   truth	   space	   a	   debate	   about	   the	   meaning	   of	   victimhood	   has	   emerged,	  
producing	  different	  opposing	  narratives.	  	  
	  
Multiple,	  Conflicting	  Narratives	  of	  Victimhood	  
Recent	   scholarship	   has	   grappled	   with	   the	   question	   of	   victimhood	   in	   post-­‐authoritarian	  
regimes.	   Drawing	   on	   interviews	   with	   war	   criminals	   and	   reports	   of	   the	   confessions	   of	  
perpetrators	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   settings	   in	   Argentina,	   Brazil,	   Chile	   and	   South	   Africa,	   for	  
instance,	  Leigh	  Payne	  analyzes	  the	  behavior	  of	  perpetrators	  (in	  terms	  of	  remorse,	  heroism,	  
denial,	  or	  sadism)	  and	  the	  reaction	  of	  victim	  groups.46	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  
denial	  still	  remains	  an	  important	  phenomenon	  in	  society.	  Partly,	  as	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  in	  the	  
following,	  because	  state	  institutions	  have	  sustained	  certain	  political	  discourses—such	  as	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  Pietro	  Marcenaro,	  Reconciliation	  and	  Political	  Dialogue	  Between	  the	  Countries	  of	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia,	  
Parliamentary	  Assembly	  Rapporteur	  Report	  (Council	  of	  Europe,	  2011).	  
45	  See	  interview	  with	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Program	  and	  European	  Union	  officials	  in	  Sarajevo	  in	  May	  2011.	  
46	  Payne,	  Unsettling	  Accounts:	  Neither	  Truth	  nor	  Reconciliation	  in	  Confessions	  of	  State	  Violence.	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foundational	  myth	  of	  the	  Croatian	  Homeland	  War	  1991-­‐1995.	  In	  this	  context,	  veterans	  have	  
generally	   enjoyed	   financial	   support	   in	   form	   of	   pensions	   provided	   by	   the	   state.47	   On	   the	  
contrary,	   state	   institutions	   across	   the	   region	   have	   often	   ignored	   the	   fate	   of	   civilian	   war	  
victims	   and	   their	   families.	   During	   the	   RECOM	   consultation	   process	   participating	   victims	  
association	  have	  therefore	  stressed	  the	  need	  to	  define	  the	  meaning	  and	  status	  of	  a	  victim,	  
illustrating	  RECOM	  initiators’	  conundrum	  of	   integrating	  different	  narratives	  of	  the	  region’s	  
looming	  past.	  	  
As	  a	  member	  of	  a	  local	  victim	  association	  from	  Zvornik,	  a	  town	  in	  northeastern	  Bosnia	  from	  
which	  nearly	  all	  Muslims	  were	  expelled	  during	  the	  1992-­‐1995	  war,	  underlined:	  
Persecution	  of	  the	  civilian	  population	  can’t	  be	  compared	  to	  the	  persecution	  of	  those	  
who	  bore	   rifles	  and	  were	  members	  of	  a	  military	   formation.	  Today,	   these	  numbers	  
are	  being	  made	  equal.	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  make	  a	  balance	  in	  this	  war:	  they	  are	  trying	  
to	  make	   it	   up	  with	   the	  previous	  war.	   (...)	   This	  means	   that	   a	   civilian	   is	   a	   civilian,	   a	  
soldier	   should	  not	  be	  mentioned	  because	  after	  all	   he	  was	  a	  member	  of	   the	  army,	  
those	  are	  separate	  issues.	  However,	  here	  I	  exclusively	  speak	  about	  civilians,	  people	  
who	  were	  taken	  and	  killed	  at	   their	  doorsteps	  or	  a	  bit	   further	  depending	  on	  where	  
one	  was	  killed.48	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  Veterans	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  for	  instance,	  have	  also	  benefitted	  from	  financial	  and	  political	  support	  by	  their	  
respective	  governments.	  See	  Popić	  and	  Panjeta,	  Compensation,	  Transitional	  Justice	  and	  Conditional	  International	  
Credit	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina.	  
48	  Cited	  in	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM,	  Report	  About	  the	  Consultative	  Process	  on	  Instruments	  of	  Truth-­‐	  Seeking	  About	  War	  
Crimes	  and	  Other	  Serious	  Violations	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Post-­‐Yugoslav	  Countries,	  8.	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This	   narrative,	   however,	   stands	   in	   opposition	   to	   the	   RECOM	  members’	   goal	   to	   establish	  
facts	   about	   human	   rights	   violations	   and	  war	   crimes	   of	  all	   victims.49	   And	   indeed,	   in	   some	  
cases,	  the	  meaning	  of	  victim	  includes	  social	  groups	  that	  do	  not	  match	  the	  Zvornikan’s	  above	  
definition	   but	   include	   former	   members	   of	   the	   armed	   forces.	   Although	   the	   Coalition	   for	  
RECOM	  Initiative	  counts	  only	  six	  veterans	  associations	  versus	  well	  over	  one	  hundred	  victims	  
associations,	   this	   situation	   demonstrates	   the	   inherent	   predicament	   of	   RECOM’s	   leading	  
members	   to	   draw	   bridges	   among	   different	   local	   and	   regional	   civil	   society	   organizations	  
during	  their	  consultation	  meetings.	  	  
In	   local	   and	   regional	   consultation	   meetings,	   such	   as	   in	   Vukovar	   in	   summer	   2010	   and	   in	  
Skopje	   in	  winter	   2010,	   for	   instance,	  members	   of	   different	   branches	   of	   the	  Association	   of	  
Underage	   Volunteers	   of	   the	   Homeland	   War	   also	   participated	   in	   the	   discussion.50	   These	  
organizations	   have	   been	   created	   for	   persons,	   who	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   war	   were	   not	  
considered	   adults,	   yet	   fought	   in	   the	  1991-­‐1995	  Croatian	  war.	  As	   underage	  participants	   in	  
the	   hostilities,	   however,	   they	   are	   not	   entitled	   to	   any	   veteran	   pensions	   from	   the	   Croatian	  
state.51	  Hence,	  the	  concerns	  of	  one	  of	  their	  representatives	  with	  regards	  to	  RECOM’s	  task	  of	  
registering	  human	  losses	  stands	  in	  contrast	  with	  the	  statement	  given	  by	  the	  member	  of	  the	  
Zvornika	  victims	  association:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  The	  final	  draft	  of	  the	  statute	  was	  adopted	  on	  the	  fourth	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  Assembly	  Meeting	  on	  26	  March	  2011	  
in	  Belgrade.	  The	  draft	  is	  available	  at	  http://www.zarekom.org/documents/Proposed-­‐RECOM-­‐Statute.en.html,	  
accessed	  on	  May	  2,	  2011.	  
50	  See	  reports	  of	  the	  consultation	  meetings	  at	  http://www.zarekom.org/Consultations.en.html,	  accessed	  on	  February	  
11,	  2011.	  
51	  See	  informal	  interview	  with	  Documenta	  director	  Vesna	  Teršelić	  in	  Vukovar	  on	  14	  July	  2010.	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I	   am	   in	   favor	   of	   a	   register	   of	   all	   losses,	   which	   would	   include	   both	   civilians	   and	  
military	  men,	  and	  that	  list	  must	  inevitably	  include	  foreign	  nationals	  who	  participated	  
in	   those	  conflicts.	  How	  are	  we	  going	  to	  register	   them?	  We	  should	   include	  them	   in	  
the	   same	   register,	   together	   with	   the	   members	   of	   international	   forces.	   And	   a	  
separate	  register	  should	  be	  created	  for	  victims,	  primarily	  victims	  of	  war	  crimes.52	  	  
RECOM’s	  policy	  strategy	  therefore	  does	  not	  necessarily	  receive	  the	  approval	  from	  its	  main	  
target	  and	  support	  groups	  of	  war	  victims.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  its	  holistic	  approach,	  some	  victims’	  
organizations,	  such	  as	  the	  Mothers	  of	  Srebrenica,	  do	  not	  participate	  officially	  as	  a	  member	  
of	   the	   RECOM	   coalition	   because	   their	   members	   insisted	   on	   the	   exclusive	   definition	   of	  
noncombatants.53	   Narratives	   by	   political	   actors	   and	   state	   institutions	   also	   complicate	  
RECOM’s	  mission	  to	  establish	  a	  regional	  commission.	  
Nationalist	  discourses	  generated	  by	  (particularly	  populist)	  political	  actors	  across	  the	  region	  
still	  pose	  an	  impediment	  to	  the	  successful	  creation	  of	  truth	  spaces	  by	  human	  rights	  activists.	  
As	   a	   case	   in	   point,	   after	   the	   arrest	   of	   Ratko	  Mladić	   on	   26	  May	   2011,	   the	   Serbian	  Radical	  
Party	  organized	  a	  rally	  consisting	  of	  about	  10,000	  nationalist	  protestors	  who	  rallied—with	  a	  
small	   amount	   of	   participants	   rioting—in	   front	   of	   the	   Serbian	   parliament	   in	   Belgrade	   to	  
demonstrate	   against	   Mladić’s	   extradition	   to	   The	   Hague.54	   A	   few	   months	   earlier,	   Croatia	  
faced	   a	   similar	   situation	  with	   nationalists	   and	   veterans	  mobilizing	   large	   parts	   of	   Croatian	  
society	   across	   the	   region	   in	   order	   to	   protest	   against	   the	   ICTY	   first	   instance	   verdict	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Supra	  note	  50.	  
53	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM,	  Report	  About	  the	  Consultative	  Process	  on	  Instruments	  of	  Truth-­‐	  Seeking	  About	  War	  Crimes	  
and	  Other	  Serious	  Violations	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Post-­‐Yugoslav	  Countries,	  8.	  See	  also	  Supra	  note	  29.	  
54	  Steven	  Erlanger,	  “Pro-­‐Mladic	  Demonstrators	  in	  Serbia	  Rally	  Against	  His	  Extradition,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  May	  29,	  2011.	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General	  Ante	  Gotovina	  case.55	  The	  verdict	  was	  handed	  down	  two	  days	  before	  the	  initial	  start	  
date	  of	  the	  RECOM	  signature	  campaign	  in	  Croatia.	  Given	  the	  very	  tense	  political	  climate	  in	  
the	   country,	   human	   rights	   activists	   postponed	   the	   launch	   of	   the	   signature	   campaign	   to	   a	  
later	   date	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   violence	   among	   their	   campaign	   volunteers	   and	  
demonstrators.56	  	  Drawing	  on	  the	  latter	  case,	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  question	  of	  state	  victimhood,	  
which	   acts	   as	   an	   institutional	   hurdle	   to	   the	   constitution	   of	   truth	   spaces	   in	   society—in	  
addition	   to	   the	   differing	   narratives	   of	   victims	   mentioned	   above—and	   which	   further	  
exacerbates	  the	  work	  of	  NGO	  activists	  in	  the	  field.	  	  
Political	   symbolism	   has	   a	   very	   strong	   effect	   on	   the	   community	   if	   it	   is	   grounded	   in	   lived	  
experience.	  Ben	  Anderson	  explores	  the	  sociopolitical	  consequences	  on	  employing	  symbols	  
for	   political	   means	   in	   a	   longitudinal	   studies	   stretching	   over	   centuries57,	   Alex	   Bellamy	  
analyzes	   the	   question	   temporally	   and	   spatially	   more	   concise,	   focusing	   on	   Croatia.58	   Not	  
surprisingly,	   the	   foundational	  myth	  of	   former	   Croatian	   army	   commander,	  Gotovina—who	  
has	   risen	   to	   an	   emblematic	   war	   hero	   figure	   in	   Croatian	   society,	   and	  who	   represents	   the	  
ontological	   core	   of	   the	   nation’s	   nascent	   identity	   incarnated	   in	   a	   fight	   of	   good	   (Croatia)	  
against	   evil	   (Serbia)—has	   sparked	   ferocious	   criticism	   at	   the	   intersection	   between	  
international	   and	   national	   politics.	   Despite	   the	   Croatian	   government’s	   international	  
cooperation	   which	   led	   to	   his	   arrest	   and	   transfer	   to	   the	   ICTY	   in	   December	   2005,	   the	  
normative	   shift	   in	   favor	   of	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   in	   the	   endlessly	   dragging—and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Radio	  Free	  Europe/Radio	  Liberty,	  “Hague	  Tribunal	  Sentences	  Croatian	  Generals	  To	  Long	  Prison	  Terms,”	  News,	  April	  
14,	  2011,	  http://www.rferl.org/content/un_judgments_due_in_croatian_war_crimes_case/3557888.html.	  
56	  See	  interview	  with	  Signature	  Campaign	  officials	  of	  the	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  in	  May	  2011.	  
57	  Benedict	  Anderson,	  Imagined	  Communities:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Origin	  and	  Spread	  of	  Nationalism	  (Verso,	  1991).	  
58	  Bellamy,	  The	  Formation	  of	  Croatian	  National	  Identity:	  A	  Centuries-­‐Old	  Dream,	  1–6.	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politically	  highly	  explosive—extradition	  issue	  of	  Gotovina	  was	  incomplete.	  In	  fact,	  during	  the	  
entire	   period,	   politicians	   strategically	   reopened	  debate	   on	   Croatia’s	   national	   foundational	  
myths.59	  After	  the	  verdict,	  the	  Croatian	  government	  even	  took	  the	  necessary	  steps	  to	  initiate	  
an	  appeals	  process	  and	  provide	  questionable	  amounts	  of	   legal	   and	   financial	   assistance	   to	  
Gotovina’s	  defense	  team	  in	  The	  Hague.60	  	  
Unsurprisingly,	   human	   rights	   activists	   have	   geared	   up	   to	   provide	   alternative	   spaces	   of	  
deliberation	  for	  victims	  in	  society.	  Yet,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  multiple	  narratives	  of	  the	  Coalition	  
for	  RECOM	  Initiative’s	  members	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  campaign	  leaders	  also	  grappled	  with	  
communicating	  their	  common	  strategy	  and	  goals	  to	  participating	  members,	  which	  is	  a	  very	  
fragile	   process	   given	   the	   transnational	   context	   of	   the	   fact-­‐finding	   movement.	   Below	   I	  
discuss	   the	   problem	   of	   mobilizing	   collective	   action	   by	   first	   drawing	   on	   conceptual	  
frameworks	   and	   then	   by	   providing	   empirical	   evidence	   from	   the	   RECOM	   consultation	  
campaign.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Pavlaković,	  “Better	  the	  Grave	  Than	  a	  Slave:	  Croatia	  and	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Former	  
Yugoslavia.”	  
60	  Croatian	  Times,	  “Croatian	  Government	  Forms	  Team	  to	  Help	  Gotovina,	  Markac,”	  Croatiantimes.com,	  April	  18,	  2011.	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The	  Difficulties	  of	  Framing	  a	  Transnational	  Discourse:	  The	  Local-­‐
Regional	  Divide	  
The	  notion	  of	  frames,	  and	  more	  precisely	  the	  concept	  of	  frame	  analysis,	  is	  used	  to	  analyze	  
how	  people	   understand	   situations	   and	   activities	   in	   particular	   social	   contexts.	   Rather	   than	  
being	   home	   to	   one	   particular	   discipline,	   it	   has	   been	   applied	   in	   different	   research	   areas.61	  	  
The	   extensive	   use	   of	   this	   research	   methodology	   in	   sociology,	   however,	   is	   generally	  
attributed	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Erving	  Goffman	  and	  his	  1974	  book	  Frame	  analysis:	  An	  Essay	  on	  the	  
Organization	   of	   Experience.62	   	   Since	   the	   1980s,	   framing	   concepts	   have	   also	   been	   applied	  
most	   extensively	   to	   social	   movement	   studies,	   making	   them—along	   with	   resource	  
mobilization	  and	  political	  opportunity	  processes—a	  crucial	   tool	   to	  understanding	   the	  nuts	  
and	  bolts	  of	  collective	  action	  in	  the	  field.63	  More	  recent	  research	  has	  continually	  expanded	  
the	   analytical	   scope	   of	   framing	   in	   order	   to	   cope	   with	   the	   structural	   bias	   as	   a	   result	   of	  
political	   opportunity	   models,	   focusing	   on	  more	   dynamic	   phenomena.64	   In	   addition,	   some	  
authors	  have	  also	  examined	  transnational	  mobilization	  and	  the	  challenges	  social	  actors	  have	  
to	   confront	   when	   working	   across	   national	   boundaries.65	   Two	   particular	   aspects	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  The	  different	  research	  areas	  include	  linguistics	  and	  discourse	  analysis;	  communication	  and	  media	  studies;	  political	  
science	  and	  policy	  studies	  and	  sociology.	  For	  a	  review	  of	  the	  different	  concepts	  in	  these	  areas	  see	  Robert	  Benford	  and	  
David	  Snow,	  “Framing	  Processes	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  An	  Overview	  and	  Assessment,”	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Sociology	  
(2000):	  611–639.	  
62	  Goffman,	  Frame	  Analysis:	  An	  Essay	  on	  the	  Organization	  of	  Experience.	  
63	  For	  an	  extensive	  list	  of	  authors	  see	  Benford	  and	  Snow,	  “Framing	  Processes	  and	  Social	  Movements:	  An	  Overview	  and	  
Assessment,”	  612.	  
64	  Goodwin	  and	  Jasper,	  “Caught	  in	  a	  Winding,	  Snarling	  Vine:	  The	  Structural	  Bias	  of	  Political	  Process	  Theory.”	  
65	  Donatella	  della	  Porta	  and	  Sidney	  Tarrow,	  Transnational	  Protest	  and	  Global	  Activism	  (Lanham,	  MD:	  Rowman	  &	  
Littlefield	  Publishers,	  Inc.,	  2005).	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abundant	   scholarship	   are	   especially	   helpful	   in	   order	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   current	   RECOM	  
campaign	  process:	  cultural	  framing	  and	  transnational	  framing.	  
Jeffrey	   Goodwin	   and	   Jaswin	   Jasper’s	   analysis,	   for	   instance,	   points	   to	   a	   very	   important	  
observation	   in	   social	   movement	   theory.	   According	   to	   them,	   the	   political	   opportunity	  
thesis—principally	  developed	  by	  the	  prolific	  efforts	  of	  senior	  scholars	  such	  as	  Charles	  Tilly,	  
Sidney	   Tarrow	   and	   Doug	   McAdams	   in	   their	   political	   process	   approach—provides	   only	   a	  
limited	   explanation	   to	   understand	   the	   success	   or	   failure	   of	   how	   a	   movement	   is	   able	   to	  
mobilize	   its	   base.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   they	   center	   on	   additional	   dynamics	   that	   social	  
movements	   research	   should	   integrate	  within	   its	   analytical	   tools:	   agency	  and	  culture.66	   For	  
the	  purpose	  of	  our	  RECOM	  case	  study	  it	  is	  noteworthy	  to	  explore	  the	  latter.	  More	  precisely,	  
Goodwin	   and	   Jasper	   refer	   to	   countercultural	  movements	   including	   ”literary,	  musical,	   and	  
other	  artistic	  movements	  that	  challenge	  dominant	  beliefs	  and	  symbols,	  influence,	  collective	  
identities,	   and	   even	   penetrate	  more	   state-­‐oriented	  movements.”67	   Thus,	   they	   go	   beyond	  
process	   theorists’	   analyses	   on	   solely	   challenging	   cultural	   codes	   that	   are	   oriented	   towards	  
the	   state	   or	   political	   institutions	   such	   as	   feminist	  movements	   or	   gay	   rights.	  Goodwin	   and	  
Jasper	  posit	  that	  
all	   these	   factors	   are	   affected	   by	   conscious	   strategies,	   decisions,	   and	   (ultimately)	  
actions	  of	  protestors,	   their	  opponents,	   and	   state	  actors.	   These	   factors	   tend	   to	  get	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Goodwin	  and	  Jasper,	  “Caught	  in	  a	  Winding,	  Snarling	  Vine:	  The	  Structural	  Bias	  of	  Political	  Process	  Theory.”	  
67	  Ibid.,	  35.	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treated	  as	  though	  they	  were	  stable	  structures	  rather	  than	  the	  outcomes	  of	  actions	  
informed	  by	  strategic	  calculations.68	  
Their	  work	   seamlessly	   lines	  up	  with	  earlier	   research	  by	  David	  Snow	  and	  his	   colleagues	  on	  
frame	   alignment	   processes,	   which	   is	   “the	   linkage	   of	   individual	   and	   [social	   movement	  
organization]	   SMO	   interpretive	   orientations,	   such	   that	   some	   set	   of	   individual	   interests,	  
values	   and	   beliefs	   and	   SMO	   activities,	   goals	   and	   ideology	   are	   congruent	   and	  
complementary.”69	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  RECOM	  Initiative,	  participating	  members	  were	  indeed	  
hoping	  to	  bring	  together	  different	  backgrounds	  and	  experiences,	  expecting	  to	  find	  the	  kind	  
of	  congruence	  and	  complementarity	  Snow’s	  research	  team	  was	  referring	  to.	  As	  an	  example,	  
a	   member	   of	   the	   Serbian	   NGO	  Women	   for	   Peace,	   Jelena	   Cakić,	   expressed	   exactly	   these	  
hopes	   during	   a	   national	   consultation	   of	   the	   RECOM	   campaign	   in	   Fruška	   Gora,	   Serbia,	   on	  
October	  10,	  2008:	  
I	  think	   it	  would	  be	  good	  to	  organize	  meetings	  of	  associations	  of,	   let’s	  say,	  mothers	  
from	  Srebrenica	   [and]	   some	  women	   from	  Serbia,	  who	  went	   through	   some	   similar	  
tragedies;	   to	   connect	   them	  and	  give	   them	  space	   in	  media	   (…)	  That	  would	  be	  very	  
efficient	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  sensitization	  of	  the	  society.70	  
Yet,	  the	  regional	  and	  transnational	  character	  of	  the	  initiative	  is	  precisely	  the	  crux	  of	  problem	  
the	   Coalition	   for	   RECOM	   campaign	  members	   are	   grappling	  with.	   In	   fact,	   the	   issues	   to	   be	  
dealt	   with	   vary	   in	   form,	   scope	   and	   intensity.	   	   For	   instance,	   the	   problems	   that	   Slovenia	  
(which	  has	  joined	  the	  coalition	  recently	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2010)	  has	  to	  face,	  differ	  entirely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  Ibid.,	  40.	  
69	  “Frame	  Alignment	  Processes,	  Micromobilization,	  and	  Movement	  Participation,”	  464.	  
70	  Cited	  in	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM,	  Report	  About	  the	  Consultative	  Process	  on	  Instruments	  of	  Truth-­‐	  Seeking	  About	  War	  
Crimes	  and	  Other	  Serious	  Violations	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Post-­‐Yugoslav	  Countries,	  64.	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from	  the	  problems,	  with	  which	  Croatia,	  Serbia	  or	  Kosovo	   let	  alone	  Bosnia	  are	  confronted.	  
Without	   going	   into	   detail	   about	   each	   of	   the	   cases,	   I	   chose	   the	   examples	   of	   Croatia	   and	  
Slovenia	  to	  illustrate	  this	  point.	  	  
As	  discussed	  earlier,	  Croatia’s	  intricate	  balancing	  act	  when	  dealing	  with	  the	  repercussions	  of	  
the	  1992-­‐1995	  conflict	   is	  due	  to	  a	  question	  of	   identity	  politics.	  Post-­‐Tudjman	  governments	  
not	   only	   have	   faced	   difficulties	   in	   transforming	   the	   official	   narrative	   Croatia’s	   national	  
freedom	  and	   independence	   struggle,	   but	   also	   turned	   a	   blind	   eye	   to	   human	   rights	   abuses	  
and	   war	   crimes	   within	   the	   ranks	   of	   Croatian	   military	   forces.	   Recent	   efforts,	   however,	  
illustrate	   that	   political	   and	   human	   rights	   initiatives	   have	   moved	   the	   right	   direction	   of	  
changing	  this	  public	  discourse,	  without,	  necessarily,	  discrediting	  the	  independence	  struggle	  
the	  young	  state	  had	  to	  go	  through.71	  	  
Slovenia,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  barely	  succumbed	  to	  violent	  conflict,	  and	  the	   little	   fighting	   that	  
occurred,	  only	  lasted	  for	  a	  few	  days.	  Its	  secession	  from	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  was,	  at	  least	  
in	   this	   regard,	   fairly	   uneventful.	   The	   country	   has,	   however,	   its	   own	   dark	   chapter	   of	   the	  
1990s:	  a	  register	  of	  residents	  from	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  which	  was	  erased	  
by	   the	  Slovenian	  government,	   the	  people	  on	   the	   list	  become	  known	  as	   the	   ‘Izbrsani’	   (the	  
erased).	  In	  fact,	  after	  Slovenia	  declared	  its	  independence,	  a	  majority	  of	  non-­‐Slovenians	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	   Civil	   society,	   however,	   is	   far	   from	   being	   homogenous.	   Instead,	   it	   is	  made	   up	   of	   different	   factions	   ranging	   from	  
human	  rights	  activists	  to	  defenders	  of	  the	  status	  quo.	  See	  for	  instance	  Vukašin	  Pavlović,	  Društveni	  Pokreti	  i	  Promene	  
(Beograd:	  Udruženje	   za	   politi	   ke	   nauke	   Jugoslavije,	   2003).	  While	   human	   rights	   organizations,	   focusing	  on	   issues	   of	  
dealing	  with	   the	   past,	   advocate	   for	   change	   (including	   accountability,	  memorialization	   and	   transparency),	   veterans’	  
organizations	  maintain	  a	  tight	  grip	  on	  Croatia’s	  Homeland	  War	  discourse,	  protesting	  against	   ICTY	  rulings	  and	  urging	  
the	  government	  to	  oppose	  cooperation.	  See	  for	  instance	  “Thousands	  Protest	  Croatia	  War	  Crime	  Arrests,”	  France24,	  
December	  26,	  2009,	  http://www.france24.com/en/node/4956665.	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able	  to	   legalize	  their	  status	  and	  gain	  Slovenian	  citizenship.	  Yet,	  those	  who	  didn’t	  have	  this	  
privilege,	   had	   to	   bear	   the	   fate	   of	   the	   undesirable	   and	   fell	   through	   the	   intentional	  
bureaucratic	   cracks	   of	   the	   administration.	  According	   to	  naturalization	   laws	  passed	   shortly	  
after	  Slovenia’s	  newly	  acquired	  sovereignty,	  they	  became	  illegal	  alien	  residents	  and	  had	  to	  
face	   judicial	   charges,	   often	   leading	   to	   the	   expulsion	   from	   the	   country.	   Although	   the	  
Slovenian	  constitutional	  court	  recognized	  the	  erasure	  as	  unconstitutional	  in	  1999	  and	  2003,	  
discriminatory	  practices	  continued.	  Only	  since	  2002	  have	  the	  victims	  initiated	  steps	  to	  fight	  
for	   their	   rights	  and	  gain	  recognition	   for	   their	  cause.	  Over	   the	  past	   two	  decades,	  however,	  
silence	  and	  amnesia	  eroded	  their	  cause	  and	  their	  cases.72	  The	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  Initiative	  
organized	  a	  regional	  consultation	  meeting	  in	  September	  2010	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Slovenian	  
human	   rights	   organizations	   that	   advocate	   for	   the	   Izbrsani	   cause,	   hence	   underlining	   their	  
commitment	   to	   cope	  with	  different	   injustices	   that	  were	   committed	  during	   the	   split	   up	  of	  
the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	   	  The	  difficulties	   lying	  ahead	  for	  a	  regional	  approach	   in	  dealing	  with	  
the	   past	   consist	   of	   creating	   sufficient	  momentum	   for	   a	   common	   cause,	   while	   in	   parallel,	  
acknowledging	  and	  integrating	  very	  different	  issues	  and	  traumas	  of	  war	  victims.	  
The	   breakup	   of	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia	   has	   led	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   multiple	   nation-­‐states,	  
which	  makes	   state	  politics	  across	   the	   region	  a	  matter	  of	   international	  politics	  and	   foreign	  
policy.	  Although	  these	  new	  countries	  share	  a	  common	  history	  and	  broke	  off	  from	  the	  same	  
former	  federalist	  state,	  current	  interstate	  relations	  are	  considered	  high	  politics	  and	  each	  of	  
the	   young	   states’	   sovereignties	   represent	   a	   sacred	   cow.	   Therefore,	   RECOM’s	   campaign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Jasminka	  Dedić,	  Vlasta	  Jalušič,	  and	  Jelka	  Zorn,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Exclusion	  Citizenship,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  Erased	  in	  
Slovenia	  (Ljubljana:	  Mirovne	  Institute,	  2003).	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efforts	   across	   the	   region—in	   spite	   of	   the	   different	   countries	   sharing	   a	   historical	   and	  
sociopolitical	   background—is	   an	   example	   of	   transnational	   politics	   par	   excellence.	   Recent	  
research	  that	  has	  focused	  on	  transnational	  framing	  theory	  thus	  provides	  rich	  insights	  for	  the	  
RECOM	  case.	  In	  their	  edited	  volume,	  Transnational	  Protest	  and	  Global	  Activism,	  the	  editors	  
Donatella	   della	   Porta	   and	   Sidney	   Tarrow,	   present	   a	   collection	  of	   different	   case	   studies	   to	  
discuss	   issues	   of	   transnational	   collective	   action,	   a	   term	   they	  use	   to	   “indicate	   coordinated	  
international	   campaigns	   on	   the	   part	   of	   networks	   of	   activists	   against	   international	   actors,	  
other	  states,	  or	  international	  institutions.”73	  Interestingly,	  in	  some	  of	  these	  case	  studies	  they	  
show	  how	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  was	  transformed	  for	  its	  activists.	  More	  precisely,	  they	  argue	  
that	   the	   transformations	   occurred	   based	   changes	   in	   the	   environment,	   such	   as	   the	  
development	   of	   electronic	   forms	   of	   communication	   and	   inexpensive	   international	   travel,	  
among	  others;	  behavior,	   including	   learning	  processes	  among	   international	  actors	   to	  adapt	  
policy	  strategies	  or	  activities;	  and	   in	  state-­‐society	  relation.	  And	  it	  is	  notably	  the	  latter,	  they	  
stress	  as	  a	  factor	  for	  change:	  
Relations	   between	   movements	   and	   governments	   are	   a	   major	   source	   of	   change.	  
Social	  movements	  do	  not	  act	  in	  a	  vacuum,	  and,	  in	  fact,	  the	  strongest	  influences	  on	  
their	   behavior	   and	   tactics	   are	   the	   behavior	   and	   tactics	   of	   the	   government	   they	  
challenge.	  The	   last	  decade	  has	   shown	   that	  governments	  also	   imitate	  one	  another,	  
therefore	   leading	   to	   increasing	   similarities	   in	   the	   contexts	   in	   which	   movement	  
campaigns	  and	  protests	  take	  place.74	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  Donatella	  della	  Porta	  and	  Sidney	  Tarrow,	  “Transnational	  Pprocesses	  and	  Social	  Activism:	  An	  Introduction,”	  in	  
Transnational	  Protest	  and	  Global	  Activism	  (Lanham,	  MD:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Publishers,	  Inc.,	  2005),	  7.	  
74	  Ibid.,	  9.	  
	  169	  
Interestingly,	  the	  changes	  at	  the	  state	  level	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  fostered	  by	  the	  RECOM	  
campaign	   and	   its	   members	   are	   yet	   to	   bear	   the	   fruit	   of	   their	   labor.	   As	   of	   today,	   the	  
movement	  is	  still	  struggling	  to	  create	  enough	  momentum	  to	  establish	  the	  independent	  fact-­‐
seeking	   body	   with	   government	   support	   across	   the	   region.	   However,	   even	   if	   the	  
institutionalization	   of	   such	   a	   transnational	   truth	   commission	   for	   the	   war	   crimes	   in	   the	  
Balkans	  might	  never	  materialize,	  the	  incessant	  efforts	  and	  the	  numerous	  local,	  national	  and	  
regional	  consultations	  have	  contributed	  to	  sensitize	  and	  educate	  society	  about	  these	  grave	  
human	  rights	  violations.75	  	  While	  the	  bottom-­‐up	  approach	  is	  still	  struggling	  to	  get	  its	  feet	  off	  
the	  ground,	  state	  cooperation	  regarding	  war	  crimes	   issues	  have	   increased	   in	  recent	  years.	  
Earlier,	  I	  outlined	  several	  symbolic	  gestures	  of	  heads	  of	  state	  across	  the	  region	  to	  apologize	  
and	   recognize	   heinous	   crimes	   committed	   during	   the	   conflicts.	   Recently,	   leaders	   in	   the	  
former	   Yugoslavia	   have	   even	   taken	   a	   step	   further	   to	   expand	   and	   consolidate	   their	  
cooperation	   regarding	  war	   crimes	   prosecution.76	   On	   February	   3,	   2012,	   Croatian	   president	  
Ivo	  Josipović,	  Serbian	  president	  Boris	  Tadić	  and	  the	  tripartite	  Bosnian	  leadership,	   including	  
Bakir	   Izetbegović,	   Zeljko	   Komsić	   and	   Nebojsa	   Radmanović,	   met	   in	   Bosnia	   Herzegovina	   at	  
Mount	  Jahorina,	  outside	  Sarajevo,	  where	  Josipović	  proposed	  that	  the	  three	  countries	  sign	  a	  
three-­‐state	  agreement	  on	  prosecution	  of	  war	  crimes.	  	  According	  to	  this	  initiative	  each	  of	  the	  
signatory	  parties	  will	  prosecute	  its	  own	  citizens,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  crime	  took	  place	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Jelena	  Subotić,	  “The	  RECOM	  Initiative:	  The	  Promise	  and	  Peril	  of	  Regional	  Truth	  Seeking	  in	  the	  Balkans,”	  Puls	  
Demokratije,	  February	  10,	  2010.	  See	  also	  interview	  with	  Vjeran	  Pavlaković,	  history	  professor	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Rijeka,	  Croatia,	  on	  6	  September	  2010.	  
76	  Some	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  bilateral	  cooperation	  between	  the	  different	  states	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  exists	  already,	  such	  as	  
I	  have	  illustrated	  with	  the	  Glavaš	  case	  in	  chapter	  2.	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on	  its	  territory	  or	  on	  a	  territory	  outside	  of	  the	  country’s	  jurisdiction.	  The	  other	  participating	  
states	  will	  also	  make	  available	  documents	  and	  evidence	  relevant	  to	  the	  case.77	  	  
This	  above	  example	  illustrates	  how	  state-­‐level	  institutions	  and	  civil	  society	  actors	  have	  two	  
different	  agendas	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  dealing	  with	  the	  past.	  Although	  governments	  primarily	  
seek	   legal	   mechanisms	   to	   account	   for	   mass	   atrocities	   in	   the	   region,	   they	   also	   engage	   in	  
symbolic	   activities,	   including	  memorials	   and	   apologies,	   among	   others.	   Yet,	   these	   political	  
actions	  are	  predominantly	  associated	  with	  problems	  and	  questions	  of	  concern	  to	  society	  at	  
large,	  while	  human	  rights	  activists	  have	  spearheaded	  a	  movement	  that	  promotes	  individual	  
rights.	  Thus	  activists	  are	  moving	  the	  human	  rights	  debate	  on	  war	  crimes	  from	  a	  state-­‐centric	  
to	   a	   victim-­‐centered	   approach	   in	   transitional	   justice	   processes	   in	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia.	  
Nonetheless,	  as	  I	  discuss	  in	  the	  following,	  human	  rights	  advocates	  have	  to	  engage	  in	  more	  
abstract	   and	   legal-­‐oriented	   strategies	   in	   order	   to	   implement	   their	   restorative	   justice	  
campaign	  across	  the	  region.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
This	  chapter	  has	  examined	  the	  recent	  regional	  restorative	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  former	  
Yugoslavia,	  the	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  Initiative,	  which	  is	  currently	  taking	  shape	  and	  recently	  
finished	  its	  consultations	  process	  and	  meetings	  to	  define	   its	  mandate	  and	  the	  institutional	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  Denis	  Dzidic,	  “Josipovic	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character	  of	  its	  body.	  After	  the	  violent	  disintegration	  of	  Yugoslavia	  in	  the	  1990s,	  the	  region	  
has	   witnessed	   several	   retributive	   and	   restorative	   mechanisms	   to	   cope	   with	   the	   past,	  
including	   war	   crimes	   tribunals—on	   the	   international	   and	   (to	   a	   lesser,	   but	   still	   noticeable	  
extent)	   national	   level—and	   fact-­‐finding	   initiatives.	   During	   these	   processes	   human	   rights	  
activists	  have	  occupied	  an	  important	  intermediary	  function,	  communicating	  and	  interacting	  
between	  spaces	  created	  by	  varying	  justice	  and	  truth	  narratives.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  was	  
to	   analyze	   these	   different,	   intersecting	   spaces	   and	   the	   role	   of	   civil	   society	   within	   these	  
spaces	   to	   help	   understand	   recent	   practices	   to	   establish	   a	   transnational	   fact-­‐finding	  
mechanism.	   The	   first	   part	   of	   this	   chapter	   addressed	   the	   ongoing	   internal	   and	   external	  
struggle	   of	   human	   rights	   activists	   to	   establish	   an	   extra-­‐legal	   space	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   past	  
across	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia.	   In	   this	   context,	   I	   also	   analyzed	   the	   conflicting	   impact	   of	  
different	   victims	   groups’	   narratives	   that	   accompanied	   the	   institutionalization	   process.	  
Finally,	  I	  examined	  the	  emerging	  issues	  in	  RECOM’s	  regional	  approach	  to	  find	  support	  for	  its	  
cause	   by	   discussing	   and	   employing	   framing	   concepts	   from	   social	   movement	   theory.	   In	  
Chapter	  6,	  I	  will	   look	  at	  how	  legal	  concepts	  have	  influenced	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  fact-­‐











In	   Chapter	   5	   I	   analyzed	   the	   sociopolitical	   struggle	   of	   human	   rights	   activists	   to	   launch	   the	  
Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  Initiative	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  deliberative	  space	  for	  victims.	  I	  pointed	  
not	  only	   to	   the	   internal	  disputes	  and	  disagreements	  of	   its	  members,	  but	   also	   to	  pressure	  
from	   other	   civil	   society	   groups	   and	   social	   as	  well	   as	   political	   actors	   in	   the	   region.	   In	   this	  
chapter,	  I	  expand	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  truth	  spaces	  described	  earlier,	  illustrating	  how	  activists—
in	  their	  effort	  to	   institutionalize	  the	  RECOM	  campaign	  efforts—distanced	  themselves	  from	  
their	   main	   support	   group,	   victims	   and	   victims	   families.	   Put	   differently,	   during	   the	  
consultation	   efforts	   to	   create	   a	   draft	   statute	   of	   the	  RECOM	   fact-­‐finding	   body,	   the	   driving	  
NGO	   forces	   of	   the	   campaign,	   particularly	   the	   Humanitarian	   Law	   Center,	   have	   adopted	   a	  
strategy	   that	   follows	  a	  state-­‐centric	   logic,	   in	  order	   to	  gain	  support	   from	  governments	  and	  
political	  leaders.	  To	  this	  end,	  the	  meetings	  involved	  legal	  practitioners	  and	  experts	  to	  define	  
the	  details	  of	  the	  scope	  and	  powers	  of	  the	  commission.	  While	  other	  voices,	  such	  as	  ordinary	  
citizens	   (notably	   victims)	   and	   other	   specialists—such	   as	   historians,	   sociologists	   and	   other	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scholars—also	   contributed	   to	   the	   elaboration	   of	   the	   current	   draft	   statute,	   the	   impact	   of	  
legal	   frameworks	   and	   ideas	   on	   the	   statute	   are	   especially	   telling	   in	   order	   to	   explain	   the	  
changing	  notion	  of	  human	  rights	  on	  the	  local	  level	  in	  the	  region	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  
The	  dominance	  of	  legal	  concepts	  in	  institutionalizing	  fact-­‐finding	  measures	  raises	  questions	  
about	  the	  influence	  and	  consequences	  of	  hard	  justice	  (such	  as	  retributive	  mechanisms)	  on	  
soft	  justice	  (such	  as	  restorative	  tools,	  including	  truth	  commissions).	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  refer	  to	  
this	   trend	   as	   the	   legalization	   of	   truth	   spaces.	   In	   fact,	   with	   the	   process	   of	   legalizing	   truth	  
spaces	  activists	  have	  increased	  their	  ‘invented’	  space	  to	  foster	  deliberative	  spaces	  of	  justice	  
for	  civil	  society.1	  Yet,	  they	  also	  attempted	  (and	  currently	  still	  are	  attempting)	  to	  embed	  their	  
newly	   created	   space	   in	   the	   space	   originally	   provided	   by	   state	   institutions	   to	   depoliticize	  
transitional	   justice	   efforts	   in	   the	   region.	   In	   other	   words,	   without	   legal	   and	   official	  
recognition	   by	   member	   states	   across	   the	   region,	   these	   grassroots	   efforts	   will	   remain	  
without	   legitimacy	   and	   the	   commission	   will	   not	   likely	   be	   created.	   I	   show,	   however,	   that	  
their	   goal	   of	   legal-­‐oriented	   depoliticization	   of	   restorative	   justice	   processes	   remains	   still	  
highly	  political,	  as	  they	  struggle	  to	  establish	  an	  officially	  institutionalized	  truth	  space.	  
This	   chapter	   therefore	   focuses	  on	   the	  challenges	  of	   the	   legalistic	   influence	  on	   fact-­‐finding	  
processes.	  More	  precisely,	   I	   analyze	   the	  ongoing	  political—and	  also	   legal-­‐oriented—battle	  
to	   institutionalize	  alternative	   transitional	   justice	  mechanisms.	  To	   this	  end,	   I	   structured	  my	  
chapter	   into	   four	   different	   sections.	   Firstly,	   I	   describe	   the	   early	   grass-­‐roots	   discussions	   of	  
RECOM’s	  mandate	  drawing	  on	  two	  local	  consultations	  in	  Knin,	  Croatia	  and	  Kruševac,	  Serbia.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  chapter	  5	  for	  more	  detail.	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Secondly,	  I	  discuss	  some	  of	  the	  earlier,	  fundamental	  questions	  that	  arose	  in	  light	  of	  crafting	  
a	   proper	   mandate	   for	   the	   regional	   fact-­‐finding	   body.	   Then,	   in	   the	   main	   section	   of	   this	  
chapter,	   I	   rely	   on	   data	   collection	   of	  my	   participant	   observation	   of	   RECOM’s	   last	   regional	  
forum	   on	   transitional	   justice	   in	   October	   2010	   before	   the	   RECOM	   campaign	   members	  
finalized	   the	   draft	   statute	   in	   March	   2011.	   This	   forum	   highlights	   the	   dilemma	   of	   NGO	  
activists’	  struggle	  to	  legitimize	  the	  commission	  at	  the	  state-­‐level,	  resulting	  in	  what	  I	  call	  the	  
legalization	  of	  truth	  spaces.	  To	  conclude,	  I	  discuss	  some	  of	  the	  conceptual	  implication	  of	  this	  
phenomenon,	  especially	  because	  this	  juridification	  of	  fact-­‐finding	  bodies	  bears	  its	  roots	  in	  a	  
broader	  law-­‐society	  development.	  	  
	  
Early	  Grass-­‐Roots	  Efforts:	  Local	  Consultations	  in	  Croatia	  and	  
Serbia	  	  
As	  mentioned	   in	   chapter	   5,	   during	   the	   first	  meeting	   in	   the	   fall	   of	   2005	   several	   renowned	  
NGOs	  from	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia—including	  Documenta,	  the	  Research	  and	  Documentation	  
Center	  and	  the	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center,	  among	  others—discussed	  the	   idea	  of	  a	  regional	  
truth	   commission.	  Their	   initial	   idea	  eventually	   led	   to	  a	   follow-­‐up	   regional	  meeting	   in	  May	  
2008,	  the	  first	  regional	  forum	  on	  transitional	  justice	  in	  Podgorica,	  Montenegro.	  During	  this	  
forum	   the	   organizers	   and	   participants	   decided	   to	   initiate	   a	   consultation	   process	   to	  
materialize	   a	   fact-­‐finding	   body	   for	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia.	   This	   process	   took	   nearly	   three	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years,	  before	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  Initiative—the	  official	  name	  of	  the	  
campaign—voted	   on	   a	   final	   draft	   for	   the	   commission’s	   mandate	   in	   March	   2011.	   NGO	  
activists	   hope	   to	   introduce	   the	   current	   draft	   statute	   to	   national	   parliaments	   across	   the	  
region	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  Their	  goal	   is	  to	  have	  each	  legislative	  adopt	  and	  ratify	  the	  body’s	  
institutional	   framework	   and	   mandate—a	   27-­‐page	   legal	   document	   with	   over	   50	   articles,	  
divided	  into	  thirteen	  parts—before	  creating	  the	  commission.	  
The	   process	   of	   gaining	   grassroots	   support	   for	   the	   campaign	   was	   the	   result	   of	   numerous	  
consultations	  with	  local	  communities.	  Below,	  I	  draw	  on	  comments	  by	  participants	  of	  two	  of	  
these	  consultation	  processes	  in	  order	  to	  sketch	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  initial	  ideas	  and	  issues	  
raised	  during	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  campaign.	  After	  discussing	  these	  two	  cases,	  I	  illustrate	  
the	   increasing	   local-­‐regional	   gap	   during	   the	   later	   phases	   of	   the	   campaign	   between	   the	  
movement	   organizers	   and	   local	   communities.	   During	   one	   of	   the	   early	   consultations,	  
organized	  on	  August	  4,	  20092	  in	  Knin,	  Croatia—a	  city	  situated	  in	  a	  region	  that	  many	  Croatian	  
Serbs	  had	  to	  escape	  during	  the	  Croatian	  1995-­‐military	  intervention,	  Operation	  Storm—one	  
of	  the	  pressing	  issues	  raised	  by	  participants	  was	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  RECOM	  Initiative	  to	  help	  
establish	   a	   different	   version	   of	   the	   past.	   Revealing	   the	   ‘truth,’	   as	   some	   of	   the	   victims	  
participating	   at	   the	   roundtable	   phrased	   it,	   was	   one	   of	   the	  most	   important	   achievements	  
they	   expected	   from	   the	   commission	   in	   order	   to	   counter	   the	   prevailing	   discourse	   of	   the	  
Homeland	  war—patriotic	  nation-­‐building	  war	  in	  which	  Croatian	  soldiers	  did	  not	  commit	  any	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  organizers	  chose	  to	  hold	  the	  consultation	  meeting	  one	  day	  before	  the	  Croatian	  national	  holiday,	  Victory	  and	  
Homeland	  Thanksgiving	  Day	  and	  the	  Day	  of	  Croatian	  defenders,	  which	  honors	  Croatia’s	  veterans	  and	  is	  celebrated	  in	  
Knin	  by	  the	  political	  establishment,	  the	  military,	  veterans	  and	  the	  public.	  The	  event	  is	  a	  very	  nationalist	  and	  
conservative	  celebration	  of	  Croatia’s	  young	  nationhood.	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war	   crimes	  but	   only	   helped	  defeat	   terrorists	  who	   threatened	   the	   young	   state’s	   territorial	  
integrity,	  according	  to	  the	  official	  discourse	  of	  the	  Croatian	  government.3	  
Jovan	  Berić,	  a	  Serbian	  victim	  from	  Zadar,	  Croatia,	  believes	  in	  the	  RECOM	  movement	  as	  it	  can	  
help	  to	  uncover	  perpetrators	  of	  different	  crimes.	  His	  comments	  thus	  underline	  his	  urge	  to	  
reveal	  facts	  of	  past	  war	  crimes	  and	  atrocities:	  
What	   do	   you	   have	   to	   talk	   to	   them	   about,	   they	   killed	   your	   parents,	   and	   you	   are	  
sitting	  with	  them.	  […]	  That’s	  not	  how	  I	  think	  […]	  because	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  every	  
Croat	   is	   responsible	   for	   the	   crimes	   committed,	   but	   individuals,	   whose	   names	   are	  
unfortunately	   not	   yet	   known.	   That	   is	   why	   I	   am	   looking	   forward	   to	   seeing	   this	  
initiative	   up	   and	   running	   because	   I	   truly	   hope	   this	   can	   help	   name	   all	   war	   crime	  
perpetrators,	  which	  will	  help	  us	  go	  in	  a	  better	  direction.4	  
Participants	   at	   the	   consultation	   several	  weeks	   later	   in	   Kruševac,	   Serbia,	   on	   September	   7,	  
2009,	  expressed	  similar	  opinions	  regarding	  the	  need	  to	  establish	  facts	  about	  the	  past.	  Miško	  
Radonjić,	  a	  representative	  of	  a	  local	  NGO	  called	  Euro	  Contact	  underlined	  that:	  
I	  personally	  believe	  that	  RECOM	  should	  only	  deal	  with	  the	  facts,	  that	  it	  should	  not	  
even	  […]	  tackle	  the	  issue	  of	  causes,	  because	  that	  leads	  straight	  into	  politics,	  which	  
will	  definitely	  create	  additional	  problems.5	  
In	   fact,	  political	  groups,	  governments	  and	  other	  actors	  have	  continuously	  politicized	  many	  
war-­‐related	   issues	   across	   the	   region	   in	   the	   post-­‐conflict	   Balkans.6	   The	   RECOM	   Initiative’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	  chapter	  3	  for	  further	  details	  on	  Croatia’s	  Homeland	  War.	  
4	  See	  RECOM	  consultation	  with	  the	  local	  community,	  Knin,	  Croatia,	  August	  4,	  2009.	  
5	  See	  RECOM	  consultation	  with	  the	  local	  community,	  Kruševac,	  Serbia,	  September	  7,	  2009.	  
6	  Issues	  range	  from	  the	  manipulated	  and	  distorted	  accounts	  of	  the	  number	  of	  dead	  in	  the	  Srebrenica	  massacre	  in	  BiH	  
to	  the	  involvement	  of	  politicians	  in	  war-­‐related	  bribery	  scandals	  and	  arms	  deals.	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intention	  was	  to	  overcome	  this	  politicking.	  To	  this	  end,	  campaign	  members	  also	  wanted	  to	  
reach	  out	  to	  a	  larger	  public.	  
While	  many	  of	  the	  consultations	  with	  local	  communities	  centered	  on	  victims,	  the	  organizers	  
of	   the	  RECOM	  campaign	   carefully	   drafted	   a	   strategy	   that	  would	   reach	  beyond	   this	   target	  
group.	   Youths	   constituted	  a	   group	  on	  which	  members	  of	   the	  RECOM	   Initiative	   focused	   in	  
particular.	  During	   the	  earlier	   consultation	   in	   Knin	   Emina	  Bužinkić	   a	  member	  of	   the	   Young	  
People	   of	   Croatia	   Network	   thus	   emphasized	   the	   significance	   of	   engaging	   younger	  
generations	  in	  a	  dialogue	  about	  past	  mass	  atrocities.	  According	  to	  her,	  	  
It	   is	  very	   important	  to	  me	  to	  stress	  that	  young	  people	  want	  to	  know	  the	  facts.	  We	  
want	  to	  know	  the	  truth;	  we	  want	  to	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  dealing	  with	  the	  past	  process.	  
That	  is	  very	  important	  for	  us	  because	  it	  influences	  the	  way	  we	  are	  going	  to	  build	  our	  
future.	  For	  us,	  this	  commission	  is	  important	  at	  the	  level	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  past	  and	  
learning	   about	   the	   events	   of	   the	   past.	   For	   us	   it	   is	   important	   at	   the	   level	   of	  
transferring	  something	  to	  new	  generations.7	  
These	  earlier	  consultations	  with	  local	  communities	  focused	  on	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  the	  
commission’s	  mandate;	  yet,	  in	  some	  of	  the	  later	  consultations	  especially	  during	  2010—such	  
as	   the	  ones	  held	  by	  Documenta	   in	  Croatia’s	   rural	   and	  urban	  areas—the	  draft	   statute	  had	  
grown	  into	  a	  relatively	  complex	  legal	  document,	  hampering	  the	  dialogue	  between	  the	  local	  
community	  and	  the	  NGO	  activists	  promoting	  the	  RECOM	  Initiative.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Ibid.	  supra	  note	  4.	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The	  case	  of	  a	  consultation	  meeting	  with	  civil	  society	  organizations	  in	  Osijek,	  Croatia’s	  third	  
largest	  city	  that	  was	  heavily	  destroyed	  during	  the	  1992-­‐1995	  war	  is	  a	  good	  case	  in	  point	  to	  
emphasize	  the	  problem	  of	  RECOM	  Initiative	  members	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  regional-­‐local	  divide.	  
Put	  differently,	  while	  the	  organizers	  made	  an	  effort	  to	  be	  connected	  to	  their	  community	  at	  
the	  base	  and	  to	  integrate	  local	  concerns	  into	  the	  regional	  project,	  these	  attempts	  were	  very	  
difficult	  and	  did	  not	  always	  lead	  to	  the	  expected	  results.	  	  
Some	   of	   my	   transcribed	   notes	   from	   my	   fieldwork	   at	   the	   Croatian	   nonprofit	   during	   this	  
period	  highlight	  these	  intricate	  processes.	  The	  meeting	  at	  Osijek	  took	  place	  on	  July	  14,	  2010,	  
a	  hot	   and	  dry	   summer	  day	  with	   temperatures	  well	   above	  95	  degrees	   Fahrenheit.	  A	   small	  
team	  of	  Documenta	   staff,	   including	  director	  Vesna	   Teršelić,	  media	   liaison	   Eugen	   Jakovčić,	  
and	   the	   young	   dynamic	   program	   coordinator	   Darija	  Marić	   had	   left	   their	   office	   in	   Zagreb	  
early	  in	  the	  morning	  to	  embark	  on	  a	  3-­‐hour	  drive	  east	  through	  Slavonia's	  rolling	  hills	  along	  
the	   northern	   border	   of	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina	   in	   order	   to	   reach	   to	   Osijek,	   situated	   in	  
Croatia’s	  northeastern	  territory	  about	  half	  an	  hour	  west	  of	  the	  Serbian	  border.	  Earlier	  that	  
week,	  Eugen	   Jakovčić	  had	  asked	  me	  whether	   I	  would	   like	   to	   join	   them	  to	  meet	  with	   local	  
NGOs	   in	  Slavonia's	  capital,	  Osijek,	  and	  on	  Thursday,	   I	  was	  sitting	  with	   the	  entire	  staff	   in	  a	  
small	   silver	   Opel	   Corsa,	   riding	   to	   a	   local	   consultation	   in	   a	   place	   that	   I	   had	   read	   about	   in	  
history	  books	  about	   the	  Balkan	  wars	   in	   the	  1990s,	  but	   to	  which	   I	  had	  never	  been	  before.	  
Needless	   to	   say	   that	   my	   heart	   was	   pounding,	   knowing	   I	   would	   be	   not	   only	   be	   able	   to	  
witness	  a	  local	  consultation	  meeting,	  but	  also	  be	  able	  to	  visit	  the	  city	  after	  we	  finished	  work.	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When	   we	   arrived,	   the	   first	   impressions	   of	   the	   city	   reminded	   me	   of	   a	   typical	   German	  
medium-­‐sized	   town.	  The	   red	   roof	   tiles	  were	  shiny	  and	   the	  plastered	  walls	  of	   the	   two	  and	  
three	  story	  houses	  were	  painted	  in	  different	  colors,	   including	  pale	  blue,	   lemon	  yellow	  and	  
salmon.	   Some	   houses	   looked	   relatively	   new,	   leading	   me	   to	   believe	   that	   those	   were	  
destroyed	  during	  the	  war	  and	  renovated	  in	  the	  years	  since	  the	  armed	  violence	  had	  stopped.	  
Others,	  looked	  more	  withered,	  but	  still	  in	  good	  shape.	  	  
This	   picture	   of	  Osijek	  was	   in	   stark	   contrast	  with	   the	   image	   of	   Vukovar	   I	   have	   kept	   in	  my	  
memory.	  I	  visited	  Vukovar	  in	  one	  of	  my	  later	  consultations	  with	  Documenta’s	  activists.	  The	  
city	  is	  about	  half	  an	  hour	  south	  of	  Osijek,	  directly	  at	  Serbia’s	  northwestern	  border.	   In	  fact,	  
the	  people	  of	  Vukovar	  wanted	  to	  send	  a	  message	  that	  they	  will	  never	  forget	  the	  atrocities	  of	  
the	   past	  war.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   heavily	   damaged	  water	   tower	   at	   the	   town	   entrance	   is	   still	  
looming	   over	   the	   houses	   and	   buildings	   around	   it.	  More	   strikingly,	   however,	   was	   the	   still	  
completely	   destroyed	   theatre-­‐looking	   building	   (from	   which	   only	   its	   walls,	   a	   few	   wooden	  
beams	   and	   the	   onion-­‐shaped	   towers	   in	   each	   corner	   of	   the	   building	   remained)	   in	   the	   city	  
center	  next	   to	   the	  modern	  and	   transparent	  glass-­‐facade	  of	   the	  current	   town	  hall	  building	  
that	  was	  rebuilt	  in	  recent	  years.	  The	  inhabitants	  of	  Vukovar	  insisted	  on	  keeping	  this	  somber	  
dismal	   site	   of	   annihilation	   in	   the	   heart	   of	   their	   city,	   as	   a	   reminder	   and	   warning	   for	  
generations	  to	  come.	  The	  sight	  of	  such	  destruction	  surely	  left	  a	  haunting	  impression	  and	  a	  
feeling	  of	  unease	  lingering	  inside	  of	  me.	  
	  As	  we	  finally	  parked	  the	  car	   in	  a	  side	  street	   in	  the	  city	  center	  Osijek,	   I	  did	  not	  have	  these	  
looming	  pictures	  in	  my	  head.	  We	  walked	  for	  less	  than	  a	  block	  before	  entering	  a	  courtyard,	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which	   looked	   like	   it	  could	  have	  served	  as	  the	  residence	  of	  a	  “ban”,	  a	   local	   lord	  during	  the	  
Austro-­‐Hungarian	  Empire.	  Now,	  it	  was	  home	  of	  the	  NGO	  the	  Center	  for	  Peace,	  Non-­‐Violence	  
and	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Osijek,	  ran	  by	  Katharina	  Kruhonja.8	  	  
The	  atmosphere	  at	  the	  Center	  was	  very	  collegial	  and	  good-­‐humored.	  The	  entire	  group	  that	  
met	   this	   day	   consisted	   of	   roughly	   two-­‐dozen	  of	   local	   activists,	  many	  of	   them	  part	   of	   tiny	  
associations	   from	   small	   villages	   around	   Osijek	   and	   Slavonia.	   The	   consultation	   with	   these	  
activists—which	  lasted	  several	  hours	  and	  which	  was	  video	  taped	  by	  a	  film	  team	  Documenta	  
hired	  for	  its	  consultation	  campaign—was	  very	  telling	  in	  how	  these	  bigger,	  more	  established	  
NGOs	   in	   the	   region	   struggle	   to	   integrate	   the	   needs	   of	   local	   populations	  within	   the	   larger	  
framework	   of	   the	   Coalition	   for	   RECOM	   Initiative.	   As	   a	   case	   in	   point,	   while	   Documenta	  
members	   set	   up	   stage	   for	   their	   consultation	   performance—a	   conference-­‐style	   setting	  
including	  a	   long	  panel	   table	  with	  microphones	   for	   the	  talks	  by	  Documenta	  staff	  about	  the	  
RECOM	  draft	  statute	  and	  several	  additional	  rectangular	  tables	  put	  together	  in	  a	  u-­‐shape	  to	  
accommodate	   all	   of	   the	   participants—the	   room	   slowly	   filled	   up	   with	   local	   activists	   from	  
diverse	  backgrounds,	   including	   young	  dynamic	  NGO	  activists,	   a	   few	  ordinary	   citizens,	   and	  
older	  members	   of	   various	   smaller	   associations.	   After	  media	   spokesperson	   Eugen	   Jakovčić	  
gave	   a	   brief	   introduction	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   RECOM	   Initiative,	   he	   led	   the	   more	  
technical-­‐oriented	  roundtable	  discussion	  about	  each	  of	  the	  statute’s	  articles.	  Documenta’s	  
director	   Vesna	   Teršelić	   was	   complementing	   his	   explanations.	   During	   this	   dialogue,	   which	  
resembled	  a	  Q&A	  session	  during	  a	  regular	  conference	  or	  panel	  discussion,	  an	  elderly	  woman	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  For	  more	  detail	  on	  Kruhonja’s	  work	  see	  chapter	  4.	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who	  was	  part	  of	  a	  one-­‐person	  association	  in	  her	  village	  interrupted	  the	  formal	  discussion	  on	  
provisions	   in	   the	   statute,	   in	   order	   to	   tell	   her	   story	   and	   experience	   of	   the	  war.	   After	   she	  
explained	   to	   the	  participants	   that	   she	  had	   lost	  a	   family	  member	  and	   the	  missing	  person’s	  
remains	   had	   still	   not	   been	   found	   yet,	   she	   pulled	   out	   a	   handmade	   photo	   album	   sharing	  
pictures	   and	   memories	   of	   her	   loved	   one.	   	   Her	   question	   to	   Documenta’s	   team	   evolved	  
particularly	   around	  one	   issue:	  what	  would	  RECOM	  do	   for	  her	  and	  her	  personal	   situation?	  
Could	  they	  initiate	  a	  process	  that	  would	  allow	  her	  to	  exhibit	  her	  photos	  and	  voice	  her	  cause	  
across	   the	   nation?	   And	   would	   they	   be	   able	   to	   help	   her	   find	   the	   remains	   of	   her	   family	  
member?	   While	   the	   official	   response	   of	   RECOM	   members	   supported	   her	   request,	   the	  
conversation	  quickly	   turned	  back	   to	  more	   technical	  and	  abstract	  questions	  of	   the	  statute,	  
leaving	   the	   woman’s	   concerns	   to	   the	   side.	   Yet,	   she	   was	   not	   the	   only	   one,	   questioning	  
RECOM’s	  objectives.	  	  
Other	  members	  also	  had	  troubles	  following	  the	  big-­‐picture	  objectives	  of	  the	  campaign	  put	  
forward	  by	  Documenta’s	  staff.	  Branislav	  Vorkapić,	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  Organization	  for	  
Civil	  Initiatives	  in	  Osijek,	  raised	  his	  concern	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  discussed	  goals:	  	  
The	  longer	  I	  analyze	  this	  statute,	  the	  more	  confused	  I	  feel.	  I	  keep	  wondering	  if	   it	   is	  
possible	  to	  create	  a	  diagram	  to	  reflect	  the	  stipulations	  of	  the	  statute	  to	  help	  us	  see	  
the	   organization	   more	   clearly.	   For	   example,	   it	   says	   here	   that	   members	   will	   be	  
professionally	   engaged	   individuals.	   […]	   What	   exactly	   is,	   then,	   the	   management	  
mechanism?	  Who	  makes	  strategic	  decisions?	  Then,	  as	  I	  see	  further	  down	  in	  the	  text,	  
there	   are	   these	  members	   and	   it	   is	   not	   clear	  where	   they	   belong	   according	   to	   this	  
scheme.	   Then,	   there	   are	   investigation	   teams,	   and	   then	   there	   is	   this	   executive	  
secretariat,	  which	   is	   further	   divided.	   Each	   of	   those	   segments	   has	   its	   leader,	   so	   to	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speak,	  and	  that	  segment	  is	  supposed	  to	  conduct	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  work.	  So,	  when	  I	  
try	  to	  picture	  all	  of	  this,	  trying	  to	  understand	  the	  whole	  mechanism,	  I	  get	  confused.9	  	  
Vorkapić	   concerns	   illustrate	   the	   growing	   disconnect	   between	   the	   movement’s	   early	  
motivations	  of	  creating	  a	  victim-­‐oriented	  institution	  and	  a	  non-­‐judicial	  space	  for	  victims	  and	  
those	  who	   suffered	   in	   order	   to	   complement	   existing	   retributive	  mechanisms.	   In	   fact,	   the	  
complex	   structure	   of	   the	   organization—illustrated	   by	   the	   different	   organizational	  
components	  of	  the	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  participants	  with	  its	  different	  working	  groups	  and	  
the	  Council—is	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  various	  contexts	  and	  interests	  the	  movement	  tried	  to	  
integrate	  within	  its	  mandate	  as	  mentioned	  in	  chapter	  6.	  As	  a	  result,	  both	  examples	  above,	  
the	   early	   2009	   consultations	   in	   Knin	   and	   Kruševac	   and	   the	   later	   ones	   in	   2010,	   such	   as	   in	  
Osijek,	  have	  illustrated	  the	  troubles	  the	  main	  NGOs	  of	  the	  RECOM	  movement	  faced	  during	  
the	   campaign	   to	  present	   the	   concept	  of	   a	   regional	   truth	   commission	   to	   local	   populations	  
and	  incorporate	  the	  ideas	  at	  the	  grassroots	  level	  into	  the	  draft	  statute.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  
further	  elaborate	  on	  some	  of	   the	  many	   issues	  human	  rights	  activists	  grappled	  with	  during	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  See	  Local	  Consultation	  with	  Civil	  Society	  Organizations	  on	  the	  Draft	  RECOM	  Statute,	  July	  13,	  2010,	  Osijek,	  Croatia.	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Fundamental,	  Recurring	  Questions	  during	  the	  Campaign	  Process	  
One	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  the	  drafters	  of	  the	  RECOM	  statute	  incessantly	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  was	  
the	   question	   of	   how	   to	   define	   certain	   terms	   in	   the	   statute.	  While	   certain	   terms,	   such	   as	  
“war	  crimes”	  or	  “civilians”	  were	  more	  easily	  determined	  referring	  to	  international	   law	  and	  
existing	   treaties,	   other	   ones,	   such	   as	   the	   term	   “commission”	   or	   the	   difference	   between	  
“veteran”	  and	  “combatant”	  were	  more	  difficult	  to	  define	  and	  to	  decide	  upon.	  For	  the	  term	  
“commission”	  of	  the	  fact-­‐finding	  body,	  the	  final	  draft	  statute	  of	  March	  21	  therefore	  clearly	  
defined	  that:	  
The	   Regional	   Commission	   for	   Establishing	   the	   Facts	   about	  War	   Crimes	   and	   other	  
Gross	  Violations	  of	  Human	  Rights	  Committed	  on	  the	  Territory	  of	  the	  form	  Yugoslavia	  
is	  an	  international	  regional	  organization	  established	  by	  this	  Agreement.10	  
Interestingly,	  however,	  the	  decision	  of	  whether	  to	  use	  “veteran”	  or	  “combatant”	  in	  the	  final	  
draft	  statute	  requires	  us	  to	  look	  at	  the	  semantics	  of	  both	  terms.	  A	  veteran,	  according	  to	  the	  
Oxford	  American	  Dictionary	  is	  “a	  person	  who	  has	  served	  in	  the	  military,”	  while	  a	  combatant	  
is	  “a	  person	  or	  nation	  engaged	  in	  fighting	  during	  a	  war.”11	  	  The	  drafters	  eventually	  settled	  on	  
combatant,	  because	  the	  larger	  meaning	  of	  the	  term,	  that	  of	  a	  person	  engaged	  in	  fighting	  did	  
not	  necessarily	  belong	   to	  an	   institutionalized	  and	  national	  military	   force,	  but	   rather	   could	  
imply	   that	   the	  person	  belonged	   to	  other	   armed	   forces,	   such	  as	   a	  paramilitary	   group.	   The	  
statute	  defines	  them	  as	  “members	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  of	  one	  side	   in	  a	  conflict	  as	  well	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  See	  final	  RECOM	  draft	  statute	  March	  21,	  2011,	  p.	  6,	  at	  http://www.zarekom.org/documents/Proposed-­‐RECOM-­‐
Statute.en.html,	  accessed	  May	  13,	  2011.	  
11	  Angus	  Stevenson	  and	  Christine	  Lindberg,	  New	  Oxford	  American	  Dictionary	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010)	  at	  
http://www.oxfordamericandictionary.com,	  accessed	  January	  15,	  2012.	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members	   of	  militia	   and	   volunteer	   corps	   forming	   part	   of	   such	   armed	   forces.”12	  Moreover,	  
they	  underline	  that	  as	  a	  member	  of	  any	  of	  these	  groups,	  a	  person	  does	  not	  necessarily	  have	  
to	  engage	  in	  fighting	  on	  his	  or	  her	  own	  territory	  and	  that	  any	  civilians	  who	  “spontaneously	  
take	  up	  arms	  to	  resist	  the	  invading	  forces”	  also	  falls	  into	  this	  category.13	  
	  Additionally,	  the	  term	  “veteran”	  has	  a	  distinguished	  meaning	  in	  society,	  and	  particularly	  in	  
Croatia	  (but	  also	  across	  the	  region	  and	  in	  most	  nation-­‐states)	  the	  defenders	  of	  the	  nation,	  
former	  military	  veterans,	  remain	  a	  prestigious	  social	  actor	  group	  within	  the	  state,	  glorified	  
not	   only	   by	   the	   conservative	   political	   party	  HDZ,	   but	   also	   by	   large	   parts	   of	   rural	   Croatian	  
society.	  The	  choice	  to	  use	  combatant	  then,	  strips	  this	  connotation	  from	  the	  term,	  stressing	  
instead	  the	  action	  of	  fighting	  in	  an	  armed	  conflict.	  Such	  an	  image,	  however,	  is	  far	  from	  being	  
more	   neutral	   than	   the	   picture	   that	   the	   term	   “veteran”	   evokes.	   While	   it	   might	   be	   more	  
objective	   in	   political	   terms,	   it	   still	   refers	   to	   images	   of	   violence	   and	   war.	   Slavko	   Kecman,	  
member	   of	   the	   Association	   for	   Peace	   and	   Human	   Rights	   in	   Bilje,	   Croatia,	   expressed	   his	  
opinion	  with	  respect	  to	  whether	  to	  chose	  the	  term	  veteran	  or	  combatant	  during	  one	  of	  the	  
many	  RECOM	  consultations:	  
You	  mention	  here,	  under	  point	  b)	  Veterans	  whose	  death	  or	  disappearance	  is	  a	  direct	  
consequence	  of	  the	  armed	  conflict/wars.	  I	  understand	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Convention	  
on	  the	  Prevention	  and	  Punishment	  of	  the	  Crime	  of	  Genocide,	  so	  I	  think	  it	  would	  be	  
better	  to	  rephrase	  it	  to	  read	  combat	  participants.14	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Ibid.	  see	  supra	  note	  10,	  p.	  4.	  
13	  Ibid.	  
14	  Ibid.	  supra	  note	  9.	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In	   addition	   to	   selecting	   the	   proper	   terminology	   for	   the	   statute,	   the	   drafters	   also	   had	   to	  
grapple	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  time	  in	  various	  different	  ways.	  
Firstly,	  the	  planners	  of	  the	  commission	  faced	  several	  difficulties	  regarding	  the	  timeframe	  of	  
RECOM’s	  mandate.	  In	  other	  words,	  for	  how	  long	  should	  the	  body	  investigate	  war	  crimes	  and	  
gross	  human	  rights	  violations?	  After	  several	  hour-­‐long	  debates,	  the	  drafters	  deiced	  to	  define	  
the	   timeframe	   of	   operation	   of	   the	   commission	   to	   three	   years.	   This,	   however,	   does	   not	  
include	  the	  initial	  preparation	  time	  to	  set	  up	  the	  institutional	  framework.	  Additionally,	  the	  
commission	  might	  extend	  its	  work	  for	  an	  additional	  six	  months	  if	  necessary.	  The	  extension	  
was	   added	   in	   view	   of	  writing	   and	   publishing	   the	   commission’s	   final	   report	   and	  meant	   to	  
provide	  extra	  time	  if	  further	  investigations	  were	  found	  to	  be	  crucial	  for	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  
report.15	   Furthermore,	   the	   question	   of	   the	   temporal	   and	   territorial	   scope	   of	   the	  
commission’s	  inquiry	  presented	  yet	  another	  bone	  of	  contention.	  	  
While	  the	  final	  version	  of	  the	  statute	  states	  that:	  
The	  Commission	  shall	  establish	  the	  facts	  about	  war	  crimes	  and	  other	  gross	  violations	  
of	   human	   rights	   committed	   in	   the	   period	   from	   January	   2,	   1991	   to	   December	   31,	  
2001	  in	  the	  states	  formed	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  inquire	  into	  the	  
political	   and	   societal	   circumstances	   that	   decisively	   contributed	   to	   the	   outbreak	   of	  
wars	   or	   other	   forms	   of	   armed	   conflict	   and	   to	   the	   commission	   of	   war	   crimes	   and	  
other	   gross	   violations	   of	   human	   rights,	   and	   inquire	   into	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	  
crimes	  and	  violations,	  including	  those	  which	  became	  manifest	  after	  2001;16	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Ibid.	  supra	  note	  10,	  p.	  7.	  
16	  Ibid.	  supra	  note	  10,	  article	  15,	  p.11.	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the	  members	  of	  the	  working	  group	  spent	  session	  after	  session	  splitting	  hair	  on	  defining	  the	  
appropriate	   timeframe	   for	   the	  commission.17	   The	   final	   timeframe	   includes	  all	  of	   the	  years	  
that—during	   and	   after	   the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia—led	   to	   armed	   conflicts,	  
starting	  with	  the	  first	  conflict	  between	  Croatia	  and	  Slovenia	  in	  mid-­‐1991	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
last	  one	  in	  Macedonia,	  in	  September	  2001.	  Yet,	  violence	  in	  the	  Kosovo	  region,	  for	  instance,	  
continued	   long	   after	   2001.	   In	   2004,	   mass	   violence	   against	   Serbs	   and	   Roma	   in	   Kosovo	  
intensified,	  partially	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  violence	  against	  Kosovo	  Albanians	  in	  1998-­‐1999.18	  
The	   last	   clause	   of	   article	   15	   in	   the	   final	   draft	   statute	   (cited	   above)	   “including	   those	   [war	  
crimes	   and	   human	   rights	   violations]	   which	   became	   manifest	   after	   2001,”	   therefore	  
illustrates	   that	   the	  drafters	  of	   the	  statute	  were	  concerned	  about	   recurring	  violence	   in	   the	  
region.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   they	   also	   intended	   to	   empower	   the	   commission	   to	   investigate	  
into	  more	  recent	  human	  rights	  abuses.	  
Last	  but	  not	  least,	  already	  during	  RECOM’s	  early	  consultation	  process	  participants	  raised	  the	  
question	  of	   amnesties.19	  While	   Saša	  Radovanović	   from	   the	   Institute	   for	   Serbian	  Culture	   in	  
Serbia	  and	  several	  other	  participants	  during	  the	  local	  RECOM	  consultation	  in	  Kruševac	  made	  
it	   clear	   that	   they	  were	   strongly	   against	   amnesty	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia,	  
some	   participants	  were	   divided	   over	   the	   issue	   and	   the	   role	   that	   the	   regional	   fact-­‐finding	  
body	  RECOM	  could	  play	  in	  this	  regard.20	  Given	  the	  prevailing	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  the	  inclination	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  See	  informal	  discussions	  with	  Vjeran	  Pavlaković,	  historian	  (University	  of	  Rijeka)	  and	  member	  of	  the	  RECOM	  working	  
group	  to	  establish	  its	  mandate	  in	  May	  2011.	  
18	  See	  informal	  discussions	  with	  Documenta’s	  director	  Vesna	  Teršelić	  in	  July	  2010	  and	  May	  2011.	  
19	  Some	  authors	  used	  quantitative	  analysis	  to	  analyze	  sequencing	  of	  amnesties	  with	  questionable	  success.	  See	  for	  
instance	  Olsen,	  Payne,	  and	  Reiter,	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Balance:	  Comparing	  Processes,	  Weighing	  Efficacy.	  	  
20	  Ibid.	  supra	  note	  5.	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of	  international	  and	  national	  policymakers	  across	  the	  region	  to	  employ	  war	  crimes	  courts	  to	  
account	   for	   past	   atrocities,	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   blanket	   amnesties,	   such	   as	   some	   of	   the	  
participants	  referred	  to,	  would	  ever	  be	  a	  serious	  point	  of	  discussion.	  However,	  conditioned	  
amnesties	   reminiscent	   of	   plea-­‐bargaining	   arrangements	   in	   the	   courtroom	   could	   be	  
considered	   a	  way	   of	   including	   perpetrators	   in	   the	   commission’s	   public	   hearings.	   Such	   an	  
idea	  has,	  of	  course,	  very	  little	  support	  from	  representatives	  of	  judiciaries	  in	  the	  states	  of	  the	  
former	   Yugoslavia.	   It	   remains	   therefore	   a	   highly	   controversial	   subject.	   Above,	   I	   described	  
some	  of	  the	  more	  pertinent	  fundamental	  questions	  with	  regards	  to	  establishing	  a	  regional	  
fact-­‐finding	  body.	  Below,	  I	  draw	  on	  additional	  fieldwork	  data	  in	  order	  to	  address	  more	  legal-­‐
related	  issues	  that	  emerged	  particularly	  in	  the	  last	  phase	  of	  the	  RECOM	  campaign.	  
	  
Finalizing	  the	  Statute:	  Swerving	  from	  a	  Bottom-­‐Up	  to	  a	  State-­‐Centric	  
Approach	  	  
In	   the	   final	   stages	   of	   drafting	   the	   RECOM	   statute,	   consultations	   intensified	   again	   on	   the	  
national	   and	   regional	   level,	   and	   the	  discussed	   issues	   centered	  on	   state-­‐related	  questions,	  
including	  the	  commission’s	  interaction	  with	  the	  judiciary,	  the	  election	  of	  its	  members	  and	  its	  
broader	  goals	  and	  assignments,	  among	  others.21	   In	  the	  following,	   I	  draw	  on	  my	  participant	  
observation	  of	  the	  7th	  Regional	  Forum	  on	  Transitional	  Justice	  held	  in	  Zagreb,	  Croatia,	  from	  
October	  15-­‐17,	  2010	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  how	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  principal	  RECOM	  campaign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  See	  for	  instance	  different	  working	  groups	  during	  the	  7th	  regional	  form	  on	  transitional	  justice	  held	  in	  Zagreb,	  15-­‐17	  
October	  2010.	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members,	   notably	   the	   Humanitarian	   Law	   Center,	   have	   shifted	   from	   local,	   victim-­‐oriented	  
issues,	  to	  larger	  legal	  and	  state-­‐centered	  questions.	  The	  overall	  data	  for	  these	  findings	  are	  
based	  on	  participant	  observation	  and	   interviews	  of	  consultations	  held	  by	  the	  Coalition	   for	  
RECOM	   Initiative	   from	   spring	   2008	   to	   summer	   2011.22	   To	   this	   end,	   I	   first	   provide	   some	  
background	  on	  the	  setting	  of	  the	  conference	  and	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  took	  place.	  I	  then	  
describe	   the	  workshop	   session	  on	   the	   relations	  of	  RECOM	  with	   the	   judicial	   institutions	   in	  
each	  country.	  This	  workshop	  also	  addressed	  other	  state-­‐related	  problems.	  
	  
The	  Rocky	  Road	  to	  Organizing	  the	  7th	  Regional	  Forum	  on	  Transitional	  
Justice	  
When	   the	  organizers	   and	   sponsors	   first	   decided	   to	   hold	   the	   forum,	   the	  original	   date	  was	  
scheduled	   for	   late	   September	   2010.	   The	   main	   campaign	   NGO	   actors,	   Documenta	   and	  
Humanitarian	   Law	   Center,	   had	   the	   goal	   of	   generating	   an	   effective	   transnational	   public	  
relation	   impact	   with	   the	   organization	   of	   their	   last	   regional	   transitional	   justice	   forum	   in	  
Zagreb	  before	  the	  launch	  of	  their	  signature	  campaign	  for	  the	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  Initiative	  
in	  spring	  2011	  to	  assure	  public	  support	  for	  the	  movement.23	  As	  a	  consequence,	  their	  guest	  
list	  did	  not	  only	   include	  human	  rights	  activists,	  but	  also	  government	  officials,	   international	  
state	   representatives	   and	   other	   public	   figures,	   such	   as	   scholars,	   experts,	   and	   journalists,	  
among	  others.	  Even	  the	  Croatian	  President’s	  office	  had	  agreed	  months	   in	  advance	  to	  save	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Over	  100	  consultations	  were	  held	  during	  this	  period	  at	  the	  local,	  national,	  and	  regional	  level.	  
23	  See	  chapter	  7	  with	  details	  on	  the	  challenges	  of	  the	  signature	  campaign.	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the	   date	   in	   president	   Ivo	   Josipović’s	   calendar	   upon	   a	   request	   from	   Documenta’s	  
spokesperson	  and	  media	  representative	  Eugen	  Jakovčić,	  but	  the	   initial	  schedule	  had	  to	  be	  
changed	  due	  to	  international	  events.24	  	  
In	  fact,	  after	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (ICJ)	  finally	  expressed	  its	  advisory	  opinion	  on	  
July	  22,	  2010	  that	  “the	  declaration	  of	  independence	  of	  17	  February	  2008	  [of	  the	  Republic	  of	  
Kosovo]	   did	   not	   violate	   general	   international	   law,”25	   Josipović	   urged	   leaders	   in	   both	  
countries	  to	  cooperate	  and	  find	  grounds	  for	  a	  dialogue	  at	  the	  annual	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  
Meeting	  in	  September.26	  Hence,	  Josipović	  decided	  to	  travel	  to	  New	  York	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  
to	   facilitate	   a	   dialogue	   if	   necessary,	   exactly	   during	   the	  week	   of	   the	   initially	   scheduled	   7th	  
Regional	   Forum	  of	   Transitional	   Justice.	  When	   the	  president’s	   office	   communicated	   to	   the	  
Croatian	  human	  rights	  activists	  that	  the	  head	  of	  state	  could	  not	  participate	  in	  person	  during	  
the	  conference,	  but	  that	  they	  would	  send	  a	  spokesperson,	  the	  directors	  of	  Documenta	  and	  
Humanitarian	  Law	  Center	  were	  concerned	  that	  the	  regional	  political	  impact	  would	  seriously	  
be	  diminished	  if	  Josipović	  were	  not	  present.	  Thus,	  tremendous	  resources	  were	  mobilized	  in	  
order	  to	  postpone	  the	  international	  symposium.	  
When	  the	  conference	   finally	   took	  place	   from	  October	  15-­‐17,	  2010,	   the	  Croatian	  president	  
was	  able	  to	  attend,	  sending	  a	  strong	  political	  signal	   to	  the	  states	   in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  
about	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  campaign.	  It	  was	  held	  in	  a	  conference	  room	  inside	  the	  upscale	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  President	  Josipović	  officially	  expressed	  his	  support	  for	  the	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  Initiative	  on	  August	  30,	  2010.	  The	  
following	  day,	  his	  Serbian	  counterpart,	  Boris	  Tadić	  declared	  his	  official	  support	  to	  the	  campaign.	  
25	  See	  ICJ	  advisory	  opinion,	  22	  July	  2010,	  General	  List	  No.	  141,	  available	  at	  www.icj-­‐
cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf,	  accessed	  September	  12,	  2011.	  
26	  B92,	  “Croat	  President:	  Belgrade,	  Priština	  to	  Turn	  to	  Dialogue,”	  B92	  News,	  July	  24,	  2010,	  
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-­‐article.php?yyyy=2010&mm=07&dd=24&nav_id=68660.	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Westin	   Hotel	   in	   downtown	   Zagreb,	   slightly	   to	   the	   Northeast	   of	   the	   capital’s	   botanical	  
gardens,	  making	  it	  not	  only	  easily	  accessible	  for	   international	  participants	  and	  visitors,	  but	  
also	   for	   the	   Croatian	   public	   at	   large.	   White	   tablecloths	   and	   champaign	   served	   at	   the	  
reception	  during	  the	  nocturnal	   inauguration	  ceremony	  were	  a	  sign	  of	  how	  important	  NGO	  
activists	  considered	  their	  event	  to	  be.	  Moreover,	  the	  entire	  staff,	  who	  during	  their	  regular	  
work	  usually	  dressed	  casually	  wearing	  jeans	  and	  button-­‐up	  shirts—generally	  not	  tucked	  into	  
the	  pants—had	  traded	  in	  their	  daily	  wardrobe	  for	  dress	  pants,	  suits	  and	  cocktail	  dresses.	  For	  
a	  couple	  of	  days,	  this	  forum	  turned	  Croatia's	  generally	  sleepy	  capital	  Zagreb	  into	  a	  buzzing	  
beehive,	   with	   several	   hundreds	   of	   local	   politicians,	   the	   press	   and	   international	  
representatives	  discussing	  transitional	  justice	  issues	  across	  the	  region.	  All	  eyes	  were	  focused	  
on	  the	  final	  touches	  of	  the	  RECOM	  draft	  statute.	  
	  
The	  Legal	  Debate	  and	  Issues	  of	  the	  RECOM	  Draft	  Statute	  at	  the	  7th	  Forum	  
Due	   to	   the	   limited	   time,	   several	   workshops	   about	   different	   sections	   and	   topics	   of	   the	  
statute	   were	   organized	   simultaneously.	   Nataša	   Kandić,	   the	   director	   of	   the	   Humanitarian	  
Law	   Center,	   headed	   the	   group	   discussing	   legal	   issues,	   especially	   the	   relations	   of	   the	  
commission	  with	  the	  judiciaries	  across	  the	  Balkans,	  with	  the	  title	  “The	  Mandate	  of	  RECOM	  
and	  its	  Authority	  with	  Respect	  to	  the	  Authority	  of	  National	  Judiciaries.”	  The	  organizers	  had	  
set	  up	  the	  roundtable	  discussion	  for	  this	  group	  in	  one	  of	  the	  hotel's	  upstairs	  meeting	  rooms,	  
with	  barely	  enough	  space	  for	  a	   few	  extra	  seats	  around	  the	  roughly	  20	  chairs	  placed	  along	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the	  oval-­‐shaped	  conference	  table	  and	  a	  half-­‐open	  translation	  booth	  with	   two	   interpreters	  
sharing	  the	  tiny	  available	  space	   in	  one	  of	   the	  corners	  of	   the	  room.	  This	  sloppily	  organized	  
workshop	  setting	  clashed	  with	  the	  lavishly	  catered	  and	  designed	  inaugural	  cocktail	  party	  the	  
night	  before.	  As	  many	  other	  participants	  and	  conference	  guests,	   I	  arrived	  at	  the	  workshop	  
with	  some	  delay	  and	  the	  discussants	  had	  already	  started	  debating	  several	  issues	  in	  regards	  
to	  different	  articles	  and	  paragraphs	  of	   the	  current	  draft	  statute.	  While	   I	  was	  crouching	  on	  
top	   a	   heater	   in	   front	   of	   a	   large	  window	  with	   panoramic	   view	   of	   the	   city,	   I	   unpacked	  my	  
laptop	  to	  take	  notes	  and	  started	  my	  voice	  recorder.	  Meanwhile,	  there	  was	  a	  growing	  horde	  
of	   interested	   individuals	   piling	   into	   the	   room.	  Overwhelmed	   by	   the	   never-­‐ending	   flow	   of	  
people,	   I	  made	   eye	   contact	  with	  Nataša	   Kandić	  who	  was	   sitting	   directly	   across	   the	   room	  
from	  me.	   A	   few	  moments	   later,	  Ms.	   Kandić	   grew	   impatient	   with	   the	   crowd	   and	   advised	  
me—in	   a	   tone	   that	   made	   clear	   that	   no	   was	   not	   an	   option—I	   would	   be	   better	   off	  
participating	  in	  one	  of	  the	  other	  workshops,	  implying	  that	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  latecomers	  do	  the	  
same.	   She	   explained	   that	   this	   meeting	   would	   be	   less	   interesting	   for	   the	   press	   and	   the	  
general	   public	   because	   the	   issues	   concerned	   many	   legal	   and	   technical	   details	   of	   the	  
commission’s	  statute.	  	  
After	   I	  had	  spent	  several	  semesters	  delving	   into	  RECOM's	  history	  and	  evolution,	   I	  was	  not	  
ready	  to	  sit	   in	  with	  a	  workshop	  that	  discussed	  broader	   issues,	  but	  wanted	  to	  remain	  with	  
this	  roundtable,	  in	  order	  to	  collect	  valuable	  data	  for	  my	  research.	  Despite	  being	  baffled	  by	  
her	  boldness	  to	  send	  me	  out	  of	  the	  room,	  I	  kept	  a	  straight	  face	  insisting	  that	  I	  knew	  enough	  
about	  the	  movement	  and	  would	  indeed	  be	  interested	  in	  staying	  to	  listen	  to	  the	  participants’	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suggestions	  and	  comments.	  My	  frank	  response	  also	  encouraged	  many	  of	  the	  other	  seatless	  
guest,	  who	  were	  standing	  or	  leaning	  against	  the	  wall	  to	  stay	  and	  follow	  the	  discussion.	  The	  
participants	   sitting	   around	   the	   table	   mainly	   included	   lawyers,	   legal	   experts	   and	  
practitioners,	   such	   as	   Nikola	   Bešenski,	   a	   judge	   at	   the	   County	   Court	   of	   Vukovar,	   Croatia	  
(County	   Courts	   in	   Croatia	   have	   jurisdiction	   over	   war	   crimes),	   Velija	   Murić	   from	   the	  
Montenegro	  Lawyers’	  Committee	   for	  Human	  Rights,	  and	   Ibro	  Bulić	   from	  the	  Office	  of	   the	  
War	  Crimes	  Prosecutor	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  among	  others.	  They	  addressed	  several	  
legal	  concerns	  with	  the	  current	  statute.	  
One	  of	  the	  issues	  raised	  during	  the	  workshop	  were	  perpetrator	  statements	  during	  hearings	  
of	   the	   commission.	   The	   RECOM	   statute	   article	   on	   “Public	   Hearings	   of	   Victims	   and	   Other	  
Persons”	   envisages	   public	   hearings	   to	   provide	   a	   space	   for	   victims	   to	   speak	   about	   their	  
sufferings	  and	  their	  families’	  sufferings.	  In	  addition,	  the	  article	  contains	  also	  a	  paragraph	  on	  
the	  possibility	  of	  perpetrators	  who	  committed	  war	  crimes	  or	  serious	  human	  rights	  violations	  
to	   testify	   on	   a	   voluntary	   basis.	   Such	   a	   clause,	   however,	   opens	  up	   a	   deluge	  of	   issues	  with	  
regards	   to	   accountability	   and	   dealing	   with	   the	   past.	   The	   issues	   range	   from	   amnesty	   or	  
immunity	  for	  the	  testifying	  perpetrator	  to	  judicial	  questions,	  such	  as	  whether	  the	  tasks	  of	  a	  
commission	  would	  impede	  on	  the	  work	  of	  the	  judiciary	  in	  the	  region	  and/or	  to	  what	  extent	  
the	   involvement	   of	   a	   commission	   could	   be	   complementary	   to	   the	   already	   existing	  
retributive	   justice	   mechanisms.	   Ibro	   Bulić,	   Prosecutor	   at	   the	   Office	   of	   War	   Crimes	  
Prosecutor	   of	   Bosnia	   and	   Herzegovina,	   raised	   his	   concerns	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   scope	   and	  
tasks	  of	  the	  national	  judiciaries	  in	  this	  context,	  insisting	  that	  “we	  cannot	  invite	  perpetrators	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for	   questioning,	   or	   for	   deposition	   taking	   without	   the	   presence	   of	   their	   defenders.”27	   His	  
argument	  clearly	  reflected	  his	  consternation	  with	  possible	  violations	  of	  judicial	  procedures.	  
As	   long	  as	  there	  was	  a	  guarantee	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  existing	   legal	   framework,	  testimonies	  of	  
perpetrators	  could	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  public	  hearings.	  	  
The	  mandate	  and	  power	  of	  the	  commission	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  perpetrators	  was	  further	  discussed	  in	  
the	  statute’s	  article	  on	  “Findings	  on	  Perpetrators,”	  which	  will	  be	  published	  after	  RECOM’s	  
mandate	  ends,	  when	  it	  will	  provide	  a	  final	  report	  to	  governments	  and	  the	  public	  across	  the	  
region.	  An	  early	  version	  of	  the	  draft	  that	  was	  circulated	  during	  the	  forum	  stated	  that:	  
The	   Commission	   is	  mandated	   to	   indicate	   in	   its	   Final	   Report	   based	   on	   established	  
facts	  whether	  an	  individual	  committed	  a	  criminal	  act	  of	  war	  crime	  or	  serious	  human	  
rights	  violation.	  Such	  finding	  will	  have	  no	  impact	  on	  court	  decisions.28	  
The	   wording	   this	   particular	   paragraph	   in	   the	   statute	   was	   subject	   to	   a	   very	   lively	   debate	  
during	   the	   workshop.	   Participant	   Jasminka	   Biloš,	   a	   Croatian	   lawyer,	   for	   instance	   rightly	  
wondered:	  
Who	  will	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Commission,	  who	  will	  be	  the	  competent	  individual	  to	  
decide	   if	   the	   facts	   we	   have	   collected	   point	   to	   the	   criminal	   responsibility	   of	   an	  
individual?29	  
Representatives	   from	   international	   organizations,	   such	   as	   Ivan	   Jovanović	   from	   the	   OSCE	  
Mission	  to	  Serbia,	  however,	  did	  not	  question	  the	  RECOM’s	  authority	  in	  this	  regard.	  On	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  See	  7th	  Regional	  Forum	  on	  Transitional	  Justice,	  Working	  Group:	  “The	  Mandate	  of	  RECOM	  and	  its	  Authority	  with	  
Respect	  to	  the	  Authority	  of	  National	  Judiciaries,	  Zagreb,	  Croatia,	  October	  16,	  2010.	  
28	  Ibid.	  supra	  note	  27.	  
29	  Ibid.	  supra	  note	  27.	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contrary,	  he	  underlined	  the	  great	  importance	  of	  the	  commission’s	  ability	  to	  point	  to	  alleged	  
perpetrators	  in	  its	  final	  report:	  
I	  think	  that	  RECOM	  must	  absolutely	  have	  it	  in	  its	  mandate	  to	  be	  able	  to	  indicate	  in	  
the	   Final	   Report	   that	   an	   individual	   may	   have	   committed	   a	   war	   crime.	   Because	   if	  
RECOM	  is	  only	  allowed	  to	  make	  a	  compilation	  of	  victims’	  testimonies,	  the	  results	  of	  
its	  work	  will	  be	  insignificant.30	  
In	  the	  final	  draft	  statute	  that	  was	  eventually	  adopted	  by	  its	  members	  several	  months	  after	  
the	  forum,	  the	  drafters	  slightly	  modified	  the	  initial	  text	  and	  harnessed	  the	  commission	  with	  
a	   less	   powerful	   mandate	   with	   regards	   to	   what	   statements	   it	   could	   publish	   on	   alleged	  
perpetrators.	  Its	  current	  version	  was	  printed	  as	  follows:	  
The	  Commission	  may	  conclude	  in	  the	  Final	  Report	  that	  the	  established	  facts	  lead	  to	  
a	  serious	  suspicion	  that	  an	  individual	  committed	  a	  war	  crime	  or	  other	  gross	  violation	  
of	  human	  rights.	  Such	  findings	  shall	  not	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  court	  decision	  and	  shall	  
not	  prejudice	  the	  outcome	  of	  criminal	  proceedings,	  if	  any.31	  
Ironically,	   during	   the	   debate	   Ms.	   Kandić	   underlined	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   Coalition	   for	  
RECOM	   Initiative,	   notably	   because	   the	   retributive	   justice	   mechanisms	   in	   the	   former	  
Yugoslavia	  and	  The	  Hague	  led	  to	  accountability	  efforts	  that	  ignored	  victims’	  needs.	  Yet,	  the	  
abstract	   and	   technical	   comments	   and	   discussion	   on	   legal	   questions	   of	   the	   commission	  
during	   the	  workshop	   underlined	   the	   new	   direction	   the	   RECOM	   campaign	   had	   taken:	   less	  
victim-­‐centered	  and	  eager	  to	  find	  support	  from	  governments	  in	  the	  region.	  Regardless,	  the	  
goal	   here	   is	   not	   to	   assess	   the	   normative	   value	   of	  NGO	   activists	   to	   build	   a	  momentum	  of	  
states	  in	  the	  region	  endorsing	  the	  commission.	  Instead	  this	  strategy	  highlights	  the	  dilemma	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Ibid.	  supra	  note	  27.	  
31	  Ibid.	  supra	  note	  27.	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activists	   faced	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   alternative	   transitional	   justice	   mechanisms	   in	   the	  
Balkans.	  
In	  concluding	  this	  section,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  say	  a	  few	  words	  on	  RECOM’s	  role	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  
work	  of	  national	  war	  crimes	  prosecutions.	  This	  part	  calls	   for	  a	  brief	   reflection	  on	  critically	  
embedding	   fact-­‐finding	   in	   a	   legal	   and/or	   judicial	   space.	   According	   to	   the	   draft	   statute,	  
institutionally,	  RECOM	  will	  be	  an	  official	  body	  endorsed	  by	  the	  various	  governments	  of	  the	  
former	  states	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  but	  will	  function	  independently,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier.	  In	  order	  
to	   emphasize	   the	   institutionalized	   grassroots	   effort,	   the	   organizers	   launched	   a	   signature	  
campaign	  after	   the	   forum	   in	   spring	  2011	   to	   collect	  over	  one	  million	   signatures	  across	   the	  
region.	  The	  idea	  was	  to	  generate	  enough	  public	  support	  and	  buttress	  lobbying	  efforts	  with	  
respect	  to	  introducing	  legislation	  in	  each	  of	  the	  RECOM	  member	  countries	  to	  establish	  the	  
official	  institutional	  structure.32	  	  	  
In	   theory,	   the	   body	   has	   a	   non-­‐judicial	   character,	   however,	   the	   consequences	   of	   certain	  
powers	   exerted	   by	   the	   members	   was	   a	   touchy	   subject	   in	   numerous	   consultation	   and	  
workshop	  meetings	  between	  coalition	  members	  who	  discussed	  the	  mandate	  and	  role	  of	  the	  
commission	   in	   view	   of	   finalizing	   the	   draft	   statute.	   This	   issue	   illustrates	   the	   problematic	  
character	  of	  truth	  commission	  mandates	   in	  general.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  their	  objective	   is	  to	  
disclose	  facts	  about	  human	  rights	  violations	  by	  providing	  victims	  a	  space	  to	  have	  their	  voices	  
heard—a	  form	  of	  soft	  justice	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  past.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  their	  goal	  is	  also	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  See	  interview	  series	  with	  several	  NGOs	  across	  the	  region	  in	  May	  2011.	  Currently,	  the	  campaign	  collected	  over	  
500,000	  signatures	  and	  now	  continues	  to	  collect	  signatures	  online.	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account	  for	  violence	  and	  war	  crimes,	  which,	  in	  many	  cases,	  require	  some	  form	  of	  retributive	  
justice.33	  	  
In	  this	  context,	  article	  49	  of	  the	  statute	  ‘The	  role	  of	  the	  Commission	  in	  criminal	  prosecution,’	  
has	   repeatedly	   been	   discussed	   in	   multiple	   consultation	   sessions.34	   The	   article	   comprises	  
three	  paragraphs	   relative	   to	   the	   role	  of	  RECOM	  with	   respect	   to	   alleged	  perpetrators	   that	  
participate	   in	   public	   hearings	   and	   reveal	   “information	   leading	   to	   the	   discovery	   of	   a	  mass	  
grave	  location	  or	  information	  significant	  for	  discovering	  other	  perpetrators.”	  While	  the	  first	  
paragraph	   stipulates	   a	   suggestive	   power	   to	   RECOM	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   a	   war	   crimes	   court	   to	  
recommend	   mitigating	   circumstances	   if	   any	   information	   is	   obtained	   from	   an	   alleged	  
perpetrator	   that	   could	   lead	   to	   either	   the	   discovery	   of	  missing	   persons	   in	  mass	   graves	   or	  
other	   perpetrators,	   the	   second	   and	   third	   paragraphs	   propose	   pardons	   if	   the	   collected	  
information	   from	   an	   alleged	   (paragraph	   two)	   or	   sentenced	   (paragraph	   three)	   perpetrator	  
lead	   to	   further	  discoveries	   that	  help	   the	  overall	   fact-­‐finding	  mission	  about	  past	  atrocities.	  
Prima	   facie,	   this	   discussion	   seems	   purely	   legal,	   concerning	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   roles	  
between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   RECOM.	   This	   issue,	   however,	   when	   examined	   more	   closely,	  
reveals	  a	  set	  of	  problems	  that	  range	  from	  defining	  the	  scope	  of	  amnesties–which	  in	  the	  case	  
of	  RECOM	  have	  a	  conditional	  character—to	  the	  current	  judicial	  system’s	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  
region,	  thus	  turning	  the	  scope	  of	  legal	  issues	  into	  political	  challenges.35	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  briefly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  While	  Rwandan	  Gacaca	  courts	  have	  dealt	  with	  mass	  atrocities	  on	  a	  local	  scale	  (including	  shaming	  and	  other	  forms	  
of	  sanctions	  for	  less	  grave	  crimes),	  the	  Peruvian	  truth	  commission	  cooperated	  with	  the	  domestic	  judiciary	  to	  
prosecute	  perpetrators.	  
34	  The	  following	  information	  is	  based	  on	  the	  statute	  from	  26	  March	  2011.	  See	  RECOM	  website	  at	  
http://www.zarekom.org/documents/Proposed-­‐RECOM-­‐Statute.en.html,	  accessed	  June	  12,	  2011.	  
35	  Several	  case	  studies	  discuss	  the	  legal	  problems	  of	  amnesties,	  elaborating	  on	  the	  political	  difficulties	  of	  amnesties	  to	  
foster	  democratic	  transition	  and	  arguing	  that	  that	  amnesties	  or	  pardons	  should	  only	  be	  considered	  in	  exceptional	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address	  some	  conceptual	  problems	  of	  law	  society	  relations	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  work	  of	  fact-­‐finding	  
bodies	   in	   the	   following,	  before	   turning	   to	  political	   and	   funding-­‐related	  questions	   that	  not	  
only	  concern	  the	  RECOM	  process,	  but	  also	  transitional	  justice	  processes	  in	  the	  region	  more	  
broadly	  in	  chapter	  7.	  
	  
Beyond	  Legalizing	  Truth	  Spaces	  
At	   the	  beginning	  of	   this	  chapter	   I	   introduced	  a	   trend	   I	   refer	   to	  as	   the	   legalization	  of	   truth	  
spaces—describing	   the	   phenomenon	   how	   activists,	   practitioners,	   and	   experts	   employ	  
tangible	  and	  practicable	  legal	  instruments	  during	  consultation	  meetings	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  
the	  mandate	  for	  the	  regional	  commission.	  Above	  I	  also	  provided	  an	   in-­‐depth	  discussion	  of	  
the	  legal	  issues	  that	  the	  members	  in	  charge	  of	  drafting	  the	  statute	  had	  to	  deal	  with.	  In	  the	  
following	   section	   I	  will	   discuss	   some	  of	   the	   conceptual	   ramifications	  of	   this	  phenomenon,	  
because	   the	   juridification	   of	   truth-­‐seeking	   bodies	   bears	   its	   roots	   in	   a	   broader	   law-­‐society	  
development.	   It	  describes	  the	   interactions	  between	   legal	  experts—such	  as	  elite,	  academic	  
and	   professional	   networks—and	   their	   relationship	   to	   society	   in	   diverse	   sociopolitical	  
contexts.	   Though	   Yves	   Dezalay	   and	   Bryant	   Garth	   have	   not	   applied	   this	   concept	   of	  
legalization	   to	   post-­‐conflict	   justice	  mechanism,	   they	   studied	   this	   trend	   in	   a	  more	   general	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
cases	  as	  to	  not	  jeopardize	  the	  retributive	  justice	  efforts	  and	  only	  if	  other	  forms	  of	  justice	  mechanisms,	  such	  as	  
restorative	  instruments,	  are	  in	  place	  Carsten	  Stahn,	  “Complementarity,	  Amnesties	  and	  Alternative	  Forms	  of	  Justice:	  
Some	  Interpretative	  Guidelines	  for	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court,”	  Journal	  of	  International	  Criminal	  Justice	  3,	  no.	  3	  
(2005):	  695;	  James	  Gibson,	  “Truth,	  Justice,	  and	  Reconciliation:	  Judging	  the	  Fairness	  of	  Amnesty	  in	  South	  Africa,”	  
American	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Science	  46,	  no.	  3	  (2002):	  540–556.	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international	   and	   regional	   context	   as	   I	   have	   already	   discussed	   and	   further	   developed	   in	  
chapters	  2	  and	  4.36	  The	  conceptual	  underpinning	  of	   their	   study	  can	  also	  be	  applied	   to	   the	  
current	  analysis	  of	  the	  RECOM	  fact-­‐seeking	  initiative.37	  
In	   fact,	   earlier	   I	   described	   how	   they	   used	   Bourdieu’s	   work	   in	   order	   to	   show	   how	   the	  
transformation	   of	   ideas	   is	   contingent	   on	   education,	   time	   and	   space.	   Here	   I	  would	   like	   to	  
come	   back	   to	   Bourdieusian	   concepts	   such	   as	   social	   capital	   and	   habitus	   to	   underline	   the	  
process	  of	   legitimizing	  truth-­‐seeking	  initiatives.	  While	  social	  capital	   is	  a	  sociologist	  concept	  
that	   refers	   to	   the	   value	   of	   social	   relations	   and	   the	   role	   of	   cooperation	   to	   get	   collective	  
results	   in	   our	   particular	   case,	   habitus	   is	   defined	   as	   the	   set	   of	   socially	   learned	   skills.38	   As	   I	  
have	   shown	   at	   the	   end	   of	   chapter	   4	   with	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   ICTJ,	   transitional	   justice	  
processes	  have	  gained	  a	  more	  holistic	  meaning,	  including	  restorative	  practices,	  such	  as	  truth	  
commissions.	  The	  network	  and	  social	  relations	  that	  practitioners	  at	  the	  ICTJ	  created	  around	  
the	   concept	   of	   fact-­‐finding	   projects	   thus	   reverberated	   during	   the	   RECOM	   campaign,	  
especially	  in	  RECOM	  reports	  that	  underlined	  the	  continuous	  support	  of	  ICTJ	  staff	  during	  the	  
various	   phases	   of	   the	   campaign.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   existing	   social	   capital	   was	   used	   to	  
legitimize	   alternative	   transitional	   justice	   mechanisms	   in	   the	   region	   and	   the	   reference	   to	  
established	   actors	   and	   practitioners	   by	   members	   of	   the	   RECOM	   Initiative	   was	   used	   to	  
bolster	   the	  movement’s	   credibility.	   The	  practices	  and	   skills	   associated	   to	   implement	   truth	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  See	  chapter	  4	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  some	  of	  their	  other	  work.	  
37	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  on	  how	  ideas	  and	  knowledge	  travel	  in	  the	  case	  of	  legal	  concepts	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  see	  
chapter	  4.	  	  
38	  Pierre	  Bourdieu,	  Outline	  of	  a	  Theory	  of	  Practice	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1977).	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commission,	  however,	  as	  I	  will	  show	  below,	  are	  far	  from	  being	  clearly	  delineated	  from	  other	  
fields.	  Rather	  these	  fact-­‐finding	  initiatives	  are	  built	  on	  overlapping	  skill	  sets	  and	  practices.	  
Indeed,	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  truth-­‐seeking	  bodies	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  influence	  
of	   hard	   justice,	   such	   as	   retributive	  mechanisms,	   on	   soft	   justice,	   such	   as	   restorative	   tools,	  
including	   truth	   commissions,	   as	   mentioned	   earlier.	   The	   former	   is	   based	   on	   measurable	  
results,	  notably	  the	  number	  of	  processed	  cases	  and	  rendered	  verdicts,	  whereas	  the	  latter,	  at	  
least	  initially,	  have	  relied	  on	  outcomes	  which	  seem,	  at	  first,	  less	  quantifiable.	  Yet,	  sociologist	  
and	   director	   of	   the	   Truth-­‐Seeking	   Program	   at	   the	   International	   Center	   for	   Transitional	  
Justice,	   Eduardo	   Gonzalez—who	   has	   consulted	   and	   participated	   in	   many	   different	   local,	  
national	   and	   regional	   initiatives	   around	   the	  world	   to	   set	   up	   commissions	   and	  bodies	   that	  
deal	   with	   the	   past	   (see	   chapter	   4)39—has	   stressed	   the	   need	   to	   think	   differently	   when	   it	  
comes	  to	  implementing	  successful	  strategies	  for	  truth	  commissions.40	  	  
The	  reason	  why	  judicial	  mechanisms	  are	  able	  to	  produce	  a	  quicker,	  and	  often—in	  terms	  of	  
output	  (such	  as	  the	  number	  of	  verdicts)—more	  successful	  track	  record,	  is	  because	  law	  has	  
turned	   the	  notion	  of	   justice	   into	   something	   tangible	   and	  applicable	  despite	   its	   disputable	  
value	  and	  impact	  on	  a	  subject,	   in	  time	  and	  in	  space.	  The	  notion	  of	  truth,	  however,	  cannot	  
easily	   be	   quantifiable	   or	   be	   constrained	   in	   a	   body	   of	   legal	   texts.41	   Nonetheless,	   RECOM	  
coalition	   members	   intend	   to	   create	   a	   large	   database,	   tracking	   cases	   and	   human	   losses	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  He	  also	  consulted	  the	  RECOM	  members	  during	  meetings	  in	  Serbia	  and	  Kosovo	  in	  spring	  and	  summer	  2010.	  
40	  See	  interview	  with	  Eduardo	  Gonzalez	  on	  10	  September	  2010	  in	  Belgrade,	  Serbia.	  
41	  Retributive	  justice	  mechanisms,	  however,	  have	  also	  a	  truth-­‐disclosing	  component	  and	  therefore	  are	  considered	  by	  
some	  as	  history-­‐setting	  institutions.	  For	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	  history-­‐defining	  capacity	  of	  the	  ICTY	  cf.	  Richard	  Wilson,	  
“Judging	  History:	  The	  Historical	  Record	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Former	  Yugoslavia,”	  Human	  
Rights	  Quarterly	  27,	  no.	  3	  (2005):	  908–942.	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across	  the	  region.42	  Such	  a	  project	  is	  in	  line	  with	  policy	  strategies	  implemented	  by	  the	  UN	  ad	  
hoc	  court—which	  has	  a	  large	  electronic	  database	  of	  its	  cases—and	  local	  institutions,	  such	  as	  
the	  Bosnian	  state	  court,	  which	  has	  one	  of	  the	  most	  state	  of	  the	  art	  databases	  to	  document	  
its	  cases	  and	  help	  the	  coordination	  between	  different	  judiciaries	  on	  the	  entity	  level	  in	  BiH.43	  
Despite	  the	  meticulous	  and	  ongoing	  attempts	  to	  fit	  the	  mandate	  of	  a	  regional	  commission	  
neatly	  into	  a	  legal	  document,	  the	  statute,	  the	  strengths	  of	  this	  initiative	  might	  lie	  elsewhere.	  
For	   instance,	   various	   efforts—e.g.	   numerous	   congressional	   bodies	   of	   inquiry	   on	   specific	  
massacres	   or	   death	   squads—preceded	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   Peruvian	   truth	   commission,	  
which	  was	  put	  in	  place	  in	  the	  early	  2000s	  and	  delivered	  an	  8000-­‐page	  report	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
2003.	   In	   fact,	   the	   institutionalization	   of	   RECOM—no	   matter	   how	   desirable	   by	   its	  
proponents—is	   far	   from	   being	   a	   fait	   accompli.	   Many	   factors,	   ranging	   from	   the	   regional	  
political	   climate	   to	   internal	   consensus	   of	   the	   coalition	   members	   demonstrate	   that	   this	  
initiative	  still	   requires	  ample	  support	   from	  within	  and	  outside.	  Notwithstanding,	  according	  
to	  a	  member	  of	  the	  RECOM	  draft	  statute	  advisory	  board,	  even	  if	  all	  these	  efforts	  would	  not	  
result	   in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  commission,	  many	  positive	  side	  effects	  have	  taken	  root	  in	  the	  
region.	   The	   legacy	   includes	   strengthening	   local	   grass	   roots	   efforts,	   improving	   a	  
commemorative	  culture,	  and	  inciting	  transnational	  cooperation	  between	  governments	  and	  
civil	  society,	  among	  others.44	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  See	  interview	  with	  RECOM	  coalition	  members	  in	  June	  2011.	  
43	  See	  interview	  with	  Sven	  Marius	  Urke,	  secondee	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  Foreign	  Ministry	  and	  currently	  international	  
advisor	  at	  the	  Bosnian	  High	  Judicial	  and	  Prosecutorial	  Council	  in	  May	  2011.	  	  
44	  See	  interview	  with	  Vjeran	  Pavlaković,	  historian	  (University	  of	  Rijeka)	  and	  member	  of	  RECOM	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  
human	  rights	  activism	  in	  Croatia.	  September	  2010.	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The	   efforts	   put	   into	   setting	   up	   RECOM,	   however	   are	   proof	   that	   stakeholders	   (including	  
activists,	  practitioners	  and	  lawmakers),	  are	  not	  merely	  copying	  a	  fact-­‐finding	  body	  that	  is	  for	  
instance	  modeled	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  South	  African	  truth	  commission.	  Instead,	  they	  are	  
aware	  that	  the	  context,	  conditions	  and	  objectives	  in	  the	  Balkans	  are	  unique.	  Hence,	  to	  cope	  
with	  the	  dominant	  influence	  of	  legal	  experts	  in	  shaping	  an	  adequate	  body	  for	  dealing	  with	  
mass	  atrocities	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  RECOM	  members	  have	  tried	  to	  expand	  the	  range	  
of	   consultants	   and	   experts	   that	   the	   future	   commission	   will	   draw	   from.	   Similar	   to	   the	  
Peruvian	   truth	   commission—which	   involved	   political	   scientists,	   anthropologists,	  
sociologists,	   psychologists	   and	   historians,	   among	   others—the	   Coalition	   for	   RECOM	   has	  
invited	   scholars,	  practitioners	  and	  experts	   from	  different	   fields	   that	   range	   from	  history	   to	  
psychology.45	   While	   the	   ratio	   of	   non-­‐legal	   experts	   remains	   still	   relatively	   low,	   this	   trend	  
highlights	   the	   attempt	   to	   tackle	   political	   and	   institutional	   challenges	   differently.46	   Each	   of	  
the	  experts	  brings	   a	  unique	   set	  of	   assets	   and	  knowledge	   to	   the	  discussion	   table,	  which—
notably	   for	   the	  preparation	  and	   consultation	   to	  define	   the	  mandate	  of	   the	   commission—
was	  very	  crucial.	  While	  psychoanalysts	  will	  be	  able	  to	  evaluate	  or	  address	  questions	  related	  
to	  victims	  and	  how	  they	  deal	  with	  trauma	  in	  certain	  forms	  of	  testimonies	  or	  public	  hearings,	  
forensic	  anthropologists	  can	  help	  define	  practical	  parameters	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  determining	  
the	  role	  of	  RECOM	  in	  mass	  grave	  discoveries,	  and	  historians	  prove	  useful	   to	  delineate	  the	  
historical	  period	  for	  which	  the	  commission	  should	  be	  designed	  for.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Supra	  note	  44,	  and	  informal	  conversations	  with	  Vesna	  Teršelič	  in	  August	  2010.	  
46	  As	  a	  case	  in	  point,	  when	  one	  of	  the	  founding	  organizations	  Documenta	  held	  national	  and	  regional	  consultations	  in	  
Croatia	  and	  BiH	  attempting	  to	  get	  non-­‐legal	  scholars	  involved	  in	  their	  workshops	  (in	  particular	  academics	  from	  the	  
social	  sciences)	  the	  response	  rate	  of	  political	  science,	  history,	  and	  sociology	  professors,	  among	  others	  was	  very	  low.	  
The	  data	  is	  based	  on	  participant	  observation	  and	  interviews	  during	  my	  2009-­‐2011	  fieldwork.	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It	   is	  too	  early	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  one	  choice	  over	  another.	  Notwithstanding,	  the	  short	  
history	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  draft	  statute,	  in	  particular	  its	  final	  phase,	  has	  cast	  a	  doubt	  on	  
whether	  NGO	  activists	   can	   remain	   close	   to	   their	   local	  base.	  While	  human	   rights	   advocate	  
engage	  in	  victim-­‐oriented	  activism,	  the	  need	  for	  state-­‐level	  political	  support—and	  financial	  
support,	  as	  I	  will	  examine	  in	  the	  following	  chapter—has	  put	  them	  into	  a	  difficult	  position.	  In	  
order	   to	   implement	   the	   regional	   fact-­‐finding	   commission	   they	   have	   to	   address	   broader,	  




Building	  on	  the	  sociopolitical	  struggles	  described	  in	  chapter	  5,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  analyzed	  the	  
development	   of	   NGO	   activists	   to	   increase	   their	   ‘invented’	   space	   to	   foster	   deliberative	  
spaces	  of	  justice	  for	  civil	  society.	  I	  concentrated	  on	  the	  challenges	  of	  the	  legalistic	  influence	  
on	   truth	   seeking	   and	   I	   investigated	   the	   ongoing	   political	   barriers	   to	   institutionalize	  
alternative	  transitional	  justice	  instruments.	  Drawing	  on	  diverse	  consultation	  processes	  that	  I	  
observed	   during	  my	   fieldwork	   in	   the	   region,	   I	   examined	   the	   current	   legalization	   of	   truth	  
spaces	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  human	  rights	  activists	  attempted	  to	  embed	  their	  newly	  created	  
space	  in	  the	  space	  originally	  provided	  by	  state	  institutions	  to	  depoliticize	  transitional	  justice	  
efforts	  in	  the	  region.	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  discussed	  the	  process	  of	  NGOs	  attempting	  to	  draft	  a	  very	  
detailed	   legal	   document	   that	   serves	   as	   the	   commission’s	  mandate.	  Hence,	  my	   analysis	   of	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the	  7th	  Regional	  Forum	  on	  Transitional	  Justice	  in	  Zagreb,	  Croatia	  during	  October	  15-­‐17,	  2010	  
illustrated	   the	   activists’	   struggle	   to	   strike	   the	   right	   balance	   between	   victim-­‐oriented	  
advocacy	  and	  legitimizing	  their	  campaign	  with	  the	  required	  state-­‐level	  support.	  	  
To	  address	  these	  issues	  I	  divided	  my	  chapter	  into	  four	  different	  sections.	  In	  the	  beginning,	  I	  
sketched	   the	   initial	   grass-­‐roots	   debates	   of	   RECOM’s	   mandate	   presenting	   two	   local	  
consultations	   in	   Knin,	   Croatia	   and	   Kruševac,	   Serbia.	   Subsequently,	   I	   explored	   several	  
questions	   associated	   with	   drafting	   a	   mandate	   for	   the	   regional	   fact-­‐finding	   body.	   For	   my	  
main	   section,	   I	   relied	  on	   fieldwork	  data	   from	  my	  participant	   observation	  of	   RECOM’s	   last	  
regional	   forum	   on	   transitional	   justice	   in	   October	   2010	   before	   the	   members	   finalized	  
RECOM’s	   draft	   statute	   in	   March	   2011.	   The	   forum	   emphasized	   the	   conundrum	   of	   NGO	  
activists’	  efforts	  to	  institutionalize	  the	  commission	  at	  the	  state-­‐level,	  resulting	  in	  what	  I	  call	  
the	   legalization	   of	   truth	   spaces.	   Finally,	   I	   elaborated	   on	   some	   of	   the	   conceptual	  
consequences	  of	  this	  phenomenon,	  as	  this	  juridification	  of	  truth	  commissions	  is	  grounded	  in	  
a	   larger	   law-­‐society	   development.	   My	   goal	   in	   this	   chapter	   was	   to	   show	   that	   activists’	  
strategy	   of	   legal-­‐oriented	   depoliticization	   of	   restorative	   justice	   processes,	   despite	   their	  
repetitive	  efforts,	  remain	  still	  highly	  political,	  as	  activists	  continue	  to	  struggle	  to	  establish	  an	  
officially	   institutionalized	   truth	   space.	   I	   further	   explore	   the	   conflict	   between	   state-­‐centric	  
transitional	   justice	   initiatives	  and	  bottom-­‐up	  efforts	  across	   the	  region	   in	   the	  next	  chapter,	  
when	   I	   discuss	   questions	   with	   regards	   to	   post-­‐conflict	   justice	   funding	   using	   the	   case	   of	  






Picking	  Up	  the	  Tab	  for	  Transitional	  Justice:	  




After	  a	  close-­‐up	  of	  the	  RECOM	  draft	  statute	  and	  the	  impact	  and	  politics	  of	  legal	  concepts	  on	  
institutionalizing	   the	   fact-­‐finding	   body	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   this	   chapter	   complements	  
my	  argument	  of	  democratizing	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  that	  I	  developed	  throughout	  
this	   study	  by	  addressing	  a	   couple	  of	  questions	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	  price	  of	   transitional	   justice.	   In	  
fact,	   chapter	   7	   looks	   at	   the	   case	   of	   BiH	   and	   discusses	   the	   politics	   of	   aid	   in	   post-­‐conflict	  
settings	   by	  drawing	  on	   two	   case	   studies	   of	  Norway	   and	   Sweden	   in	   order	   to	  highlight	   the	  
challenges	  in	  particular	  with	  regards	  to	  civil	  society	  efforts.	  	  BiH	  was	  particularly	  ravaged	  by	  
the	   violent	   conflicts	   in	   the	   1990s.	   As	  mentioned	   briefly	   in	  my	   introduction,	   BiH	   has	   been	  
under	   the	   tutelage	   of	   different	   international	   and	   regional	   actors	   since	   the	   signing	   of	   the	  
Dayton	   peace	   agreements	   in	   1995,	   including	   the	   OHR1;	   first	   to	   rebuild	   physical	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  While	  its	  current	  head	  the	  Austrian	  Valentin	  Inzko	  used	  to	  also	  be	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  Special	  Representative	  
for	  BiH,	  since	  2011,	  the	  EU	  has	  decided	  to	  appoint	  a	  separate	  representative	  for	  this	  position.	  Currently,	  Peter	  
Sørensen,	  from	  Denmark	  has	  been	  chosen	  for	  the	  EU	  Special	  Representative	  position.	  The	  aim	  of	  decoupling	  both	  
positions	  is	  to	  prepare	  BiH	  for	  the	  EU	  accession	  process,	  according	  to	  the	  EU.	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infrastructural	   damage	   and	   subsequently	   to	   monitor	   BiH’s	   democratization	   process,	  
strengthen	   its	   political	   institutions,	   and	   help	   its	   war	   torn	   society	   during	   the	   post-­‐conflict	  
transition.	   Several	   authors	   explain	   that	   despite	   numerous	   reform	   initiatives	   BiH’s	   society	  
continues	   to	   grapple	   with	   ethnic	   divisions,	   which	   fuel	   persistent	   political	   crises	   and	  
institutional	   instability.2	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   political	   turmoil	   at	   the	   state	   (national)	   level	   of	  
BiH’s	  institutions,	  the	  development	  of	  Bosnian	  civil	  society	  has	  not	  met	  the	  expectations	  of	  
Western	   aid	   actors—and	   NGOs	   that	   work	   for	   these	   donors.3	   International	   development	  
efforts	  still	  struggle	  to	  strengthen	  state-­‐society	  relations	  in	  BiH.	  This	  sociopolitical	  malaise	  is	  
very	   visible	   with	   regard	   to	   donors’	   accountability	   efforts	   for	   past	   mass	   atrocities.	   In	   this	  
chapter	  I	  explores	  this	  phenomenon,	  analyzing	  how	  the	  international	  understanding	  of	  the	  
conflict	  has	  translated	  into	  donors’	  agendas	  and	  activities	  in	  transitional	  justice	  processes.	  
Although	   the	   cost	   of	   rebuilding	   and	  developing	  post-­‐conflict	   societies	   has	   found	   scholarly	  
attention4,	   very	   few	   studies	   have	   addressed	   the	   price	   of	   justice	   to	   cope	   with	   past	   mass	  
atrocities	  and	  the	  politics	  that	  it	  entails.	  Some	  scholars	  have	  grappled	  with	  the	  question	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Florian	  Bieber,	  “Constitutional	  Reform	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina:	  Preparing	  for	  EU	  Accession,”	  Policy	  Brief	  European	  
Policy	  Center	  (2010);	  Roberto	  Belloni,	  “Bosnia:	  Dayton	  Is	  Dead!	  Long	  Live	  Dayton!,”	  Nationalism	  and	  Ethnic	  Politics	  15,	  
no.	  3–4	  (2009):	  355–375;	  Bruce	  Hitchner,	  “From	  Dayton	  to	  Brussels:	  The	  Story	  Behind	  the	  Constitutional	  and	  
Governmental	  Reform	  Process	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,”	  Fletcher	  Forum	  of	  World	  Affairs	  30	  (2006):	  125.	  
3	  Roberto	  Belloni,	  “Civil	  Society	  in	  War-­‐to-­‐Democracy	  Transitions,”	  in	  From	  War	  to	  Democracy:	  Dilemmas	  of	  
Peacebuilding,	  ed.	  Anna	  Jarstad	  (Cambridge,	  United	  Kingdom:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press	  Cambridge,	  2008),	  182–
211;	  Martina	  Fischer,	  Peacebuilding	  and	  Civil	  Society	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina:	  Ten	  Years	  After	  Dayton	  (Lit,	  2005);	  
Adam	  Fagan,	  “Civil	  Society	  in	  Bosnia	  Ten	  Years	  After	  Dayton,”	  International	  Peacekeeping	  12,	  no.	  3	  (2005):	  406–419;	  
David	  Chandler,	  “Democratization	  in	  Bosnia:	  The	  Limits	  of	  Civil	  Society	  Building	  Strategies,”	  Democratization	  5,	  no.	  4	  
(1998):	  78–102.	  
4	  See	  for	  instance	  Graciana	  del	  Castillo,	  Rebuilding	  War-­‐Torn	  States:	  The	  Challenge	  of	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Economic	  
Reconstruction	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  USA,	  2008);	  Sultan	  Barakat,	  After	  the	  Conflict:	  Reconstruction	  and	  
Development	  in	  the	  Aftermath	  of	  War,	  vol.	  1	  (IB	  Tauris,	  2005);	  Michael	  Brown	  and	  Richard	  Rosecrance,	  The	  Costs	  of	  
Conflict:	  Prevention	  and	  Cure	  in	  the	  Global	  Arena,	  vol.	  118	  (Rowman	  &	  Littlefield	  Pub	  Inc,	  1999);	  Alcira	  Kreimer,	  The	  
World	  Bank’s	  Experience	  with	  Post-­‐conflict	  Reconstruction	  (World	  Bank	  Publications,	  1998).	  For	  studies	  specifically	  on	  
BiH	  see	  for	  instance	  Vladimir	  Gligorov,	  “Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,”	  Southeast	  European	  and	  Black	  Sea	  Studies	  1,	  no.	  1	  
(2001):	  132–139;	  Wei	  Ding	  and	  Christine	  Wallich,	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina:	  Toward	  Economic	  Recovery	  (World	  Bank	  
Publications,	  1996).	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the	   price	   of	   international	   war	   crimes	   trials,	   comparing	   different	   UN	   ad	   hoc	   and	   hybrid	  
tribunals	  as	  well	  as	  some	  domestic	  courts,	  such	  as	  the	  War	  Crimes	  Chamber	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  
BiH.	  In	  an	  article	  published	  a	  few	  years	  ago,	  for	  instance,	  Rupert	  Skilbeck	  details	  the	  cost	  of	  
different	   tribunals	  and	  courts,	   ranging	   from	  the	   ICTY	   to	   the	  hybrid	   court	   in	  Cambodia.	  He	  
argues	   that	   the	   huge	   budget	   costs	   of	   earlier	   UN	   courts	   for	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia	   and	  
Rwanda	  need	  to	  be	  replaced	  with	  more	  sustainable	  models	  in	  the	  future.5	  While	  Skilbeck’s	  
work	  provides	  a	  general	  overview	  of	  the	  different	  costs,	  an	  earlier	  study	  by	  Cesare	  Romano	  
explains	  in	  detail	  which	  budget	  models	  his	  eleven-­‐selected	  court	  cases	  employ	  and	  discusses	  
the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  each.6	  
	  Existing	  scholarship	  primarily	  focuses	  on	  the	  overall	  cost	  of	  legal	  procedures;	  yet,	  it	  doesn’t	  
address	   the	   politics	   of	   it.	   In	   other	  words,	   little	   is	   known	   about	   the	   reasoning	   for	   donors’	  
policy	  and	  strategy	  choices.	  In	  fact,	  several	  questions	  still	  remain	  partly	  unanswered	  in	  this	  
context:	  Who	   is	   paying	   for	   these	   retributive	   accountability	   efforts?	  What	   are	   the	   donors’	  
goals	   and	   motivations?	   And	   what	   challenges,	   problems	   and	   risks	   result	   from	   these	  
international	   strategies	   to	   promote	   transitional	   justice	   projects	   in	   BiH?	   It	   is	   beyond	   the	  
scope	  of	  this	  chapter	  to	  provide	  a	  comprehensive	  answer	  to	  all	  of	  these	  questions.	  Instead	  
my	   research	  aims	   to	  explore	   the	  politics	  of	   the	   cost	  of	   justice	   in	  BiH	  by	   concentrating	  on	  
only	   a	   few	   actors	   and	   their	   funding	   activities.	   My	   goal	   is	   to	   provide	   an	   overview	   of	   aid	  
processes	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  projects	  and	  examine	  problems	  and	  tensions	  that	  arise	  in	  
relation	  to	  broader	  transitional	  justice	  efforts,	  including	  in	  particular	  civil	  society	  initiatives.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Rupert	  Skilbeck,	  “Funding	  Justice:	  The	  Price	  of	  War	  Crimes	  Trials,”	  The	  Human	  Rights	  Brief	  15,	  no.	  3	  (2008):	  2.	  
6	  Cesare	  Romano,	  “The	  Price	  of	  International	  Justice,”	  Law	  and	  Practice	  of	  International	  Courts	  and	  Tribunals	  4	  (2005):	  
281.	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An	  important	  number	  of	  international	  development	  actors,	  such	  as	  EU	  member	  states,	  the	  
EU	  itself,	  the	  US,	  and	  the	  UN,	  among	  other	  states	  and	  international	  organizations,	  have	  and	  
currently	  still	  are	  assisting	  BiH	  during	  its	  transition	  phase	  and	  help	  the	  country	  to	  deal	  with	  
its	  burdensome	  past.	   In	  spite	  of	  BiH’s	  donor	  panoply,	   this	  chapter	  concentrates	  mainly	  on	  
Norway	   and	   Sweden.	  While	   the	   latter	   is—in	  monetary	   terms—among	   the	   largest	   single-­‐
country	  donors	   in	  BiH,	   I	   selected	  the	   former	   (which	  still	   ranks	  among	  the	   larger	  donors	   in	  
BiH)	  in	  order	  to	  include	  a	  medium-­‐sized	  member	  country	  of	  the	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  
Cooperation	   and	   Development	   (OECD)	   that	   is	   also	   part	   of	   the	   Development	   Assistance	  
Committee	  of	  the	  OECD.	  In	  fact,	  large	  donor	  countries	  like	  the	  US	  are	  less	  interesting,	  as	  the	  
US	   is	  currently	  phasing	  out	  regional	  support,	  contrary	  to	  Norway,	  which	  foresees	  a	  steady	  
assistance	  flow	  in	  the	  years	  to	  come.7	  Additionally,	  Norway	   is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  EU,	  which	   is	  
yet	  another	  important	  observation	  for	  Norwegian	  aid	  strategies,	  as	  I	  will	  show	  later.	  While	  it	  
is	  possible	  to	  provide	  longitudinal	  data	  on	  general	  development	  assistance	  trends	  in	  BiH	  and	  
data	   that	   show	   both	   donors	   among	   various	   other	   development	   actors—including	   single	  
donor	  countries	  and	  international	  organizations	  (see	  figure	  and	  table	  1	  below)—it	  is	  difficult	  
to	   break	   down	   the	   exact	   cost	   of	   transitional	   justice	   assistance	   of	   Norway	   and	   Sweden.	   I	  
briefly	  discuss	  several	  reasons	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  such	  specific	  data.	  
First,	   as	   laid	   out	   in	   an	   evaluation	   report	   on	   Norwegian	   development	   aid	   in	   the	   former	  
Yugoslavia,	   the	   government	   created	   only	   one	   formal	   policy	   document	   about	   its	   aid	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Interview	  with	  Deputy	  Chief	  of	  Mission	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  Embassy	  in	  Sarajevo	  on	  18	  May	  2011.	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strategies	  between	  1991	  and	  2008	  for	  parliamentary	  debate,	  which	  was	  published	  in	  1999.8	  
Moreover	   the	   government,	   respective	  ministries—such	   as	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs	  
(MFA)—and	  other	  agencies—such	  as	  the	  Norwegian	  Agency	  for	  Development	  Cooperation	  
(Norad)—didn’t	  maintain	  a	  central	  archive	  of	  development	  activities	   in	  order	   to	  create	  an	  
institutional	   memory	   including	   performance	   tracking	   of	   its	   earlier	   projects	   and	   funding	  
activities.9	  	  
At	  this	  point	  it	  is	  also	  helpful	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  concepts	  of	  transitional	  justice	  and	  
justice	   sector	   reform	   (JSR)	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   these	   development	   activities	   discussed	   in	   this	   article.	  
Although	   transitional	   justice	   has	   become	   an	   encompassing	   umbrella	   term	   to	   describe	   a	  
variety	   of	   mechanisms	   to	   deal	   with	   past	   gross	   human	   rights	   abuses—ranging	   from	  
retributive	  justice	  tools	  to	  restorative	  justice	  practices10—interestingly,	  in	  BiH’s	  post-­‐conflict	  
context,	   transitional	   justice	   refers	   particularly	   to	   supporting	   and	   improving	   war	   crimes	  
trials.11	   As	   war	   crimes	   trials	   are	   part	   of	   the	   regular	   court	   system,	   it	   is	   unsurprising	   that	  
accountability	  efforts	  against	  mass	  atrocities	  overlap	  with	  broader	  reform	  processes	  within	  
the	   judicial	   system.12	   Although	   this	   article	   does	   not	   intend	   to	   address	   JSR	   issues	   in	  
particular,	  it	  expands	  on	  a	  few	  general	  justice	  reform	  problems,	  such	  as	  some	  of	  the	  work	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Norad,	  Evaluation	  of	  Norwegian	  Development	  Cooperation	  with	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  Volume	  I,	  Evaluation	  (Oslo:	  
Evaluation	  Department,	  Norwegian	  Agency	  for	  Development	  Cooperation,	  2010),	  7.	  
9	  Ibid.	  In	  interviews	  in	  May	  2011,	  Norwegian	  officials	  underlined,	  however,	  that	  the	  cooperation	  between	  government	  
agencies	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  shared	  internal	  archives	  had	  been	  started	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  publication	  of	  Norad’s	  2010	  
evaluation	  report.	  
10	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  see	  for	  instance	  Teitel,	  Transitional	  Justice.	  
11	  Despite	  a	  number	  of	  international	  actors,	  including	  the	  United	  States	  Institute	  for	  Peace,	  that	  backed	  national	  and	  
local	  truth	  commission	  initiatives	  in	  BiH,	  the	  success	  rate	  has	  been	  limited.	  See	  for	  instance	  Cécile	  Jouhanneau,	  “Les	  
Mésaventures	  des	  Projets	  de	  Commission	  Vérité	  et	  Réconciliation	  pour	  La	  Bosnie-­‐Herzégovine	  (1997-­‐2006):	  Une	  
Étude	  de	  la	  Circulation	  des	  Modèles	  Internationaux	  de	  Résolution	  des	  Conflits	  Mémoriels,”	  in	  Le	  Passé	  au	  Présent:	  
Gisements	  Mémoriels	  et	  Politiques	  Publiques	  en	  Europe	  Centrale	  et	  Orientale,	  ed.	  George	  Mink	  and	  Pascal	  Bonnard	  
(Paris:	  Michel	  Houdiard	  Editeur,	  2010).	  
12	  Many	  interviewees	  stressed	  the	  programmatic	  overlap	  in	  this	  regard.	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the	  High	  Judicial	  and	  Prosecutorial	  Council	   (HJPC).	  The	  HJPC	  is	  a	  national	   institution	   in	  BiH	  
that	  serves	  as	  a	  watchdog	  for	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  judicial	  system.	  Members	  of	  the	  Council	  
appoint,	  train,	  and	  discipline	  judges,	  among	  other	  things.	  Additionally,	  they	  also	  advise	  the	  
government	   about	   judicial	   budgets.	   Addressing	   some	   of	   these	   broader	   issues	   that	   are	  
indirectly	   related	   to	   war	   crimes	   can	   thus	   clarify	   certain	   donor	   strategies	   and	   their	  
perceptions	  of	  transitional	  justice	  processes	  in	  BiH.	  
As	  mentioned	  above,	   the	   following	   figure	   and	   table	  1	  with	   general	   data	   from	   the	  OECD’s	  
website	  are	  helpful	  to	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  development	  situation	  in	  BiH	  during	  the	  
past	  decade.	  	  The	  figure	  below	  on	  BiH’s	  net	  official	  development	  assistance	  and	  official	  aid	  
that	  the	  country	  received	  in	  the	  period	  from	  2000	  to	  2010	  (including	  international	  donors,	  
such	  as	  the	  UN,	  EU	  and	  World	  Bank,	  among	  others;	  as	  well	  as	  single	  country	  donors,	  such	  as	  
Austria,	   Japan,	   Norway	   and	   Sweden,	   among	   others)	   shows	   that	   the	   sum	   of	   aid	  
disbursements	  has	  dropped	  44	  percent	  from	  738	  million	  US	  dollars	  in	  2000	  to	  492	  million	  US	  
dollars	   in	   2010.	   This	   was	   to	   be	   expected,	   as	   the	   early	   2000s	   were	   a	   period	   in	   which	  
reconstruction	   aid	   decreased	   with	   assistance	   programs	   emphasizing	   more	   on	   technical	  
services	   and	   democratic	   transition	   projects,	   such	   as	   electoral	   reforms	   and	   public	   sector	  









	   	   	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  BiH’s	  Total	  Net	  Development	  Assistance	  
	  
	  
The	  statistical	  data	  on	  development	  assistance	  to	  BiH	  by	  single	  donor	  country	  below—with	  
the	  exception	  of	  multilateral	  aid	  by	  EU	  Institutions	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  table	  1—confirms	  the	  
above	   trend	   that	  aid	   flows	  have	  been	  decreasing	   lately.	  While	  Sweden’s	  assistance	   to	  BiH	  
was	  around	  30	  million	  US	  dollars	   in	   recent	  years,	  Norway’s	   total	  aid	  was	  a	   little	  under	  20	  
million	   during	   the	   same	   time	   period.	   Interestingly	   EU	   funding—despite	   some	   cuts	   after	  
2005,	  is	  still	  very	  important	  and	  amounted	  to	  105	  million	  dollars	  in	  2010,	  mostly	  due	  to	  its	  
enlargement	  agenda	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans.	  These	  numbers,	  however,	  should	  only	  help	  to	  
paint	   a	   general	   picture	   of	   development	   assistance	   in	   BiH	   during	   the	   last	   decade.	   	   More	  
importantly,	   the	  goal	  of	   this	  chapter	   is	  not	   to	  provide	  extensive	  statistical	  data	  on	   foreign	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aid	  in	  BiH’s	  transitional	  justice	  processes,	  but	  instead	  to	  discuss	  aid	  politics	  and	  point	  to	  the	  





Furthermore	   the	   comparison	   between	   the	   two	   Scandinavian	   countries	   is	   of	   particular	  
interest,	  since	  Norway	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  EU	  and	  Sweden,	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  EU	  membership,	  still	  
pursues	   an	   independent	   development	   agenda	   (and	   funding)	   on	   top	   of	   its	   contribution	   to	  
larger	  EU	  funds.	  Although	  BiH	  has	  been	  a	  big	  laboratory	  of	  emergency,	  reconstruction	  and	  
Table 1: BiH's Total  Aid Flow in Million US dollars of Selected Donors from 2000-2010
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Donor(s)
Australia __* 0.01 __ __ __ __ __ 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
Austria 22.52 14.19 10.89 15.2 18.59 25.93 29.07 33.08 38 28.59 31.38
Germany 91.51 27.04 19.42 21.81 29.92 26.1 26.68 29.03 46.91 27.63 29.95
Netherlands 43.3 52.91 37.34 25.16 24.82 21.09 18.92 21.1 31.27 21.75 14.26
Norway 30.78 16.87 23.83 21.62 17.01 17.69 19.01 17.38 19.01 15.85 18.23
Sweden 23.89 29.02 26.98 35.4 34.08 46.88 40.2 37.03 28.67 32.43 28.02
United States 85.75 135.06 75.78 68.74 61.92 49.46 66.04 31.61 26.44 31.07 28.33
EU Institutions 196.06 154.26 129.26 135.83 124.56 164.52 89.29 69.29 85.87 72.62 105.09
*Note: No data was available for the blank cells Source: OECD
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development	  aid	   since	   the	  outbreak	  of	   the	  war	   in	  1992,	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	   chapter	   I	  
focus	  only	  on	  the	  period	  from	  2000	  to	  the	  present	  and	  examine	  aid	  allocations	  to	  projects	  
that	  are	  specifically	  related	  to	  transitional	  justice	  efforts.	  
My	  research	  is	  based	  on	  extensive	  fieldwork	  in	  BiH	  between	  2009	  and	  2011,	  including	  over	  
three-­‐dozen	   interviews	   with	   official	   representatives	   of	   donor	   countries,	   activists	   and	  
experts.	   Embassy	   representatives	   from	   the	   Swedish	   and	   Norwegian	  Missions	   in	   Sarajevo	  
kindly	   responded	   to	   my	   interview	   requests,	   providing	   valuable	   reports	   and	   official	  
documentation	   to	   help	   better	   understand	   the	   development	   activities	   of	   both	   countries.	  
Additionally,	   I	   interviewed	   staff	   of	   the	   HJPC,	   the	   UNDP,	   the	   OSCE,	   the	   EU	   Special	  
Representative,	   and	   the	   OHR.	   I	   also	   had	   several	   interviews	   and	   discussions	   with	   human	  
rights	   activists	   including	   staff	   from	   the	   Coalition	   for	   RECOM	   (a	   transnational	   fact-­‐finding	  
initiative	  created	  in	  2008),	  the	  Research	  and	  Documentation	  Center,	  and	  the	  Youth	  Initiative	  
for	   Human	   Rights	   in	   Sarajevo.	   I	   chose	   the	   interviewees	   by	   their	   relevance	   to	   the	   current	  
transitional	  justice	  process	  in	  BiH	  and	  did	  not	  encounter	  any	  resistance	  scheduling	  meetings	  
for	   interviews.	  Notwithstanding	   the	   openness	   of	   interview	  participants	   to	   provide	   helpful	  
answers	  and	   information	  to	  my	  questions,	  some	  of	  them	  were	  particularly	  cautious	  about	  
their	  statements,	  emphasizing	  that	  the	  information—albeit	  not	  confidential—should	  not	  be	  
quoted	   directly	   with	   their	   name	   in	   any	   published	   material.	   This	   vigilant	   behavior	   and	  
carefully	   crafted	   public	   relations	   demeanor	   underlines	   the	   persisting	   politicization	   of	  
important	  sociopolitical	  and	  socioeconomic	  issues	  and	  debates	  in	  BiH.	  
	  213	  
I	  employ	  concepts	   from	   international	  political	  economy,	  an	   interdisciplinary	   field	  of	  study,	  
which	  concentrates	  on	  how	  political	  forces,	  such	  as	  states,	  institutions	  and	  individual	  actors,	  
shape	   economic	   structures	   and	   systems	   in	   international	   relations.	   A	   range	   of	   authors	  
treated	  a	  variety	  of	  issues	  addressing	  the	  political	  issues	  of	  different	  economic	  activities	  and	  
sectors	   in	   BiH.13	   Although	   my	   research	   does	   not	   directly	   focus	   on	   the	   effects	   of	  
development	   aid	   on	   economic	   interactions	   in	   BiH,	   it	   addresses	   the	   cost	   of	   transitional	  
justice	   and	   the	   politics	   behind	   foreign	   aid	   that	   is	   disbursed	   in	   BiH’s	   post-­‐conflict	   justice	  
settings.	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	   demonstrate	   that	   initially	   international	   development	   strategies	  
were	  not	   tailored	   to	   the	  needs	  of	   local	  project	   funding.	  Over	   time,	  however,	   government	  
reports	   illustrate	   that	   donors	   have	   attempted	   to	   target	   aid	   and	   funding	   strategies	   more	  
effectively.	  	  
The	   first	   part	   of	   this	   article	   outlines	   the	   state-­‐centric	   concept	   behind	   post-­‐conflict	  
development	   support	   in	   BiH.	   I	   then	   illustrate	   this	   approach	   by	   drawing	   on	   the	   different	  
transitional	  justice	  development	  strategies	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  and	  Swedish	  governments.	  In	  
the	  second	  part	  of	  my	  piece,	   I	  discuss	   the	  challenges	  and	  problems	  associated	  with	   these	  
strategies	   and	   development	   projects.	   I	   show	   that	   current	   development	   approaches	  
nonetheless	  focus	  on	  cooperation	  with	  state	  institutions	  and	  have	  difficulties	  reaching	  local	  
civil	  society	  actors	  and	  their	  projects.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  See	  for	  instance	  Timothy	  Donais,	  The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Peacebuilding	  in	  Post-­‐Dayton	  Bosnia	  (Routledge	  London,	  
2005);	  Michael	  Pugh,	  “Postwar	  Political	  Economy	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina:	  The	  Spoils	  of	  Peace,”	  Global	  Governance	  
8,	  no.	  4	  (2002):	  467–482;	  Peter	  Andreas,	  “The	  Clandestine	  Political	  Economy	  of	  War	  and	  Peace	  in	  Bosnia,”	  
International	  Studies	  Quarterly	  48,	  no.	  1	  (2004):	  29–52.	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Post-­‐conflict	  Aid	  Strategies	  in	  BiH:	  A	  State-­‐Centric	  Concept	  
The	  following	   is	  a	  brief	  historical	  analysis	  of	  the	  creation	  and	   legacy	  of	  the	   ICTY	  as	  well	  as	  
the	   spill	   over	   effect	   of	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   to	   the	   national	   level	   in	   BiH—I	  will	  
summarize	   some	   of	   the	  War	   Crimes	   Chalmber’s	   (WCC)	  work	   at	   the	   BiH	   State	   Court14—in	  
order	   to	   understand	   donors’	   preferences	   to	   invest	   in	   retributive	   justice	   rather	   than	  
restorative	  justice	  mechanisms.	  In	  fact,	  due	  to	  the	  difficult	  rise	  of	  the	  UN	  ad	  hoc	  tribunal	  in	  
The	   Hague,	   ICTY	   advocates,	   such	   as	   its	   first	   Chief	   Prosecutor	   Richard	   Goldstone,	   were	  
initially	  against	  any	  truth	  commission	  attempts,	  as	  they	  believed	  this	  would	  undermine	  the	  
initially	  fragile	  work	  of	  the	  Tribunal.15	  
From	  a	  historic	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  827	  establishing	  the	  ICTY	  in	  
The	   Hague	   (Netherlands)	   in	   1993	   required	   considerable	   legwork	   from	   a	   committed	   and	  
ambitious	  transnational	  network	  of	  international	  legal	  experts,	  lawyers	  and	  diplomats.16	  Yet,	  
since	   its	   creation,	   the	   future	   of	   the	   UN	   ad	   hoc	   war	   crimes	   tribunal	   with	   the	   goal	   of	  
accounting	   for	  mass	   atrocities	   committed	   during	   the	   violence	   in	   the	   1990s	   was	   far	   from	  
certain.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  lack	  of	  funding	  rendered	  its	  initial	  work	  extremely	  difficult.	  On	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The	  BiH	  State	  Court	  is	  an	  internationally	  established	  hybrid	  court,	  modeled	  after	  the	  ICTY	  for	  war	  crimes	  committed	  
in	  BiH.	  It	  was	  created	  in	  2002.	  
15	  Peskin,	  International	  Justice	  in	  Rwanda	  and	  the	  Balkans:	  Virtual	  Trials	  and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  State	  Cooperation,	  41–
43.	  
16	  Pierre	  Hazan,	  Justice	  in	  a	  Time	  of	  War:	  The	  True	  Story	  Behind	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  Former	  
Yugoslavia	  (Texas	  A&M	  University	  Press,	  2004);	  Hagan,	  Justice	  in	  the	  Balkans:	  Prosecuting	  War	  Crimes	  in	  the	  Hague	  
Tribunal.	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the	  other	  hand,	  the	  politicization	  of	  its	  decisions	  by	  different	  governments	  in	  the	  region17—
once	   it	   operated	   on	   a	   regular	   trial	   schedule—undermined	   the	   ICTY’s	   credibility	   and	  
legitimacy	  across	  different	  social	  groups	  in	  societies	  across	  the	  Balkans.	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  politicization	  issues	  described	  in	  Jelena	  Subotić’s	  book18,	  the	  court	  has	  had	  a	  
visible	   track	   record,	   since	   it	   held	   its	   first	   trial	   over	   15	   years	   ago,	   expanding	   international	  
humanitarian	   law	   across	   the	   region.19	   In	   July	   2011,	   Serbian	   authorities	   captured	   and	  
transferred	   the	   last	   war	   criminal	   on	   the	   ICTY’s	   161	   person	   long	  most	   wanted	   list	   to	   The	  
Hague,	  buttressing	  the	  court’s	  legacy	  and	  fulfilling	  its	  original	  objectives	  of	  trying	  a	  long	  list	  
of	   indictees	   from	   the	   states	   of	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia.20	   The	   creation	   of	   the	   ICTY	   is	   often	  
cited	  as	  a	  watershed	  in	  the	  quest	  to	  account	  for	  international	  war	  crimes21,	  fueling	  a	  global	  
spill	   over	   effect	   that	   led	   not	   only	   to	   numerous	   regional	   and	   hybrid	   courts	   across	   many	  
continents,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court	  in	  2002.	  
For	   a	   number	   of	   reasons	   this	   so-­‐called	   justice	   cascade22	   also	   helped	   develop	   stronger	  
retributive	   mechanisms	   within	   the	   region.	   First,	   the	   ICTY’s	   list	   of	   perpetrators	   only	  
contained	  a	  selective	  and	  symbolic	  amount	  of	  individuals	  and	  committed	  war	  crimes.	  Thus,	  
from	   the	   start,	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   complementary	   domestic	   trials	   would	   be	   necessary	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  Subotić,	  Hijacked	  Justice:	  Dealing	  with	  the	  Past	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  In	  the	  court’s	  early	  years,	  the	  prosecution	  could	  not	  
work	  properly,	  as	  indicted	  perpetrators	  would	  not	  be	  handed	  to	  the	  ICTY	  by	  national	  authorities	  in	  various	  countries,	  
such	  as	  Serbia	  and	  Croatia.	  
18	  Ibid.	  
19	  Teitel,	  “Global	  Transitional	  Justice.”	  
20	  For	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  ICTY’s	  achievements	  see	  website	  the	  Tribunal’s	  website	  at	  http://icty.org/sid/324,	  accessed	  
20	  February	  2012.	  
21	  Robert	  Cryer	  and	  Paul	  Mora,	  “I.	  The	  Coroners	  and	  Justice	  Act	  2009	  and	  International	  Criminal	  Law:	  Backing	  the	  
Future?,”	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Quarterly	  59,	  no.	  03	  (2010):	  805;	  Drumbl,	  Atrocity,	  Punishment,	  and	  
International	  Law,	  46.	  
22	  Lutz	  and	  Sikkink,	  “The	  Justice	  Cascade:	  The	  Evolution	  and	  Impact	  of	  Foreign	  Human	  Rights	  Trials	  in	  Latin	  America.”	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continue	  the	  work	  of	  the	  UN	  ad	  hoc	  tribunal	  in	  the	  Balkans.	  Second,	  the	  courtroom	  in	  The	  
Hague,	  situated	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  Europe,	  was	  at	  a	  distance	  from	  the	  actual	  sites	  of	  the	  crime	  
scenes.	   While	   this	   was	   necessary	   at	   the	   beginning—due	   to	   the	   ongoing	   conflict	   in	   the	  
region—the	   geographic	   gap	   currently	   separating	   victims,	   witnesses	   and	   society	   from	   the	  
war	  criminal	   trials	  has	  diminished	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  court	   to	   transmit	  a	  message	   to	  
the	  states	  in	  transition,	  and	  in	  particular	  their	  societies.	  Hence	  justice	  efforts	  at	  the	  national	  
level	   have	   increased—in	   the	   cases	   of	   Croatia	   and	   Serbia,	   for	   instance,	   the	   basic	  
effectiveness—in	   terms	   of	   case	   selection,	   impartiality,	   appeals,	   for	   instance—can	   still	   be	  
improved.23	  The	   record	  of	   the	  WCC	   in	  BiH’s	  State	  Court,	   created	  by	  a	  2002	   law,	   is	  overall	  
promising.	  Despite	  numerous	  challenges	  (ranging	  from	  issues	  related	  to	  case	  transfers	  from	  
the	   ICTY	   to	   obstacles	   in	   legal	   procedures,	   such	   as	   witness	   protection),	   it	   has	   used	   its	  
internationalized	  character	  to	  promote	  not	  only	  substantive	  criminal	  law	  provisions	  of	  BiH,	  
but	   also	   European	   human	   rights	   norms,	   as	   defined	   by	   the	   European	   Convention	   for	   the	  
Protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Fundamental	   Freedoms	   and	   applicable	   case	   law	   of	   the	  
European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights.24	  
Indeed,	  since	  the	  prosecutor’s	  office	  and	  the	  war	  crimes	  section	  of	  the	  court	  reached	  its	  full	  
operation	  ability	  in	  2005,	  the	  Court	  has	  delivered	  over	  68	  final	  verdicts	  and	  several	  so-­‐called	  
Rule	  11bis	  cases	  have	  been	  processed.25	  The	  latter	  refer	  to	  transfer	  cases	  from	  the	  ICTY,	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  See	  for	  instance	  reports	  published	  by	  NGOs	  and	  organizations	  including	  Documenta	  Center	  for	  Dealing	  with	  the	  
Past,	  OSCE,	  and	  the	  Humanitarian	  Law	  Center.	  	  
24	  Melika	  Murtezić,	  “The	  War	  Crimes	  Chamber	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,”	  in	  International	  Criminal	  
Justice:	  Law	  and	  Practice	  from	  the	  Rome	  Statute	  to	  Its	  Review,	  ed.	  Roberto	  Bellelli	  (London:	  Ashgate	  Publishing,	  Ltd.,	  
2010),	  349.	  
25	  OSCE,	  Delivering	  Justice	  in	  BiH:	  An	  Overview	  of	  War	  Crimes	  Processing	  from	  2005	  to	  2010.	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which	   the	   domestic	   judiciary	   carries	   on	   the	  work	   of	   The	  Hague	   Tribunal	   due	   to	   the	  UN’s	  
completion	  strategy	  for	  the	  ICTY.	  The	  international	  community,	  including	  the	  ICTY,	  the	  OHR	  
and	   several	   countries	   that	   seconded	   judges	   to	   the	   BiH	   Court	   in	   the	   beginning,	   were	  
instrumental	  for	  the	  current	  modus	  operandi	  of	  the	  War	  Crimes	  Chamber.	  	  
In	  this	  context,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  ponder	  on	  how	  much	  it	  costs	  to	  provide	  these	  services	  and	  
who	  paid	   for	   them.	   	   The	  BiH	   State	  Court	   is	   a	   hybrid	   court26	   and	   its	   current	   funds	   for	   the	  
period	  of	  2004-­‐2011	  budgets	  amount	  to	  57	  million	  euros	  (77	  million	  US	  dollars).	  While	  the	  
investments	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Court’s	  operations	   in	  relatively	   important—partly	  due	  
to	  setting	  up	  the	  logistics	  of	  a	  functional	  prosecution	  and	  court	  system—annual	  budgets	  in	  
more	   recent	   years	   from	  2009-­‐2011	   are	   on	   average	   3	  million	  US	  dollars.	   Comparing	   these	  
figures	   to	   the	   cost	   of	   the	   ICTY	   during	   the	   same	   period	   illustrates	   how	   expensive	  
international	  criminal	  justice	  is	  compared	  to	  domestic	  justice—partly	  because	  of	  the	  scope	  
of	   the	   operations,	   such	   staff	   travel	   and	   interpreters,	   among	   others	   	   (see	   table	   2	   below).	  
Over	  20	  donors	  support	  the	  Court,	  ranging	  from	  large	  countries	  and	  organizations	  such	  as	  
the	  EU	  and	  US	  to	  small	  countries	  such	  as	  Luxemburg	  or	  Cyprus.27	  	  Moreover,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
2011,	  the	  ICTY	  had	  a	  staff	  of	  869,	  whereas	  the	  State	  Court	   in	  BiH	  only	  employs	  about	  one	  
third	   of	   the	   ICTY’s	   total	   amount.28	   Since	   its	   first	   case	   in	   1995,	   the	   ICTY	   has	   indicted	   161	  
alleged	  perpetrators	  and	  concluded	  proceedings	  for	  126	  accused	  (35	  are	  still	  ongoing).29	  In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  For	  a	  detailed	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  BiH’s	  hybrid	  court	  and	  the	  Cambodian	  model	  see	  for	  instance	  Martin-­‐Ortega	  
and	  Herman,	  Hybrid	  Tribunals	  &	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  Notes	  from	  Bosnia	  &	  Herzegovina	  &	  Cambodia.	  
27	  The	  entire	  list	  consists	  of	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  BiH,	  Canada,	  Cyprus,	  Denmark,	  the	  EU,	  Finland,	  France,	  Germany,	  
Greece,	  Ireland,	  Italy,	  Japan,	  Luxembourg,	  the	  Netherlands,	  Norway,	  Portugal,	  Spain,	  Sweden,	  Switzerland,	  United	  
Kingdom	  and	  the	  US.	  	  
28	  See	  ICTY	  Website,	  accessed	  on	  February	  20,	  2012.	  
29	  Ibid.	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comparison,	   BiH’s	   War	   Crimes	   Chamber	   indicted	   a	   total	   of	   168	   persons	   already	   since	   it	  
began	  its	  work	  in	  2005	  and	  rendered	  65	  judgments	  of	  134	  commenced	  trials.30	  Juxtaposing	  
the	  total	  number	  of	  indicted	  persons	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  ICTY’s	  and	  BiH’s	  State	  Court	  budget	  





This	   brief	   summary	   of	   the	   ICTY’s	   work	   and	   its	   influence	   on	   the	   WCC’s	   war	   crimes	  
prosecution	   in	   BiH	   provide	   useful	   background	   information	   in	   order	   to	   describe	   the	  
development	  agendas	  of	  Norway	  and	  Sweden	  and	  discuss	  some	  of	  their	  funding	  strategies.	  
Below,	   I	   first	   present	   some	   of	   Norway’s	   general	   development	   activities	   in	   BiH.	   Then,	   I	  
examine	  Norwegian	  financial	  support	  of	  transitional	  justice	  processes,	  before	  looking	  at	  the	  
Swedish	  aid	  efforts.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Registry	  BiH	  State	  Court,	  Annual	  Report	  (Sarajevo,	  2010),	  62.	  
Table 2: Annual Budgets of the ICTY and the BiH Court in Million Euros from 2005-2011
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Court Type
BiH Court -- 10.2 7.6 7.7 2.3 4.4 3.4 57.6 *
ICTY 135.9 138.2 138.2 171.2 171.2 150.9 150.9 1056.6
* Note:        Source: BiH Court & ICTY
Total
For 2005 no data are available for the BiH Court. Due 
to the ICTY's biennium budgets starting in 2004-05 
some of the amounts match.
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The	  ‘Norwegian	  Model’:	  A	  Top-­‐Down	  Approach	  
Norway’s	  involvement	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  aid	  in	  BiH	  has	  been	  far-­‐reaching.	  Since	  the	  outbreak	  
of	  violence	  in	  the	  region,	  the	  kingdom	  provided	  financial	  support	  during	  different	  stages	  of	  
the	  conflict,	  including	  humanitarian	  emergency	  funds	  during	  the	  hostilities	  (in	  particular	  to	  
refugees);	   reconstruction	  aid	   shortly	  after	   the	  end	  of	   the	   fighting	  of	  warring	   factions;	  and	  
development	   aid	   (geared	   towards	   democratic	   transition),	   notably	   after	   2000.	   In	   the	  
following,	   I	   provide	   some	   contextual	   elements	   of	   Norway’s	   aid	   strategies	   to	   provide	  
background	   information	   on	   the	   Norwegian	   case.	   Then,	   I	   elaborate	   on	   some	   transitional	  
justice	  aspects	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  government’s	   intervention	   in	  Bosnian	  politics,	   illustrating	  
its	  top-­‐down	  capacity	  building	  efforts.	  
When	  examining	  Norway’s	  development	  agenda	  in	  the	  Balkans,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recall	  that	  
Norway	   is	   not	   part	   of	   the	   EU.	   Although	   policy	   recommendations	   and	   reports	   from	   the	  
respective	  Norwegian	   institutions,	   such	  as	   the	  MFA	  or	  Norad—which	   serves	  as	  a	  advisory	  
body	   to	   the	   MFA—make	   brief	   mention	   of	   EU	   structures,	   aid	   strategies	   and	   the	   EU	  
enlargement	   road	  map,	  explicit	   collaborative	  efforts	   remain	   in	   the	  background	  of	  broader	  
aid	   objectives.	   Instead,	   a	   2010	   evaluation	   report	   of	   Norwegian	   development	   aid,	   for	  
instance,	  only	  refers	  to	  the	  EU’s	  Stabilization	  and	  Association	  Agreement	  (SAA)31	  goals	  after	  
listing	  major	  international	  development	  actors,	  including	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  UN.32	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  SAAs	  are	  part	  of	  the	  EU	  Stabilization	  and	  Association	  Process	  and	  European	  Neighborhood	  Policy.	  They	  are	  based	  
on	  the	  EU’s	  acquis	  communautaire—the	  accumulated	  legislation,	  legal	  acts,	  and	  court	  decisions—which	  constitute	  
the	  body	  of	  European	  Union	  law.	  Before	  a	  country	  can	  become	  a	  EU	  member,	  several	  negotiation	  rounds	  with	  the	  EU	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Moreover,	   development	   efforts	   of	   the	   Norwegian	   government	   in	   BiH,	   and	   the	   Western	  
Balkans	   more	   generally,	   lack	   a	   clear	   and	   overarching	   policy	   strategy.	   Norwegian	  
involvement	   is	  merely	  based	  on	  policy	   formulations	   in	   the	  government’s	  annual	  budget.33	  
Such	   a	   policy	   approach	   is	   contrary	   to	   international	   donor	   strategies,	   which	   have	   been	  
streamlined	   in	   recent	   years	   to	   follow	   benchmarking	   criteria	   and	   measurable	   results.34	  
Hence,	  suffice	   to	  say	   that	  Norway’s	   lack	  of	  a	  clear	  strategic	  vision	  made	  the	  evaluation	  of	  
high-­‐level	   relevance	   and	   general	   effectiveness	   of	   particular	   aid	   programs	   in	   assessment	  
reports	  very	  difficult	  or	  at	  times	  even	  impossible.35	  
Interestingly,	  however,	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  explicit	  aid	  strategy	  has	  not	  posed	  any	  accountability	  
issues	   for	   the	   Norwegian	   government.	   In	   fact,	   the	   Storting,	   the	   country’s	   parliament,	  
approves	   aid	   allocations	   annually.	   The	   legislative	   approval	   therefore	   guarantees	  
transparency.	  This	  process	   is	  part	  of	  a	  donor	  policy	  plan	  called	  the	  “Norwegian	  Model.”	   In	  
sum,	  as	  Norwegian	  actors	  from	  the	  public,	  private	  and	  non-­‐profit	  sector	  constitute	  the	  main	  
recipients	  of	  Norwegian	  development	  funding,	  accountability	  and	  transparency	  are	  assured	  
via	   internal	   check-­‐and-­‐balance	   mechanisms,	   such	   as	   annual	   institutional	   reports.	   Several	  
advantages	   result	   from	   the	   current	   set	   up.	   First	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process,	   which	   is	  
controlled	  by	  the	  MFA,	  is	  fast.	  In	  fact,	  all	  the	  involved	  Norwegian	  actors	  (such	  as	  managers,	  
executive	   directors,	   and	   other	   experts)	   can	   be	   reached	   easily	   based	   on	   the	   MFA’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	  the	  candidate	  country	  have	  to	  be	  accomplished	  in	  order	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  a	  country’s	  legislation	  complies	  with	  
the	  over	  30	  chapters	  of	  EU	  legislation.	  	  	  
32	  Norad,	  Evaluation	  of	  Norwegian	  Development	  Cooperation	  with	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  Volume	  II,	  Evaluation	  (Oslo:	  
Evaluation	  Department,	  Norwegian	  Agency	  for	  Development	  Cooperation,	  2010),	  6.	  
33	  According	  to	  officials	  at	  the	  Norwegian	  Embassy	  in	  Sarajevo	  during	  an	  interview	  in	  May	  2011,	  the	  country’s	  oil	  
revenue,	  in	  particular,	  figures	  into	  its	  generous	  aid	  portfolio.	  	  
34	  See	  for	  instance	  2005	  Paris	  Declaration	  on	  aid	  effectiveness.	  
35	  Norad,	  Evaluation	  of	  Norwegian	  Development	  Cooperation	  with	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  Volume	  I,	  iii.	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communication	  channels	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  these	  actors	  to	  fulfill	  their	  goals.36	  
According	   to	   a	   Norad	   evaluation	   report,	   this	   ‘door-­‐to-­‐door’	   delivery	   chain	   and	   the	  
accountability/transparency	  efforts	  have	  provided	  Norway	  much	  visibility	   in	   the	  European	  
political	   space.37	   Nonetheless,	   as	   I	   discuss	   later	   in	   this	   chapter,	   such	   an	   organizational	  
structure	   based	   on	   national	   actors,	   rather	   than	   local	   cooperation	   partners,	   also	   bears	   a	  
number	  of	  problems.	  
The	   majority	   of	   Norway’s	   aid	   in	   terms	   of	   transitional	   justice	   funding	   in	   BiH	   goes	   to	  
supporting	  the	  HJPC.38	   It	   is	  an	  autonomous	  BiH	  institution	  established	  in	  2004	  by	  law	  with	  
the	  task	  of	  ensuring	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  judicial	  
services	  at	  the	  state	  and	  entity	  levels	  of	  BiH.39	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  although	  the	  HJPC	  is	  not	  
specifically	  an	   institution	   responsible	   for	  overseeing	   transitional	   justice	  processes	  and	  war	  
crimes	   prosecutions,	   it	   is	   nonetheless	   part	   of	   the	   check-­‐and-­‐balance	   system	   within	   the	  
justice	   system	  and	  BiH’s	   political	   institutions.	  According	   to	   Sven	  Marius	  Urke,	   a	   seconded	  
Norwegian	  civil	  servant,	  who	  has	  been	  serving	  as	  an	  international	  member	  of	  the	  HJPC	  since	  
its	   creation40,	   it	   is	   crucial	   for	   promoting	   war	   crimes	   prosecutions.	   To	   this	   end	   the	   HJPC	  
appoints	   impartial	  and	   independent	   judges	  who	  will	   also	   serve	  on	   the	  bench	  of	   the	  WCC.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  This	  is	  particularly	  important,	  as	  Norway’s	  development	  agency,	  Norad,	  which	  was	  an	  independent	  government	  
body	  managing	  aid	  and	  development	  programs	  during	  the	  1990s,	  became	  part	  of	  the	  MFA	  in	  2004.	  It	  now	  serves	  as	  a	  
knowledge	  management	  and	  technical	  advisory	  body	  for	  the	  MFA	  and	  its	  embassies.	  
37	  Norad,	  Evaluation	  of	  Norwegian	  Development	  Cooperation	  with	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  Volume	  I,	  6.	  
38	  Total	  judicial	  and	  legal	  sector	  reform	  funding	  for	  the	  period	  of	  1996-­‐2008	  was	  about	  10	  million	  euros	  (13.4	  million	  
US	  dollars),	  excluding	  secondment	  salaries	  to	  its	  experts	  and	  civil	  servants	  working	  in	  BiH	  institutions.	  	  
39	  For	  more	  details	  see	  Law	  on	  the	  High	  Judicial	  and	  Prosecutorial	  Council	  of	  BiH,	  May	  23,	  2002.	  The	  HJPC	  is	  the	  
successor	  body	  of	  the	  Independent	  Judicial	  Commission	  (IJC),	  established	  by	  the	  then	  High	  Representative	  Wolfgang	  
Petritsch	  in	  2001.	  
40	  Before	  becoming	  an	  international	  member	  of	  the	  HJPC,	  Mr.	  Urke	  was	  also	  part	  of	  the	  international	  team	  working	  
on	  the	  IJC	  in	  BiH.	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Interestingly,	   other	   members	   of	   international	   organizations	   had	   similar	   opinions	   of	   the	  
HJPC’s	   work41	   and	   were	   stressing	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   Council	   for	   transitional	   justice	  
processes	  not	  only	  in	  BiH,	  but	  also	  across	  the	  region,	  as	  I	  explain	  below.	  
A	  major	  focus	  of	  Norway’s	  aid	  has	  been	  on	  the	  transfer	  of	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  from	  
the	  Norwegian	   judicial	   system	  model.	  While	  Norway’s	   involvement	   in	   helping	   to	   increase	  
the	  capacity	  of	  this	  body	  in	  recent	  years	  has	  been	  remarkable,	  according	  to	  Mr.	  Urke42,	  the	  
structural	   conditions	   for	   its	   success	   were	   defined	   by	   the	   EU	   and	   the	   OHR	   insisting	   on	   a	  
unified	  legal	  sector	  reform	  in	  BiH	  and	  pushing	  for	  the	  signing	  of	  these	  judicial	  sector	  reform	  
agreements.43	  	  
Interestingly,	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Council	  has	  fueled	  a	  spill	  over	  effect.	  Recently,	  the	  impact	  of	  
the	   judiciary	   watchdog	   has	   led	   to	   cooperative	   efforts—initiated	   by	   the	   international	  
influence	   within	   the	   Council’s	   organizational	   structure—with	   other	   governments	   in	   the	  
region	   (including	   Kosovo	   and	   Serbia)	   to	   reproduce	   similar	   models.44	   Based	   on	   these	  
achievements,	   current	   Norwegian	   funding	   for	   these	   activities	   will	   not	   be	   decreased	   for	  
several	  the	  years	  to	  come.	  
Such	   a	   transitional	   justice	   aid	   strategy	   reveals	   two	   important	   insights	   about	   Norwegian	  
development	  politics.	  First,	  the	  Scandinavian	  state	  has	  a	  preference	  to	  commit	  its	  funds	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Interviews	  with	  several	  members	  of	  international	  organizations,	  including	  the	  OSCE,	  UNDP,	  and	  the	  EU,	  among	  
others.	  
42	  Interview	  with	  Sven	  Marius	  Urke	  on	  May	  11,	  2011.	  
43	  Norad,	  Evaluation	  of	  Norwegian	  Development	  Cooperation	  with	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  Volume	  II,	  52.	  
44	  Interview	  with	  Sven	  Marius	  Urke	  on	  May	  11,	  2011.	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institutions	  created	  by	  the	  international	  community.45	  Moreover,	  Norway’s	  emphasis	  lies	  on	  
capacity	  building	  rather	  than	  infrastructure	  or	  institution	  building,	  unlike	  other	  international	  
actors	  in	  the	  region.	  While	  knowledge	  transfer	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  Norwegian	  aid	  policies,	  the	  
comparison	   below	   with	   another	   important	   donor	   in	   BiH,	   Norway’s	   neighbor,	   Sweden,	  
highlights	  the	  many	  similarities	  and	  differences	  in	  development	  funding.	  
	  
Sweden’s	  Role:	  Promoting	  the	  EU	  Enlargement	  Agenda	  
With	  an	  annual	  aid	  budget	  of	  32	  million	  euros	  (43	  million	  US	  dollars)	   in	  2009,	  the	  Swedish	  
kingdom	  is	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  single-­‐country	  donors	  in	  the	  region.	  As	  a	  comparison,	  Norway	  
spent	  about	  16	  million	  euros	  (21.5	  million	  US	  dollars)	  of	  bilateral	  aid	  the	  same	  year	  and	  the	  
EU	   enlargement	   budget	   for	   BiH	  with	   its	   Instruments	   for	   Pre-­‐Accession	   (IPA)	   added	   up	   to	  
about	  73	  million	  euros	  (98million	  US	  dollars)	  (see	  table	  1	  above).46	   It	   is	   important	  to	  note,	  
however,	   that	   the	   Swedish	   support	   comes	   on	   top	   of	   its	   share	   contributed	   to	   EU	  
enlargement	   efforts.	   While	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   provide	   exact	   amounts	   for	   grants	   supporting	  
transitional	   justice	   projects	   in	   general,	   the	   ratio	   of	   funding	   for	   justice-­‐related	   projects	   is	  
roughly	  one	  tenth	  of	  the	  entire	  aid	  budget	  for	  Norway,	  Sweden	  and	  the	  EU.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Reasons	  for	  such	  a	  strategy	  vary,	  but	  are	  linked	  to	  transparency,	  flexibility	  and	  directness	  of	  donor	  funds,	  as	  
described	  above.	  In	  this	  context,	  Norway	  is	  also	  providing	  development	  grants	  in	  the	  War	  Crimes	  Section	  of	  the	  BiH	  
State	  Court.	  It	  has	  been	  particularly	  engaged	  in	  providing	  Norwegian	  support	  staff,	  such	  as	  prosecutors	  and	  judges.	  
46	  IPA	  is	  the	  EU’s	  assistance	  to	  countries	  engaged	  in	  the	  accession	  process	  to	  the	  EU	  for	  the	  period	  2007-­‐2013.	  It	  was	  
preceded	  by	  other	  programs	  including	  the	  Special	  Accession	  Program	  for	  Agriculture	  &	  Rural	  Development	  (SAPARD)	  
and	  the	  program	  of	  community	  aid	  to	  the	  countries	  of	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  called	  Phare,	  among	  others.	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Sweden’s	  government	  has	  a	  broad	  justice	  sector	  reform	  aid	  portfolio	  that	  goes	  beyond	  war	  
crimes	  prosecution	  and	  transitional	  justice	  support.	  While	  it	  co-­‐funded	  the	  2002-­‐created	  BiH	  
State	  Court	  to	  account	  for	  war	  crimes	  with	  seconded	  Swedish	  civil	  servants,	  acting	  as	  judges	  
or	  prosecutors,	  Sweden	  also	  supports	  the	  HJPC.	   In	  particular,	   it	  currently	  provides	  funding	  
for	   an	   electronic	   case	   management	   system,	   which	   will	   facilitate	   judicial	   cooperation	  
between	   the	   different	   entities	   and	   between	   the	   neighboring	   states	   in	   the	   region.47	  
Additionally,	  the	  Swedish	  government	  has	  recently	  shown	  a	  strong	  interest	  in	  prison	  sector	  
reform	  and	  juvenile	  justice,	  along	  with	  its	  French	  counterparts.	  This	  initiative	  resulted	  from	  
a	  thorough	  justice	  sector	  evaluation	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Swedish	  International	  Development	  
Agency	  (Sida)	  in	  2007.	  
In	   this	  context,	   the	  Sida	  analysis	   followed	  a	  model	  of	   the	  so-­‐called	   justice	  chain,	   including	  
five	  sections—police,	  prosecution,	  courts,	   legal	  aid,	  and	  carrying	  out	  of	  criminal	  sanctions.	  
Although	   the	   assessment	   demonstrated	   the	   need	   of	   reform	   in	   all	   areas,	   Sweden’s	  
development	  strategies	  have	  since	  focused	  on	  particularly	  weak	  links	  of	  the	  chain:	  
Support	  of	  the	  justice	  sector	  will	  be	  based	  on	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  judicial	  chain	  
and	   any	   weak	   links	   identified,	   and	   paying	   attention	   to	   possible	   synergy	  
effects.	   This	   support	   can	  cover	   issues	   relating	   to	   the	  administrative	   courts,	  
enforcement	   and	   penal	   care.	   Support	   can	   also	   be	   given	   to	   supplementary	  
measures	   lying	   outside	   the	   remit	   of	   the	   justice	   sector	   strategy	  based	  on	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  See	  also	  interview	  with	  Swedish	  International	  Development	  Agency	  (Sida)	  official	  of	  the	  Swedish	  Embassy	  in	  
Sarajevo	  in	  May	  2011.	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rights	  perspective,	  for	  example,	  support	  to	  juveniles	  who	  come	  into	  contact	  
with	  judicial	  authorities.48	  
Sweden	  has	  also	  supported	  projects	  with	  BiH’s	  state	  level	  institutions,	  such	  as	  the	  Ministry	  
of	  Justice.	  
One	  explanation	  why	  Swedish	  development	  support	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  is	  broader	  and	  
includes	   also	   cooperation	   with	   government	   institutions	   in	   Bosnia	   is	   that	   Sida	   has	   a	   long	  
tradition	   of	   formulating	   project	   proposals	   and	   multi-­‐year	   strategy	   planning.49	   Moreover,	  
Sweden,	   as	   a	   member	   of	   the	   EU,	   has	   tailored	   its	   aid	   strategy	   to	   EU	   guidelines	   for	  
enlargement	  processes	   in	  the	  region.	  Sweden’s	  agenda	  also	  foresees	  a	  steadily	  decreasing	  
aid	  budget,	  as	   it	  prepares	   to	  merge	  certain	  activities	  with	  EU	  partners	  and	  projects.50	  The	  
close	  ties	  between	  the	  EU	  institutions	  and	  the	  Swedish	  government	  are	  clearly	  outlined	  in	  
the	   Swedish	   2011-­‐14	   development	   report.	   It	   states	   that	   the	   main	   strategy	   for	   reform	  
cooperation	   in	   BiH	   should	   be	   based	   on:	   “Democratic,	   equitable	   and	   sustainable	  
development	  as	  well	  as	  improved	  conditions	  for	  EU	  integration.”51	  Sweden’s	  government	  is	  
thus	   closely	   following	  EU	  policies	   that	  have	  been	   consolidated	  by	   the	  SAA	   signed	   in	  2008	  
and	   EU	   financial	   support	   to	   BiH	   via	   its	   IPA	   funds.	   Notwithstanding	   the	   EU’s	   overarching	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Sida,	  Strategy	  for	  Development	  Cooperation	  with	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina:	  January	  2011	  –	  December	  2014	  
(Stockholm:	  Government	  Offices	  of	  Sweden,	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  2010),	  4.	  
49	  Although	  Norwegian’s	  MFA	  also	  processes	  project	  ideas,	  they	  have	  been	  relatively	  punctual,	  based	  on	  a	  short-­‐term	  
vision	  without	  any	  benchmarking	  or	  evaluation	  possibility.	  Indeed,	  Norway’s	  first	  internal	  (and	  relatively	  
comprehensive)	  assessment	  of	  the	  MFA	  and	  Norad’s	  development	  assistance	  dates	  from	  2010	  only.	  	  
50	  Sida,	  Strategy	  for	  Development	  Cooperation	  with	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina:	  January	  2011	  –	  December	  2014,	  7.	  
According	  to	  various	  interviews	  with	  Norwegian	  diplomatic	  officials	  in	  Sarajevo	  in	  May	  2011,	  Norway’s	  aid	  budget	  for	  
BiH	  is	  likely	  to	  increase	  in	  the	  years	  to	  come.	  
51	  Ibid.,	  3.	  Quote	  italicized	  in	  original	  text.	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development	  agenda	   for	   the	  Western	  Balkans,	   Sweden	   is	   still	   able	   to	   conduct	  a	   relatively	  
independent	  donor	  strategy.	  	  
When	  comparing	  the	  cases	  of	  Norway	  and	  Sweden,	  it	  is	  noticeable	  that	  both	  donors	  have	  a	  
preference	  for	  providing	  support	  to	  state-­‐run	  institutions,	  be	  it	  through	  institution-­‐building	  
projects	   or	   capacity	   building.	   In	   spite	   of	   this	   admittedly	   cursory	   history	   of	   international	  
criminal	   law	   in	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia	   and	   Norway	   and	   Sweden’s	   donor	   support	   to	   BiH’s	  
judiciary	   to	   fight	  war	   crimes,	   several	   observations	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   donor	   strategies	   can	   be	  made	  
here.	   As	   I	   will	   show	   later,	   domestic	   politics	   in	   Bosnia	   between	   the	   entities—and	   the	  
different	  ethnic	  groups—still	  remain	  politically	  charged	  and	  are	  very	  difficult	  to	  cope	  with.	  
Hence	   building	   state-­‐institutions	   by	   using	   the	   leverage	   of	   the	   OHR	   and	   introducing	  
accountability	   efforts	   by	   creating	   a	   state-­‐level	   court	   have	   been	   positive	   measures	   to	  
establish	  a	  counter-­‐balance	  within	  BiH’s	  political	  institutions.	  As	  direct	  involvement,	  such	  as	  
the	   number	   of	   international	   judges	   on	   the	   Court’s	   bench	   has	   been	   phasing	   out	   in	   recent	  
years,	   donors	   have	   shifted	   to	   more	   subtle	   support,	   such	   as	   capacity	   building	   projects	  
through	  workshops	  and	  professional	  exchange	  programs.52	  
Yet,	  the	  fragile	  political	  climate	  in	  BiH	  has	  also	  kept	  donors	  from	  interacting	  more	  seriously	  
with	  a	  broader	  spectrum	  of	  actors	  on	  the	  ground,	  which	  I	  will	  address	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  
this	   article.53	   Instead	   the	   support	   strategies	   described	   above	   illustrate	   the	   inclination	   of	  
countries	   like	  Norway	   and	   Sweden	   to	   concentrate	   their	   aid	   efforts	   on	   projects	   that	   have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Interview	  with	  international	  judge	  at	  the	  BiH	  State	  Court	  in	  September	  2009.	  
53	  The	  author	  is	  aware	  that	  several	  projects	  with	  entity	  and	  local	  administrative	  institutions	  are	  in	  place,	  but	  they	  are	  
comparatively	  smaller	  to	  the	  important	  funding	  of	  main	  judicial	  actors.	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been	  directly	  related	  with	  the	  international	  humanitarian	  law	  spill	  over	  effect	  generated	  by	  
the	   work	   of	   the	   ICTY.	   International	   watchdogs,	   such	   as	   the	   OSCE	   have	   pointed	   out	   this	  
phenomenon:	   although	   BiH’s	   judiciary	   has	   made	   progress	   in	   prosecution	   war	   crimes	   in	  
recent	  years,	  problems	  persist,	  including	  a	  large	  backlog	  of	  cases	  and	  cooperation	  between	  
judiciaries	  on	  different	   levels	   and	  among	  countries.54	  Consequently,	   assessing	   the	  existing	  
shortcomings,	   officials	   of	   Norway	   and	   Sweden	   underlined	   the	   requirement	   to	   provide	  
development	   support	   that	   incrementally	   builds	   on	   these	   needs.	   An	   important	   amount	   of	  
funding	   therefore	   currently	   goes	   to	   an	   information	   technology	   project	   consisting	   of	   a	  
database	   management	   system	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   access	   to	   existing	   cases	   across	   the	  
judiciary	  system	  in	  BiH.55	  The	  trend	  of	  disbursing	  bilateral	  aid	  for	  retributive	  justice	  projects	  
implemented	   by	   state	   institutions	   is	   partly	   due	   to	   donors’	   interests	   of	   measuring	   the	  
outcome	   of	   their	   distributed	   funds.	   Below	   I	   briefly	   describe	   the	   logic	   behind	   evaluating	  
international	  funding	  in	  trial	  mechanisms.	  
	  
Tracking	  War-­‐Crimes-­‐Trial	  Progress:	  Gauging	  Aid	  Output	  
The	  findings	  and	  recommendations	  of	  several	  of	  the	  international	  donor	  evaluation	  reports	  
on	  the	  BiH	  State	  Court	  and	  analyses	  of	  the	  justice	  sector	  reform	  in	  BiH	  are	  generally	  based	  
on	  statistical	  data.56	  These	  assessments	  precisely	  count	  the	  number	  of	  processed	  cases	  by	  
the	   court,	   while	   other	   related	   results	   are	   also	   measured	   using	   quantitative	   research	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  International	  judge,	  supra	  n	  52.	  
55	  Interviews	  with	  officials	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  and	  Swedish	  Embassies	  in	  Sarajevo	  in	  May	  2011.	  	  
56	  Norad,	  Evaluation	  of	  Norwegian	  Development	  Cooperation	  with	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  Volume	  I.	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methods.	   According	   to	   an	   OSCE	   report,	   which	   compares	   the	   outcomes	   and	   the	   work	  
performance	   of	   the	   judiciary’s	   war	   crimes	   section	   in	   recent	   years,	   have	   progressively	  
improved	  war	  crimes	  prosecutions	  in	  BiH.57	  One	  of	  the	  figures	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  report,	  for	  
instance,	   indicates	   that	   the	   number	   of	   accused	   brought	   to	   trial	   from	   January	   2005	   until	  
September	  2010	  rose	  from	  16	  in	  2005	  to	  28	  in	  2010.58	  Collecting	  and	  in	  particular	  evaluating	  
statistical	  data	  on	  trial	  outcomes	  has	  become	  part	  of	  donors’	  activities	  in	  order	  to	  measure	  
the	   output	   of	   their	   development	   assistance.	   Alternative	   attempts	   to	   foster	   sociopolitical	  
change	  in	  postwar	  BiH,	  however,	  are	  more	  difficult	  to	  account	  for.	  
As	   the	   outcome	   of	   restorative	   justice	   practices	   are	  more	   difficult	   to	   capture	   statistically,	  
NGOs—inspired	   by	   these	   output-­‐assessment	   trends—have	   also	   developed	   and	   adapted	  
quantitative	   evaluation	   tools	   in	   order	   to	  measure	  more	   reconciliatory-­‐oriented	   activities,	  
which	   I	   briefly	   mention	   below.	   Conceptually,	   several	   authors	   have	   grappled	   with	   the	  
question	  of	  how	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  transitional	  justice	  measures,	  using	  a	  variety	  of	  case	  
studies.59	  And	  indeed,	  according	  to	  them,	  the	  problem	  of	  how	  restorative	  and	  reconciliatory	  
activities	   in	   transitional	   justice	  processes	   can	  be	  quantified	   is	   a	   tough	  nut	   to	   crack.	  Geoff	  
Dancy,	  for	  instance,	  stresses	  the	  limitations	  of	  statistical	  analyses:	  	  
The	  summary	  statistics	  defend	  against	  the	  claim	  that	  transitional	  justice	  mechanisms	  
have	  uniquely	  destabilizing	  impacts	  within	  transitional	  contexts	  [...].	  Unfortunately,	  
such	   an	   impact	   assessment,	   and	   even	   those	   that	   are	   much	   more	   technically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  International	  judge,	  supra	  n	  52.	  
58	  OSCE,	  Delivering	  Justice	  in	  BiH:	  An	  Overview	  of	  War	  Crimes	  Processing	  from	  2005	  to	  2010,	  98.	  
59	  Hugo	  Van	  der	  Merwe,	  Victoria	  Baxter,	  and	  Audrey	  R.	  Chapman,	  eds.,	  Assessing	  the	  Impact	  of	  Transitional	  Justice:	  
Challenges	  for	  Empirical	  Research	  (Washington,	  DC:	  United	  States	  Institute	  of	  Peace	  Press,	  2009).	  
	  229	  
sophisticated,	  can	  do	  very	  little	  by	  way	  of	  evaluation[60],	  or	  determining	  the	  ‘worth’	  
of	   transitional	   justice	   interventions.	   Looking	   at	   these	   numbers,	   lost	   are	   crucial	  
considerations,	   like	  whether	   formerly	  victimized	  citizens	  of	  Timor-­‐Leste	  or	  Rwanda	  
or	   Peru	   understand	   ‘justice’	   to	   have	   been	   achieved	   or	   whether	   they	   can	   feel	  
‘reconciled’	  with	  their	  neighbors.61	  
To	   this	   end,	   some	   scholars,	   despite	   extensive	   fieldwork	   and	   emic	   case	   studies,	   suggest	  
further	   longitudinal	   studies	   to	   gauge	   reconciliatory	   change,	   which	   remains	   difficult	   if	   not	  
impossible	   to	   measure.62	   While	   it	   is	   complicated	   to	   determine	   the	   healing	   value	   of	   a	  
memorial	   or	   other	   restorative	   justice	   processes	   within	   society,	   NGO	   activists	   have	  
attempted	   to	   address	   the	   evaluative	   requirements	   and	   implemented	  projects	   that	   aim	  at	  
fulfilling	  donor	  requests	  to	  show	  measurable	  results.	  
Non-­‐profit	   organizations,	   such	   as	   the	   Research	   and	   Documentation	   Center	   in	   Sarajevo—
which	  was	  created	  in	  2004	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  collecting	  data	  on	  human	  losses	  during	  the	  1992-­‐
1995	  war	  in	  BiH—have	  started	  to	  create	  database	  projects	  in	  order	  to	  document	  war	  crimes	  
and	  human	  rights	  violations	  across	  the	  region.	  These	  archives	  help	  to	  break	  down	  myth	  and	  
politicization	  of	  past	  conflicts	  on	  the	  one	  hand;63	  and	  provide	  donors	  with	  tangible	  results	  
after	   a	   project,	   hence	   establishing	   a	   measurable	   benchmark	   on	   the	   other	   hand.64	   The	  
regional	   fact-­‐finding	   initiative	   RECOM	   has	   operated	   along	   similar	   lines,	   attempting	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Italicized	  in	  original	  text.	  
61	  Geoff	  Dancy,	  “Impact	  Assessment,	  Not	  Evaluation:	  Defining	  a	  Limited	  Role	  for	  Positivism	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Transitional	  
Justice,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Transitional	  Justice	  4,	  no.	  3	  (2010):	  376.	  
62	  Eric	  Stover	  and	  Harvey	  M.	  Weinstein,	  My	  Neighbor,	  My	  Enemy:	  Justice	  and	  Community	  in	  the	  Aftermath	  of	  Mass	  
Atrocity	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  
63	  Nidžara	  Ahmetaševic,	  “Bosnia’s	  Book	  of	  the	  Dead,”	  Justice	  Report,	  June	  21,	  2007,	  
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/analysis/5606.	  
64	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  Bosnian	  Book	  of	  the	  Dead,	  the	  Research	  and	  Documentation	  Center	  has	  also	  created	  a	  software	  
program	  integrating	  Google	  Maps	  in	  order	  to	  trace	  war	  crimes,	  human	  rights	  violations	  during	  the	  1992-­‐1995	  conflicts	  
in	  BiH.	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depoliticize	   the	   work	   of	   a	   regional	   truth-­‐seeking	   body	   and	   turning	   its	   advocacy	   work—
raising	   the	   voice	   of	   victims	   in	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia—into	   an	   objective	   and	   scientifically	  
measurable	   project.	   However,	   international	   donors	   have	   yet	   to	   embrace	   this	   trend	   and	  
adjust	  their	  funding	  patterns	  accordingly.65	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  draw	  on	  the	  RECOM	  case	  in	  
order	  to	  discuss	  the	  difficulties	  of	  civil	  society	  engagement	  in	  this	  context.	  	  	  
The	   above	   overview	   of	   Norwegian	   and	   Swedish	   donor	   efforts	   distinctly	   underlines	   the	  
strong	  trend	  of	  how	  grant	  funding	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  accountability	  has	  been	  geared	  towards	  
retributive	   justice.	   Unfortunately,	   the	   support	   of	   a	   larger	   transitional	   justice	   strategy	   has	  
hence	  been	  relatively	   ignored.	   In	   the	   following	   I	  outline	   the	  problems	  associated	  with	   the	  
BiH	   war	   crimes	   strategy	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   broader	   transitional	   justice	   strategy	   in	   BiH.	  
Additionally,	   I	   explore	   other	   related	   challenges	   that	   donors	   in	   BiH	   face,	   which	   help	   us	  
understand	   their	   current	   development	   agenda.	   The	   donors’	   state-­‐centric	   approach	   also	  
hinders	  alternative	  transitional	  justice	  initiatives	  launched	  by	  civil	  society.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Interview	  data	  collected	  in	  May	  2011	  with	  EU	  officials	  and	  other	  representatives	  of	  several	  donor	  countries	  have	  
indicated	  that	  NGO	  research	  proposals	  still	  fall	  short	  of	  fulfilling	  funding	  requirements	  of	  government	  or	  EU	  
guidelines,	  resulting	  in	  the	  refusal	  or	  ineligibility	  of	  NGO	  applications.	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Donor	  Challenges	  and	  Influence	  on	  Broader	  Transitional	  Justice	  
Initiatives	  	  
The	  road	  to	  democratic	  transition	  in	  BiH	  since	  the	  international	  peace	  Dayton	  agreement	  in	  
1995	  has	  been	  incessantly	  rocky.	  Nevertheless,	  quarreling	  political	  elites	  of	  different	  ethnic	  
origins,66	   frequently	   had	   to	   cede	   to	   the	   pressure	   and	   power	   of	   the	   OHR	   to	   enforce	   and	  
implement	   incremental	   reforms	   over	   the	   years.	   Yet,	   the	   fall	   2010	   elections—which	   have	  
resulted	   in	   an	   ongoing	   coalition-­‐building	   imbroglio	   of	   BiH’s	   political	   parties—left	   the	  
country’s	   political	   institutions	   months	   without	   a	   ruling	   government.67	   The	   reform	   of	   the	  
justice	  sector,	  which	  is	  still	  ongoing,	  pertinently	  highlights	  the	  intricate	  problems	  BiH	  society	  
is	  facing	  in	  its	  long	  and	  seemingly	  never-­‐ending	  post-­‐conflict	  period.	  
As	   mentioned	   above,	   the	   decision	   to	   restructure	   BiH’s	   judiciary	   eventually	   led	   to	   the	  
establishment	   of	   the	  HJPC	   in	   order	   to	  monitor	   reforms	   in	   the	   justice	   system.	  One	   of	   the	  
important	  programs	  the	  Council	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  from	  2002	  to	  2004—immediately	  after	  its	  
creation—consisted	  of	  vetting,	  a	  procedure	  of	  screening	   individuals	  who	  hold	  public	  office	  
to	  ensure	  minimum	  standards	  of	  integrity	  in	  public	  service	  and	  which	  is	  widely	  recognized	  as	  
an	   important	   in	   security	   sector	   reform	   measures	   in	   post-­‐conflict	   societies.	   During	   this	  
period,	  replacements	  for	  nearly	  1000	  judges	  and	  prosecutors	  were	  sought,	  and	  their	  posts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Including	  Bosnian	  Croats,	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  and	  Bosnian	  Serbs.	  
67	  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  “Bosnia:	  State	  Institutions	  Under	  Attack”	  (International	  Crisis	  Group	  Europe	  Briefing,	  
2011).	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filled	  by	  an	  open	  competition.68	  This	  process,	  however,	  was	  highly	  politicized	  with	  political	  
leaders	  criticizing	  the	  work	  of	  the	  HJPC	  and	  trying	  to	  influence	  appointments.69	  
Almost	   a	   decade	   after	   this	   initial	   vetting,	   the	   HJPC	   still	   watches	   over	   appointment	  
procedures;	   yet,	   recent	   developments	   show	   that	   the	   discussions	   and	   activities	   evolving	  
around	  BiH’s	   judiciary	  remain	  very	  politicized.	   In	  February	  2011,	  the	  then-­‐president	  of	  the	  
Federation	  of	  BiH	   (FBiH)70,	   Borjana	  Krišto,	   ignored	   the	   constitutional	   competencies	  of	   the	  
HJPC	  by	   adopting	   a	   decision	   on	   appointments	   of	   judges	   at	   the	   FBiH	  Constitutional	   Court.	  
She	  and	  her	  vice	  presidents	  signed	  the	  decision	  on	  appointments	  of	  two	  judges	  without	  the	  
prior	  approval	  of	  the	  HJPC,	  which	  proposes	  candidates	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  the	  independence	  
and	  impartiality	  of	  judges	  and	  prosecutors.	  Ms.	  Krišto	  eventually	  withdrew	  her	  decision.71	  
In	   sum,	   since	   its	   creation	   the	   HJPC	   has	   become	   an	   important	   body	   among	   BiH’s	   political	  
institutions	   and	   the	   continuous	   financial	   and	   political	   support	   of	   foreign	   donors	   has	  
guaranteed	  a	  proper	  modus	  operandi.	  Notwithstanding,	  the	  above	  example	  illustrates	  that	  
local	   leaders	   still	   attempt	   to	   decrease	   the	   HJPC’s	   influence	   and	  manipulate	   appointment	  
processes.	  In	  the	  eyes	  of	  several	  BiH	  politicians	  it	  remains	  an	  intrusion	  in	  local	  politics.	  The	  
dilemma	   for	   donors	   therefore	   consists	   gauging	   how	   to	   best	   strengthen	   the	   BiH’s	  
institutional	   framework	   and	   engaging	   local	   actors,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   reducing	   the	  
impression	  of	  interventionist	  politics	  of	  the	  OHR	  and	  the	  EU.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  OECD,	  The	  OECD	  Handbook	  on	  Security	  Sector	  Reform	  (SSR)	  Supporting	  Security	  and	  Justice	  (Paris:	  Organization	  of	  
Cooperation	  and	  Economic	  Development,	  2007),	  109.	  
69	  Lara	  Nettelfield,	  Courting	  Democracy:	  The	  Hague	  Tribunal’s	  Impact	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina’	  (Cambridge,	  NY:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  Chapter	  8.	  
70	  FBiH	  is	  one	  two	  BiH	  entities,	  with	  the	  other	  one	  being	  Republika	  Srpska.	  
71	  	  Dragan	  Bradvica,	  “Krišto	  Popustila	  Odustajanje	  Kandidata	  Ili	  Pritisci	  OHR-­‐a?,”	  Dnevni	  List	  (Sarajevo,	  February	  25,	  
2011).See	  also	  website	  of	  the	  EU	  Police	  Mission	  in	  BiH	  (EULEX)	  at	  http://www.eupm.org/,	  accessed	  April	  13,	  2011.	  
	  233	  
The	   case	   of	   the	   HJPC’s	   politicized	   activities	   nicely	   illustrates	   the	   quandary	   international	  
donors	  face	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  choosing	  specific	  projects	  to	  which	  they	  intend	  to	  allocate	  aid	  
to	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  settings.	  Despite	  donor	  funding	  that	  focuses	  mainly	  on	  grants	  supporting	  
state	  institutions,	  in	  particular	  the	  judiciary—generally	  seen	  as	  an	  independent	  actor	  among	  
government	  institutions—the	  fragile	  political	  landscape	  within	  BiH	  only	  aggravates	  populist	  
political	   discourses	   of	   top-­‐down	   donor	   activities	   and	   interventionist	   politics	   led	   by	   the	  
international	   community.	   Predictably	   major	   donors	   remain	   cautious	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  
investing	   in	   civil	   society	   initiatives72,	   because	   the	   politics	   and	   the	   level	   of	   politicization	  
between	  local	  governments	  and	  different	  social	  groups	  and	  movements—including	  victims	  
and	  their	  families,	  veterans,	  and	  others—remains	  very	  high.73	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  politicking	  
that	   occurs	   on	   diverse	   levels	   in	   BiH,	   the	   cooperation	   between	   different	   donors	   is	   also	   a	  
source	  of	  potential	  problems	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  coordination.	  
	  
Limited	  Donor	  Coordination	  
The	   analysis	   of	   information	   from	   over	   a	   dozen	   semi-­‐structured	   interviews	   with	   donor	  
officials	  from	  different	  countries	  and	  international	  organizations	  during	  fieldwork	  conducted	  
in	   May	   2011	   demonstrates	   the	   repeated	   concern	   of	   donors	   with	   regards	   to	   project	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  During	  some	  of	  my	  fieldwork	  in	  May	  2011,	  several	  official	  representatives	  from	  different	  government	  and	  
international	  organizations	  underlined	  this	  dilemma	  and	  the	  hesitations	  to	  fund	  civil	  society	  initiatives.	  
73	  Denisa	  Kostovicova,	  “Civil	  Society	  in	  the	  Western	  Balkans:	  Vehicle	  for	  or	  Obstacle	  to	  Transitional	  Justice,”	  in	  Conflict	  
and	  Memory:	  Bfidging	  Past	  and	  Future	  in	  (South	  East)	  Europe,	  ed.	  Wolfgang	  Petritsch	  and	  Vedran	  Dzihic,	  Southeast	  
European	  Integration	  Perspectives	  3	  (Baden-­‐Baden	  (Germany):	  Nomos,	  2010).	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coordination	   and	   collaboration.	   Indeed,	   although	   different	   actors	   began	   to	   harmonize	  
transitional	   justice	   aid	   activities	   in	   recent	   years,	   the	   organizational	   structure	   of	   the	  
concerted	  efforts	  remains	  highly	  informal	  based	  on	  a	  very	  loose	  network.74	  One	  reason	  why	  
these	  collaborative	  efforts	  have	  yet	  to	  properly	  take	  shape	  is	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  network	  
members,	  including	  states	  and	  international	  organizations.	  
For	  instance,	  Norway’s	  development	  officials	  are	  representatives	  of	  their	  state,	  as	  are	  their	  
Swedish	   counterparts.	   Although	   not	   a	   EU	   member,	   Norway’s	   general	   development	  
objectives	  comply	  with	  Sweden’s	  policy	  agenda	  and	  EU	  objectives.	  The	  EU,	  however,	  has	  a	  
more	  intricate	  position	  within	  the	  BiH	  institutional	  framework.	  	  As	  pointed	  out	  in	  a	  footnote	  
at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  article	  until	  recently	  the	  current	  head	  of	  the	  OHR	  used	  to	  be	  also	  the	  
EU	  Special	  Representative	  for	  BiH.	  The	  decision	  to	  merge	  both	  positions	  was	  fueled	  by	  the	  
idea	  that	  the	  OHR	  would	  eventually	  wind	  down	  its	  activities,	  once	  the	  political	  leadership	  in	  
BiH	   has	   implemented	   a	   certain	   number	   of	   reforms.	   The	   last	   oversight	   power	   will	   then	  
remain	  with	  the	  Europeans,	  embedded	  within	  the	  EU	  enlargement	  process	  in	  the	  Western	  
Balkans.	  
The	  EU	  and	  the	  OHR	  are	  nonetheless	  not	  the	  only	  regional	  and	  international	  actors.	  In	  fact,	  
the	   UNDP	   and	   the	   OSCE	   are	   also	   part	   of	   the	   political	   landscape	   in	   BiH.	   As	   seen	   above,	  
UNDP’s	   role	   in	   the	  politics	   of	   transition	  has	  done	   little	   to	  promote	   local	   involvement	   and	  
despite	  converging	  road	  maps	  of	  each	  of	  the	  actors,	  policy	  interests	  differ.	  According	  to	  EU	  
officials,	   the	   monthly	   meetings	   among	   donors	   are	   characterized	   by	   an	   informal	   but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  Interviews	  with	  several	  donor	  officials	  during	  fieldwork	  in	  May	  2011.	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informative	   style.75	   Since	   these	   meetings	   are	   on	   a	   voluntary	   basis,	   they	   also	   depend	   on	  
professional	  ties	  between	  the	  different	  actors	  and	  their	  respective	  agendas	  that	  they	  need	  
to	  tackle	  at	  the	  time	  a	  meeting	  is	  scheduled.	  Moreover,	  these	  meetings	  are	  for	  international	  
donors	   only,	   excluding	   local	   actors,	   such	   as	   representatives	   of	   different	  ministries	   or	   the	  
government.	  While	  such	  a	  policy	  is	  understandable	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  donors	  who	  seemingly	  
struggle	   when	   attempting	   to	   coordinate	   aid	   projects,	   it	   also	   discredits	   the	   overarching	  
objective	  highlighted	  in	  recent	  reports	  across	  the	  donor	  community,	  which	  is	  to	  strengthen	  
local	   involvement.	   This	   situation	   is	   even	  more	   delicate	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   implementing	   a	  
post-­‐conflict	  roadmap	  that	  goes	  beyond	  war	  crimes	  trials,	  and	  aims	  at	  integrating	  a	  broader	  
transitional	  justice	  strategy,	  as	  I	  discuss	  below.	  
	  
War	  Crimes	  Strategy	  versus	  Transitional	  Justice	  Strategy	  
In	   2007,	   the	   BiH	   government	   established	   a	   working	   group	   in	   order	   to	   draft	   a	   national	  
strategy	  for	  dealing	  with	  war	  crimes	  and	  related	  issues,	  which	  was	  adopted	  by	  the	  Council	  
of	  Ministers	  the	  following	  year.	  The	  rationale	  behind	  drafting	  this	  strategy	  included	  several	  
concerns.	   First,	   it	   aimed	   to	   address	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   systematic	   approach	   to	   account	   for	   the	  
large	   number	   of	  war	   crimes	   cases,	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   impunity	   and	   facilitate	   the	   timely	  
prosecution	  of	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  known	  perpetrators.	  Second,	  no	  centralized	  statistical	  
data	  on	  the	  number	  of	  prosecuted	  war	  crimes	  cases	  was	  available	  in	  the	  country.	  Such	  data	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75	  Interview	  with	  EU	  officials	  in	  May	  2011.	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could	  serve	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  judiciary’s	  efficiency	  and	  assist	  in	  gauging	  future	  material	  
and	  human	  investment	  in	  order	  to	  process	  cases.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  lack	  of	  harmonizing	  court	  
practices,	   partly	   due	   to	   the	   application	   of	   several	   criminal	   codes	   in	   BiH.	   Despite	   the	  
introduction	  of	  a	  new	  criminal	  code	  in	  2003,	  the	  management	  of	  war	  crimes	  cases	  remained	  
deficient	   and	   the	   transfer	   of	   war	   crimes	   cases	   between	   different	   courts	   lacked	  
coordination.76	  
The	  political	  effort	  of	  outlining	  the	  conditions	  of	  war	  crimes	  prosecution	  in	  the	  country	  has,	  
without	  a	  doubt,	  provided	  donors	  with	  a	  clear	  idea	  of	  a	  reform	  agenda	  in	  this	  particular	  area	  
of	  the	  justice	  sector.	  The	  idea	  of	  mapping	  ongoing	  trials,	  outstanding	  war	  crimes	  cases	  and	  
terminated	  proceedings	  were	   thus	   a	   catalyst	   for	   creating	   an	   electronic	   case	  management	  
system,	  which	  is	  even	  more	  modern	  than	  the	  database	  used	  at	  the	  ICTY.77	  Fixing	  objectives	  
to	  be	  met	  within	  a	  reasonable	  timeline—such	  as	  a	  roadmap	  to	  finish	  prosecuting	  the	  bulk	  of	  
most	   complex	   war	   crimes	   cases	   within	   seven	   years	   of	   adopting	   the	   strategy78—has	   also	  
been	   very	   helpful	   for	   donors	   to	   adopt	   precise	   project	   proposals	   for	   funding	   specific	  
programs	  or	  meeting	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  local	  justice	  system.	  Thus,	  technical	  support,	  such	  as	  
the	   information	   technology	   investments,	   and	   capacity	   building	   to	   train	   judicial	   staff	   has	  
since	  been	  clearly	  stated	  in	  donor	  policy	  strategy	  papers.79	  
Contrary	   to	   the	   explicit	   national	   war	   crimes	   strategy	   in	   BiH,	   there	   is	   no	   overarching	  
transitional	  justice	  strategy	  outlining	  reconciliatory	  measures,	  a	  political	  dialogue,	  and	  fact-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  Council	  of	  Ministers,	  “National	  War	  Crimes	  Strategy”,	  December	  2008,	  3–4.	  
77	  Interviews	  with	  officials	  of	  the	  HJPC	  in	  May	  2011.	  
78	  The	  strategy	  suggests	  finishing	  prosecuting	  all	  the	  war	  crimes	  cases	  within	  15	  years	  of	  its	  adoption.	  
79	  See	  for	  instance	  the	  Swedish	  strategy	  for	  development	  cooperation	  in	  BiH	  2011-­‐2014.	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finding	   and	   documentation	   initiatives	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   conflict	   during	   1992-­‐1995	   in	   BiH.	  
However,	   under	   the	  auspices	  of	  UNDP,	   lawmakers,	   experts	   and	   civil	   society	  organizations	  
have	  convened	  consultation	  meetings	  since	  spring	  2010—in	  January	  2010,	  the	  BiH	  Council	  
of	   Ministers	   adopted	   a	   decision	   to	   form	   and	   implement	   a	   transitional	   justice	   working	  
group80—in	  order	  to	  discuss	  topics,	  such	  as	  reparations,	  truth	  commissions	  and	  institutional	  
reform.81	  Norway’s	  development	  agency	  did	  not	  contribute	  to	  these	  efforts.82	  While	  Sweden	  
provided	   assistance	   to	   an	   earlier	   UNDP	   project	   from	   2007-­‐2009,	   called	   “Bosnia	   and	  
Herzegovina:	   Supporting	   National	   Capacities	   in	   Transitional	   Justice	   for	   Bosnia	   and	  
Herzegovina,”	  according	  to	  UNDP	  officials,	  the	  role	  of	  Sweden	  and	  other	  bilateral	  donors	  in	  
the	  talks	  about	  a	  transitional	  justice	  strategy	  in	  BiH	  are	  minor	  and	  informal.83	  	  
Despite	  the	  awareness	  of	  integrating	  NGO	  actors	  into	  transitional	  justice	  processes	  in	  BiH,	  in	  
order	   to	   respond	   to	   concerns	   within	   society84,	   the	   participation	   of	   civil	   society	  
organizations—particularly	   BiH	   victims	   associations—is	   also	   limited	   and	   problematic.	   The	  
political	   crisis	   after	   the	   tumultuous	   general	   elections	   in	   fall	   2010	   only	   exacerbated	  
cooperation	  efforts	  among	  the	  different	  participating	  groups.85	  In	  fact,	  UNDP-­‐led	  initiatives	  
to	   include	   local	   level	   efforts	   remain	   limited	   to	   state	   institutions.	   Although	   UNDP	   officials	  
were	   not	   opposed	   to	   civil	   society	   actors	   in	   transitional	   justice	   processes,	   UNDP	   does	   not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  See	  Decision	  on	  the	  Establishment	  of	  the	  Expert	  Working	  Group	  for	  Development	  of	  the	  Transitional	  Justice	  
Strategy	  in	  BiH	  and	  the	  Action	  Plan	  for	  its	  Implementation	  on	  21	  January	  2010.	  
81	  Interview	  with	  UNDP	  officials	  in	  May	  2011.	  
82	  See	  website	  of	  the	  Norwegian	  Embassy	  with	  a	  summary	  of	  its	  2010	  project	  support,	  at	  
http://www.norveska.ba/Embassy/Embassy_Fund/An-­‐overview-­‐over-­‐the-­‐projects-­‐supported-­‐by-­‐the-­‐Norwegian-­‐
Ministry-­‐of-­‐Foreign-­‐Affairs-­‐in-­‐2010/,	  accessed	  January	  3,	  2012.	  	  
83	  Interview	  with	  UNDP	  officials	  on	  16	  May	  2011.	  
84	  Zoran	  Pajić	  and	  Dragan	  Popović,	  Facing	  the	  Past	  and	  Access	  to	  Justice	  from	  a	  Public	  Perspective	  (United	  Nations	  
Development	  Programme	  in	  BiH,	  2010),	  26.	  
85	  Ibid.	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provide	  any	  official	  political	  support.86	  The	  regional	  fact-­‐finding	  initiative	  RECOM	  mentioned	  
earlier	  serves	  as	  a	  good	  case	   in	  point.	  While	  RECOM	  is	  seeking	  support	  from	  governments	  
across	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia	   to	   establish	   a	   transnational	   body	   to	   document	   and	   disclose	  
human	  rights	  violations	  and	  war	  crimes	  during	  the	  1991-­‐2001	  conflicts	  in	  the	  region87,	  UNDP	  
neither	  sponsors	  RECOM	  financially	  nor	  stands	  politically	  behind	   it.88	  As	  the	  objective	  of	  a	  
transitional	  justice	  strategy	  for	  BiH	  consists	  of	  creating	  a	  general	  framework	  which	  the	  BiH	  
national	  war	  crimes	  strategy	   is	  part	  of,	   it	   is	  understandable	  that	  such	  a	  broad	  road	  map	  is	  
more	  difficult	   to	  elaborate.	   The	   lack	  of	  a	   clear	   vision	  might	  also	  explain	  why	  donors	  have	  
been	  reluctant	  to	  latch	  onto	  specific	  project	  funding	  in	  this	  area.	  	  
	  
Difficulties	  Strengthening	  Civil	  Society	  
Donor	  efforts	   to	  go	  beyond	  war	  crimes	   strategies	   to	   include	  a	  broader	   transitional	   justice	  
vision	  have	  not	  only	  been	  limited	  due	  the	  lack	  of	  putting	  the	  issue	  on	  the	  agenda	  for	  future	  
donor	   policies,	   but	   also	   because	   of	   the	   modest	   interaction	   of	   Swedish	   and	   Norwegian	  
development	   teams	   with	   local	   civil	   society	   actors.	   Indeed,	   the	   ‘Norwegian	   Model,’	   as	  
described	  above,	  circumvents	  direct	  contact	  with	  local	  NGOs	  by	  allocating	  aid	  funds	  directly	  
to	   major	   Norwegian	   NGOs.89	   While	   local	   capacity	   can	   be	   built	   through	   the	   intermediary	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  UNDP	  officials,	  supra	  n	  83.	  
87	  See	  website	  of	  RECOM	  coalition	  for	  more	  detail	  at	  http://www.zarekom.org/,	  accessed	  May	  18,	  2011.	  
88	  UNDP	  officials,	  supra	  n	  83.	  
89	  As	  a	  comparison,	  the	  World	  Bank	  rarely	  disburses	  funds	  directly	  to	  Civil	  Society	  Organizations	  (CSOs)	  either.	  Instead	  
it	  applies	  a	  strictly	  state-­‐centric	  donor	  approach.	  Hence,	  a	  CSO	  receives	  project	  funds	  by	  working	  as	  a	  paid	  consultant	  
or	  contractor	  to	  the	  borrower	  (government).	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function	   of	   international	   actors,	   this	   strategy	   relies	   on	   a	   top-­‐down	   approach	   that	   ignores	  
local	  problems	  and	  needs.	   Yet,	   donors	  prefer	   this	   strategy	  as	   it	   allows	   for	  more	   flexibility	  
when	  disbursing	  funding.90	  
Interestingly,	   the	   reason	   for	   the	   weak	   interaction	   between	   local	   stakeholders	   and	  
international	  donors	  is	  strongly	  described	  in	  a	  Sida	  2008	  evaluation	  report:	  
There	   is	   a	   strong	   feeling	   amongst	   stakeholders	   that	   norms	   need	   to	   be	  
changed	  across	  the	  whole	  of	  society	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  social	  improvement.	  
“People”	  are	  perceived	  as	  being	  timid	  and	  lethargic.	  …	  Stakeholders	  do	  not	  
in	  general	  consider	  BiH	  to	  have	  a	  strong	  civil	  society.91	  	  
Although	   the	   donors’	   political	   discourse	   emphasizes	   the	   need	   to	   strengthen	   civil	   society	  
organizations;92	  in	  practice,	  donors	  rely	  on	  their	  own,	  domestic	  organizations	  to	  implement	  
development	  strategies.93	  And	  while	  civil	  society	  is	  encouraged,	  according	  senior	  officials,94	  
collaborative	   relations	  with	   the	  donors	  are	  only	  maintained	  between	  government	  entities	  
and	  international	  organizations.	  
Already	  several	  years	  after	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  international	  donor	  activity	  had	  ebbed,	  several	  
scholars	   criticized	   the	   interventionist	   approach	   followed	   by	   the	   different	   international	  
actors	  on	  the	  ground	  after	   the	  ceasefire	  agreement	   in	  Dayton,	  Ohio	   in	  1995.	  Some	  of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  Norad,	  Evaluation	  of	  Norwegian	  Development	  Cooperation	  with	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  Volume	  I,	  12.	  
91	  Steve	  Powell	  et	  al.,	  Outcome	  Mapping	  Evaluation	  of	  Six	  Civil	  Society	  Projects	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  Summary	  
Report,	  Sida	  Evaluation	  2008:17	  (Sida	  Department	  of	  Europe,	  2008),	  22.	  
92	  See	  also	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme,	  Country	  Programme	  Document	  for	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  
(2005-­‐2009)	  (Sarajevo,	  2004).	  
93	  For	  a	  larger	  discussion	  on	  the	  politics	  of	  foreign	  aid	  cf.	  Carol	  Lancaster,	  Foreign	  Aid:	  Diplomacy,	  Development,	  
Domestic	  Politics	  (University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2007).	  
94	  Interviews	  with	  donor	  country	  representatives	  in	  Sarajevo	  in	  May	  2011.	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research	   in	   the	  early	  2000s	  deplores	   in	  particular	   the	   lack	  of	   long-­‐term	  strategies	  and	   the	  
disempowering	   impact	   of	   these	   measures	   on	   actors	   on	   the	   ground.95	   Analyzing	   the	  
recommendations	  of	  recent	  donor	  strategy	  assessment	  reports,	  I	  was	  surprised	  to	  observe	  
that	  even	  years	  after	  the	  insightful	  studies,	  transitional	  justice	  donors	  are	  still	  grappling	  with	  
how	  to	  best	  integrate	  civil	  society	  actors	  into	  their	  strategies.	  
Recent	   Norwegian	   and	   Swedish	   guidelines	   for	   future	   grant	   planning	   with	   respect	   to	  
transitional	  justice	  mechanisms—focusing	  on	  civil	  society	  participation	  and	  strengthening	  of	  
local	   actors	   within	   society—serve	   as	   a	   case	   in	   point.	   The	   reports	   suggest	   that	   funding	  
recipients	   be	   diversified,	   in	   other	   words	   local	   stakeholders	   should	   be	   progressively	  
integrated	   with	   the	   possibility	   of	   directly	   receiving	   allocated	   funds.	   Additionally,	   they	  
recommend	  strengthening	  the	  relationship	  between	  donors	  and	  NGOs.	  All	  these	  measures,	  
however,	   should	   pursue	   the	   donor’s	   principal	   goal	   of	   building	   and	   sustaining	   local	  
involvement.96	  Without	  question,	   such	  an	  objective	   is	  easier	   said	   than	  done.	   In	  particular,	  
since	   a	   recent	   embezzlement	   scandal	   with	   the	   Research	   and	   Documentation	   Center	   in	  
Sarajevo	  alienated	  European	  and	  Norwegian	  donors.97	  Yet,	  fund	  abuse	  is	  an	  exception	  and	  
not	  the	  rule.	  Rather	  the	  lack	  of	  engagement	  of	  international	  donors	  with	  grassroots	  actors	  
jeopardizes	  important	  civil	  society	  initiatives	  as	  the	  example	  below	  illustrates.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  Florian	  Bieber,	  “Aid	  Dependency	  in	  Bosnian	  Politics	  and	  Civil	  Society:	  Failures	  and	  Successes	  of	  Post-­‐war	  
Peacebuilding	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina,”	  Croatian	  International	  Relations	  Review	  8,	  no.	  26–27	  (2002):	  25–30;	  Roberto	  
Belloni,	  “Civil	  Society	  and	  Peacebuilding	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,”	  Journal	  of	  Peace	  Research	  38,	  no.	  2	  (2001):	  163–
180.	  
96	  Norad,	  Evaluation	  of	  Norwegian	  Development	  Cooperation	  with	  the	  Western	  Balkans	  Volume	  I,	  chap.	  3	  and	  4;	  
Powell	  et	  al.,	  Outcome	  Mapping	  Evaluation	  of	  Six	  Civil	  Society	  Projects	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  22–24.	  
97	  Interviews	  with	  EU	  and	  Norwegian	  officials	  in	  May	  2011.	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Unheard	  Voices:	  The	  Example	  of	  the	  RECOM	  Signature	  Campaign	  
As	  described	  above,	  the	  RECOM	  project	  is	  a	  transnational	  NGO	  initiative	  fueled	  by	  the	  need	  
to	   complement	   retributive	   justice	   efforts	   and	   with	   the	   goal	   to	   help	   societies	   across	   the	  
region	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   conflicts	   in	   the	   1990s	   in	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia.	   I	   draw	   on	   this	  
particular	  case	   in	  order	   to	  demonstrate	  how	   limited	   funding	  undermines	   the	  visibility	  and	  
reach	  of	  grass-­‐roots	  initiatives,	  particularly	  in	  BiH.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  following	  is	  thus	  not	  
to	   provide	   a	   comprehensive	   account	   of	   the	   emergence	   and	   scope	   of	   the	  movement,	   but	  
rather	  to	  briefly	  describe	  the	  signature	  campaign	  phase	  of	  the	  project	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  
the	  impact	  and	  difficulties	  of	  the	  coalition	  partners	  in	  BiH	  during	  their	  effort	  to	  promote	  this	  
fact-­‐finding	  initiative.	  
Despite	  its	  regional	  character,	  RECOM	  is	  mainly	  funded	  by	  donors	  and	  supporters	  who	  are	  
directly	   in	   contact	   with—or	   financially	   support—the	   Serbian	   non-­‐profit	   organization,	   the	  
Humanitarian	  Law	  Center,	  headed	  by	  the	  controversial	  Serbian	  human	  rights	  activist	  Nataša	  
Kandić.	  They	  include	  George	  Soros’	  Open	  Society	  Institute	  (OSI),	  the	  United	  States	  Institute	  
for	   Peace	   (USIP),	   the	   Dutch	   Embassy	   in	   Belgrade,	   the	   Robert	   Bosch	   Stiftung,	   and	   the	  
European	   Instrument	   for	  Democracy	  &	  Human	  Rights	   (EIDHR),	   among	  others.	  Neither	   the	  
Swedish	  nor	   the	  Norwegian	  Embassies	  provide	  any	   financial	  aid	   to	   the	  project.	  Moreover,	  
the	  current	  funds	  from	  participating	  donors	  did	  not	  match	  the	  projected	  budget	  for	  certain	  
phases	  of	  the	  initiative.	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In	  fact,	  an	  updated	  budget	  proposal	  for	  the	  RECOM	  initiative	  dating	  from	  February	  2011—
for	   the	  period	  winter	  2008	   to	   summer	  201198—outlines	   the	  different	   steps	  of	   the	  project	  
and	   their	   respective	   expenses.	   Each	   of	   the	   above	   donors	   matches	   or	   contributes	   to	   the	  
budgetary	   requirements.	   Different	   activities	   range	   from	   logistical	   support—such	   as	  
accommodation	   for	   members	   of	   the	   coalition	   during	   consultation	   meetings	   across	   the	  
region—to	   salary	   expenses	   for	   consultants	   who	   share	   their	   expertise	   and	   provide	   their	  
advice	   to	   the	   steering	   committee	  and	  working	  groups	  of	   the	   initiative.	  At	   the	   time	  of	   the	  
publication	  of	  the	  revised	  budget,	  for	  instance,	  RECOM	  lacked	  nearly	  40	  000	  euros	  (58	  000	  
US	  dollars)	  in	  order	  to	  pay	  for	  a	  regional	  transitional	  justice	  forum	  in	  Sarajevo	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
the	   consultation	   and	   signature	   campaign	   of	   the	   project.	  More	   importantly,	   however,	   the	  
movement	   lacked	   almost	   one	   million	   euros	   (1.3	   million	   US	   dollars)	   for	   its	   signature	  
campaign.	  While	   activists	  were	   still	   able	   to	   cope	  with	   the	   lack	   of	   funding,	   the	   budgetary	  
shortfall	  jeopardized	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  project	  and	  led	  to	  solemn	  consequences.	  
To	   understand	   the	   extent	   and	   the	   seriousness	   of	   the	   issue,	   it	   is	   helpful	   to	   provide	   some	  
sociopolitical	   background	   of	   the	   movement	   and	   highlight	   different	   obstacles.	   After	   a	  
preparatory	   phase	   to	   define	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   fact-­‐finding	   initiative	   and	   extensive	  
consultation	  meetings	   in	   order	   to	   introduce	   and	   disseminate	   the	   idea	   across	   the	   former	  
Yugoslavia,	   founders	   planned	   to	   launch	   a	   public	   signature	   campaign	   in	   each	   of	   the	  
participating	  countries.	  The	  goal	  was	   to	  collect	  one	  million	  of	  signatures	   in	  order	   to	   lobby	  
different	  governments	  and	  legislative	  bodies	  in	  these	  states	  to	  secure	  the	  official	  support	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  For	  a	  detailed	  budget	  see	  Excel	  spreadsheet	  with	  the	  2008-­‐2011	  funding	  resources	  presented	  by	  type	  of	  expenses	  
and	  donor	  source	  on	  the	  official	  RECOM	  website	  at	  http://www.zarekom.org/documents/Budget-­‐Coalition-­‐for-­‐
REKOM.en.html,	  accessed	  May	  17,	  2011.	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the	   political	   leadership	   and	   elites.	   Yet,	  without	   the	   needed	   funding,	   the	   RECOM	  coalition	  
members	  had	  to	  improvise,	  organizing	  the	  entire	  signature	  campaign	  with	  an	  army	  of	  youth	  
volunteers	   from	  a	   youth-­‐based	  NGO	  network	   in	   the	   region,	   called	   the	  Youth	   Initiative	   for	  
Human	   Rights.	   Originally	   founded	   in	   Serbia,	   this	   organization	   has	   now	   offices	   and	  
independent	  branches	  in	  BiH,	  Croatia,	  Kosovo	  and	  Montenegro.99	  	  
Although	   young	   ambitious	   leaders	   and	   organizers	   were	   able	   to	   mobilize	   a	   noteworthy	  
amount	  of	  signatories	  for	  their	  cause,	  the	  initial	  objective	  of	  one	  million	  signatures	  was	  not	  
accomplished.100	   According	   to	   several	   of	   the	   youth	   leaders,	   lack	   of	   volunteers,	   hasty	  
training,	  and	  limited	  resources	  for	  a	  broad	  outreach	  strategy	  were	  mentioned	  as	  the	  main	  
difficulties	   organizers	   had	   to	   cope	   with	   during	   the	   campaign.101	   Interestingly,	   when	   the	  
signature	   campaign	   was	   in	   full	   swing	   during	   my	   May-­‐June	   2011	   fieldwork,	   none	   of	   the	  
officials	   at	   the	  Embassies	  or	   international	  organizations	   seemed	   to	  be	  aware	  of	   it.	   Rather	  
than	  the	  lack	  of	  interest	  of	  the	  international	  donors,	  however,	  it	  is	  the	  disconnect	  of	  these	  
actors	  with	  local	  civil	  society	  as	  well	  as	  the	  limited	  funding	  of	  the	  signature	  campaign	  that	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  See	  website	  at	  http://www.yihr.org/en/,	  accessed	  May	  11,	  2011.	  
100	  According	  to	  different	  officials	  of	  the	  RECOM	  campaign	  the	  number	  of	  collected	  signatures	  during	  this	  period	  was	  
around	  350.000,	  but	  the	  campaign	  continues	  to	  collect	  additional	  signatures	  online.	  
101	  Series	  of	  interviews	  with	  youth	  leaders	  across	  the	  region	  in	  May	  2011.	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Conclusion	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  analyzed	  different	  international	  donor	  activities	  to	  account	  for	  war	  crimes	  
and	  human	  rights	  violations	  after	  mass	  atrocity	   in	  BiH.	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  compared	  Norwegian	  
and	  Swedish	  donor	   support	   in	  BiH	   since	   the	  early	  2000s.	  Drawing	  on	  extensive	   fieldwork,	  
including	   interviews	   with	   donor	   officials,	   activists	   and	   experts,	   I	   mapped	   various	   aid	  
programs	   in	  BiH’s	  post-­‐conflict	   society.	   I	   explored	   in	  particular	   the	   cost	  of	   justice	  and	   the	  
politics	  of	  transitional	  accountability	  efforts,	  examining	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  donors	  integrate	  
civil	  society	  and	  local	  actors	  in	  their	  funding	  projects,	  illustrated	  by	  the	  RECOM	  case.	  Despite	  
several	  report	  recommendations	  stating	  otherwise,	  both,	  Norway	  and	  Sweden,	  have	  kept	  a	  
top-­‐down	   approach—disbursing	   grants	   to	   their	   respective	   domestic	   non-­‐profit	  
organizations.	  Contrary	   to	  Norway,	  however,	  Sweden’s	  policy	  strategy	   foresees	  a	  stronger	  
streamlining	  with	  the	  EU	  enlargement	  agenda.	  Several	  problems	  result	  from	  their	  strategies.	  
First	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  broader	  transnational	  justice	  strategy	  in	  BiH,	  which	  could	  complement	  the	  
2008	   national	   war	   crimes	   strategy—with	   the	   goal	   of	   improving	   the	   efficiency	   of	   BiH’s	  
judiciary—limits	   donor	   investments	   mainly	   to	   state	   institutions.	   Strengthening	   ties	   with	  
NGOs	   and	   local	   actors	   therefore	   remains	   very	   restrained.	   Second,	   donor	   coordination	  
among	  different	  international	  actors	  needs	  to	  be	  improved	  as	  their	  collaboration	  continues	  
to	   be	   irregular	   and	   informal.	   Furthermore,	   local	   actors	   and	   institutions	   are	   not	   only	   aid	  
recipients,	   but	   also	   play	   an	   active	   role	   in	   shaping	   these	   processes.	   While	   political	   elites	  
oppose	  certain	  structural	  and	  institutional	  reforms—criticizing	  international	  donors	  on	  their	  
interventionist	   agenda—human	   rights	   NGOs	   and	   victims	   associations	   have	   struggled	   to	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secure	   funding	   from	   international	   state	   actors	   to	   initiate	   regional	   restorative	   justice	  
processes.	  
To	  conclude,	  despite	  a	  trend	  shift	  in	  international	  donor	  reporting—highlighting	  the	  need	  to	  
improve	   local	   initiatives	   of	   funding	   projects	   and	   transitional	   justice	   efforts—the	   main	  
obstacle	  development	  aid	  actors	  are	  confronted	  with	  pertains	  to	  the	  question	  of	  measuring	  
outcome.	  While	   reforms	   in	  war	  crimes	  prosecutions	  have	  been	  such	   that	  progress	   can	  be	  
traced	   by,	   for	   instance,	   the	   number	   of	   processed	   cases	   or	   the	   number	   of	   judicial	  
professionals	   sitting	  on	   the	  bench	   to	   try	   alleged	  perpetrators,	   reform	  projects	  within	   civil	  
society	  appear	  to	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  track.	  It	  is	  time	  for	  both	  sides—the	  civil	  society	  sector	  
and	   international	  donors—to	  enhance	  collaborative	  efforts	  by	  mapping	   reliable	  guidelines	  
to	  ensure	   the	   transparency	  of	   funding	   flows,	   the	  adequate	  assessment	  of	   results,	  and	  the	  
creation	  of	  stronger	  relations	  between	  state	  institutions	  and	  society	  in	  BiH.	  The	  potential	  for	  
such	   a	   dialogue	   exists,	   and	   the	  moment	   for	   encouraging	   the	   necessary	   political	   steps	   to	  










In	  my	  dissertation	  I	  examined	  the	  politics	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  in	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  I	  
discussed	  the	  protagonistic	  role	  of	  human	  rights	  activists	  in	  challenging	  existing	  transitional	  
justice	  models	  that	  emphasize	  international	  and	  domestic	  war	  crimes	  trials	  over	  restorative	  
justice	  mechanisms,	  especially	  truth	  commissions.	  Grounding	  political	  sociology	  in	  a	  political	  
science	  perspective,	  my	  study	  aimed	  at	  strengthening	  the	  sociopolitical	  research	  agenda	  of	  
post-­‐conflict	   justice.	   In	   other	  words,	   I	   examined	   the	   importance	   of	   political	   objectives	   of	  
different	  actors	  in	  transition	  contexts.	  In	  particular,	  I	  looked	  at	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  
state	   (or	   its	   representatives)	   and	   society,	   characterized	  by	   civil	   society	  organizations.	   This	  
study	  went	   therefore	   beyond	   statist,	   normative	   and	   legalist	   scholarship	   on	   accountability	  
after	  mass	  atrocity	  and	  built	  on	  an	  emerging	  literature	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  that	  focuses	  on	  
the	  impact	  of	  global	  human	  rights	  on	  the	  national	  and	  local	  level.	  It	  explored	  various	  factors	  
to	   explain	   human	   rights	   advocates’	   recent	   unsuccessful	   efforts	   to	   initiate	   a	   transnational	  
fact-­‐finding	  body—the	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  Initiative—weighing	  it	  against	  the	  successes	  and	  
challenges	   of	   the	   ICTY	   as	   well	   as	   the	   difficulties	   of	   national	   judiciaries	   to	   prosecute	   war	  
crimes	  and	  gross	  human	  rights	  violations	  across	  the	  region.	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To	  this	  end,	  chapter	  2	  provided	  a	  methodological	  approach	  for	  scholarship	  on	  global	  efforts	  
to	   account	   for	   mass	   atrocities,	   state	   violence	   and	   grave	   human	   rights	   violations	   that	  
complements	   variable-­‐oriented	   and	   causality-­‐driven	   methodology	   in	   transitional	   justice	  
studies.	   I	   believe	   that	   it	   helps	   scholars	   and	   practitioners	   illuminating	   developments	   in	  
transnational	  contexts,	  such	  as	  post-­‐conflict	  justice	  processes,	  to	  which	  various	  actors	  and	  in	  
particular	   human	   rights	   activists	   are	   exposed	   and	   in	   which	   they	   play	   an	   increasingly	  
important	   role.	   Through	   my	   research	   design	   I	   worked	   to	   define	   the	   role	   of	   civil	   society	  
actors	   and	  how	   they	   interact	   in	  different	   spaces.	  Moreover,	   the	   structure	  of	  my	   research	  
was	  well	  suited	  to	  describe	  where	  and	  when	  these	  interactive	  processes	  take	  place.	  Thanks	  
to	   participant	   observation	   and	   narrative	   interviews,	   two	   anthropological	   and	   sociological	  
analytical	  tools,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  observe	  different	  transnational	  networks,	  study	  their	  practices	  
and	  goals,	  and	  examine	   the	   relationship	  between	  different	  actors	  and	  how	  their	  activities	  
affect	  each	  of	  the	  groups	  and	  different	  transitional	  justice	  processes	  more	  broadly.	  	  Yet,	  my	  
alternative	   and	   complementary	  methodology	   did	   not	   aim	   at	   turning	   legal	   scholars,	   social	  
scientists	   and	   practitioners	   into	   anthropologists,	   ethnographers	   or	   sociologists.	   To	   the	  
contrary,	  my	   goal	   is	   to	   generate	   new	   ideas	   for	   the	   growing	   field	   of	   transitional	   justice	   in	  
order	  to	  explore	  and	  pursue	  an	  alternative	  epistemology	  grounded	  in	  political	  science	  that	  
provides	   a	   different	   perspective	   and	   offers	   unique	   theoretical	   insights	   to	   some	   of	   the	  
fundamental	  questions	  that	  still	  require	  our	  full	  scholarly	  attention	  today.	  
In	   chapter	   3	   I	   presented	   a	   background	   analysis	   of	   the	   ideological	   and	   institutional	  
underpinnings	   of	   the	   ICTY’s	   early	   years.	   While	   I	   illustrated	   the	   importance	   of	   emerging	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concepts	   and	   ideas,	   I	   also	  underlined	  how	  key	   figures	   influenced	   the	   course	  of	   the	   ICTY’s	  
evolution	   through	   their	   agency.	   	   For	   this,	   I	   outlined	   the	   initial	   struggles	   of	   international	  
experts	  and	  politicians	  to	  pass	  a	  UN	  Security	  Council	   resolution	  and	  create	  the	  UN	  ad	  hoc	  
tribunal.	  Subsequently	  I	  underlined	  the	  difficulties	  even	  after	  the	  preliminary	  obstacles	  were	  
overcome.	  In	  fact,	  applying	  international	  norms	  and	  rules	  on	  a	  domestic	  level	  turned	  out	  to	  
be	   contested	   by	   various	   actors,	   such	   as	   international	   policymakers,	   legal	   experts	   and	  
domestic	   political	   actors.	   	   To	   highlight	   these	   problems	   empirically,	   I	   used	   the	   case	   of	  
Croatian	   politics.	   It	   suffices	   to	   say	   that	   these	   struggles	   within	   national	   judiciaries	   and	  
bureaucracies,	  however,	  are	  not	  an	  exception	  limited	  to	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  Rather	  they	  
are	   part	   of	   a	   trend	   showing	   that	   transitional	   justice	   processes	   are	   confronted	   with	  
opposition	   when	   transversing	   from	   the	   international	   to	   the	   national	   level.	   As	   a	  
consequence,	  my	  research	  findings	  are	  very	  helpful	  to	  examine	  other	  cases	  as	  well,	  as	  I	  will	  
show	  below.	  
In	   the	   following	   chapters,	   I	   turned	   to	   NGO	   actors	   to	   sketch	   their	   understanding	   of	  
international	  humanitarian	  law,	  their	  early	  involvement	  in	  transitional	  justice	  processes,	  as	  
well	  as	  their	  motivations	  to	  implement	  alternative	  and	  complementary	  mechanisms	  to	  deal	  
with	   the	   past.	   Chapter	   4	   therefore	   described	   accountability	   practices	   of	   different	   NGOs	  
across	  the	  former	  Balkan	  region	  to	  illustrate	  how	  these	  activists	  have	  helped	  to	  promote	  the	  
human	  rights	  discourse	  of	   fighting	   impunity	  and	  war	  crimes.	  Additionally,	   it	  demonstrated	  
that	   NGOs	   also	   contributed	   to	   strengthening	   bottom-­‐up	   approaches.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  
interpretation	  of	   international	   humanitarian	   law	  by	  early	   ICTY	   cases	   gained	  a	  new	  victim-­‐
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centered	   dimension.	   By	   redefining	   who	   should	   be	   the	   center	   of	   attention,	   human	   rights	  
activists	   took	   the	   first	   steps	   towards	   democratizing	   human	   rights.	   They	   stressed	   the	  
importance	   of	   the	   local	   space	   and	   increased	   the	   victims’	   voices	   in	   societies	   across	   the	  
region.	  In	  this	  context,	  I	  first	  discussed	  the	  difficulties	  witnesses/victims	  have	  to	  face	  in	  war	  
crimes	   trials	  as	  well	  as	   the	  challenges	  of	  NGOs	  providing	  support	   in	   this	   setting.	  Second,	   I	  
introduced	   a	   conceptual	   framework	   that	   explained	   the	   changing	   meaning	   of	   a	   grand	  
narrative	  of	  human	  rights	   to	  a	   localized	  understanding	  of	   its	  meaning.	  Last,	   I	  pointed	  to	  a	  
broader	  shift	  in	  transitional	  justice	  strategies	  in	  which	  restorative	  justice	  mechanisms	  have	  
found	  their	  place	  within	  the	  general	  discourse	  of	  the	  ICTY’s	  retributive	  justice	  strategy.	  	  
Chapter	  5	  explored	  the	  politics	  involved	  in	  the	  campaign	  to	  establish	  the	  fact-­‐finding	  body,	  
the	  Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  Initiative,	  across	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  It	  focused	  on	  internal	  and	  
external	  difficulties	  of	  NGOs	  to	  expand	  their	  sphere	  of	  influence	  and	  continue	  to	  transform	  
the	  human	  rights	  discourse.	  During	  the	  campaign	  process	  human	  rights	  activists	  took	  on	  an	  
important	   intermediary	   role,	   communicating	   and	   interacting	   between	   spaces	   created	   by	  
varying	  narratives	  of	  truth	  and	  justice.	  My	  aim	  was	  to	  analyze	  these	  different,	   intersecting	  
spaces	  and	  the	  role	  of	  civil	  society	  within	  these	  spaces	  to	  help	  understand	  recent	  efforts	  to	  
establish	  this	  transnational	  fact-­‐finding	  mechanism.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  looked	  primarily	  at	  the	  
ongoing	   internal	  and	  external	   struggle	  of	  human	  rights	  activists	   to	  establish	  an	  extra-­‐legal	  
space	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   past	   across	   the	   former	   Yugoslavia.	   Furthermore,	   I	   analyzed	   the	  
conflicting	   impact	   of	   different	   victims	   groups’	   narratives	   that	   accompanied	   the	  
institutionalization	   process.	   Finally,	   I	   examined	   the	   emerging	   issues	   in	   the	   RECOM	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movement’s	  regional	  approach	  to	  create	  support	  for	  its	  cause	  by	  discussing	  and	  employing	  
framing	  concepts	  from	  social	  movement	  theory.	  	  
Building	   on	   the	   sociopolitical	   struggles	   described	   in	   chapter	   5,	   in	   chapter	   6	   I	   traced	   the	  
development	   of	   NGO	   activists’	   efforts	   to	   increase	   “invented”	   space,	   in	   which	   to	   foster	  
deliberative	   spaces	   of	   justice	   for	   civil	   society.	   In	   order	   to	   do	   so,	   I	   looked	   at	   how	   legal	  
concepts	  influenced	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  fact-­‐finding	  measures—a	  trend,	  which	  I	  refer	  
to	   as	   the	   legalization	   of	   truth	   spaces.	  Moreover,	   I	   concentrated	   on	   the	   challenges	   of	   the	  
legalistic	   influence	   on	   truth	   seeking	   and	   investigated	   the	   ongoing	   political	   barriers	   to	  
institutionalizing	   alternative	   transitional	   justice	   instruments.	   I	   examined	   the	   current	  
legalization	  of	  truth	  spaces	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  human	  rights	  activists	  attempted	  to	  embed	  
their	   newly	   created	   space	   in	   the	   space	   originally	   provided	   by	   state	   institutions	   to	  
depoliticize	   transitional	   justice	   efforts	   in	   the	   region.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   I	   discussed	   the	  
process	  of	  NGOs	  attempting	  to	  draft	  a	  very	  detailed	  legal	  document	  that	  serves	  as	  the	  truth	  
commission’s	  mandate.	  My	  goal	  in	  this	  chapter	  was	  to	  show	  that	  activists’	  strategy	  of	  legal-­‐
oriented	   depoliticization	   of	   restorative	   justice	   processes,	   despite	   their	   repetitive	   efforts,	  
remain	   still	   highly	   political,	   as	   activists	   continue	   to	   struggle	   to	   establish	   an	   officially	  
institutionalized	   truth	   space.	   Additionally,	   I	   explored	   the	   conflict	   between	   state-­‐centric	  
transitional	   justice	   initiatives	  and	  bottom-­‐up	  efforts	  across	  the	  region	  which	  were	  also	  the	  
research	  focus	  of	  my	  previous	  chapter.	  
Chapter	   7	   analyzed	   different	   international	   donor	   activities	   to	   account	   for	  war	   crimes	   and	  
human	  rights	  violations	  after	  mass	  atrocity	   in	  BiH.	   I	  mapped	  various	  aid	  programs	   in	  BiH’s	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post-­‐conflict	  society,	  comparing	  mainly	  Swedish	  and	  Norwegian	  aid	  strategies.	  I	  explored	  in	  
particular	  the	  cost	  of	  justice	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  transitional	  accountability	  efforts,	  examining	  
the	  extent	  to	  which	  donors	  integrate	  civil	  society	  and	  local	  actors	  in	  their	  funding	  projects,	  
illustrated	  by	  the	  RECOM	  case.	  Several	  problems	  result	  from	  their	  strategies.	  First	  the	  lack	  
of	   a	   broader	   transnational	   justice	   strategy	   in	   BiH	   presents	   a	   major	   obstacle.	   In	   fact,	   an	  
overarching	  transitional	  justice	  policy	  approach	  in	  BiH	  could	  complement	  the	  2008	  national	  
war	  crimes	  strategy,	  whose	  goal	  is	  to	  improve	  the	  efficiency	  of	  BiH’s	  judiciary.	  Instead,	  the	  
lack	  of	  a	   transitional	   justice	   strategy	   limits	  donor	   investments	  mainly	   to	   state	   institutions.	  
Strengthening	  ties	  with	  NGOs	  and	  local	  actors	  therefore	  remains	  very	  restrained.	  Despite	  a	  
trend	   shift	   in	   international	   donor	   reporting—highlighting	   the	   need	   to	   improve	   local	  
engagement	   of	   funding	   projects	   and	   transitional	   justice	   efforts—the	   main	   obstacle	  
development	   aid	   actors	   are	   confronted	   with	   pertains	   to	   the	   question	   of	   measuring	  
outcome.	  While	   reforms	   in	  war	  crimes	  prosecutions	  have	  been	  such	   that	  progress	  can	  be	  
traced	   by,	   for	   instance,	   the	   number	   of	   processed	   cases	   or	   the	   number	   of	   judicial	  
professionals	   sitting	  on	   the	  bench	   to	   try	   alleged	  perpetrators,	   reform	  projects	  within	   civil	  
society	  appear	   to	  be	  more	  difficult	   to	   track.	  Furthermore,	   local	  actors	  and	   institutions	  are	  
not	   only	   aid	   recipients,	   but	   also	   play	   an	   active	   role	   in	   shaping	   these	   processes.	   While	  
political	   elites	  oppose	   certain	   structural	   and	   institutional	   reforms—criticizing	   international	  
donors	  on	  their	   interventionist	  agenda—human	  rights	  NGOs	  and	  victims	  associations	  have	  
struggled	   to	   secure	   funding	   from	   international	   state	   actors	   to	   initiate	   regional	   restorative	  
justice	  processes.	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Further	  Research	  and	  Comparative	  Case	  Studies	  
As	   I	   explained	   above,	   my	   dissertation	   explored	   the	   struggle	   of	   domestic	   human	   rights	  
activists	   to	   define	   the	   local	   meaning	   of	   international	   humanitarian	   law	   and	   transitional	  
justice	  practices	  across	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia.	  However,	  far	  from	  being	  a	  finite	  process	  that	  
started	   in	   the	   past	   and	   has	   already	   found	   closure,	   the	   current	   situation	   offers	   several	  
opportunities	   for	   new	   research	   projects	   in	   the	   future.	   As	   a	   case	   in	   point,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	  
RECOM	  project’s	  unsuccessful	  struggle	  to	  institutionalize	  a	  fact-­‐finding	  body,	  the	  project	  has	  
not	  been	  buried	  entirely	  by	  its	  founders.	  While	  RECOM’s	  momentum	  slowed	  down	  recently	  
(mainly	   due	   to	   funding	   issues),	   the	   project	   founders	   continue	   to	   lobby	   governments	   and	  
societies	  across	  the	  states	  of	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  to	  support	  the	  initiative.	  Changes	  in	  the	  
present	   political	   environment	   in	   the	   Balkans,	   such	   as	   improved	   collaboration	   among	   the	  
former	  conflict	  protagonists,	  would	  present	  a	  drastic	  sociopolitical	  shift.	  Such	  a	  shift	  could	  
thus	  generate	  new	  insights	  about	  post-­‐conflict	   justice	  processes	  and	  would	  call	   for	  further	  
analysis.	   Additional	   issues	   that	   could	   be	   addressed	   range	   from	   the	   question	   of	   how	   to	  
adequately	  integrate	  transitional	  justice	  mechanisms	  in	  the	  EU’s	  enlargement	  process	  of	  the	  
Western	  Balkan	  states	  to	  the	  continuous	  politicization	  problems	  of	  the	  past	   in	  each	  of	  the	  
countries	  across	  the	  region.	  	  	  
My	   research	   also	   applies	   to	   transitional	   contexts	   in	  which	   conflict	   has	   not	   entirely	   ebbed	  
away,	  such	  as	   in	  Colombia,	  South	  America.	   In	  fact,	  after	  1948	  the	  term	  “La	  Violencia”	  was	  
coined	   to	  describe	   the	  violent	   conflict	   that	   struck	   the	  country,	  when	   the	  populist	  political	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leader	   Jorge	   Gaitán	   was	   assassinated	   and	   US-­‐backed	   military	   attacks	   led	   to	   the	  
reorganization	   of	   Communist	  militants	   into	   the	   Revolutionary	   Armed	   Forces	   of	   Colombia	  
(FARC)	  and	  the	  National	  Liberation	  Army	  (ELN)	   in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s.	  Since,	  the	  country	  
has	   been	   plagued	   by	   an	   asymmetric	   low-­‐intensity	   conflict	   in	   which	   paramilitary	   groups,	  
nacrotraffickers	  and	  government	  forces	  fight	  to	  gain	  control	  over	  large	  areas	  of	  Colombian	  
state	  territory	  and	  its	  populations.	  It	  suffices	  to	  say	  that	  transitional	  justice	  initiatives	  in	  this	  
country	   continue	   to	   be	   a	   long	   and	   elusive	   process.	   	   A	   young	   French	   scholar,	   Delphine	  
Lecombe,	   for	   instance,	  analyzed	   the	  complex	   conditions	  and	  various	  actors	   in	   the	   conflict	  
and	   described	   the	   problematic	   Colombian	   transitional	   justice	   campaign	   in	   this	   non-­‐
transitional	   context.1	   In	   fact,	   the	   current	  work	  of	   the	   ICTJ	   in	  Colombia	   also	   illustrates	   this	  
dilemma.	  The	  “Justice	  and	  Peace	  Law”	  that	  the	  Colombian	  legislature	  passed	  in	  2006	  is	  yet	  
another	  example	  which	  underlines	  how	  demobilization,	  truth-­‐seeking	  and	  peace	  processes	  
are	   intertwined	   and	   difficult	   to	   put	   in	   place	   in	   an	   instable	   and	   fragile	   sociopolitical	   and	  
economic	  environment.	  Some	  of	  these	  conditions	  are	  similar	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  former	  
Yugoslavia,	  such	  as	  that	  of	  BiH.	  Therefore	  a	  comparative	  study	  that	  analyzes	  the	  transitional	  
justice	  developments	  in	  both	  cases,	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia	  and	  Colombia,	  could	  offer	  helpful	  
insights	   about	   actor	   strategies	   and	   best	   practices	   in	   order	   to	   create	   context-­‐specific	  
transitional	  justice	  strategies	  that	  apply	  in	  this	  particular	  case	  to	  non-­‐transitional	  settings.	  	  
Yet	   another	   example	   that	   my	   research	   can	   be	   applied	   to	   is	   the	   wave	   of	   transitions	   in	  
Northern	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  after	  the	  Arab	  spring	  movements.	  In	  fact,	  during	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Delphine	  Lecombe,	  “Mobilisation	  Autor	  D’un	  Modèle	  De	  Sortie	  De	  Conflit,”	  Raison	  Politiques,	  no.	  1	  (2008):	  59–75.	  
	  254	  
tectonic	  political	  shifts,	  authoritarian	  political	  leaders	  often	  used	  violence	  against	  their	  own	  
population,	   including	   for	   instance	  Bahrain,	  Egypt,	  and	  Libya,	  among	  others.	  The	  questions	  
that	  have	  arisen	  in	  each	  of	  the	  cases	  is	  how	  best	  to	  account	  for	  human	  rights	  violations	  and	  
deal	   with	   injustices.	   While	   trials	   are	   one	   mechanism,	   various	   local	   actors	   also	   suggest	  
putting	   in	   place	   truth	   commissions	   to	   cope	   not	   only	   with	   abuses	   committed	   during	   the	  
immediate	  transition	  processes,	  but	  also	  with	  human	  rights	  violations	  committed	  during	  the	  
reign	   of	   autocratic	   rulers.	   A	   report	   by	   Chatham	  House,	   a	   British	   think	   tank	   established	   in	  
1920,	   highlights	   the	   difficulties	   that	   transitional	   governments	   face	   when	   seeking	  
appropriate	  tools	  to	  confront	  human	  rights	  violations	  during	  the	  Arab	  spring.2	  	  However,	  as	  I	  
suggested	   in	   my	   own	   research,	   it	   is	   particularly	   crucial	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   revolutionary	  
uprisings	  across	  the	  Middle	  East	  that	  we	  study	  local	  processes	  and	  that	  we	  also	  include	  civil	  
society	   actors	   in	   our	   analyses.	   While	   it	   is	   important	   to	   discuss	   the	   appropriate	   tools	   to	  
account	  for	  past	  atrocities,	  it	  is	  equally	  important	  that	  we	  understand	  the	  politics	  behind	  it,	  
which	  requires	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  involved	  actors.	  A	  political	  sociology	  of	  transitional	  
justice	  processes	  therefore	  offers	  a	  promising	  analytical	  framework	  for	  a	  broader	  and	  more	  
nuanced	  understanding	  of	  these	  dynamics.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Hemi	  Mistry,	  Transitional	  Justice	  and	  the	  Arab	  Spring,	  Meeting	  Summary:	  International	  Law	  and	  Middle	  East	  
Program	  (London:	  Chatham	  House,	  February	  1,	  2012).	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List	  of	  Selected	  Organizations	  and	  Interviewees	  
	  
For	  confidentiality	  reasons	  the	  names	  of	  many	  interview	  participants	  do	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  




BiH	  Court,	  Sarajevo.	  
 International	  and	  local	  judges	  and	  prosecutors	  
 Other	  Staff	  and	  representatives	  
	  
High	  Judicial	  and	  Prosecutorial	  Council,	  Sarajevo,	  BiH.	  
 Sven	  Marius	  Urke,	  International	  Member	  of	  the	  Council	  
 Kenan	  Alisah,	  Staff	  of	  the	  HJPC	  Secretariat	  
 Other	  Staff	  and	  representatives	  
	  
Belgrade	  District	  Court,	  Serbia.	  
 Sinisa	  Vazić,	  President	  of	  the	  War	  Crimes	  Chamber	  
 Ivana	  Ramić,	  Media	  Spokesperson	  of	  the	  Court	  
 Bruno	  Vekarić,	  Deputy	  War	  Crimes	  Prosecutor	  	  
 Other	  Staff	  and	  representatives	  
	  
Center	  for	  Peace	  Studies,	  Zagreb,	  Croatia.	  
 Gordan	  Bosanac	  
 Other	  Staff	  and	  representatives	  
	  
Croatian	  Disabled	  Homeland	  War	  Veterans	  Association	  
 Renato	  Selj,	  President	  
 Other	  Staff	  and	  representatives	  
	  
Delegation	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  BiH.	  
 Several	  leading	  country	  experts	  	  
 Other	  local	  staff
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Delegation	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  to	  Croatia.	  
 Several	  leading	  country	  experts	  	  
 Other	  local	  staff	  
	  
Documenta	  Center	  for	  Dealing	  with	  the	  Past,	  Zagreb,	  Croatia.	  
 Vesna	  Teršelič,	  Director	  
 Eugen	  Jakovčić,	  Media	  Spokesperson	  
 Darija	  Marić,	  Regional	  Coordinator	  
 Other	  Staff	  and	  representatives	  
	  
Muslim-­‐Croat	  Federation's	  Veterans	  Association,	  Sarajevo,	  BiH.	  
 Senad	  Hubijer,	  President	  
 Other	  Staff	  and	  representatives	  
	  
Research	  and	  Documentation	  Center,	  Sarajevo,	  BiH.	  
 Mrsad	  Tokača,	  Director	  
 Lejla	  Mamut,	  Regional	  Coordinator	  
 Other	  Staff	  and	  representatives	  
	  
Humanitarian	  Law	  Center,	  Belgrade,	  Serbia.	  
 Nataša	  Kandić,	  Director	  
 Sandra	  Orlović,	  Deputy	  Executive	  Director	  	  
 Matthew	  Holliday,	  Outreach	  and	  Development	  Director	  
 Dragan	  Popović,	  Program	  Director	  
 Lazar	  Stojanović,	  RECOM	  Media	  Spokesperson	  
 Other	  Staff	  and	  representatives	  
	  
International	  Center	  for	  Transitional	  Justice,	  New	  York,	  United	  States.	  
 Eduard	  Gonzalez,	  Director,	  Truth	  and	  Memory	  Program	  
 Several	  transitional	  justice	  and	  Balkans	  experts	  	  
 Other	  local	  staff	  and	  representatives.	  
	  
International	  Crisis	  Group,	  Sarajevo,	  BiH.	  
 Several	  Balkans	  experts	  	  
 Other	  local	  staff	  
	  
International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  The	  Hague,	  Netherlands.	  
 Current	  and	  former	  judges	  and	  prosecutors	  	  
 Other	  staff	  and	  representatives	  
	  
International	  Criminal	  Tribunal	  for	  the	  former	  Yugoslavia,	  Outreach,	  Zagreb,	  Croatia.	  
 Several	  leading	  country	  experts	  	  
 Other	  local	  staff	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Office	  of	  the	  High	  Representative,	  Sarajevo,	  BiH.	  
 Several	  leading	  country	  experts	  	  
 Other	  local	  staff	  
	  
Organization	  for	  Security	  and	  Cooperation	  in	  Europe,	  Mission	  in	  Sarajevo,	  BiH.	  
 Several	  leading	  country	  experts	  	  
 Other	  local	  staff	  
	  
Coalition	  for	  RECOM	  Initiative	  
 Coordination	  Council	  members	  
 Expert	  members	  
 Partner	  organizations	  including	  victims’	  association	  and	  veterans’	  organizations	  
	  
United	  Nations	  Development	  Program,	  Sarajevo,	  BiH.	  
 Several	  leading	  country	  experts	  	  
 Other	  local	  staff	  
	  
University	  of	  Zagreb,	  Croatia.	  
 Tvrtko	  Jakovina,	  Assistant	  Professor	  of	  History,	  Faculty	  of	  Social	  Sciences	  
 Viktor	  Koska,	  Term	  Professor,	  Department	  of	  Political	  Science	  
	  
University	  of	  Rijeka,	  Croatia.	  
 Vjeran	  Pavlaković,	  Assistant	  Professor,	  Department	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  
 Other	  faculty	  
	  
Youth	  Initiative	  Croatia	  
 Mario	  Mažić	  
 Other	  local	  staff	  
	  
Youth	  Initiative	  Serbia	  
 Maja	  Mićić,	  Director	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